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Preface 
This is a book about how the Prussian School of History came to be. Be-
cause that process occurred bit by bit and over time, I have been old-
fashioned enough to resort to historical narration. Because these historians 
were men of ideas with a lot to say, I have explained their ideas as fully 
and fairly as I could. That kind of intellectual history is also a bit old-
fashioned, but some ideas deserve close iscrutiny. Their ideas do, because, 
though sometimes wrong, they are always interesting. More to the point 
for a historian, their ideas were strongly influential. Granted, that influ-
ence was exercised within an elite, but Imperial Germany was an authori-
tarian state, and, by definition, authoritarian states are ruled by elites. 
I was attracted to the study of this subject, in the first place, because 
I thought it would help in understanding the Germany that was partially 
created in the first unification of 1866 and 1870-71. I was, and remain, at-
tracted for another reason. The formation of this school is a striking case 
in point of both the indeliberately self-serving quality of ideology for 
intellectuals in politics and of the essentially religious nature of some 
modern nationalism. 
I have some intellectual debts that I especially want to acknowledge. I 
learned from the late Leonard Krieger to ask about the politics of history 
in Germany. Emile Karafiol taught me a great deal about how to read the-
oretical discourse. William H. McNeill taught me the need for an architec-
tonic perspective and, always, the importance of writing punctually and 
clearly. My colleagues Peter Cline and Gordon Thompson read and cri-
tiqued this manuscript. I have tried to follow their advice. The late Marian 
Shelby, a teacher and friend for many years, also read it and offered judi-
cious suggestions. My wife, Edna Southard, repeatedly took time away 
from her own demanding schedule of research and publication to read and 
critique what I wrote. Art history's loss was, I hope, intellectual history's 
gain. My gratitude and appreciation are surpassing, and I dedicate the 
. book to her and to David and Jared. I am grateful to Earlham College'S Pro-
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fessional Development Fund for its support and for the confidence it 
showed in my work. I especially want to thank the library staffs at the 
Frankfort Universitatsbibliothek, the Marburg Universitatsbibliothek, the 
Newberry Library of Chicago, the Regenstein Library of the University of 
Chicago, Lilly Library of Indiana University, and, of course, Earlham Col-
lege's own Lilly Library. To Cheri Gaddis of Earlham's Social Science Di-
vision special thanks are due for friendliness and computer expertise in 
manuscript preparation. 
Introduction 
The Prussian or "Little German" (kleindeutsch) School of history is nor-
mally defined in terms of the political program that its adherents ad-
vanced: the unification of Germany, without Austria's German provinces, 
as a constitutional monarchy under the Hohenzollern. This definition by 
political program is understandable. Their major political outlook is more 
recognizable than the theories that underlie it, and in their mature works, 
historians such as Johann Gustav Droysen (1808-86), Heinrich von Sybel 
(1817-95), and Heinrich von Treitschke (1834-96) were stridently pro-
Prussian in their German nationalism. Moreover, they enjoyed the celebrity 
that comes from being on the winning side. Along with other colleagues, 
they had predicted and, afterward, justified the national unification that 
Bismarck actually accomplished in 1866 and 1870-71. Finally, they were 
politically important. As educators at elite universities and writers of his-
tories for an educated national readership, they helped give intellectual 
respectability to the nationalism of Wilhelminian Germany. Those are per-
suasive reasons for grouping them in terms of the political content in their 
histories, but this definition comes at some cost. It partly overlooks what 
they thought they were doing. As they viewed matters, their expectant de-
mand for unification under Prussia's dynasty was only one of several 
major political goals that rested less on their personal wishes than on what 
they thought was a durable structure of historical theory. In any case, to 
define them chiefly in terms of the role they anticipated for Prussia stresses 
what their political program became while ignoring what it originally was 
until well into the revolutionary year 1848. To reduce their careers to that 
single, though very important, political demand is like reviewing a book 
after reading only its conclusion. 
Droysen and his colleagues were undeniably political advocates, but 
they rationalized their advQcacy with a conception of history that, to their 
minds, kept them from being what their opponents often accused them of 
being, propagandists disguised as professional historians. That is, they 
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were political historians in a peculiarly intense sense of the term. In prin-
ciple, as in practice, they eliminated any firm distinction between scholar-
ship and partisanship by thinking of history as progressive, of progress as 
inevitable, and of inevitability as good. In consequence, present and future 
politics seemed merely the necessary continuation of previous history and 
their advocacy merely the logical extension of their interpretation of by-
gone events. To state the case differently, past and present were points on 
a continuum of progress such that their understanding of the past and 
their engagement in the present were functions each of the other. They did 
not believe that this quality made their histories tendentious, though it of-
ten did, and in fact some of their works were genial enough still to be read 
with profit. In the spectrum of German politics, they were constitutional 
moderates, always a bit to the right of center, but in one important respect 
they resembled the Marxists (who took some of their key ideas from the 
same sources as these historians did). They denied that a politically neu-
tral history was either possible or desirable, because sound scholarship 
could find where history was moving and thus chart the right political 
course to follow. By the same token, the observable movement of history 
in the present told them what questions to pose of the past. 
To see why they believed that, it is necessary to look at their view of 
the historical process. They imagined it to be unitary and progressive: uni-
tary in the sense that it possessed a single meaning or purpose and pro-
gressive in the sense that what was implicit at the beginning of history 
became continually more explicit, that is, more fully and adequately real-
ized, as age succeeded age. They were quite aware of suffering in history 
and they did not suppose that people in later ages were always happier 
than those born earlier, but they did think that history was a record of 
eventual betterment. In other words, history for them had an agenda, and, 
strange though it seems at first to those studying their ideas from the out-
side, they generally expected history to complete its main tasks in their 
own time and country. The outcome of their politics was, really, an "end 
of history" -not a cessation of historical occurrences, but a cessation of 
onward historical movement because the historical process had already 
achieved its long-term, beneficent purposes.1 That was why their scholar-
ship and their partisanship were inseparable. Their political program was 
not a list of things that they, personally, wanted to make happen. On the 
contrary, their expectations for the future were an extrapolation of ten-
dencies that they, as historians, found at work in the past, predictions sup-
ported by historical expertise. They even concluded that the flowering of 
historical studies in their Germany was itself a historical necessity re-
quired to give contemporaries the insight needed for further advance. This 
meant that as long as they still had unification to look forward to, and be-
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fore they had too many paiitful collisions with a stubborn. reality, their 
ideas had a millenarian flavor so that they sometimes described the future 
of Germany almost as if it would be God's kingdom on the earth. No doubt 
that helps explain their complaints about Germany after unification; the re-
ality could not possibly have lived up to their dreams. 
Their vision of history had a content as well as a form. They not only 
believed that history had a grand' purpose but also thought they knew 
what that purpose was and, at least in general terms, how it would be 
achieved. World history-and like many in the nineteenth-century West 
they confounded Europe with the world-began with the appearance of 
political freedom in ancient Hellas and would culminate in the creation of 
a German nation-state in which freedom would be genuine and enduring. 
A free pe~ple, the Germans, would freely impose binding authority on it-
self without, however, curtailing the freedom of individuals within the 
community. With the partial exception of the United States, which they ad-
mired but only dimly understood, no society and no age had achieved 
these things before. Antiquity had failed in this because, in the absence of 
Christiarrlty, private freedom was corrosive and undermined the common 
good. Medieval Christianity had marked an advance insofar as it showed 
the way to a more responsible enjoyment of freedom, but it left this po-
tential unrealized because, in its distrust of the world, it turned away from 
the state. Stable freedom would be the crowning achievement of modem 
hist9ry, which they dated from the German Reformation of the sixteenth 
century. 
They saw the Reformation as simultaneously and interrelatedly a po-
litical and religious event. By purifying Christian doctrine and practice, it 
cleansed Christianity of the antiworldliness that allegedly barred the way 
to statehood, and by drawing on the civic tradition found in classical liter-
ature, it offered a vision of the state that would make it possible to institu-, 
tionalize Christian teachings. Faced with the obvious fact that the two 
qualities in German politics they most detested, absolutism and particu-
larism, had increased rather than abated after the sixteenth century, they 
argued that the Reformation foreshadowed but could not create the mod-
em state and concluded, therefore, that the later consolidation of royal au-
thority in the various German territorial states was as beneficial in the long 
run as it was relentless and hateful in the short. The princes, as agents of 
historical purpose, had cleared away the feudal rubble that prevented 
internal unity and, once this necessary task was completed in the eigh-
teenth century, had unwittingly invited fundamental reform through the 
manifest illegitimacy of their rule. The revolutions of the late eighteenth 
century, though often misguided, were so many promising signs of ulti-
mate freedom. More important, Prussia's performance in the last years of 
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Napoleon's rule showed that she was destined to resume and complete the 
political work of the Reformation. Their analysis of their own age, there-
fore, was often a matter of hopeful hunting for signs of this resumed move-
ment forward. 
They were, of course, open to the charge of wishful thinking, of mak-
ing history tell them what they wanted to know. The irritability and insis-
tence of some of their remarks on historical method suggest that they 
occasionally felt defensive. Nonetheless, they believed that their pre-
dictions were conclusively grounded in historical evidence, and they de-
fended that belief by paying close attention to questions about the nature 
of historical knowledge. Despite considerable variety in matters of detail, 
their ideas on method were highly congruent in two respects. First, they 
thought of the historical process as a progressive development or unfold-
ing of the "spirit" (or Geist). That meant that history was intellectual at the 
core and intelligible to the inquiring minds of historians. In consequence, 
the tendencies that they found at work in history were, to them, its real 
content. The chief, though not the only, source of this idea was G.W.F. 
Hegel (1770-1831), whose philosophy they had studied with varying de-
grees of comprehension and thoroughness. Second, they insisted, at times 
heatedly, that the discovery of historical tendencies had to proceed through 
the studious examination of empirical evidence. This insistence was in part 
an effort to dissociate themselves from Hegel, who increasingly struck 
them as the philosopher of the Restoration. It was also a matter of profes-
sional pride. By underscoring the historian's special ability to infer major 
conclusions about present and future from the detailed evidence of the 
past, they gained a welcome feeling of superior authority and a ready-
made answer when someone questioned the soundness of their political 
pronouncements. 
Because they really were trying to find the truth, their avowed em-
piricism had the additional function of insuring them against reading into 
the past whatever they wanted to find there. They needed that insurance, 
because their line of questioning was so present-minded. That is, discon-
tent with their own age and hopes for the future suggested the queries they 
made of the past, whereas their deliberate empiricism assured them that 
evidence would govern their conclusions. At a minimum, then, present-
mindedness would not lead to subjectivity and arbitrariness. At best, it 
would direct them to the right questions, and their high regard for data 
would lead them to valid answers. It is important to note two further qual-
ities of their view of history. Although they thought of history as culmi-
nating in the establishment of a unified German nation-state, their ideas 
were both cosmopolitan and religious. They were cosmopolitan because, 
although they never tired of arguing that unification would be good for 
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both Prussia and Germany, they were being more than polite in claiming 
that it would also benefit the rest of humanity. After all, German unifica-
tion as a constitutional monarchy under the Hohenzollern was a solution 
to the problem of freedom posed by world history. Germany would 
provide a helpful model for others and would make the world a more 
peaceful place. Their ideas were religious in several ways. In essence, they 
searched history for the partly hidden workings of Providence, and their 
interpretation of the past was really exegesis. Further, they expected their 
findings to improve their contemporaries and to make them morally ready 
for a life of freedom. To that extent, their lectures and publications were 
homiletic. Their outlook, however, was religious in more than the loose, 
analogical sense in which any ultimate commitment can be termed reli-
gious. They believed, and Droysen believed very strongly, that the histor-
ical sequence was a continual unfolding of God's plan. They thought of 
history as a theodicy and of themselves as God's agents. 
This gave them a self-confidence and sense of mission that is hard to 
imagine. To an extent given to few academics in any time or place, they 
thought that they had something really important to say: they were the 
men with the map that showed humanity where it had been and where it 
was going. By doing so, of course, they helped it get there. Because they 
really wanted to make things better, their attitude was undoubtedly un-
selfish. It was also self-serving. They had special knowledge, and for them, 
knowledge was power. They needed a sense of power. They were mem-
bers of a small, urban, and highly educated elite in a still overwhelmingly 
agrarian and traditional society. Moreover, they belonged to an elite of at-
tainment in a society still largely domina~ed by an elite of birth. In other 
words, they were nationalists who were divided by education and occu-
pation from most of the nation and who had little say about the conduct of 
affairs. By claiming an authoritative interpretation of modern Germany's 
role in world history, they reunited themselves with their fellow nationals. 
By maintaining that this interpretation would actually help bring the fu-
ture about, they enjoyed the illusion of directing events. Finally, the path 
they foresaw Prussia and Germany taking precluded mob rule and revo-
lutionary violence, though not violence itself, and so avoided a challenge 
to elites as such. Their illusion of power was not disturbed by their own 
potent social fears. 
They were therefore able, more or less contentedly, to engage in a "pol-
itics of expectation" -a term for their choice of political tactics during Vor-
miirz, the useful German word for the period preceding the outbreak of 
revolution in March 1848---until, in 1848, they found themselves called on 
actually to do something. In that period they looked forward to the great 
reversal, when weak, divided, seemingly tyrannized Germany would ac-
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complish its historical mission and become a colossus among the Euro-
pean powers as well as the first truly free political society in Europe. They 
inevitably faced the difficult question of what to do while they waited for 
this necessary change to occur. Because they believed that they had all 
history on their side, they could have chosen to do nothing, to simply let 
events take their predetermined course. That possibility never occurred 
to them. They were too impatient, too eager for the sensation of making 
things happen. Besides, their theories offered clear guidance for suitable 
political activity. 
Their chief task, insofar as censorship in the German states permitted, 
was to reveal the future to contemporaries through an examination of past 
and present. This task had two advantages. It helped assure that Germans 
would know their parts when the curtain went up on liberation and unifi-
cation and, further, that they would be morally ready for the heavy de-
mands that statehood was bound to make. Unification and true political 
freedom required prior consciousness of their nature and necessity. This 
suggests an attitude on their part that needs underscoring. They did not 
think of politics in terms of setting goals and then working to achieve 
them. On the contrary, prior history had already set the goals, and it was 
simple duty to accept them as self-evidently good and to work for their at-
tainment. That belief induced moral complacency when the future seemed 
secure, outright exhilaration when inevitable change seemed at last to be 
occurring, and a readiness for accommodation when, as in 1848, matters 
did not turn out as expected. In short, they lacked an independent stan-
dard by which to judge events, and in the end, events governed them. (This 
is not to say'that their disappointment in 1848 led them to betray former 
liberal ideals. Their liberalism was always a bit tenuous, and what there 
was of it merely became more commonsensical.) 
It is also important to understand that their ideas were neither idio-
syncratic nor eccentric. They were as clear and forceful as possible in mak-
ing their ideas known, and usually their literate contemporaries either 
agreed with, or at least were not contemptuous of, what they had to say. 
They were successful, sometimes brilliantly successful, in their profes-
sional careers. They were popular lecturers, and major publishers printed 
their works. Of the four historians most closely studied in the following 
chapters, three were elected in 1848 to the National Assembly at Frankfort, 
and one to the Hessian parliament at Cassell. Clearly/their views did not 
seem strange or exceptionable, nor should they have. The originality of the 
Prussian School lay not in the novelty of its individual ideas but in its syn-
thesis of them. Its adherents used familiar ideas to argue a reassuring case 
in a novel way. This again raises the problem of what to call this group. 
The term Prussian School is enough of a historiographic convention to 
be unaVOIdable, but it is a misnomer for several reasons. Its members ad-
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mired Prussia, though at times critically, but not all of them were Prussian 
patriots. They valued Prussia as the future unifier of Germany, as a means 
rather than as an end in itself. This is simply to repeat the initial point that 
it is a mistake to reduce a complex of theories to a single political demand. 
For that reason, this study is an examination of the origins of that complex 
before 1848, its modification in several important respects during 1848 and 
1849, and, more extensively, its application by historians in subsequent 
decades. Chapters I, 2, and 3 treat the period before 1848 with special at-
tention to Droysen, who played the central role in articulating the ideas of 
the school. Chapters 4,5, and 6 show what happened to these historians in 
1848 and 1849, and how political exigencies forced them to revise their 
ideas. Chapter 7 shows the uses to which these revised ideas were put. 
Admittedly, this outline excludes some material that one might expect 
to find in such a study. For example, it pays less attention to Droysen's His-
tory of Pruss ian Politics (1855-86), Sybel's Foundation of the German Empire 
(1889-94), and Treitschke's History of Germany in the Nineteenth Century 
(1874-94) than to less well known works from the 1830s and 1840s. The rea-
son is that this a study of origins, and, in any case, their famous later works 
make more sense when their prehistory is known. By the same token, a 
number of historians who were in the school, or least closely associated 
with it, receive only general treatment in favor of close study of its actual 
founders. Treitschke is a case in point. He was an engaging speaker and 
writer who was singularly influential in popularizing many of its ideas 
and commonplaces. That does not change the fact that he was only four-
teen in 1848 and took over these ideas from others. The same considera-
tion applies, though less strikingly, to Hermann Baumgarten (1825-93). 
Other historians are excluded from detailed treatment for other reasons. 
Friedrich Christoph Dahlmann (1785-1860) agreed with many of the 
school's ideas, but he took a very different view of historical progress, 
largely because he reached intellectual maturity before Hegel's ascen-
dancy. Ludwig Hausser (1818-67) and Georg Gottfried Gervinus (1805-71) 
shared the school's view of progress and linked politics to history but, in 
very different ways, did not share its ideas on the nature of the future 
Prusso-German state. 
Having had an active role in creating the school was the standard for 
inclusion, and the first six chapters therefore deal with four individuals 
who in Vormiirz had parallel, sometimes interconnected, careers: Droysen, 
Max Duncker (1811-86), Duncker's younger protege Rudolf Haym 
(1821-1901), and Sybel. They differed from one another in temperament, 
in theoretical detail, and, more rarely, in immediate responses to events, 
but by 1848 they had arrived at substantially the same ideas about the 
relationship between history and politics and had projected essentially 
the same future for Germany. Moreover, they drew the same lessons 
8 Introduction 
from their failed hopes in 1848 and revised their theories and interpreta-
tions of history accordingly. They and other historians then incorporated 
those revisions into the mature works of the Prussian School, which, with 
the unification of Germany in 1866 and 1870-71, became the official histo-
riography of a Prussian-oriented, nationalist, right-of-center liberalism. 
The study of the origins of this school, then, is a gateway to understand-
ing how many educated, respectable Germans in Imperial Germany saw 
their national history. 
That is reason enough to study the history of the school, but there are 
two other reasons. First, the careers, especially the prerevolutionary ca-
reers, of Droysen and his colleagues have some bearing on our judgments 
about the typicality or atypicality of German intellectual and political de-
velopment. As the bibliographic essay at the end of this study shows, there 
is an interesting division of opinion as to whether nineteenth-century 
Germany developed along the same track as other modernizing, indus-
trializing European countries (Britain, in particular) or whether Germany 
followed its own special path (Sonderweg) into modernity. The Sonderweg 
thesis arose from wartime and postwar neeC.s to take a long-term view of 
Hitlerism, though it had important precedents in certain prewar German 
celebrations and lamentations over German distinctiveness. The stimulat-
ing challenges to the notion of German upeculiarityu is essentially Marxist 
in inspiration and social historical in information.2 1t is always questionable 
whether one can explain, in any detail, the ideas of individuals through ref-
erence to social context, suggestive though such attempts may be, and it is 
certainly irresponsible to try to characterize a whole society by discussing 
analytically the rarefied musings of prominent members of its intellectual 
elite. When all that has been said, however, it also remains to say that there 
is no western European equivalent of the historical ideas in the school's 
works. Purposive historical progress toward human freedom innational 
states was a liberal vision throughout Europe. More peculiarly German, 
however, was the Augustinian Christian equation of progress with theod-
icy and, as its corollary, the eventually worshipful acceptance of whatever 
history dished out. We are much in the lat~ Leonard Krieger's debt for coin-
ing the phrase "the German idea of freedom. u3 The historians studied here 
represented a German idea of progress that shaped, one might say de-
formed, German liberalism. 
Second, this study of the Prussian School affords a look into one of the 
final chapters in the story of an ancient, and anciently influential, idea-
namely, the ideal of directional, providential history, divinely governed 
and working largely through unseen process toward ultimate good. The 
idea has multiple and complex origins in the Hellenistic intellectual mix of 
the ancient Mediterranean, though its medieval and modem European 
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forms were mediated by Augustine of Hippo and Boethius in the fifth and 
sixth centuries C.B. The providential view of history, once so pervasive, 
has been banished, in part by secularization but more by the horrors of 
twentieth-century history, which have made the idea of beneficent pur-
pose in history seem too widely improbable to be taken seriously by many 
people. Theologians can decide whether that is a sensible conclusion or 
not. Suffice it here to say that, in recent times, some once very familiar 
intellectual furniture has been removed from historical space, and now 
we have become accustomed to the bareness of the room. This study of the 
historical-political thought of Droysen and of others in the school lets us 
recall how the room looked until very recently and, so, lets us measure the 
distance from the last century to what some call the postmodern age. 
1 _____ _ 
Droysen and the 
Problem of Freedom 
The Prussian School took form because of the severe disappointments of 
the revolutionary years 1848-49, but those disappointments are intelligi-
ble only after studying the expectations that, after seeming triumph, failed 
badly. For the most part, that is, the mature ideas of the Prussian School 
were transmutations and recombinations of prerevolutionary ideas made 
when successive defeats and failures at last forced Droysen, Duncker, and 
Haym-along with, of course, many other liberal nationalists-to reexam-
ine and, then, to reformulate beliefs that until recently had seemed un-
questionable and irrefutable. These men went through a crisis that few 
others experienced, even those who subscribed to their political program, 
because they based their political outlook on an interpretation of history 
and they thought of Germany's unification as a culminating act of world 
history. Therefore, their increasingly obvious inability during the revolu-
tion of 1848 to turn their expectations into reality was more than just a po-
litical failure. It was a calamity because it called into question the meaning 
they attributed to history. After this crisis, as before, they remained ideo-
logues, devotees of a secular religion, but they became chastened ideo-
logues, no longer bent on chasing the best at the expense of the good or 
even the relatively good. Sybel's experience was somewhat different. Even 
before 1848, he was less certain about what the future held, less confident 
that the historical process was unstoppably beneficent. In consequence, he 
seems to have been less surprised and less shocked by events. To a certain 
degree, Droysen, Haym, and Duncker ended up where Sybel had always 
been---except that they did so with the intellectual assertiveness of the be-
latedly wise. They never quite overcame their prehistory. 
That prehistory began in 1831, with Droysen's first plans for open po-
litical advocacy. He had two projects in mind, although he failed to bring 
either to completion. First, and almost certainly with Ranke's conservative 
Historical-Political Journal in mind, he proposed creating a "journal of 
political-historical content" that, in effect, would have been an ideological 
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counter to Ranke's publication. Because he wanted national unification 
and constitutional government of a sort, however, he did not have the 
backing of the Prussian government for his journal, as Ranke did for 
his. Second, Droysen considered publishing a political correspondence to 
make the same points. His model here was Paul Achatius Pfizer's Corre-
spondence of Two Germans (1831), the first work to propose, if only in a let-
ter among letters, Germany's unification by Prussia.! Droysen's letters 
about these projects are useful as evidence for his already distinctive 
political views, but the fact that he considered becoming a publicist is 
unremarkable; his doing so is just one of many examples of the political 
excitement that briefly filled Germany after the 1830 July Revolution in 
France. Along with many other young, well-educated Germans, he hoped 
that the Restoration might end in the Germanies as well, though he also 
feared renewed invasion from revolutionary France. His projects are im-
portant for another reason. They were the first instances of the close link-
age between his political advocacy in the present and his philological and 
historical research into the past. . 
They make sense only against the background of the research into 
ancient history and literature with which Droysen was then occupied. 
Droysen was an intellectual prodigy from the remote districts of the 
Hohenzollern monarchy. The son of a Prussian army chaplain in a small 
town in Pomerania, he studied on scholarships (and later on fees earned 
by tutoring the young Felix Mendelssohn, for whom he later wrote lyrics 
for some Lieder) at a local gymnasium and, later, the new but flourish-
ing University of Berlin.2 Jn his essay of application to the university, he 
wrote that "nothing is more wholesome or needful for the German spirit 
than fertilization with the Hellenic."3 This was more than an ingratiating 
piety. He exerted himself in the study of classical philology, and in 1831, 
when he was considering active publicism, he was deeply engrossed in 
major research into ancient Greek history. He was twenty-three years old 
and had just finished nis doctoral dissertation, "On the Kingdom of the 
Lagids under Ptolemaus VI Philometor." He was already at work on his 
translations of Aeschylus's tragedies, a beautiful rendering that long re-
mained a standard German version, which he published along with his-
torical commentaries the next year. This work was also a preliminary to 
his still famous History of Alexander the Great (1833), which, in tum, led to 
the first volume of History of Hellenism (1836). These works fundamentally 
altered the way in which historians viewed late Greek history: Droysen 
was the first to demonstrate persuasively that Greek history after· the 
Macedonian conquest was more a record of new, constructive begin-
nings than of decay and decline.4 Jn these and other, less important works, 
Droysen offered an interpretation of ancient history in which he portrayed 
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Hellenistic history as the poser of a problem of freedom still current in his 
own time and due for solution in his own country. 
Droysen's advocacy and inquiries were already functions one of the 
other. Considered by themselves, neither his studies of ancient Greece nor 
his planned ventures in publicism are fully understandable. Considered 
together, however, they show the outlines of the theoretical system that he 
applied, with some additions but no major deletions, in the first months of 
his activities in Frankfort in 1848. He acquired the main elements of this 
system during his formal studies at Berlin. Although Droysen spent most 
of his adult career as a historian, he began as a student of philology and, 
to a lesser extent, philosophy. There were, of course, no history students in 
Germany when he enrolled at Berlin in 1826. (Interestingly, Max Duncker, 
who finished his Berlin degree in 1834, was the first.) Nonetheless, history 
courses were a prominent part of the curriculum and were supposed to 
make moral citizens out of callow students. Droysen avoided all of them, 
whether taught by Friedrich Wilken (1777-1840), Friedrich von Raumer 
(1781-1873), or the already celebrated, but not yet ennobled, Leopold 
Ranke (1795--1886).5 Given his strong interest in ancient Greece, he did 
much of his work with the classical philologist August Boeckh (1785-
1867). As Boeckh's student, he not only perfected his knowledge of the 
corpus of Greek literature but also learned what was, in fact, a special 
approach to history. 
Boeckh's own teacher, Friedrich August Wolf (1759-1824), had pio-
neered this approach when, in the course of studying Homer's epics, he 
became interested in Homer's milieu and used philological techniques to 
reconstruct the past in order that he might read texts in context. What Wolf 
did for Homer and his age, Boeckh did for fifth-century Athenian litera-
ture in his book, The Political Economy of Athens.6 Boeckh taught Droysen 
that texts should suggest the questions to ask of history and that the an-
swers should reveal the true significance of the texts. Text and context 
should illuminate each other. Droysen must have been impressed favor-
ably with this approach, because he worked with Boeckh longer and more 
closely than did most of the latter's students in the 1820s.7 The evidence for 
Boeckh's influence is clear: Droysen's History of Alexander the Great and 
History of Hellenism are philological in the enriched sense that Wolf and 
Boeckh gave the term. 
Droysen acquired at Berlin a second, complementary but distinct, ap-
proach to history, namely, an insistent desire to relate age to age and to 
view history as a single process. Because Boeckh's use of history was pri-
marily contextual, a means to the greater end of reading texts correctly, he 
paid little attention to long-term change, which was, strictly speaking, ir-
relevant for his. purposes. Later, in 1843, Droysen (who was then leaving 
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ancient for modem history in any case) would fault philologists for doing 
as his teacher had done, for failing to note what distinguished one histor-
ical epoch from another.s His interest in periodization and interconnection 
derived from, or at least was greatly strengthened by, his work under 
G.W.F. Hegel (1770-1831). Hegel was an immensely popular and influen-. 
tiallecturer when Droysen was a student, and Droysen showed more than 
the typical interest in his series of lectures. He heard Hegel's lectures dur-
ing every term of his studies and followed "Logic and Metaphysics," " Aes-
thetics," "History of Philosophy," "History of the Spirit," and "Philosophy 
of History" with enough attentiveness thatKuno Fiss:her used Droysen's 
class notes in compiling the definitive edition of Hegel's works at the tum 
of the century.9 
The question of Hegel's actual influence on Droysen, and Droysen's 
generation, is vexed. On the one hand, the exact extent of Droysen's in-
debtedness is impossible to establish because, though Droysen made oc-
casional philosophical outbursts and had a wonderfully theoretical mind, 
he wrote history rather than systematic philosophy. He just did not com-
ment in detail on the writings of Hegel or any other philosopher. Such 
commentary was not his metier. On the other hand, the importance of 
Hegel's general influence onDroysen is obviously immense, because so 
much of Droysen's conceptual vocabulary is Hegelian or, to coin a term, 
Hegelianoid-it resembles, but is not identical with, Hegel's. There are two 
compelling reasons for offering this caution. First, bright, energetic minds 
like Droysen's do not, normally, simply take over others' ideas without 
amendment or, at least, creative misinterpretation. There no doubt are 
people who simply parrot metaphysical systems, but such monodimen-
sional minds are unlikely to have achieved enough to attract historical at-
tention. Second, Droysen himself, like many other Hegelian enthusiasts in 
that time and place, self-consciously parted philosophical and, more par-
ticularly, political company with Hegel. 
Thus, within weeks of Hegel's death in 1831, Droysen began to criti-
cize Hegel, and German idealists in general, for close association with the 
hated Restoration and for insufficient attention to empirical fact,lo Inter-
estingly, neither of these charges is justified: Hegel was extraordinarily 
well read in history and was no friend of political reaction. Granted, his 
public comments about Prussia were respectful, but professors were civil 
servants who could not be expected to savage their employer in public, 
and, anyway, the Prussia for which Hegel left Heidelberg in 1818 was still 
the Prussia of the Great Reforms of Stein, Hardenberg, and Humboldt. He 
carne to Prussia, in part, because of its liberal reputation, and was privately 
critical when reaction gathered in the 1820s. It is true that Hegel defended 
suppression of the German nationalist fraternities, the Burschenschaften, af-
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ter the 1819 Wartburgfest, but those fraternities were rabidly nationalist 
and anti-Semitic, and they enjoyed burning books.u To oppose them was 
to defend order and decency, not simple-mindedly to support the Restora-
tion. Droysen is more likely to have picked up these criticisms by listening 
to other young intellectuals than through serious consideration of what 
Hegel was actually saying. By 1836, however, Droysen offered a more orig-
inal and more penetrating criticism of Hegel for contradicting basic Chris-
tian dogmas.12 Those criticisms will receive extended discussion a little 
later; right now, it is important to establish what, of a general nature, Droy-
sen and his fellows did find attractive in Hegel's philosophy. 
First, there was Hegel's insistence on the rationality, that is the neces-
sity, of the state. Hegel advanced this point in his misleading aphorism, 
"What is rational is real and what is real is.rational" (Was verniinftig ist, das 
ist wirklieh; und was wirklieh ist, das ist verniinftig).13 In so saying, Hegel 
meant to differ with Kant on the essential unobservability of the rational 
rather than to place whatever existed beyond moral challenge. For Kant, 
that is, the real thing, the Ding an sieh, could be posited but not observed. 
Hegel, by contrast, believed that the rational was "actual" in the sense of 
the German adjective wirklieh: active, present, observable. As early as 1821, 
however, a contemporary took him to mean whatever was rational actu-
ally existed, and, conversely, that whatever existed was rational, that is, 
had to exist.14 This is an example of creative misinterpretation, and on it 
rests both conservative and radical readings of Hegel. For conservatives, it 
seemed to mean that whatever existed was legitimate simply by virtue of 
existing, whereas for radicals it meant that violent change, if successful, 
was its own justification. Droysen would elaborate and specify this gen-
eral notion into a theory of ongoing, purposive change. 
To do so, he had only to borrow concepts from Hegel's updating of the 
much older providential view of history, implicit in many of Hegel's lec-
tures but stated with greatest rhetorical force and vividness in his Philoso-
phy of History. Hegel was quite explicit in insisting that the idea that 
"reason rules the world" was tightly linked to a "religious truth, namely 
that the world is not left to accident and external, accidental causes, but, 
on the contrary, a Providence (Vorsehung) rules the world."lS This was real 
providence, for it looked to the "final goal" (Endzweek) of history, that is, 
"what God wants with the world" (was Gott mit der Welt will).16 Conse-
quently, history was a "series of stages" (5tufengang) moving purposively 
toward the "consciousness of freedom" (Bewufltsein der Freiheit). Hegel ac-
knowledged that this movement came at a cost, and-in a famous com-
parison-he described history as a "slaughterbench ... upon which the 
happiness of peoples, the wisdom of states, and virtue of individuals are 
brought for sacrifice."17 It is this vision of history-as providential, dy-
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namic, and purposive-that Droysen found strongly attractive, even though 
philosophical technicalities did not always command his full attention 
and even though his view of Hegel was in part a matter of impression and 
misimpression. 
It was attractive because, although Droysen disagreed, or thought he 
disagreed, with Hegel on politics, Hegel's historical and political theory re-
assured Droysen that he was on the right and the winning side. Not only 
was historical life the theater in which God's purposes were achieved, but 
this achievement was predictable, at least to some degree. That statement 
seems odd, because Hegel is notorious for believing that philosophy al-
ways arrived too late to affect action. Thus, in a famous statement in The 
Philosophy of Right, Hegel averred: "When philosophy paints her gray 
upon gray, the form of life has already grown old, and the gray in the gray 
cannot be rejuvenated but only recognized; the owl of Minerva takes flight 
only as dusk begins to fall."ls This :meant that philosophy can comprehend 
what is and what has been, not what will come to be. The fact that Hegel 
comprehended his own age, the age of the aftermath of the French Revo-
lution of 1789, meant, however, that his own age was about to pass away. 
By implication, therefore, Hegel himself was not entirely conservative.19 
Droysen, like others in his generation, would go further and claim an abil-
ity to predict at least the near future in some detail. Here one sees the im-
portance of Droysen's essentially exaggerated charge that Hegel scanted 
empirical knowledge: supposedly, historical empiricism allowed Droysen 
to see into the future as the philosophical Hegel had been unable to do. 
Finally, it is also fair to say that Hegel offered to Droysen and his gen-
eration a sort of emotional satisfaction that was essentially religious in 
character. Ronald Knox used the· term enthusiasm to describe" a clique, and 
elite ... who are trying to live a less worldly life than their neighbours" 
and who, therefore, set themselves apart.20 There is a lot of that enthusias-
tic quality in the young people who, first, used the designedly difficult, 
almost secret language of Hegel to put a seal on their special understand-
ing of affairs and, second, broke with Hegel, while retaining a Hegelian vo-
cabulary, because the great philosopher did not, in their view, carry his 
ideas far enough: they became a spiritual elite within a spiritual elite, and 
Droysen was no exception to this rule. Here a second religious term comes 
to mind, namely, gnosis, the attainment of direct, personal knowledge 
of essential truth. This claim is more than intuitive: Hegel, along with 
Schelling, directly incorporated gnostic ideas into his philosophy, notably 
into his insistence on self-consciousness asthe ultimate goal of the spirit, 
and the Hegelian F.e. Baur (1792-1860), who founded the Tiibingen school 
of theology and in 1835 published the first modem work on gnosticism, ex-
pressly viewed gnosticism as the start of the Chris~an philosophy that led 
16 Droysen and the Prussian School of History 
to Hegelianism.21 There can be no precise measurement of the sort of sat-
isfaction that comes from feeling especially close to God (or, at least, to di-
vine purpose) and possessed of a special knowledge, but that satisfaction 
sustained Droysen and his colleagues during years of otherwise depress-
ing quiet and doubtless reassured them in drawing conclusions about his-
tory's course that no ordinary review of empirical evidence could supply. 
So, the philological training he learned from Boeckh helped Droysen in 
reaching synchronic meaning, and his philosophical initiation under Hegel 
aided him in discovering diachronic meaning in the historical process. 
He pointed to both sorts of meaning in the planned and actual publi-
cations with which he busied himself in and after 1831. He did not get be-
yond planning. There was trouble with the Prussian censors, and Droysen 
had a lot of other work to do as he began his publishing career in classical 
philology. In any case, the flurry of German political excitement following 
the French July Revolution was short lived. Nevertheless, his analysis of 
Prussian and German politics is reasonably clear, because in letters to 
friends he included synopses of the items he wanted to write and pub-
lish.22 Droysen plainly thought that Germany was due for major political 
reconstruction that would issue in a higher degree of unification. He also 
thought Germans were due to enjoy a qualititatively new kind of political 
freedom in which government would be responsible to the governed 
without weakening its power yet also without impinging on individual 
liberties. Here, too, Droysen followed the pattern of employing a broadly 
Hegelian concept, namely, of representation that would retain divisions 
within the state even while serving to create state unity, but using it to raise 
his own political demands.23 To this end, Droysen advocated a new type 
of representative government that would increase the unity and cohesion 
of the state without completely eliminating the existing stratification of so-
ciety or, equally important in Germany, suppressing regional peculiarities: 
"The essential distinctions within civil society," he contended, "are those 
of estate and 10cality."24 He meant that a lot had to change and a lot had to 
remain the same. Social hierarchy and regional variety stood in the way of 
unity and constitutional government, so they had to change. Conversely, 
they existed in fact and, so, to some extent by right; therefore, they could 
not simply be swept away. In Droysen's view, the horrors of the French 
Revolution of 1789 showed the error of the second approach. His proposed 
system of representation was supposed to combine the needed elements 
of change and continuity. 
He drew on his understanding of Hegel to make this case by de-
manding that differences of estate and locality ''be abolished (aufgehoben) 
in the nation (Volk) as in the national representation."25 This term, aufge-
hoben, deserves a brief discussion. Aufgehoben is the past participle of the 
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infinitive aufheben, a significantly ambiguous term in Hegel's lexicon. It 
means, literally, to "lift up" or, depending on context, to "abolish." In a ma-
jor conflation of meanings, Hegel gave it a third definition: to "continue" 
in the sense that whatever was abolished still existed by dint of being lifted 
to a higher level. Droysen had this third meaning in mind. Social and ge-
ographic distinctions would be abolished insofar as they retarded unity 
and freedom. To the degree that they reflected valid individual prefer-
ences and provided "elements of movement and formation," however, 
they would continue to exist, though at a higher level, as positive contri-
butions to the new state. In somewhat more concrete terms, and with the 
French centralism that he detested as a counterexample, he demanded that 
"the monarchy ... not send down thunderbolts from the topmost heights 
into the immediate sphere of private life" and that "the legislative ... not 
proceed only and directly from the primary assemblies to the vanishing 
heights of the nation's representative." Despite the stilted tone of German 
academic idealism, the terms originally derived from Montesquieu's cri-
tique of French absolutism, and Droysen called instead for "intermediate 
stages" (Mittelstufen) in public life.26 Social and regional differences would 
define these "stages." 
Droysen left only a precis for his article on this subject, not the article 
itself, so it is impossible to be sure just what he had in mind. He did demand 
that the "cities" represent "bourgeois endeavor," the "rural communes" 
speak for "peasant interests," and the "regional districts" (Landerbezirken) 
express the wishes of the "land-holding nobility." Predictably, he wanted 
to integrate as well as preserve these separate interests, so he also proposed 
that they elect deputies to a "provincial assembly" that would "unite into 
a common provincial legislature these local and estate interests that com-
prise society."27 Droysen left some major points unexplained. He did not 
actually describe the relevant institutions or define their powers. Although 
he elsewhere made it clear that he wanted national unification, he did not 
explain what would happen above the provincial level, or whether he was 
discussing provinces within German states or the provinces of the future 
Germany. It was clear, however, that he wanted to accommodate past and 
present by reconciling potentially opposed interests in the state. This shows 
a characteristic desire for revolutionary change without revolution. 
Droysen tried to identify the principle of this change with another sig-
nificantly ambiguous German word, Volksthumlichkeit. Like its prefix, Volk, 
Volksthumlichkeit can refer to either "people" or "nation" or both, with the 
added difficulty that in its former sense, it can mean "popularity" either in 
the sense of having to do with the people or in the sense of being familiar 
and widely approved of. His fear of censorship led him to be guarded in 
his discussion of this term, but he meant it to have simultaneous, noncon-
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tradictory, yet distinct meanings.28 His use of the term had major bearing 
on his idea of representative government and, :more particularly, the mo-
tives behind Prussian policy and the future tendency of Prussian actions. 
He discussed both in the abstracts of two projected articles that he in-
cluded in a letter to rus friend Ludwig Moser on 28 May 1831. 
In a play on the words usually used to describe the program of the July 
monarchy in France, he planned to entitle the first Ie juste milieu. Droysen 
did not mean this as a compliment. Rather than signifying the "right mix-
ture" or "happy medium," Ie juste milieu stood for the drift and spine-
lessness that he found sadly current in Prussian politics. Prussia had aban-
doned the policies of Frederick the Great and the Baron vom Stein and 
become "Ie juste mileu of Europe, ... the middle point between the mag-
netic poles of the European axis, admittedly and unfortunately also ... the 
contemptible locus of the indifferentism of the Staatszeitung [Prussia's of-
ten officially inspired newspaper]: neither too much nor too little, which 
means nothing at all, never to have a principle."29 Droysen meant to be 
both witty and vehement and succeeded only in being vehement. He was 
not an adventurist, but, in his eyes, to be without a principle was to be 
despicable. Prussia needed to embrace the principle of Volksthiimlichkeit by 
being both national and popular. 
In his description of the second projected article, "Forward" (Vor-
warts), he had something to say about when this infusion of principle 
would occur and what its beneficent effects would be. He explained that 
the "life force of Prussia" was the "mighty forwards" (heftige Vorwarts). It 
was in Prussia's interest and nature to act with dynamism, and in the pre-
sent this meant "expressing and preaching Volksthiimlichkeit."30 Because he 
elsewhere used the term in connection with representative government, 
this meant that Prussia had to align itself with popularity in the sense of 
popular government.31 It also entailed pursuing a form of national uni-
fication, as Droysen suggested in an interesting passage of a letter to 
Wilhelm Arendt on 31 July 1831: "I, at all events, insist [that] Brunswick, 
Cassell, etc. at least make themselves worthy through their constitutions 
of being members of the Prussian Empire (Preussischen Reiches). I think that 
history demands that. Granted, the path is long, difficult, perhaps bloody 
and filled with shame; still, hope is greater than fear and faith brighter than 
the night in which we now ... dream and despair."32 
This statement is interesting in several respects. First, it was the clear-
est statement to date of the central position that he ascribed to Prussia in 
his vision of Germany's future, though as early as 1829 he remarked in con-
.nection with German music that Prussia was "a genuine center and hinge 
of history (eine wahrhafte Angel und Heerd der Geschichte)."33 Prussia was to 
unify Germany, and by "Prussian Empire" he surely meant a Germany re-
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built by Prussia rather than a Prussia enlarged by incorporating neighbor-
ing states. Second, it showed that constitutionalism and unification were 
functions of each other. The lesser states had to make themselves "worthy" 
by introducing constitutions, and presumably Prussia, too, had to become 
a constitutional state. This suggests that he consciously thought of Volk-
sthumlichkeit in both national and popular terms and clarifies his harsh crit-
icism of current Prussian policies: the Hohenzollem monarchy had to 
recover its dynamism by working for unity and constitutional government 
of the sort that Droysen elsewhere recommended. He believed that Prus-
sia would eventually do so, and elsewhere in the letter asserted that "we 
in Germany have still to await our history."34 In later writings, Droysen 
greatly elaborated this vision of the future without changing it in any es-
sential way until late 1848. 
Droysen's analysis of the German present and his sketching of the 
German future drew heavily on his concurrent research into ancient 
Greek history. Now, as at all times in his subsequent career, he thought of 
his political recommendations as historical necessities and, at the same 
time, let his present political engagement direct his inquiries into the past. 
The first major result of this dual approach was the lengthy historical 
commentaries (Didaskalien) he included in the translation of Aeschylus'S 
tragedies in 1832. Their ostensible purpose was to give, Boeckh-like, the 
context necessary for a responsible reading of the plays. In a more Hegelian 
fashion, however, they were also meant to explain the origin of the politi-
cal problem that Germany currently faced and would eventually, Droy-
sen believed, definitively solve. Like Hegel, too, Droysen thought in terms 
of stages (Stufen) in world history. Hegel divided history into an oriental, 
a Greek, a Roman, and a German stage. Like Hegel, Droysen traced free-
dom back to the Greek and viewed the last, the German, age of history 
as the time for fully realizing freedom. There the similarity ends. Lacking 
Hegel's cosmopolitan erudition, he had little interest in asiatic history 
and, as will appear, hediscussed Hellenism rather than a Roman phase in 
history. In the 1830s, indeed, Droysen's attention was riveted to the (in 
his view) related, but essentially distinct, matters of classical Greek 
drama and the effects and significance of Alexander the Great's con-
quests. For this reason, Droysen's historical overview of Hellenic history 
deserves close study. 
Droysen's point of departure was Solon's legislation, especially his 
law on parties, in the sixth century B.C.E. By dint of Solon's efforts and their 
eventual effects, the historical process began, and Greek history had bear-
ing on all later history. "Athens," he argued, "was the first political state." 
By this, Droysen meant that Solon's laws set the Attic people upon a "se-
ries of developments" that shaped the Greek "national spirit" (Volksgeist) 
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through all its succeeding struggles.35 That was Athens' historical "deed" 
(That), by which Droysen meant a historical accomplishment with lasting 
effects on the historical process. More specifically, it was Athens' "deed" 
to bring the" consciousness of freedom" (Bewusstsein der Freiheit) into world 
history. He equated history with politics and politics with freedom, or at 
least the "consciousness" of it. By writing in terms of "consciousness," he 
was not simply using Hegelian terms to point to the essentially mental 
quality of history. He meant also to emphasize the intrinsically problem-
atic quality of human freedom, a quality that, in his account, was painfully 
evident in Hellenic history and posed questions not fully answered even 
in Droysen's own day. 
From his point of view, the Athenian achievement was not pure gain. 
As Droysen's early remarks about the German future show, he was al-
ready a historical optimist, but his optimism, then and later, referred to the 
long term, to ultimate outcomes. He was keenly aware of human suffering 
and of the destruction of hope in the shorter run. Drawing on his sense of 
what had happened to modem Europe because of the Enlightenment and 
the French Revolution, he discussed the painful and destructive effects of 
the Athenian discovery of freedom: 
It is the natural relationship in collective human existence that ... ordering and 
obeying be determined according to difference of birth, that tge existing favorabil-
ity or unfavorability of external circumstances be viewed as essential and upheld 
as holy, that the nobility and the people stand opposed as castes ... But in histari-
cal life, the spirit that takes form within the people (Valk) is hostile to the natural 
and the given; and as soon as doubts appear about that natural distinction and 
the conditions rooted in the traditions of the centuries, the awakened spirit will 
not weary of raising its "terrible why" ifurchtbare Warum) against every custom, 
against all that exists. It shakes and buries and destroys until it has finally anni-
hilated everything that exists ... to the level of ochlocratic atomism. From this 
equality, this barren, medusa-like caricature of freedom, [the spirit] itself dies and 
the despiritualized mass sinks back in slow decay to the old, vegetative condition 
of nature.36 
The whole passage, of course, is built on an assumed antinomy between 
"natural" and "historical" existence, the latter consisting in the precarious 
and inherently unstable enjoyment of freedom. By drawing on what he 
took to be the experience of eighteenth-century Europe, Droysen meant to 
show that the evolution of isonomia (equality of law) from Solon's ideal of 
eunomia (goodness of law) had a necessarily destructive logic. That idea, 
differently expressed, was already a commonplace in the ancient world, 
but Droysen put it to two novel uses. First, it allowed him to categorize the 
Greek tragedians according to their places on the rising and falling trajec-
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tory of Hellenic freedom. Second, and by virtue of the first, it permitted 
him to identify the main features of the problem of freedom bequeathed 
by the Greeks to history, a problem that he expected Germans to solve in 
the fairly near future. 
His discussion of Hellenic history, therefore, was present-minded in 
two ways. In his strongly implied comparison between ancient Greece and 
modem Europe, he engaged in the familiar practice of scouting the past for 
parallels to the present. 37 His discussion was also present-minded in a way 
that is less familiar but more characteristic of Droysen's vision of history. 
Seen in one way, the Athenian march from "natural" to "historical" life 
and, tragically but inevitably, back to the "old, vegetative condition of na-
ture" looks like a cycle of a sort through which arty natural history might 
run, but Droysen did not think in cyclical terms. The Athenian experience 
was unique. Seen from that perspective, Hellenic history had irreversible 
consequences such that the failure of Athenian freedom itself actually con-
tributed to the eventual achievement of a stable and enduring freedom. To 
show how that was so required a consistent interpretation of the interven-
ing history, between then and his own day, and Droysen did not complete 
this interpretation before 1843. His discussion of what went wrong in 
Athens, however, shows that by 1832 he was already well on his way to 
such an interpretation. 
Because he had to account for literary as well as political history, it was 
natural for him to periodize fifth-century Athenian history in terms of the 
careers of Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides, but he claimed a mOre in-
trinsic justification for this approach. These dramatists were the spokes-
men for history, because they, unlike visual artists, were specially gifted in 
"personifying the spirit of the people (Volk) and their century."3S Because 
he wanted to fathom the meaning of history as well as make Aeschylus's 
plays intelligible to contemporaries, Droysen wanted to use texts to es-
tablish context, not just context to explain texts. He believed that their sUr-
viving dramas showed three phases in the Athenian experience of free-
dom: an initial phase termed the "guilt of freedom" (Schuld der Freiheit), a 
second, more Or less culminatory, phase labeled the "right of freedom 
(Recht der Freiheit)," and a final, unnamed period of dissolution associated 
with Euripides and, also, Aristophanes and the Sophists. 
Droysen's. discussion of these dramatists is dialectical, though this 
term has to be used cautiously because, here again, he worked with a 
Hegelian idea easily misunderstood in studying Hegel's own writings and 
rather loosely used by Droysen. Hegel himself did not often write about a 
neat sequence of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis-that was Johann Got-
tlieb Fichte's doing, and Hegel rather disapproved. He did, however, see 
both knowledge and the reality that was known as a dialectical inasmuch 
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as entities implied or produced their opposites before somehow combin-
ing into a more concrete reality. For this reason, he often analyzed matters 
through triads.39 Droysen owed to Hegel both the practice of interrelating 
opposites and of thinking in triads. Both practices inform his political his-
tory of Greek tragedy. Thus in the first, Aeschylean, period, the sense of 
freedom that resulted from breaking the nobility's command of wealth 
and office allowed Athens twice to prevail over Persia and explained the 
beauty of Aeschylus's tragedies. It also, less happily, led to the "free man's 
first consciousness of his own finitude (Endlichkeit)."40 Droysen meant 
more than that they learned that they had limitations and would one day 
die. He drew on the Christian conception of sin to reach this insight. Free-
dom, the defining quality of "historical" life, implied a moral responsibil-
ity, and human beings were too weak and inadequate always to meet their 
obligations. As a result, freedom showed them their "finitude" and left 
them with a keen sense of "guilt." The resulting anxiety receded in the sec-
ond, Sophoclean, period, during which Athenians came as close as they 
could to enjoying freedom. Sophocles' dramas, Droysen argued, reveal the 
essential qualities of Periclean Athens, which possessed "undeniably the 
most complete political character in Greece, which in a wonderfully har-
monious fashion abolished and continued (aufgehoben) all the particulari-
ties of private life and had only the state and its affairs for its essence."41 
Athens, that is, briefly enjoyed the reconciliation between the particular 
and the general that he proposed for his own scheme of representative 
government for Germany. Under those happy circumstances, freedom im-
plied "right" rather than "guilt." In German, of course, "right" or Recht can 
mean either "law" or "right." Droysen had the second meaning in mind. 
He wanted to signal the self-evident justification of freedom in the short-
lived period of harmony in Athenian politics. It soon ended, and dissolu-
tion began almost at once. 
This was the period of Euripides, Aristophanes, and the Sophists. 
Droysen revealed his own Aristotelian convictions in aesthetics by com-
plaining that Athenian art ceased to be something "necessary and closed" 
and became instead a mere "form" with the "capacity for taking up any 
content." Arbitrariness, preciosity, and subjectivity-for these were what 
Droysen was thinking of-now entered literature and the other arts because, 
as a result of corrosive effects of untrammelled freedom, the harmony of 
Periclean Athens had given way to a leveled society of atomized and self-
ish individuals that reminded him of modem-day France! The effects of 
this change also entered philosophy in the form of Sophism, which, Droy-
sen alleged, taught that the "consciousness of freedom was nothing more 
than a tyrant over men and an imposition." The arguments of the Sophists 
further weakened the social bond by encouraging what is now called moral 
,.. 
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relativism, and "the opinion of any single individual" acquired the status 
of "the eternally true." In Droysen's view, this showed that the cycle of 
Athenian freedom had moved almost full circle, with the result that "the 
state dissolved itselflike a rotting corpse."42 Droysen was usually more del-
icate in his use of images, but his choice of analogy underscores the mixed 
feelings that he had about freedom. He understood that it was a noble and 
desirable attainment that led Athens to political and cultural greatness, but 
he was also certain that its beginnings were painful and that it ended, more 
or less like a disease, in disablement and destruction. 
Moreover, when he turned to the third period of Hellenic history, 
his present-mindedness reinforced his distress. What had happened once 
could happen again, and Droysen feared revolution and its effects as much 
as he loathed unreformed absolutism. There was more to his attitude, 
however, than disgust and regret. Hegel's lectures had helped him judge 
history in terms of ultimate outcomes. Furthermore, he had recently trans-
lated Aeschylus's Oresteia; he, too, could believe that suffering brought 
wisdom and that good won out in end. Finally, he was intensely Christian 
and, as somewhat later writings show, believed that God worked benefi-
cently through history. He therefore accepted the dissolution of Athenian 
freedom as not only necessary but also desirable. It was desirable because 
it was in the long-term interest of progress toward an enduring enjoyment 
of freedom. Droysen reached this conclusion on the basis of his interpre-
tation of fourth-century Greek history in the commentaries and developed 
it further in 1836 in the first volume of the History of Hellenism and other 
writings. If, he reasoned, history began in Solon's time with the first steps 
toward freedom in Athens, then world history began only with its demise 
there because of the philosophic form that the Athenian spirit assumed in 
this final period. To drive this point home, Droysen used a further analogy 
with the present by implicitly comparing Sophism to the destructive criti-
cism of the Enlightenment and the work of Isocrates, Plato, and Aristotle 
to the synthetic philosophies of German Idealism, above all to Hegel's. He 
saw a two-sided quality in the mature works of Greek philosophy. They 
were a summing up, a completion, an end, but they were also a beginning 
because they were universal in scope and, consequently, universally ac-
cessible. That meant that the Greek trial of freedom would inform and, 
hence, change subsequent experiences of freedom. This advance grew di-
rectly out of the period of dissolution. Sophism, for example, had turned 
the "cutting weapon of the dialectic" against all remaining "positivities." 
In itself, that was a destructive development, but it had a constructive side 
because it freed "the spirit from all limitation by that which is given or be-
lieved."43 Greek philosophy thus became a philosophy for all interested 
humanity. 
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Droysen meant more than just the potential diffusion of Greek ideas 
into the non-Greek world. In 1833, the year after the appearance of The 
Works of Aeschylus, he published his History of Alexander the Great. This was 
not just a biography but a history that he subsequently used in the first v~l­
ume of his later History of Hellenism (1836). Droysen does not describe 
Alexander specifically in terms of Hegel's "world historical individuals," 
but it is evident that he had that concept firmly in mind. World historical 
individuals, Hegel maintained, worked for their own, local purposes but 
achieved results of long-term historical effect.44 That was also the case for 
Droysen's Alexander. In these books, Droysen traced the passage of Greek 
ideas to non-Greek peoples in the wake of Alexander's armies, and from 
the first, Droysen was attracted to the study of Hellenism as a partly ma-
ligned, partly ignored topic that he thought was of the highest importance 
in world history. 
In the foreword to the History of Hellenism, he argued that a phenome-
non of such magnitude that lasted so long could not simply be a product 
of weakness and decay.45 In its early pages, Droysen applied a generally 
Hegelian terminology by claiming that Alexander's conquests were not a 
"caprice of destiny" (Laune des Schicksals) but an instance of the "rule of 
providence" (Waltung der Vorsehung).46 He had been nearly as insistent at 
the beginning of his book on Alexander when he termed him an "instru-
ment of history" (Werkzeug der Geschichte) and used a biblical paraphrase 
to capture his real greatness: "All are called," he explained, but only a few 
"chosen" to carry out history's tasks.47 The providentialism in both pas-
sages was genuine. God had called Alexander and his armies to the task of 
spreading Greek ideas, uniting the previously antagonistic East and West, 
and preparing the way for the advent of Christianity. In different but re-
lated ways, all these actions were necessary for finding an eventual solu-
tion to the problem of freedom. 
Hellenism's bearing on subsequent world history was a result of its 
essential universalism. It was, Droysen argued, the "first world unity" 
(Welteinheit). Achremenid Persia, by contrast, was a mere "external aggre-
gation of peoples and countries."48 This l.:;1itary and universalist quality 
was itself a historical necessity, and to ~ow that Droysen invoked his 
characteristic (and unquestioned) assumption that, in history, success is 
its own justification. The fact that Alexander conquered with so small an 
army proved that he had to conquer because "the time had come to trans-
form the essential relationships [among] the then existing historical peo-
ples (Volker), simultaneously the aggregate condition of humanity had to 
change." The result was a cosmopolitan "west-eastern life" (westostliches 
Leben).49 These claims throw a premonitory light on quality of Droysen's 
prerevolutionary nationalism. In the tradition of Herder, he valued Ger-
man nationhood only as one among others, and was a nationalist and cos-
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mopolitan at the same time. That, too, changed in 1848. In his books on 
Alexander and Hellenism, however, his insistence on the cosmopolitan 
character of Alexander's achievements had a more specific relevance. The 
unification of East and West made it possible for non-Greeks to read 
Greek philosophy and, as a result of the defects that he found in post-
Aristotelian Greek philosophy, made religious change necessary with 
world-historical effects. 
Droysen believed that only Christianity, rightly understood and prac-
ticed, could avert recurrences of the Athenian misadventure with freedom, 
and he saw Hellenism as a precondition for Christianity. He did not say it 
was the cause, presumably because he did not want to deny the miracu-
lousness of the incarnation, but he did see Hellenism as an essential con-
dition for its appearance. The Greek and Macedonian conquerors brought 
with them a Greek culture that, because of the decay that freedom had 
brought to Athens, was "light-minded to the point of feverishness, with-
out deportment and will, without virtue and religion." This irreligiosity 
actually fostered religion, and Droysen maintained that "this Enlighten-
ment, contrary and levelling though it appears in particulars, broke the 
power of paganism and made possible a more spiritual (geistigere) reli-
gion."SO In an instance of dialectical irony, that is, Athens' malady called 
forth its own cure. Hellenistic theocracies and ruler cults were the first and 
preliminary, Christianity the final and definitive, effects of this develop-
ment.51 Although Droysen studiously ignored the possibility of Hebrew 
origins in explaining the rise of Christianity, he did not base his expla-
nation entirely on Greek frivolity.52 He pointed also to the conquerors' de-
struction of "old-national" (alt-nationalen) ways as a heavy blow to pagan-
ism that created a situation in which "a religion had to develop that rose 
above the sad here-and-now. "53 This is a further instance of his willingness 
to subordinate national particularities to world liemands and is an early 
example of a characteristic and dialectical tendency to find immense gain 
in apparent loss. A transcendent religion was obviously preferable to the 
maintenance of old folkways. 
At first inspection, none of this seems to have much to do with solving 
the problem of freedom, except in the diffuse sense that Hellenism created 
an "invisible yet all-controlling power of the spirit (Macht des Geistes)" that 
was still" seizing new ground" and, so, would surely be somehow involved 
in any solution.54 One reason for this difficulty is that Droysen's remarks 
on the rise of Christianity and its effects were necessarily brief because he 
was appropriately more intent on tracing the careers of Alexander and his 
successors than on discussing their long-term effects. His references to re-
ligious history serve mainly to point out the larger importance of his find-
ings and to indicate his preoccupations, without being the subject directly 
under discussion. Furthermore, Droysen did not yet know much about 
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post-Helienistic history. How could he, given his training and immersion 
in classical philology and given the fact that while producing these major 
works, he was supporting himself and, after a time, a family on the pro-
ceeds from private lessons? He detailed the political effects of Christianity 
only after he took a position at the University of Kiel in 1840, where he had 
to teach medieval and modern as well as ancient history. Nevertheless, the 
outlinef of his thinking, which he later filled in, were already discernible. 
They show why he thought Christianity could prevent continual repeti-
tions of the vicious cycle first displayed at Athens. 
Basic to his explanation was his distinction between "natural" or 
"vegetative" existence, which was the lot of most people at most times, and 
"historical" life lived in the "consciousness of freedom."55 Under the terms 
of this distinction, freedom was ennobling but foredoomed because, in its 
spiritual quality, it cut humanity off from nature without providing an al-
ternate source of discipline. The Greek philosophers, some of them, had 
tried to reconcile people to this condition, but had done so only with" aus-
terity and coldness."56 Christianity provided what they could not. As early 
as 1829, Droysen wrote to his close friend Albert Heydemann that it of-
fered a much-needed "confession ... of the need for reconciliation" (Ver-
sohnung) and would ultimately provide it.57 By 1831, if not already in 1829, 
he thought of this "reconciliation" in political terms, for he planned to de-
vote a quarte~ of his planned political correspondence to the world-
historical significance of Christianity.58 He surely had this notion of the 
present political importance in mind when he conjoined statements about 
the rise of Christianity to his discussion of late Greek politics, for he was 
already translating Aeschylus, and his work on Alexander was at least in 
a preliminary stage. 
Christianity, in its first appearance and latter-day realization, some-
how promised to reconcile historical humanity with its world and, so, make 
stable freedom possible. Like every advance in history, Droysen acknowl-
edged that Christianity also came at some cost. In his commentaries on 
Aeschylus he remarked on the beauty and vigor of Athenian culture in the 
fifth century B.C.E. and commented: 
That youthful age of the human race with its enthusiasm for the beautiful and its 
bubbling freshness of creaturely strength and youthful freedom is gone forever; for 
the greater seriousness of historical life, the religion of conciliation has formed it-
self, and in the long and painful centuries the stern cultivation of the Church has 
broken the natural strength of the new western peoples; at last ripened to the free-
dom of inquiry and conscience, they see themselves sunken into a terrible confu-
sion of rights and duties, a chaos of unnatural conditions and needs run wild-the 
fanaticism of industry, the labyrinthine secrecy of public life, the feverish unnatu-
ralness of a narrowly watched historical existence.59 
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Despite his piety, Droysen evidently felt some genuine regret at the loss of 
paganism and at the loss of "natural strength" of his and other peoples. It 
is also clear that, for the moment at least, Christianity and its effects actu-
ally compounded the pain that modernity caused. He was also quite cer-
tain that both loss and pain were the price of a greater and ultimate good. 
Apart from his necessarily brief and imprecise statements in some let-
ters in 1831, he said nothing in the 1830s (but a great deal in the 1840s) 
about the exact nature of that good. This much, however, is clear. Ger-
many, under Prussian leadership, would unify itself and, aided by a Chris-
tianity called into existence in part by the effects of failed Athenian 
freedom, would succeed where the Greeks had failed in establishing an 
enduring freedom under a distinctive constitutional form. These achieve-
ments, collectively, would amount to the institutionalization of Volk-
sthiimlichkeit. Droysen left this forecast vague, in part because he had no 
occasion to be specific and in part because he was not a utopian who 
spelled out details in advance. Really, he had no need to do so, because he 
was deeply (or at least avowedly) confident that history would provide 
what was necessary when it was necessary. The references to providence 
in his major works were not exercises in pious rhetoric but allusive refer-
ences to his fundamental belief, and that belief rationalized his continual 
cross-referencing of past and present. He really believed that history 
would have, had to have, a happy ending. His altogether interesting cor-
respondence with his Hamburg publisher, Friedrich Perthes, in 1836 and 
1838 shows this with great clarity. 
The correspondence makes curious reading for those accustomed to 
the habitual secularism of modem historical scholarship, and it can be 
tempting to dismiss as rhetorical flourishes Droysen's statements of his 
firmest convictions. That would be a great mistake, because in private but 
learned correspondence Droysen could and did say things that he only al-
luded to in his published works, in which he continually, though mutedly, 
referred to providence and divine purpose in history. It may also be tempt-
ing to dismiss him as serious scholar on the grounds of evident religious 
bias. That would also be a mistake. His faith increased rather than lessened 
the burden of proof that he felt, because he believed himself to be re-
searching the record of the sacred. Certainly his belief intensified his de-
termination to discover a meaning in the play of events, to move from 
particular inquiries to synthesis. 
Droysen discussed the role of God in history because Perthes, proba-
bly intrigued by some of Droysen's comments in the History of Hellenism, 
which his firm had just published, solicited his views on the currents of 
historical thought in Germany. He must have been fascinated by the reply 
he received. Droysen identified three approaches to history other than his 
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own. The first was that of Friedrich Christoph Schlosser. Droysen curtly 
dismissed his work as a kind of ahistorical moralizing that found "in his-
tory not much more than good and bad deeds." Droysen was also a moral-
ist of a sort, but he objected to applying timeless standards of judgment to 
a constantly changing historical process. Second was the work of Leopold 
Ranke. Although Droysen later collaborated with some of Ranke's stu-
dents, notably Duncker and Sybel, he had no better an opinion of Ranke 
and his students. He claimed that they "place the certainty of the fact above 
everything, indeed declare it the tendency of written history; that would 
make the work endless and certain of an absolutely worthless, negative re-
sult."60 The accusation is unfair, and it is hard to believe that Droysen had 
read much of what Ranke had already published. It is also easy to see why 
he made this charge. Droysen believed in careful and critical use of evi-
dence, but, from, his point of view, Ranke's proclaimed empiricism had 
prevented him from finding a single meaning in history. To Droysen the 
interpretation of one age seemed worthless unless it helped in under-
standing other ages. 
Third came the Hegelians. Perhaps because people often reserve their 
fiercest hatred for those with whom they almost, but not quite, agree, 
. Droysen saved his harshest criticism for the Hegelian historians, whom he 
personified in Heinrich Leo. Droysen himself, however, was too strongly 
influenced by Hegel for him simply to dismiss Leo's work in a few sen-
tences, and he had, instead, to sort out truth from error. He admitted that 
Leo's approach rested on some sound insights and remarked: "I would ac-
knowledge it myself if it were less tendentious." Hegelian history suffered 
from the converse of the flaw that he found in the Rankean: it was only in-
terested in long-term development, only interested in imposing a unified 
meaning on history. "Insofar," Droysen wrote, "as it appears only to pur-
sue the direction of developments, their paths and detours, I believe that 
it sacrifices the truth." Droysen was a philologist trained by Boeckh, and 
he understood that much of what mattered most in a given period was 
peculiar to it. Moreover, he was an empiricist. It was a commonplace in 
post-Hegelian Germany to insist that empiricism replace speculation, but 
Droysen based his empiricism on specific theological premises. 
As early as 1829 he claimed in a letter that "the counterpart of empir-
ical knowledge is not speculation but absolute knowledge, the immediate 
which is God's alone." Human inquirers could find "laws" in history, but 
not the "law of laws" which was GOd.61 This was Droysen's initial state-
ment of the key distinction that he made to Perthes in 1836 and kept in 
mind throughout his career, namely, that there was a divine and a human 
knowledge of history that were qualitatively different, even though they 
dealt with the same material. The former was absolute, the latter empiri-
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cal in nature. By 1831 at the latest, he saw political implications in this dis-
tinction. In the letter to Moser in which he discussed founding a political 
journal, he faulted German philosophers for being too speculative and, so, 
demanded: "One must begin to live, to think, to hope, to despair more 
from moment to moment and empirically (ephemer und empirice)."62 The 
empiricism that he recommended was a precondition to political recon-
struction because it was the means to a predictive certainty tha:t could ac-
curately inform political conduct. 
Now, in 1836 and with major publications to his credit, Droysen ex-
plained the bases and implications of this outlook. Droysen was a predes-
tinarian. He described himself to Perthes as a "strict believer" who was "so 
permeated" by a belief in the "omnipotent governance of God" that he felt 
certain that "not even a hair may fall from the head without his will." 
Stated differently, God "sees in the present what is and what will come to 
be." For that reason, it was "the sublime duty of scholarship to proceed 
from the mortal and human standpoint to that which the teaching of Christ 
has revealed to us." In other words, he was called as a historian to track 
the workings of Providence, but, unlike the Hegelians, to do so tJ;rrough 
the careful empirical research that was suited to merely human capabili-
ties. The historian so engaged would find repeated evidence of human 
"free will," which, though free, nonetheless obeyed "eternal necessity."63 
Freedom and necessity coexisted in the created world, just as they would 
in the political community whose establishment he anticipated. He was, in 
fact, looking forward to the creation in Germany of a stable freedom that 
would be the culmination of history in the specific sense that it would be 
a living emblem of the defining feature of all history properly so called: 
freedom working in tandem with necessity. 
Droysen was, of course, asking a lot of historians. He was giving them 
(or, more accurately, claiming for himself) the task of discovering God's 
purpose in history, both as it had operated in the past and as it would op-
erate in the future. He did not mean to be arrogant and took seriously 
Christian injunctions to be humble. In fact, it was the Hegelians whom he 
accused of the sin of pride. Only God knew everything and knew it ab-
solutely, all at once. Human beings were left, at best, with faith and the in-
vitation to a rigorous empirical knowledge. It was on those grounds that 
he attacked Hegel and his followers. In a later letter to Perthes, written in 
February 1837, he made this attack specific, even while admitting his lin-
gering admiration for the philosopher's system. "Hegel," he contended, 
"assumed the spiritual activity of the centuries [to be] a fact and derives 
from it that which is the natural historical peculiarity of the human race, 
that the human being thinks." Hegel, he continued, considered this "think-
ing" to be the Ii in-dwelling divine spark" in humanity.64 
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Droysen had the greatest admiration for the workings of the human 
intellect, but he found Hegel's vision not just erroneous but irreligious 
and heretical: 
At all events, one can see no more sublime conception of human spirituality and 
development than the Hegelian; but what an error! Here is that absolute that is not 
God, not the eternal, the unique, that revealed Christ to us, but-the hand on the 
clock to show at what hour the human recognition of God stands; nothing higher 
or even quantitatively higher than that which the pagans imagined in their ideals; 
because that really is pagan, that this [should be] the highest: human knowledge 
and intuition being form and prayed to as divinity. 
In contrast to this irreligiosity, Droysen insisted: "The basis of all human 
knowledge is empirical." Empiricism was more than a sound research 
strategy suited to human minds. To Droysen, it was a condign recognition 
of humanity's weak, no doubt fallen, condition. Moreover, it allowed con-
scientious historians to see what Hegelians could not see, namely, that "the 
human being with his freedom of will, in his struggle and split between 
good and evil, is only the organ of God's eternal will (Organ ist zu Gottes 
ewigen Willen), and despite all absolute soundness of judgment formed in 
the struggle of necessity."6S 
Neither in this, nor in his earlier letter of 1836, did Droysen claim to be 
able to explain the real existence of human free will in a historical process 
ruled by divine necessity. His failure to do so is hardly surprising, because 
that problem baffled the best theological minds from the patristic age to 
the present, and Droysen never claimed to be a theologian. His theory of 
history had theological bases, but by reserving absolute knowledge to God 
alone and insisting that human knowledge had to be empirical, he tacitly 
renounced theological argument in favor of dogmatic certainty based on 
faith in the sense of the earlier Latin credo, best rendered "I trust" rather 
than "I believe." Accordingly, and as a continuation of his attack on the 
Hegelians, he confessed to Perthes that "the historian cannot understand 
in every detail the necessity of events" and that the historical process was, 
therefore, bound to be a "wonderful mystery" to those who lived and 
acted in it. This genuine admission bespoke an attitude that helped keep 
his anger and despair in bounds-no easy task for Droysen-when things 
did not work out as he expected. If only on religious grounds, he had to be 
willing to admit that he might, after all, have been wrong in his predic-
tions. Again, he believed that there was a necessary and fundamental dis-
tinction between sequential, and hence empirical, human knowledge and 
immediate, and hence absolute, divine knowledge. The former could err; 
the latter could not. 
The terms of Droysen's argument are familiar. They derive from the 
late writings of St. Augustine; received clear and compact, and therefore 
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very influential, statement in books 4 and 5 of Boethius's Consolation of Phi-
losophy; and were exhaustively rehearsed during the sixteenth-century 
Reformation that so interested Droysen.66 The argument turned on the dif-
ficulty that the acceptance of either free will or necessity had unacceptable 
consequences. Free will without necessity severed the creature from the 
Creator, whereas necessity without free will made the Creator responsible 
for the sins of the creature. Therefore, both free will and necessity had to 
exist, and Droysen evidently accepted on faith the view that St. Augustine 
first propounded· and that Boethius expressed nicely in his distinction 
between saxulum and nunc stans. Saxulum is the etymologic~l root of our 
"secular," which is often misused as a synonym for "worldly." In fact, it is 
a time word, not a place word. The Sceculum is the order of time in which 
human beings live and in which they experience things one after another, 
that is-in Droysen's language--empirically. The nunc stans, by contrast, 
is the "eternal now" in which God lives and knows all things at once. It is 
eternity in the sense of a simultaneous existence of all events and things, 
rather than of their infinite perpetuation.67 St. Augustine and Boethius 
used this distinction to demonstrate the possibility of there being both free 
will and necessity. In their view, human actions were free in the sceculum, 
where act follows decision, but necessary, that is determined, in the nunc 
stans, wherein God always knew, and always will know, every outcome. 
For St. Augustine and Boethius, this distinction was mainly a contri-
bution to the Christian discussion of sin and redemption, but even for 
them it had major historical implications. By its terms, human history, all 
of it, had a single meaning known fully to God. That left unanswered the 
question of whether it could have an intelligible meaning for human be-
ings who lived in history. Two answers were possible. One was that hu-
man beings were trapped in the historical sequence, where they moved 
blindly, if freely, and could understand only as much of its meaning as was 
offered by divine revelation. The other answer, and this was the one that 
Droysen accepted, was to undertake the obviously difficult but, if suc-
cessful, rewarding task of studying the history that had already occurred 
in order to discover, as nearly as a merely human mind could, the realiza-
tion to date of the meaning that God saw in history.68 Because this mean-
ing came about over time and somehow involved every event in history, 
Droysen insisted on the empiricism that he found the Hegelians lacked. 
Because he trusted that there was a meaning to history, he felt confident in 
looking for it. Finally, his belief that such a meaning existed made him con-
fident that history had a happy ending and, given the long-term tension 
between freedom and necessity, that the problem of freedom would ulti-
mately be solved. Working with these assumptions, he turned increasingly 
in the 1840s to prediction, that is, to surmising not just what came next but 
what Providence meant to have come next. 
2 _____ _ 
Droysen: Interpretation 
and Prediction 
In the 1840s Droysen turned to prediction. This was less a new departure 
than a logical extension of ideas he had long held. In the preceding decade 
he had linked past and present by identifying historical life with human 
freedom and the historical process with the search for an eventual solution 
to the problem that freedom posed. His critical revision of Hegel's philos-
ophy in the light of Augustinian theology enabled him, or so he thought, 
to trace the continual realization of divine purpose in the historical record. 
The result was an extraordinary burst of political activity, especially after 
1845. As scholarship was the other side of partisanship, these years were 
also historiographically productive: he became a modem historian, with-
out losing his original interest in antiquity, and in the process wrote some 
fine history, especially his Lectures on the Wars of Freedom (1846-48). Pre-
diction, when he turned to it, was simply a matter of extrapolating into the 
future historical tendencies identified in the past, and his comments in 
1831 on representative government and Prussia's German mission were 
really foreshadowings of the more detailed predictions that he later made. 
At least, in principle it was that simple. In practice, as the pace of his po-
litical engagement quickened, he was occasionally unsettled when the his-
tory he experienced failed to conform to the history he had anticipated. 
His increased and increasingly detailed interest in the German future 
was a single instance of the heightening of liberal and nationalist expecta-
tions that many German intellectuals experienced in the 1840s, but Droy-
sen's shift to foretelling had specific causes as well. Again, his vision of 
history invited him to anticipate the future, and his personal circumstances 
now allowed him to accept the invitation. In 1843 he published the second 
and final volume of his History of Hellenism. At the same time, Georg Waitz 
joined the faculty at the University of Kiel, where for three years Droysen 
had been teaching ancient and medieval as well as modem history. Waitz 
took over the lectures in ancient and medieval history. As a result, Droy-
sen had sufficient time to concentrate delightedly on modem history.l This 
allowed him to base his predictions on a reasonably detailed knowledge 
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of recent events. Moreover, his earlier stint in teaching medieval history 
made it possible to link antiquity and modernity, so that his discussions of 
the future could follow from a grand interpretation of world history. 
At the same time, Droysen became an energetic publicist. Far from 
keeping his supposed insights into the future to himself, he used both the 
spoken and written word to bring them to the attention of the German 
public. His major work from 1843 to 1848 was the Lectures on the Wars of 
Freedom, a two-volume edition of the lectures he had delivered at Kiel that 
offered a detailed exposition of European and American history and pur-
ported to show the historical inevitability of Germany's unification as a 
constitutional monarchy by a revivified Prussia.2 During this period, pol-
itics in general and political change in particular became the chief focus of 
his attention in a special and peculiar way. On the one hand, he believed 
that his lectures and publications were themselves historically necessary 
as a means to needed change. That is, he was still enough of a Hegelian to 
assume that spiritual change had to precede institutional transformation 
and confident enough of his forensic and compositional abilities to sup-
pose that he could help ready the German spirit for national unification 
and political freedom. On the other hand, the constitutional practice of the 
German states and the German Confederation meant that he had no say in 
and, of course, no experience of practical politics. He therefore viewed pol-
itics as an outsider, a difficulty compounded by having followed his career 
to the then tiny port city of Kiel in the remote northwest. He looked at Ger-
man politics from a geographic as well as an intellectual distance. Proba-
bly for these reasons, before the revolution of 1848 he was often more 
confident than circumstances warranted and, during it, he became more 
disappointed than he should have been. 
This is not to say that he was otherworldly or naIve. As always, his op-
timism referred to ultimate outcomes; Droysen was too aware of human 
sinfulness to feel any other way. In his discussions of the past and antici-
pations of the future, he therefore tried to take human self-interest care-
fully into account. Furthermore, though he thought that it would be 
possible to limit the role of violence in the coming transformation of Ger-
many, he never doubted that a more or less forceful break with existing 
legalities would be necessary. In order tp make that point, he called on 
the more or less Hegelian conceptions retained from his student years 
and coined andcont;rasted his concept of the "right of history" (Recht der 
Geschichte) with the familiar idea of "historical right" (historisches Recht). 
The concept dates from 1839 at the latest, though he appears not to have 
used the actual term before 1843. In a letter in 1839, his friend and frequent 
correspondent Justus von Gruner criticized the existing French bicameral 
system and argued that the future German national constitution would 
have to reflect German traditions by embodying "historical right." 
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Droysen agreed that the French system was deplorable, but took issue 
with the rest of Gruner's argument: "Every historical right," he countered, 
"is in fact a non-right that has become established or made itself current. 
There is no right established by history for which it cannot be shown that it 
has modified, covered over, or destroyed an earlier right." Droysen's 
meaning is quite clear. In negative terms, historical or prescriptive rights 
turned out to be fictions when examined in terms of origins. Because every-
thing began as an innovation, continued existence through time alone 
could not make a practice or an institution legitimate. Droysen did not use 
this distinction solely for negation. It also had an important positive impli-
cation in certain historical circumstances because it conferred as well as 
denied legitimacy. Significantly, Droysen chose the eighteenth-century 
German territorial princes, whose system of government he detested, to il-
lustrate this application of his argument. He claimed that their powers de-
rived from usurpation rather than right, but then conceded that, after all, 
they possessed a certain kind of right because "the course of history has 
proven their necessity." In making this admission, he recurred to his long-
held belief that everything in history was necessary and, therefore, some-
how good, even the division of Germany among absolute princes and 
princelings. He now applied this logic to his own day and in the defense of 
future change: "If historical development has the right to create develop-
ments of right, then ... the present has the very same right." Used in this 
way, his concept of the right of history delegitimated for his own century 
the German political system that it had justified for the eighteenth and le-
gitimated radical political change in the present or near future. This was 
potentially a revolutionary doctrine, though in his instinctive modera-
tion Droysen predicted that Germans would bring about change "quietly 
and properly."3 
This was a potentially cynical idea because it made historical success 
its own justification, but equating historical necessity with God's will and 
supporting his theory by referring to "our Christian view of God's world 
governance,"4 Droysen did not see this implication. These qualifications 
could be, and at times were, tenuous in practice. Droysen wanted to vali-
date change, but he had in mind only desirable change that occurred with 
as little disruption as possible. Moreover, in using God's plan as a stan-
dard of judgment, he was invoking an invisible criterion. He could not, of 
course, know exactly what God intended. All he could do was to trace 
what, evidently, God had accomplished up to the present and make an 
educated guess about what would occur next. When events displeased 
him, he would feel momentary bitterness, but, by the terms of his argu-
ment, there was really no arguing with the judgment of history. That fact 
required him to make some major compromises and accommodations in 
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1848 and 1849, but before the revolution his distance from actual politics 
and the seemingly unchanging condition of Germany usually, but not 
always, saved him from having to reappraise his views. He thought 
about the promise that the future held, and he judged events by the con-
tribution that they made to reaching that future. The result was a sort of 
principled opportunism that made it impossible for Droysen and his fel-
lows to resist on ethical grounds whatever succeeded, however seem-
ingly unwelcome it might be. He became adept at finding silver linings in 
dark clouds. 
His first use in 1843 of the actual term right of history provides a nice 
case in point. It appears in a letter to a friend that Droysen had published 
in a limited number of copies of his History of Hellenism. Later, an editor en-
titled it the "Theology of History." There, in a sustained comparison of 
Hellenism with the French Revolution of 1789, Droysen noted the vast de-
struction of old ways that each had occasioned yet insisted that both were 
justified because the former had promoted, and the latter was still pro-
moting, historical progress.s This was as close as Droysen could come to 
applying to history the external moral standards that he deplored in 
Schlosser's writings. His vision of history as the sequential unfolding of a 
plan seen all at once by the deity saved him from judging history by a uni-
versal criterion without forcing him to accept the present as simply and 
self-sufficiently good. His concept of the right of history perfectly met his 
needs. It sanctioned change, even far-reaching and sudden change, with-
out praising change as such or subjecting history to review according to 
timeless principles, and it allowed him at the same time to batter the de-
fenses of what he called the "historical" party: "If the so-called historical 
view has no higher criterion than that of the fait accompli . .. then logically 
it can raise no kind of appeal against the phase of development that it 
damns. It is thoughtlessness to appeal to historical right without at the 
same time being willing to recognize the right of history."6 In other words, 
Droysen was a liberal not just in the sense of seeking, through reforms, 
greater individual freedom and state responsiveness to society, though 
these objectives were central to his program. He was a liberal also in the 
sense of relying on the progressive march of historical process, though for. 
him the invisible hand was providential rather than economic. 
Droysen had a strong sense of invidious contrast between conserva-
tive defenders of the existing order and those, himself among them, who 
were ready to lead the way to historically necessary change: 
As long as they see in history only the right of vis inertiae, they can justify only with 
exclamations, count only on the sympathy of [those who share] common privi-
leges, and their judgment is only arbitrariness and prejudice, confusing rather than 
enlightening, embittering instead of preparing for reconciliation .... For only a 
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truly historical point of view of the present, of its tasks, its means, its limitations, will 
be able to remedy the sad disorder of our political and social affairs and to point 
out the correct route to a happier future? 
That is, Droysen's concept of the "right of history" allowed him to point 
out what he saw as the mindless and self-serving character of conservative 
appeals to "historical right." Of course, his own argument was also self-
serving, because it was not hard to imagine where, or to whom, contem-
poraries would have to look for the needed "truly historical outlook." His 
legitimation of historical change was an assertion of the special authority 
and dignity of historians. It was also an appeal to thoughtful conservatives 
inasmuch as he suggested that the present was at an impasse such that 
only men like himself could be "enlightening" rather than "confusing," 
"preparing for reconciliation" rather than "embittering." 
This approach was problematic in two ways. First, it was an instance 
of the natural fallacy, namely, the practice of deriving an ought from an is. 
Droysen had granted history an unimpeachable right to its contents and 
freed it from judgment by any external standards. History provided its 
own justification. That being the case, it might be presumptuous to de-
mand change and difficult to explain why one change would be better than 
another. History, not the historian, had the last word. Second, and equally 
serious, the predestinarian quality of Droysen's argument also made ques-
tionable the wisdom of working for change. In practical terms, intervening 
in behalf of change might, at best, be redundant and, at -Worst, nUstaken 
because it was obviously difficult to discover God's intentions. That is, hu-
man intervention might simply be a matter of trying to make history do 
what it would do in any case, and it might also mean unintentionally try-
ing to force it out of its proper channel. In psychological terms, the call to 
action was contrary to the historical complacency that Droysen's theory 
logically implied. If everything would ultimately work out for the best be-
cause of historical necessity, then, in a sense, everything already was work-
ing out for the best at any moment in history. 
Droysen's efforts to master and remove these difficulties were not 
completely consistent. That is not surprising. Simultaneous insistence on 
the reality of free will and necessity creates enormous, probably insoluble, 
problems. Droysen admired order and system, but not oversimplification. 
At times, he seemed to counsel either confident expectation or, failing that, 
resigned acceptance of whatever God might send. Thus, in 1843 in his "The-
ology of History" he wrote: "The highest task of our scholarship is really 
theodicy."8 Similarly, in 1846 in his Lectures on the Wars of Free do III he wrote 
that "faith offers us the consolation that a hand of God bears us" and then 
remarked that "the discipline of history" consequently had "no higher task 
than to justify this faith."9 By claiming that the proper task of the historian 
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was to demonstrate divine benevolence in history, he was by implication 
advising people to reconcile themselves with history rather than to change 
it. As Droysen's remarks about the "right of history" show, however, he re-
ally wanted change and he also wanted to take a hand in bringing it about. 
He had arguments to justify this more characteristic position. 
These arguments rested on the theology that Droysen had expounded 
to Perthes in and after 1836. At that time Droysen distinguished radically 
between the divine and human experience of history. God knew all things 
at once, so that everything appeared meaningful and necessary. Human 
beings, however, saw events only in sequence, so that actions seemed free 
and contingent. In short, they lived and acted in history. Standing aside ex-
pectantly, therefore, was nonsense because there would be no history un-
less human beings acted. Their actions would succeed or fail to the extent 
that they realized God's plans. That meant that it was really a question of 
knowing what actions to take and when to take them. Only historians 
could supply that knowledge, and that was why Droysen thought of his-
tory as a calling. Without claiming infallibility, he thought that he was well 
placed to tell people what to do and when to do it. His predictions were 
just a matter of supplying as clear and reliable a map as possible. Before 
1848 he was generally confident that his map was of high quality, though 
he never actually proved that valid prediction was possible. He seems to 
have been aware of this fact, because in the "Theology of History," he ad-
mitted that no adequate philosophy of history yet existed and that no 
"Kant" had yet demonstrated a "categorical imperative of history."lo In 
the absence of such a systematic philosophy, Droysen chose the next best 
thing and reasoned from analogy by employing an image first used in 
1838 in his article "On Greek Literature," in which he referred to history 
as a "stream" and a "linear directedness."l1 Between 1843 and 1848, these 
and their equivalents were Droysen's standard metaphors for historical 
progress. They served not only to suggest ineluctable, onward flow but 
also to indicate how he inferred the future from what had gone before. 
His fullest and most revealing use of the stream analogy occurred in a 
passage from the "Theology of History," possibly because he wrote the 
piece for selected readers and, so, could be franker than when writing for 
the general public: 
Only by collectively regarding history as the development of humanity can indi-
vidual formations (Gestaltungen)-nations, cultures, states, individuals-acquire 
their true significance; even that which is true, beautiful, right, noble does not tran-
scend time and place but, on the contrary, possesses its mass and energy as a re-
sult of the fact that it is, as it were, projected upon a here-and-now. And, again, this 
collective life of humanity is an uninterrupted stream-in the thousandfold eddies 
and whirlpools [there'is] a direction that all the water follows, whether quickly or 
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slowly-there is a restless movement onwards, whose goal we may intimate from 
the direction. Nota stream of the sort where stagnant pools and puddles may not 
form on the shore, but the next flood drags them along downstream; nor is it a pro-
gression such that every kind of spiritual existence, every form of human activity 
simultaneously develops more highly in equal pulses.12 
In this dense passage, Droysen presents a series of his major ideas that ex-
plain both his confidence in the future and his confidence in discerning it. 
First, human history was a unified and single process with a collective 
meaning. That was why he felt justified in discussing German politics in 
world-historical terms. Second, events could be judged only in historical 
terms, only in terms of a "here-and-now" (by which he really meant a 
flthere-and-then"). That was why he avoided conscious use of external 
standards and tried to make history reveal its own meaning. Third, his-
tory's unity did not mean that progress occurred with uniform rapidity at 
all times and places. 
This explained away potentially embarrassing cases of stagnation and 
partly accounts for his repeated insistence that historians be empirical in 
order that evidence might govern their conclusions. Finally, and most im-
portant, prediction was possible, at least in general terms. To the degree 
that his riverine analogy was apt, he could foretell the future because it is 
obviously possible to learn a lot about where a river is headed by noting 
the direction of its flow. By the same token, and without inconsistency, he 
spared himself the impossible task of trying to describe the future in de-
tail. From a vantage point upstream, after all, it is not possible to anticipate 
every twist and tum ahead. With those points established, or at least as-
serted, to his own satisfaction, Droysen undertook to instruct his public so 
as it prepare it for its future. Again, his vision of history had both a con-
servative and a revolutionary aspect, and his belief that history was pre-
destined could imply that one should either wait for history to happen or 
actively help it achieve its necessary results. Despite continual ambiva-
lence in both areas, Droysen generally wanted to help change occur as 
quickly as possible, though without resort to revolution. His sense of his' 
own role in forwarding change is a further, and an important, part of his 
resolution of the difficulties that his theories raised, but his understanding 
of this role makes sense only in light of his reading of the tendency of mod-
ern history as the latest and, as far as solving the problem of freedom was 
concerned, the final stage of world history. The year 1843 was a benchmark 
not only for his articulation of historical theory but also for his interpreta-
tion of the historical process. In the latter, as in the former, area he elabo-
rated more fully ideas that he had already entertained in the 1830s. Now, 
as in those earlier statements, he employed Hegel's conception of a final, 
Germanic age completing and perfecting a freedom only limitedly 
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achieved by the Greeks. Now, as then, he filled those Hegelian forms with 
a content based on his own reading of the classics and increasingly, be-
cause of his teaching load at Kiel, data from medieval and modern history. 
His basic claim was that his own age and country would soon com-
plete in political and social terms the agenda set by the sixteenth-century 
Reformation, which he deeply admired and which, at least since 1829, he 
had closely associated with Prussia.13 History, he thought, was about to 
complete its tasks. That is, he saw in sixteenth-century Germany the pre-
liminary, and in nineteenth-century Germany the final and definitive, so-
lution to the world-historical problem of freedom. For this reason, his 
interpretation of the Reformation turned on his understanding of the pe-
riods preceding it. His discussion of antiquity drew on the ideas that he 
had already published in the 1830s, whereas his more schematic discus-
sion of the Middle Ages was the result of what he had learned in prepar-
ing his lectures at Kiel before 1843. He was therefore able, not altogether 
convincingly, to portray the classical and medieval periods as dialectical 
opposites that the Reformation mediated on a spiritual level and that his 
own age would reconcile in actual political practice. 
Droysen sweepingly characterized antiquity in terms of a tendency to 
remove God, and the supernatural in general, from the world, a tendency 
that he labeled Weltentgotterung ("de-godizing the world").14 This was a 
highly abstract way of describing the combined effects of Greek irreligion 
and the Macedonian conquest on paganism. He had discussed these ef-
fects in the first volume of The History of Hellenism, where he had claimed 
that they invited religious innovation and, more specifically, the advent 
of Christianity.15 Given the circumstances of its appearance, Christianity 
(and, interestingly, medieval Islam) before the Reformation displayed the 
countervailing tendency of detaching God from the world. This he termed 
Gottentweltlichung (" de-worldizing God").16 These characterizations, which 
are hardly fair to either the ancient or the medieval world, received fuller 
treatment later in 1843 in his public lecture "On the Millenial Celebration 
of the Treaty of Verdun," which he delivered to students and towns-
people at Kiel. 
A speech on the occasion of the thousandth anniversary of the treaty 
that divided the Carolingian Empire into three parts obviously encour-
aged the speaker to take a long view of events. Given his preoccupation 
with the past and the future, Droysen really needed no encouragement to 
take this view of affairs. He explained to his possibly baffled listeners that 
pagan antiquity had treasured an ideal of freedom limited only to this 
world. That ideal could briefly support a vigorous political life, as it had 
in fifth-century Athens, but it was flawed because it was a form of "acos-
mism." Droysen meant that when it did not ignore divinity altogether, it 
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recognized merely a" dualism" in which nature and supernature coexisted 
but did not interact. That was why Athenian freedom destroyed itself and 
why paganism did not endure. The ancients divorced God from the world 
and thus cut themselves off from the restraints of divine guidance. The 
converse Christian doctrine of the word made flesh, Droysen continued, 
promised to remedy this defect but was unable for centuries to keep that 
promise because medieval Christianity replied to the excessive secularism 
of "declining antiquity" with" an equally blind hatred and rejection of the 
secular."17 Here, too, the effect was to separate God and the world. 
Droysen's sweeping generalizations may seem oddly out of place in 
an attempt to explain why humanity had not yet achieved a lasting polit-
ical freedom, but to Droysen they seemed very much to the point. Though 
he did not explicitly identify it, his underlying assumption is clear enough: 
life in the state had to embody the central principle of the historical process 
where contingent human actions fulfilled God's immanent purpose and 
where freedom and necessity were simultaneously present. On that 
premise, it was clearly necessary to link God and the world. That was why 
Droysen admired the Reformation so deeply and saw it as both the start of 
modem history and the beginning of history'S completion. Modernity, in 
this view, eliminated the dross and combined what was best in the two 
preceding periods. It combined a profound "enthusiasm for classical an-
tiquity" with a deep and purified religiosity and thus summoned Chris-
tianity to its true historical mission "in the ever vital and present 
interpenetration of the mortal and the eternal (Durchdringung des Endlichen 
mit dem Ewigen), in the priesthood of all believers, in the most intimate and 
personal participation of each individual in his justification." Christianity 
could at last overcome the" complete dualism" of antiquity that had de-
sqoyed the original "intermeshing of God and world" (Verschlungenheit 
Gottes und der Welt) while also escaping the "equally unfruitful extra-
worldliness, the equally blind despisal and rejection of the secular" char-
acteristic of the Middle Ages,18 
It would be a mistake to make these ideas seem clearer than they are, 
though it is possible that Droysen buried a reasonably straightforward ar-
gulnent under the murky abstractions he used to state his major points. 
This much is clear: He thought of history as beginning and ending with a 
close association between God and the world, and he did not see the in-
tervening periods as wasted time because the reunion between the 
worldly and the divine that the Reformation began would be at a higher 
level than that which preceded the discovery of freedom in ancient Athens. 
It would be higher because, at last, political freedom would exist under the 
seal of divinity. Droysen left no doubt that his excursus on religious his-
tory was laden with political implications. Thus, in another and nearly 
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contemporary work, he followed Hegel fairly closely in blaming ancient 
worldliness both for the decline of ancient Athens and, a novel claim, for 
the low esteem in which the ancients held "private life."19 Moreover, he ac-
cused the undue elevation of the divine during the Middle Ages of lower-
ing the power and prestige of the state to such an extent that political 
authority "consisted of nothing but rights and freedoms, private legali-
ties."20 Political practice, in other words, was a direct result of the Chris-
tian religious outlook. 
That was why the Reformation seemed so filled with political promise. 
In Droysen's view, it laid the spiritual foundations for modem statehood 
and, moreover, foreshadowed the future harmony between public and pri-
vate, between community and individual. That is, it sought to restore the 
embracing public demands of ancient statehood without damaging "the 
entire plenitude of the Christian development of the personality." As in 
1831, so now more than a decade later, Droysen wanted two things that 
were hard to combine: both protection of the private and individual and 
the creation of a strong state that could draw on the energies and loyalties 
of its citizens. Because of the Reformation, he believed, the private and the 
public would not merely coexist; they would complement and draw 
strength from each other. Individual freedom, the political extension of 
Luther's "priesthood of all believers," would flourish because the state 
was powerful, and that freedom would, in tum, greatly strengthen this 
state, which would be "absolutely immoral" (absolut unsittlich) without it: 
"Only through freedom and for the sake of freedom can the state possess 
that unlimited power; the state must, like the Reformation before it, rec-
ognize, establish, and activate in reality a priesthood of all believers."21 
The freedom that Droysen had in mind was a perfect case in point of 
what Leonard Krieger called the "German idea of freedom." On the one 
hand, it gave scope to individual preference and idiosyncracy only in mat-
ters in which the state, by any definition, was uninterested. On the other 
hand, and insofar as properly public matters were concerned, it was a free-
dom of each to agree with all, really a freely willed acceptance of author-
ity.22 In order fully to understand Droysen's conception of freedom, 
however, it is necessary to review his descriptions of the future state in 
view of his discussions of post-Reformation history. He discussed these 
matters in compact form in the "Verdun Speech" and in scattered com-
ments and asides in various pamphlets and articles. He gave them ex-
tended and systematic treatment in the two sizable volumes of his Lectures 
on the Wars of Freedom. Although the first volume did not appear until 1846 
and the second only in 1848, the work is good evidence for Droysen's 
views at least after 1843. His extended arguments ill these volumes are 
congruent with what he had been saying since 1843, and, in any case, his 
42 Droysen and the Prussian School of History 
chapters are just polished versions of the lecture series in modem history 
that he gave at Kiel from 1843 to 1848. His point of departure was the 
growth of absolutism, despite the Reformation's invitation to freedom un-
der authority, and his argument rests on a crucial distinction between 
"powers" (Machte) and "states" (Staaten). 
By "powers" he meant the absolutist states that began to appear in the 
sixteenth and flourished in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Al-
though he acknowledged them to be historically necessary and therefore 
good, he termed them "powers" in order to signal that their authority was 
a matter of fact rather than of right. In doing so, he did not mean simply to 
delegitimate them. He had no absolute standards of moral reference by 
which to do so. By the "right of history," they were legitimate for the time 
and place in which they existed, but, in his view, they were no longer nec-
essary in his own century. He therefore felt entitled to point out their flaws 
through an invidious comparison with the "states" that would soon sup-
plant them. Droysen, therefore, discussed their appearallce with a mea-
sure of ambivalence. He thought that he knew what political life ought to 
be like, so he praised the "powers" for contributing to its eventual ap-
pearance while damning them for not conforming to its standards. On the 
one hand, their advent was welcome because they had a major historical 
task to perform inasmuch as there could be "no mention of statehood and 
the common good" as long as political power, which was properly unitary, 
remained divided between princes and estates.23 
This was basically a utilitarian argument in which he justified the 
"powers" in terms of the eventual (and unintended) effects of their con-
struction, though he of course also meant that God had foreseen and willed 
both cause and effect. On the other hand, because he was fighting the con-
tinued existence of "powers" in the German Confederation, he found 
much to object to in them. When the princes defeated the estates, they also 
defeated the principle of representation, and the principle of acquisition by 
conquest and inheritance meant that frontiers were drawn without refer-
ence to the wishes of the affected populations. In the Lectures, therefore, 
Droysen described this as a "political system ... that ... was sick, un-
wholesome, monstrous through and through." At another point in the 
same work he asked rhetorically who owned a "power" and answered: 
"Not this land, not this people, but a monarch who possessed land and 
people as property, as a domain that his avarice counselled him to exploit 
as well as possible;-what was the state? Not the immanent generality of 
the historical and legal life of this naturally united population but the tri-
umph of the landlordly over every other historical right, a.n abstraction of . 
enormous power, of infinite pretension, and this left to the arbitrariness of 
a mortal who, by his power, was like a god on earth."24 
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In so arguing, Droysen was well within the European tradition, feudal 
in origin, of regarding patrimonial government with horror. He was more 
original in expressing a further ambivalence. The "powers" were de-
testable, but their very wrongness was really a hidden blessing because it 
assured an eventual moral reaction against them. Not only did their ex-
ternal expansion and internal integration make it possible to realize the po-
litical potential of the Reformation, but their essential arbitrariness was 
also good, because once their historical tasks were accomplished, it called 
forth the resistance that would finally produce the state as "the highest 
moral order (sittliche Ordnung) in which a man can live."25 This was a log-
ical consequence of viewing history as theodicy. Seeming bad, including 
despotism, was really hidden good, in this case because it would, in fact 
had to, destroy itself. Self-destruction was the last of its necessary histori-
cal tasks. 
The manifest illegitimacy of the "powers" required their replacement 
with "states." Droysen's use of this key term is clearest in his discussions 
of the first, partial attempts at statehood in late-eighteenth and early-
nineteenth-century Prussian history. In keeping with the demands of his 
historical theory, he preferred to discuss principles through specific his-
torical instances rather than in general terms. He had, nonetheless, a work-
ing definition for the s.tate. The state, he argued, "lives and is indestructible 
in its people (Volk)" because it "awakens life, strength, dedication in all its 
members and they, again, certain of finding in it their noblest good, spare 
no trouble to raise it, no danger to advance it, no sacrifice to preserve it." 
The state, in other words, was an intense community whose strength de-
rived from the voluntary exertions of its citizens. This was in marked con-
trast to the powers' need to compel their passive subjects to act in their 
behalf. Droysen saw statehood as so self-sufficiently attractive that he be-
lieved that the "poverty of special dynastic interests, the pretension of 
caste privileges, the rottenness of ecclesiastical inheritance should vanish 
before so elevated a task." Again, he thought of the state as the "highest 
moral order. "26 
Before reviewing Droysen's analysis of the inevitable approach of 
statehood in Germany, it is important to note two major assumptions on 
which it rested. First, the essential morality of statehood did not mean that 
amoral, or even immoral, motivations were unnecessary for its establish-
ment. Droysen's vision of the historical process required this to be the case. 
Historical outcomes were not simply the will of God; they were also the 
products of human decisions, frequently made out of self-interest and fre-
quently having major unintended effects. This belief was theological in ori-
gin, and it placed Droysen in the liberal tradition, broadly defined: the 
common good was a result of individual pursuits. Second, Droysen's evi-
44 Droysen and the Prussian School of History 
dent nationalism coexisted with a marked cosmopolitanism. He was, of 
course, mainly interested in freedom and unity for Germany, and he saw 
Prussia as the chief actor in the approaching drama that would lead to 
those results, but he also insisted that Germany's task had been set by 
world history and that Germany's accomplishment would benefit the rest 
of the world. Only after the disappointments of 1848-49 would he write of 
peculiarly German virtues and think of German gains as coming at the ex-
pense of other nations. 
He did, however, think that history had selected Germany, and espe-
cially Prussia, for the unique historical role of solving the problem of free-
dom through the introduction of statehood. Admittedly, the replacement 
of powers with states was an event in world history, and Germany was not 
alone in moving toward political reconstruction. Germany was, however, 
the only nation situated to do the job well and in such a way that her ex-
ample would set the standard for other nations. In so doing, Germany 
would continue and perfect a process already begun in the Protestant 
North, for example, in British North America. His admiration for the 
American Revolution and for the United States was very real, though his 
discussions of American politics were poorly informed and probably had 
more to do with an affinity for American Protestantism than a critical un-
derstanding of American historyP In any case, American events had a 
mainly indicative significance for Droysen. They showed which way his-
tory was heading without speeding history's progress: America was too 
unlike Europe to teach political lessons to the old Continent.28 He saw in 
the French Revolution of 1789 another indication of coming change, 
though he distinguished sharply between what it promised and what it de-
livered. Its outbreak was a welcome sign of the approach of statehood, but 
its actual course seemed to him a terrible example of how not to go about 
building a state. He deplored French centralism and believed that the rev-
olution created only an inverted power in which political property was in 
the hands of an atomized populace rather than a hereditary monarch.29 
Only Germany or, more precisely, the Hohenzollern monarchy was his-
torically placed to bring true statehood to the Old World. 
At first glance, this conclusion seems strange, because under Droy-
sen's terms of analysis, disunited Germany was very far removed from 
statehood. Droysen's view of history, however, provided for the last be-
coming first. In Germany, the contradictions that the powers presented 
were so glaring and so hateful that they provided the needed impetus for 
change. Moreover, Germany was the land of the Reformation and there-
fore possessed the moral and intellectual prerequisites for statehood. 
Statehood required both a harmony between government and governed 
and the possession of a territory and population large enough for the state 
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to make its wishes felt beyond its borders. Neither was possible in Ger-
many without major constitutional changes and a redrawing of the Ger-
man political map. In the pursuit of statehood, that is, Germany had, in 
dialectical irony, the advantage of singularly pressing need. Because of the 
peculiar nature and situation of Prussia since the Reformation, she also 
had the advantage of opportunity. Droysen searched the Prussian past and 
present for indications that history had prepared her for the inevitable task 
of unifying Germany as a state, and he thought that he found the evidence 
that he needed. He did not yet argue, as he would after 1848, that Prussia 
had always acted in the general German interest. Instead, his argument 
turned on a reading of the supposedly objective requirements of Prussian 
self-interest: Prussia would unify Germany into a state in the full sense of 
the term because it was in Prussia's interest to do so and because the legacy 
of the Reformation provided Prussia with the moral equipment necessary 
for this task. Despite his obvious (and often disappointed) Prussian patri-
otism, Droysen tried to be as unblinkered and unsentimental as possible 
in presenting this case. Prussia had been, and currently was, a power 
among the powers of Europe, though with the important distinction that 
her devastation during the Thirty Years' War forced her rulers to be espe-
cially ruthless and unbending in asserting and consolidating royal power 
at the expense of all competitors. Once that historically necessary, and 
therefore justifiable, assertion and consolidation was complete in the reign 
of Frederick William I, an opposing tendency toward statehood appeared 
under Frederick the Great that moved the monarchy well, if emly tem-
porarily, on the way to "state citizenship" (Staatsburgerthum).30 
Droysen had in mind two accomplishments, both occasioned by Fred-
erick's perception of Prussia's political interests and both filled with 
promise for the Prussian and German future. The first was Frederick's em-
bracing of the German national cause in the not very successful League of 
Princes (Furstenbund). In his article "The Political Position of Prussia" 
(1845), he attributed to this early effort the "development of nations" (En-
twicklung der Volker) in the nineteenth century and the maintenance of 
peace among the German states.31 The second, and more important, ac-
complishment was Frederick's attempt to raise political life in Prussia to a 
"higher formation" by conceiving of the polity as "the common property 
of everyone." Droysen expressly acknowledged the limited and partial na-
ture of these achievements. Frederick's subjects, he claimed, were "on the 
way to state citizenship," but "only just on the way." In addition, he be-
lieved that Frederick resolved the contradiction between public and pri-
vate "only in an extremely superficial fashion." These limitations did not 
bother him because he was convinced that Frederick had done all that 
could be done without undercutting his position as a hereditary 
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monarch.32 Again, Droysen believed that history moved through specific 
decisions undertaken out of self-interest, which both caused and con-
stricted Frederick's reforms. It was inevitable, and therefore good, that af-
ter Frederick's death Prussia became again a mere "power." Observable 
political interests would assure that the relapse was only momentary and, 
he found, lasted only until Prussia's crushing defeat in the battles of Jena 
and Auerstedt in 1806, after which Prussia made a second, and more 
nearly successful, approach to statehood. In discussing the effects and sig-
nificance of the Prussian reforms, he singled out the Baron vom Stein for 
special praise, but he really had the objective situation of Prussia in mind, 
and, to the extent that his history could have heroes, the real hero was the 
Prussian monarchy itself. In his treatment of vom Stein (or of Frederick the 
Great or, for that matter, Alexander the Great) Droysen, following Hegel, 
thought of great men as agents chosen to perform, often indeliberately, 
tasks that history had set and that they identified in terms of immediate 
exigencies and opportunities.33 Droysen nonetheless saw Stein's brief 
tenure in office as a major foreshadowing of subsequent Prussian, Ger-
man, and world history. 
He believed that under Stein's leadership, Prussia had achieved some-
thing "qualitatively different" in history. The "reborn Prussia," he urged, 
was" a state of the new age, the first that began to mediate in a positive way 
the great contradiction into which the Revolution had polarized Europe."34 
The choice of terms is significant. "Positive mediation" is the same term 
that Droysen used to characterize the sixteenth-century Reformation. He 
now used it to suggest that Stein's reforms prefigured the second, social 
and political, reformation that was yet to come. This mediation would be 
institutional and practical. The "contradiction" to be mediated was be-
tween the older kind of "power" in which the monarch owned land and 
people and the newer kind, created in revolutionary France, in which 
ownership was vested in the populace. That is, Droysen wrote in the 
nearly obsequious language that he reserved for feats of Prussian states-
manship, the "firm, keenly perceptive, powerful" Stein "for the first time 
raised Prussia's vision far beyond and above the old dynastic politics to 
[one that was] German-national; annihilated as a power, it began to estab-
lish itself as a state." In explaining this development, Droysen again made 
significant use of the dual meaning of the German noun Volk: Under Stein, 
he claimed, "the Volk of Prussia began to see itself to be a Volk and to be 
German;" In other words, the Prussian "people" became aware of itself 
both as a community and as a part of the German "nation." The Prussian 
reforms, then, were a step on the way to both statehood for Prussia and 
unification for Germany as a whole. In both aspects, the reforms led both 
to the empowerment of the citizenry and to a major increase in state power 
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by virtue of the newly forged union of rulers and ruled. Droysen made this 
point when he argued that Stein began "that massive transformation ... of 
all the internal political relationships (Staatsverhiiltnisse) that one describes 
as the first attempt to combine civil liberty (bilrgerliche Freiheit), as England 
preserved it, with political energy (staatliche Energie), which the Revolution 
created, or more correctly to augment the full power of the throne through 
the citizenship of the nation (Staatsbilrgerlichkeit des Volkes), to comprehend 
and form the state in the truth of its moral calling, to establish it in this its 
historical position."35 • 
This analysis bore in two ways on creating a stable freedom by re-
solving the contradiction between the old monarchic and the new revolu-
tionary practice. First, a prince could not own a self-conscious nation in the 
way that, in a "power," he owned a population. Second, and conversely, a 
nation that saw itself as such would possess a degree of internal unity that 
would prevent it from owning the governmental apparatus in the way that 
the atomized population of revolutionary France supposedly had done. In 
fact, and for Droysen this was the defining essence of statehood, there 
could no longer be a contradiction between the interests and wishes of the 
government and the governed. He consequently reserved an area of "civil 
liberty," of purely personal freedom, that stood apart from the state, but 
he could not accept the idea of rights held against the state or popular con-
trol over it. This outlook had powerful effects on his attitude toward con-
stitutional projects during the meeting of the first Prussian United Diet in 
1847 and during his membership in the National Assembly in 1848-49. 
Droysen stated these ideas in synthetic form in a very important pas-
sage in which he tried to sum up the historical meaning of Stein's work. 
His language is almost rapturous, and his successive abstractions show 
how the state was the solution to the problem of freedom that was central 
in his theological reading of world history. The excitement that the passage 
shows is both a function of the religious conviction that underlies it and of 
Droysen's belief, of course untested by experience of his own in German 
politics, that freedom in the state would be incomparably satisfying to its 
future citizens. "The many and the one, the people and the state," he re-
flected, "that is the old contradiction." In Stein's Prussia, however, for 
the first but not the last time in history the units of those pairs were 
no longer externally along side of one another, nor against each other, nor the one 
instead of the other, but the state is the nation's, the nation the state's (der Staat ist 
des Volkes, das Volk des Staates) in essential reciprqcity,like the body and soul of a 
man, only incomparably richer than a merely organic life. For the nation is not 
merely the sum of its statistical strengths, not a barren monotony of political voices; 
the state is not the patrimony or ... a common denominator of innumerable arbi-
trary privileges and traditions. Its basis and objective is the "will of free men," is 
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the "royal emancipation of the moral man"; therein it desires its existence in law 
and history, just as it desires its final certainty in religion, its recognition in schol-
arship, its achievement in property ... for it is that in man which is godly.36 
The state, that is, would give freedom a durability that it had lacked in an-
cient Athens by suiting it to the requirements of human nature and, in so 
doing, would complete the work of the sixteenth-century Reformation in 
constitutional terms. To underscore that implication he included the brief 
quotations from Fichte and made the state into a kind of community of be-
lievers by identifying it with "that in man which is godly.// He had made 
the same point, more briefly but in more explicit language, in 1843 when 
he described the state as the social and political version of Luther's "priest-
hood of all believers.//37 
Droysen's characterization of Stein's accomplishments was, of course, 
highly idealized and was as much the product of wishful thinking as of em-
pirical research. In any case, the moral qualities to which he pointed would 
not be revealed by data in the normal sense of the term. The important point 
is that he was subjectively certain that he had discovered a historical truth 
of the first magnitude, one that explained the real significance of early-
nineteenth-century Prussia and that also foretold what the completed 
Prusso-German state would be like. In this certitude, Droysen parted com-
pany with most European, though not most German, liberalism. In ex-
plaining the rise of the powers and, further, people's subsequent rejection 
of them in favor of statehood, he invoked what can be called market forces, 
namely the progressive role of the competing play of individual interests 
and preferences. In the state proper, however, this competition ceased or, 
more accurately, became confined to the limited and secondary zone of 
private interests. Now, as in earlier years,.Droysen valued these interests 
and wanted them freed from unnecessary controls, but they had no direct 
bearing on the state, which, again, he identified with "that in man which is 
godly.//38 Under statehood, self-interested competition ceased, and freely 
willed acts in the common interest replaced it. 
This is not to suggest that Droysen was an early totalitarian. After all, 
he not only took care to reserve an area for private rights but also insisted 
that the unity of the state could exist only because its citizens really would 
be in free agreement with each other, and, perhaps naiVely, he never sug-
gested that this agreement would have to be compelled. Moreover, it was 
. only common sense to acknowledge that private interests are often 
parochial and selfish. Droysen the Christian no doubt wanted to see hu-
manity redeemed, and he imagined the state as the agent of redemption. 
Redemption in the form of public-mindedness must have seemed espe-
cially attractive in a Germany divided among competing sovereignties, 
J 
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sharply defined social orders and classes, East and West, North and South, 
and still distrustful confessions. It is also true that he thought of statehood, 
as anticipated under Stein and as it would be in the future, as a qualitative 
change in the human experience of history: the people, the nation, would 
at last really be one. 
In view of the vast importance that Droysen attached to Stein's work, 
it is at first surprising to note the lack of rancor with which Droysen noted 
Stein's dismissal at Napoleon's command and his replacement with Har-
denberg, who, in Droysen's opinion, made Prussia a "power" once more. 
His calm could be explained by piety, because his concept of the "right 
of history" logically required him to accept whatever happened as neces~ 
sary and therefore good, but that cannot be the whole answer, because 
Droysen was not always psychologically capable of such acceptance. 
He could be accepting in this case for several reasons. First, he was deal-
ing with events three decades in the past, so he did not have to deal with 
disappointed hopes. Second, he could take comfort in the belief that Stein 
had planted the "seeds" of a future and irreversible shift, to statehood.39 
That was why he wanted to instruct his listeners and readers in Stein's 
accomplishments. 
Finally, and most important, he could again use his consistent talent 
for finding the real good in seeming evil. Just as Prussia's defeat had 
made Stein's work possible, so Stein's defeat and, more generally, the in-
adequacies of the 1815 settlement made the ultimate triumph of state-
hood in Germany all the more certain. As long-but only as long-as 
eventual victory seemed inevitable, Droysen did not worry about a delay 
of a few decades in the solution of the problem that had haunted human-
ity, by his reckoning, since the sixth century H.C.E. His belief in the in-
evitability of victory rested on two factors in the 1815 settlement that he 
singled out as especially important: (1) the constitutional inadequacies 
and the arbitrary frontiers of the German Confederation and (2) Prussia's 
internal composition and disadvantageous position among the other 
great powers. These factors were specific instances of how the powers, 
once they had accomplished their necessary historical tasks, invited their 
own destruction and replacement with states. This specification, how-
ever, had the added advantage of allowing Droysen to point to current 
politics to show why Prussia, prodded by self-interest but acting for 
Germany, would perform the central task of world history by politically 
completing the Reformation. 
Although Droysen detested the German Confederation, he took plea-
sure in its establishment and constitution for several reasons. First, its con-
struction made unification easier to accomplish. Its founders had not tried 
to restore the Holy Roman Empire. On the contrary, and in a way that re-
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produced the constructive work of absolutizing monarchs two centuries 
earlier, its authors had cleared away the rubble of tiny sovereignties and 
quasi-sovereignties to create a smaller number of more or less enlarged 
monarchies and independent cities. In this respect alone, he thought their 
work "endlessly valuable to Germany."40 Now there were fewer Gentian 
polities to unify. "It was," he argued, "a great necessity that divided Ger-
many and then decimated its countless little principalities and then so 
wonderfully ... united so loose and irrational a compound of sovereign 
princes and free cities." This was not the founders' intention, but it was 
also not mere accident. The negotiators at Vienna in 1815 acted either with 
"cleverness or blindness, good or ill will, weakness of character or strength 
of will." The important point was that they were "only the means or in-
struments with which the necessity of our historical developments were 
realized." Not only had they made unification easier by simplifying Ger-
many's internal frontiers; they had undertaken that simplification without 
the consent of the German populations and in defiance of historical tradi-
tion, so that their creation was entirely lacking in popularity and legiti-
macy. The confederation, he contended, marked" a deep cleavage between 
Germany and its great past with its thousand-year-old legal contin¢ty."41 
This meant that the "new Germany of 1815" came into existence by the 
"right of history," with the further implication that "this most legitimate 
of all rights is just as applicable against this new creation, is just as em-
powered ... to criticize its tendencies and principles."42 
He believed that this criticism would lead to action and that Prussia 
would be the actor because, for historical reasons and especially because 
of the terms of the Vienna settlement of 1815, Prussia "was not a great 
power that, acting by itself and standing for itself, could make its interests 
and development- of strength current against the other great powers."43 
Thatis, Prussia as reconstituted in 1815 could satisfy her own political in-
terests only by acting in behalf of Germany as a whole, by merging her 
own identity with that of the larger German nation. In advancing this ar-
gument, Droysen seriously underrated the power and durability of Pruss-
ian particularism, although he was perceptive enough to note in 1847 that 
a Prussian constitution might divert Prussia from her national mission.44 
He did not, however, simply ignore the fact of Prussian self-esteem and 
self-interest. On the contrary, he emphasized the unsatisfactory nature of 
Prussia's position after 1815 in order to show that Prussia's rulers, when 
they finally took an unblinkered look at her situation, would work for na-
tional unification and statehood as a means ofredress. 
Droysen recurred to this argument frequently before and during the 
revolution of 1848,but he first and most fully presented it in 1844 in the ar-
ticle "The Political Position of Prussia," which he wrote for the political 
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and historical section that Max Duncker edited for the Halle'sche Allgemeine 
Literatur-Zeitung. His central, and easily demonstrable, contention was 
that "size and geographical position" made Prussia the weakest of the five 
great powers (the others were England, France, Austria, and Russia). 
Within her 1815 frontiers, Prussia was the smallest of the five, and, equally 
damaging, her Rhineland province was cut off from her other provinces 
by intervening German states. The only remedy was to "identify fully with 
Germany." This meant, of course, unifying Germany, in which, at this 
pOint, Droysen almost certainly included Austria's German-speaking 
provinces. The benefits for Prussia were obvious: she would gain in terri-
tory and population and, so, equal or exceed the other great powers in 
strength. Droysen did not, however, recommend a Prussian hegemony 
over Germany. To have done so would have been to renounce his belief in 
the inevitability of true statehood in Germany, for the state properly so 
called could not be a result of conquest and compulsion. To achieve unifi-
cation, Prussia needed the active consent of non-Prussian Germany, and, 
to gain that, Prussia had to transform herself, had, in a sense, to cease to be 
Prussia. Prussia had to become resolutely and consistently German; other-
wise, "the small states' fear of Prussian hegemony" would contain her within 
her existing frontiers.45 This meant more than advancing German interests, 
even when these differed from or conflicted with those of Prussia. Droy-
sen also maintained that Prussia would "merge into" (aufgehen) Germany 
and, during unification, would cease to exist as a political unit. While the 
Hohenzollern became the national dynasty, Prussia's provinces would 
severally join the once-sovereign German states as component units of the 
German federal state.46 This was asking a lot of the Hohenzollern monar-
chy, but Droysen felt confident in predicting this outcome. 
Droysen had two historical reasons for thinking Prussia capable of dis-
solving herself in the national (and, rightly considered, her own) interest. 
First, there was the internal variety of Prussia that made her, he thought, 
a Germany in miniature. Droysen admitted that "the progressing inner de-
velopment of the Prussian state," notable during the reign of Frederick the 
Great and under Stein, would have been a threat to national unification if it 
had led to "Prussianism" (Preuj3enthum). That is, Droysen also acknowl-
edged the dangerous possibility that Prussia, like, France, might give a 
common political identity to originally diverse territories and populationS, 
but he dismissed the danger because Prussia's populations were too di-
verse to be united on a subnational level, though he thought that they 
could be welded together through a common German nationality: "The 
East Germans and the Rhinelanders and the Saxons will be bound to each 
other only as German." Second, statehood was the coming thing and his-
tory showed that Prussia possessed "incomparable bases for state citizen-
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ship;" It followed, Droysen believed, that Prussia would become a "state" 
in his sense of the term. Statehood, however, now entailed being a Volk in 
his rich sense of "nation" as well as "people." Germany was a nation, and 
Prussia was not; therefore, Prussia would fulfill her destiny by merging 
into Germany and thus creating a German "state."47 
This demonstration, by itself, left unanswered the question of whether 
other German states would welcome the advances even of a transformed 
and self-annihilating Prussia. Despite his immense optimism, Droysen 
could not ignore this matter. He had, in fact, addressed it slightly earlier in 
his "German Letters" (1844). There he made his familiar point that in the 
present, it was necessary "to be a state" in order to possess "genuine sov-
ereignty." "The German peoples (VOlker) feel that," and, he continued, 
"they have the right to demand from the state to which they belong and for 
which they are supposed to be ready to sacrifice life and property ... the 
kind of protection and power that would give them a claim to a noble, 
strong, proven nationality." Just as Prussia needed them, so they needed 
Prussia, for they would be content with nothing less than a unified Ger-
many of the sort that only Prussia could create.48 Prussia would transform 
herself in order to unify Germany, and the rest of Germany would welcome 
and follow her lead. Droysen was quite certain that all this would happen. 
He could not be sure when it would happen, however, and in the 
meantime, he faced the difficult question of what to do while he waited for 
the inevitable to occur. He was not in a position to influence the day-to-
day conduct of events because the political institutions of the German Con-
federation and its member states were inaccessible to him. Even if he had 
been interested in elective office, and there is no evidence to suggest that 
he was, the sorts of decisions that his predictions called for would have 
been taken by princes and governments that were not responsible to leg-
islative bodies even where these existed. Nor, for the most part, were they 
interested in out-of-doors opinions, even when the expression of such 
opinions was legal. Of course, political opposition is possible under con-
ditions more unfavorable than those faced by Droysen, and he could have 
carried the struggle underground, but that would have been unimaginable 
to him. He was unrevolutionary both by temperament and conviction. 
He feared and disliked disorder, and, in any case, his image of the future 
called for collaboration with the princes. He wanted to reconstruct, not 
destroy and replace. In practical terms, then, he could be active in one 
or both of two ways. When circumstances seemed favorable, as they did 
in the crises of 1844 and 1846 over Schleswig-Holstein or in 1847 during 
the sessions of the first Prussian United Diet, he tried to influence 
Prussian policy by writing to old acquaintances then rising in the Prussian 
bureaucracy. At all times, he did what he did best and most easily, namely, 
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write and teach history in such a way as to prepare the present for its 
future tasks. 
This latter tactic, which accounted for the greatest share of his ener-
gies, was more than just a grudging concession to reality. It was a logical 
conclusion of his interpretation of history, especially recent history, and 
rested on his often repeated claim that the state was an expression of 
morality and therefore required moral preparation. Admittedly, it was 
convenient to have theory require him to do the only thing he could do, 
something that he did well and liked doing, but that merely made the the-
oryall the more convincing, because theories are persuasive to the degree 
that they correspond to practice. Droysen consequently sought both to tell 
Germans what their future held and to make them ready for that future 
through persuasive prediction. His clearest description of this task ap-
peared in the opening issue of Adolf Schmidt's Zeitschrift fur Geschichtswis-
senschaft. This was an appropriate forum for such a discussion, because 
Schmidt's journal in its four years of existence-it permanently suspended 
publication during the revolution of 1848-was the forerunner of the His-
torische Zeitschrift, founded in 1859 under Sybel's editorship, both in the 
sense of being a learned journal devoted entirely to history and in the sense 
of being outspokenly liberal and nationalist. Droysen used it to publish an 
open letter to the Hamburg publisher of Friedrich BUlau's History of Ger-
many from 1806 to 1830 (1842), in which he faulted BUlau for being too un-
critical of confederation politics. 
That topic was well suited to allow Droysen to expand on his sense of 
the historian's duties to the public or, to put it differently, to explain what 
he thought he was doing. Predictably, he laid heavy emphasis on the moral 
and, hence, political improvement that should result from the right kind 
of historical instruction. It was, he claimed, 
a serious and sacred office to hold before princes and peoples the mirror of self-
observation, to be the translator of history for them. There they shall perceive 
where they have erred and incurred guilt and how the beneficent hand of Provi-
dence has turned their error and guilt to the good. There they shall discover what 
they have irretrievably lost and to what they have a right, a claim, a hope. There 
they shall observe both their strength and their weakness in order to raise them-
selves with more serious purpose to the acknowledged calling of their historical 
position.49 
Droysen's meaning is clear enough. By helping people understand the 
past, the historian helped them master the present and anticipate the fu-
ture, for example, by making them see why the age of the "powers" was 
past and why Germany would be the first European nation to achieve true 
statehood. He also meant to show that the historian's task was basically a 
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moral one because historical knowledge was a form of self-knowledge that 
suited the knower for moral action by both making the past intelligible and 
making the future visible and attractive. The historian hastened travel by 
providing the map. 
The latter notion is by now quite familiar. Droysen had to show 
people where they were headed if they were to get there. His depiction of 
history as self-knowledge, which is conceptually distinct from his asser-
tion of predictive certainty, also deserves some attention. It was a thesis 
that he would later develop in great and often compelling detail in his lec-
tures on historical methodology. In this early form, however, it showed 
very dearly a quality that it never completely lost, namely, a strongly im-
plied identification of historical study with the sacrament of confession. 
Along with pointing out the interventions of Providence, historians had to 
identify errors and other instances of guilt. In the passage just quoted, 
Droysen said nothing about cases in which individuals earned merit by 
doing the right thing at the right time. This is not surprising, because, first, 
in his accounts, great men usually did not really know what they were 
doing and, second, and more generally, because Droysen took sinfulness 
as the usual human condition. He therefore needed to discuss what histo-
rians typically could do for typical people. 
Typical people, he believed, nee,ded redemption, and redemption re-
quired confession and sincere penitence; he surely understood the com-
monplace Christian doctrine that umepentant confession was no better 
than a failure to confess in the first place. Of course, this is not to say that 
he thought that a review of collective error and guilt was by itself sufficient 
for national redemption. There was no contradiction in supposing that al-
though penitence does not always lead to redemption, there can be no re-
demption without penitence. This is also not to say that he was imposing 
spirihial exercises suited to individual believers on the whole German na-
tion. In Droysen's scheme of things, to redeem Germany meant redeeming 
Germans. Otherwise, the German "state" could not be the political real-
ization of the "priesthood of all believers."so Its citizens had to (and, with 
proper instruction, would learn how to) will the state before it came into 
existence and, thereafter, had willingly to subordinate themselves to it. 
Both acts of will required moral energy and, in order that this energy be 
expended properly, considerable moral preparation. 
He did not limit this work of preparation to historians, indispensable 
though he thought their work to be. In 1846 he wrote a little known, though 
interesting, pamphlet entitled "On our Secondary School System" in an ef-
fort to occasion basic reforms in the gymnasia of Schleswig-Holstein, a 
subject of obvious interest to him as a professor at Kiel, which was mainly 
attended by their graduates. He recognized that these institutions, with 
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their heavy emphasis on Greek and Latin classics, existed mainly to pre-
pare students for university study, but he denied that this should be their 
sole, or even their chief, purpose. Education, he insisted, should prepare 
future citizens.51 That meant building character by teaching self-control 
and methodical application. Droysen took these virtues so seriously that, 
evidently in the belief that many adults in Schleswig-Holstein were unre-
deemed, he called for legislation to make parents responsible, under 
penalty of law, for promoting "stem order, ruliness, legality in their chil-
dren's lives."52 In the same spirit, he called for a great reduction in teach-
ing loads so that instructors could spend more time with individual 
students.53 Admittedly, much of his case reads like the understandable 
self-pleading of a harried college teacher who does not altogether approve 
of many of his students, but, as usual, Droysen was thinking in terms of a 
larger moral objective. He wanted the educational system to make it pos-
sible for students "to attain, through instruction and cultivation, a partic-
ular intellectual and moral education, specifically that which may hold as 
the general prerequisite for all who belong to the cultural estate (Stand der 
Gebildeten)."54 
On the face of it, this recommendation seems apolitical enough. Droy-
sen believed that there was and should be a cultural elite, and he advised 
educational reforms that would improve the means by which students be-
came members of it. In fact, his proposals were highly political because he 
was trying to use educational reform to meet the moral and intellectual de-
mands of statehood. The state needed highly educated citizens, at least a 
leavening of them, and Droysen wanted its cultural elite to be recruited on 
the basis of promise and talent, not just wealth or inherited social stand-
ing. This meant that the government should pay the tuition of deserving 
students who could otherwise not affordgymnasial study. 55 In making 
that recommendation, Droysen conjoined a liberal belief in careers open to 
talent With autobiographical memory. His own career, for instance, would 
have been impossible had he not been able to study on a scholarship. Re-
latedly, he wanted urban and rural schools to be merged so that students 
would grow up thinking of themselves as members of a single commu-
nity.56 Apart from making the community solidary, this measure was in 
principle egalitarian inasmuch as it was designed to eliminate, at least for 
the educated, inherited social distinctions. His suggestions, then, were po-
litical at least in the general sense of creating a basic precondition for po-
liticallife as he envisioned it, namely, the existence of an educated elite 
recruited solely on the grounds of merit. 
They were also political in a more specific sense. Droysen was an ed-
ucator who took education very seriously. Combined with his conception 
of political life, that basic attitude made him think of simply going to 
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school as a political act. A child's entrance into school, he explained, 
opened "for hltn a kind of public life (offentliches Leben)," with the result 
that school was "for youth what the state is for adults, only more directly 
intervening, more specifically leading, working up cultivation and free-
dom that shall eventually benefit the state."57 Given this assumption, it 
was entirely logical for him to insist .that the moral experience of schooling 
was more important than the acquisition of ideas and information, though 
he did not propose a relaxing of academic standards. If one can trust the 
memory of one of his former students at Kiel, Droysen tried to pattern his 
own university teaching according to these standards.58 
Droysen's uninterrupted seriousness should not lead one to suppose 
that he was opposed on principle to human happiness, though it is a mea-
sure of his seriousness that he actually tried to use historical instruction to 
demonstrate the need for human enjoyment or "eudaemonism." He saw 
this quality as central to life in the state and based this claim on his larger 
interpretation of modem history as a progressive reconciliation between 
Christian religiosity and life in this world. In his "Theology of History" 
(1843), for example, he argued that historical understanding had to inform 
faith in order that both might" collaborate as much as may be in the great 
work of the [human] race, 'leading creation back to the creator,' as the old 
mystical saying has it." To be sure, this task was part antiworldly: "Be-
tween God and us is the world. It is a matter of overcoming the world." 
But overcoming meant taming and appropriating, not despising and re-
jecting. Asceticism, he claimed, had not worked in the Middle Ages and 
would not work now. Droysen therefore called for "searching and shap-
ing, comprehending and using," and he acknowledged that what he deli-
cately termed "eudaemonistic necessities" would and should come into 
play. "Not now, not ever," he insisted, "will a moral system of ethics ap-
pear or Christian morals transcend the Law if eudaemonism does not ac-
quire its right and position; heed the word of the Apostle to give the flesh 
its due."59 The fleeting reference to St. Paul, admittedly, suggests that 
Droysen made this concession with some reluctance. 
Droysen did not limit his political use of historical instruction to gen-
era~ sketches of the future or to moral education of the sorts just discussed. 
His appointment as professor at Kiel gave him the opportunity, because 
Kiel in the 1840s was the chief theater for contention between Danish and 
German nationalism and the problems of Danish constitutional reform 
and laws of succession created crises over the duchies in 1844, 1846, and 
1848. Droysen held pronounced opinions about the prevalence of German 
nationality in the duchies, and these crises seemed to him promising op-
portunities for Prussian leadership in Germany. In order to make sense of 
his thoughts and actions, however, it is first necessary to review the situa-
tion in the duchies. . 
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From the perspective of ethnography, the conflict in Schleswig-
Holstein is just one of many continual conflicts caused by failure of historic 
and linguistic frontiers to correspond. The population of Holstein, situated 
between the Elbe and Eider Rivers, was almost wholly German speaking, 
but there were also Danish speakers, the so-called Eider Danes, as far south 
as the Eider River. The duchies'leading city, Kiel, was linguistically mixed. 
Schleswig, extending north from the Eider to the Kongeaa River, was Ger-
man speaking in majority, but with a sprinkling of Danish speakers even 
in the south and almost solidly Danish speaking in the north (which be-
came part of Denmark in the Treaty of Versailles in 1919). It has seemed 
well to use the terms German speaking and Danish speaking rather than Ger-
man or Danish because the distinction was purely linguistic until, in the 
nineteenth century, national consciousness intruded and many in the 
duchies felt the need to choose sides. Of course, national consciousness 
was not identical with political consciousness: Uwe Jens Lomsen (d. 1838), 
for example, won a following in the 1830s for a liberal constitution for a lib-
eral Schleswig-Holstein existing in binational independence rather on the 
model of the one then being framed for newly independent and linguisti-
cally divided Belgium. Within ten years of Lorensen's death, however, 
such a dream seemed inconceivable because of the growing clash of rival 
nationalisms. The first notes were sounded on the Danish side by the Kiel 
publicists Christian Flor and Christian Paulsen (who, interestingly, came 
from a German-speaking home in Flensburg and studied at Gottingen in 
Germany before going to Norway and becoming passionately Scandina-
vian in outlook).60 In accepting a position in Kiel in order to support his 
young family, then, Droysen coincidentally chose to work in a place in 
which teaching German history was a profoundly political act and in 
which his audiences, largely local, were really interested in politics. 
There was a lot to interest them. Not only did political and linguistic 
frontiers not correspond; that was a common situation even in western Eu-
rope. The constitutional status of the duchies was also confused, notori-
ously so, in consequence of dynastic inheritance and traditional legalities. 
This confusion had four aspects. First, the duchies were under the rule of 
the king of Denmark, at this time Christian VIII, who was by personal 
union the duke of each duchy. Second, and peculiar to Schleswig-Holstein, 
the duchies were legally inseparable-op ewig ungedeelt in the local Ger-
man dialect-but occupied quite different positions in public law. Holstein 
was a member state in the German Confederation, whereas Schleswig was 
simply a duchy that happened to have a German majority and which, 
in the nature of things, was a possible candidate for integration into the 
Danish monarchy. Relatedly, Danish nationalists thought of both duchies 
as part of the Helstat, the Danish term for the polity of Denmark proper, its 
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colonies, and Iceland.61 Thinking of the problem in terms of the Helstat had 
the advantage of preserving the link of the duchies to Denmark without 
tinkering with their constitutional peculiarities. Third, Christian VIII was 
old and had no sons. He had a designated heir, who became Frederick VII 
in 1848, but Frederick inherited through a female. That was not a difficulty 
for Denmark proper, but in German states, including the duchies, the Salic 
Law prevailed, and this law forbade female succession: Germans argued, 
in terms that of course did not persuade the Danish authorities or the 
Danish nationalists, that on Christian's death the duchies should pass to 
his nearest male heir in the German Augustenberg family. German na-
tionalists, however dim their private views of dynastic inheritance, liked 
this solution because it would keep the territories German. A fourth aspect 
must also be mentioned. These legal niceties were not only a subject for 
dispute between Germans and Danes. Denmark was on the southern shore 
of the strategic straits of Skagerrak and Kategat between the North Sea and 
the Baltic. This meant that Great Britain and Russia were deeply interested 
in Denmark's fate and, by extension, the fortunes of its monarch. 
By 1844 tempers had risen on both sides, thanks in part to Droysen's 
growing influence among young German intellectuals in the duchies.62 
The first of several crises occurred in October 1844 as a result of a book, The 
State Inheritance of Schleswig-Holstein and connected Lands, ably written by 
the young lawyer Karl Samwer, a student and friend of Droysen's. 
Samwer used detailed constitutional history to strengthen the succession 
claims of the Duke of Augustenberg. This promised an alliance between 
traditional German princes and the newer Germannationalism and, there-
fore, thoroughly alarmed the Danes. In response, Algreen Ussing, the 
Mayor of Copenhagen, moved in the Schleswig Estates at Roskilde that 
King Christian issue a declaration that the Helstat was indivisible and the 
duchies subject to the same law of succession as the rest of the monarchy. 
The failure of the royal official A.S. Orsted to decry the motion made many 
observers, Droysen among them, wrongly conclude that the monarchy 
was colluding with the Roskilde Estates to absorb the duchies into Den-
mark. Droysen was prominently active in the public outcry that followed. 
Droysen's immediate response was to draft and publish a piece enti-
tled "Kiel Address," in which, surely insincerely, he claimed to speak as a 
loyal subject who had his sovereign's best interests at heart and argued 
that King Christian should leave the duchies' traditional legal status in-
tact.63 He really meant that if they could not yet be detached from Den-
mark, they should certainly not be detached from Germany, and his real 
fear was a unilateral Danish change in their inheritance law that would 
have the former effect. Predictably, he did not rely solely on the impres-
sion that his address might make in Denmark. On 18 November he wrote 
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to acquaintances in Prussia and enclosed copies of the address in his let-
ters. To Johannes Schulze, now highly placed in the Kultusministerium (so 
called because it dealt with educational, religious, and cultural affairs), he 
offered specific suggestions for Prussian policy toward Denmark and re-
marked on his own good fortune in being able to "take part in such major 
state actions."M To Justus von Gruner, now a member of the Prussian del-
egation to the Confederate Assembly at Frankfort, he offered the same ad-
vice, namely, that Prussia should oppose any change in the duchies' status, 
and boasted about the deep impression that his "Kiel Address" had made 
on Germans in the duchies.65 
In 1845 he explained more fully what Prussia should do in his essay 
"The Political Position of Prussia," in which he demonstrated why Prus-
sian self-interest would require her unselfishly to embrace the German 
cause. For example, in a letter written shortly before the crisis, he had 
claimed that Prussia could exchange weakness for strength only by as-
suming the leadership of Kleindeutschland, a term that still referred not to 
Germany without Austria but to the little states of Germany such as 
Schleswig-Holstein, and concluded that such leadership of "the down-
trodden lesser powers [was] a first and major step toward national unifi-
cation."66 His letters to Schulze and Gruner expressed the confidence that 
Prussia now had the chance she needed. He was puzzled and then angered 
when she did not seize it. He complained that nothing was happening and 
expected that, some time soon, decisive changes would occur. In that spirit 
he wrote from Kiel in 1845 to his friend Wilhelm Arendt: "Here, like every-
where else in Germany, the situation is now stagnating in intolerable fash-
ion; or, more correctly, it is brewing under water."67 
Although he clearly believed that it was in Prussia's interest and 
power to work for the duchies, he seems this time not to have been very 
hopeful that she would actually do so. In 1844 he had been almost ebul-
lient, but he now wrote to Arendt: "Prussia in particular-and the decision 
again depends on Prussia-is far too backward in her inner development 
and liberation to take a step from which she retreated in 1815 when Ger-
many was also loudly and freshly ready to join her."68 He was, therefore, 
more or less resigned to the prospect of Prussian inaction and the conse-
quent loss at least of Schleswig, though, in his characteristic celebration of 
the future benefits of moral education and with an embarrassing display 
of self-importance, he consoled himself with the thought that this loss 
would ultimately strengthen Germany through the example of men like 
himself remaining at their embattled posts until the end.69 
By the time conditions in the duchies became settled again in early 
1845, the Holstein Estates at Itzhoe had passed a declaration to counter the 
Ussing Motion and German nationalism in the duchies had grown both in 
numbers and fervor while-liberal, middle-class movement that it origi-
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nally was-it formed a closer alliance with conservative German landown-
ers,7o The calm that returned in 1845 was temporary and was broken as 
soon as the Holstein Estates reconvened in 1846. King Christian had not 
originally welcomed the Ussing Motion, but, alarmed at the agitation that 
followed it, he now sought to subdue German nationalism by taking a firm 
stand against the Augustenberg succession. The Holstein Estates met on 
15 July 1846, and Christian sent them his Open Letter, stating that a female 
succession was legitimate in Schleswig and many parts of Holstein and 
that the duchies would remain undivided whatever happened to the suc-
cession in the rest of Holstein.71 Droysen's response to this tum in events 
was twofold. 
First, taking advantage of the relative leisure of studying chiefly mod-
em German history since the medievalist Georg Waitz's appointment to 
the Kiel faculty in 1843, Droysen had immersed himself in Schleswig-
Holstein's tangled legal history. He was, therefore, able to meet the crisis 
of 1846 by providing most of the contents of the ponderous Public Law and 
the Law of Inheritance in the Duchy of Schleswig, though other professors at 
Kiel made contributions and received credit as coauthors.72 If nothing else, 
the work is a monument to his erudition in a difficult area of a legal his-
tory and testimony as well to his willingness to change tactics when cir-
cumstances warranted. After all, by the terms of his concept of the 'I right 
of history," the mass of legal precedent that he uncovered had only anti-
quarian interest. Nonetheless, he was happy to argue from precedent 
when precedent bolstered his case. Second, and with the dynamic "right 
of history" in mind, he again tried to spur Prussia to action by pointing to 
the vast opportunities that events in the duchies opened for her,73 He was; 
of course, interested not only in the fate of the duchies but also in the 
national consequences of Prussian action on their behalf. He argued that 
Prussian intervention would not only prevent Schleswig's integration into 
Denmark; it would also lead Prussia to abandon her un-German foreign 
policy and her bureaucratic absolutism in domestic affairs.74 In his view of 
modem history, those changes would be major advances toward national 
unification and statehood. 
Despite the resignation he had felt at Prussian inaction in 1845, and de-
spite Prussian inaction throughout the 1846 crisis, his underlying confi-
dence in Prussia remained strong. At least, in January 1848, when the new 
king Frederick VII published the January Rescript, which proposed once 
again to change the status of the duchies, Droysen was inexplicably opti-
mistic. He again urged firm action on Prussia, and his letter to Gruner, now 
promoted to Really Privy Legation Counsellor in the Prussian Foreign 
Ministry, suggests that he expected Prussia to act this time,75 Perhaps this 
was because, with the Salic Law to invalidate Frederick's succession, he 
thought the legal grounds for intervention too compelling for Prussia to 
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resist. Inasmuch as domestic events in Prussia in 1847 had successively in-
flated and deflated his hopes, his optimism is remarkable. 
His reactions to the convening of the diet provide a good index to his 
political hopes and fears in 1847 and also provide a chance to see him 
trying to grapple with immediate and practical politics that lacked the 
geographical immediacy events in Schleswig-Holstein provided him. 
Moreover, exciting events were 'now occurring in Prussia, qnd in Droy-
sen's scheme of things, these might be foretokens that history was at last 
ready to complete itself. He felt the need to show people just what parts 
they would have to play when the curtain eventually went up on German 
statehood. After all, it followed from his theory that true statehood was 
possible only when people actively wanted it, and he made it his business 
to instill in them the necessary desire. Without such preparation, which he 
presumably saw as itself a historical necessity, he feared a very unhappy 
outcome. Characteristically, Droysen arrived at these conclusions in refer-
ence and response to specific, current events. In February 1817, Frederick 
William convened a united diet (Landtag), that is, a joint convention of the 
individual diets of the seven Prussian provinces. The king's general pur-
pose was to ease the growing discontent in Prussia by making a consti-
tutional gesture without granting a constitution. More specifically, he 
needed money for a railway to East Prussia and, so, sought the diet's back-
ing in order to obtain loans at favorable rates. This tame, if interesting, ges-
ture raised liberal hopes, which the monarchy systematically disappointed 
throughout the summer and autumn of 1847. Droysen's hopes, too, went 
through this boom-and-bust cycle. 
Thus, in an unpublished manuscript written in the autumn of 1847 
after it had become clear that Prussian United Diet would not accomplish 
very much, Droysen reflected on the inevitability of "further development" 
(weitere Entwicklung) and concluded: 
Not as if it would not occur if one did not want [it]; rather, it would come unbid-
den like a thief in the night or even with the fury of elemental forces, sooner, later, 
certainly irreSistibly; destroying in order to create anew, for that is the nature of 
the vital. To want it means nothing other than to recognize what is germinally 
present, ... than to recognize in advance where the general movement of affairs 
wishes to move from the here-and-now, to follow freely and consciously the path 
along which one would forcibly be dragged, not to retard or interrupt the danger-
ous tumult of movement, but to rule and control, to change those blind forces into 
victorious powers.76 
In this passage, Droysen did more than reiterate his central contention that 
the historical process was both ineluctable and predictable. He also offered 
another, more novel, idea in the form of an urgent warning. A major his-
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torical transformation, he believed, was about to occur, whether or not 
people desired and expected it. This created two possibilities. If they were 
foresightful and welcomed what would in any case occur, they could con-
trol progress and make its result an altogether happy one. If, on the con-
trary, they ignored or, worse, resisted historical change, it would occur 
anyway, but with otherwise avoidable violence and destruction. His state-
ment of these possibilities, his hope for the first and fear of the second, is 
yet another manifestation of his painful attempt to forward revolutionary 
change without revolution, without violence and upheaval. It also marks 
the first, at least the first recorded, instance of uncertainty when events 
failed to conform to his expectations. In 1844 and 1846, Prussia had already 
failed, in the struggle over the duchies Schleswig-Holstein, to do what he 
thought Prussia had to do. This did not necessarily mean that his predic-
tions were wrong. Possibly, those in power in Berlin did not yet under-
stand what history expected of them. Still, Droysen worried that such 
misunderstanding might prevent timely and peaceful change. Certainly it 
was hard to imagine creating the state in his sense of the term during a civil 
war. To understand more clearly the source of this anxiety, it is necessary 
to look closely at Droysen's excitement when the first Prussian United Diet 
met in 1847. 
Although Droysen was not impressed by the February Patent that 
called the diet into session and, like many other Germans, he was disap-
pointed by Frederick William's address to its opening session, at first he 
thought the united diet was the start of rapid progress. By April 1847 he 
had expressed delight at the "surprising speed" with which the delegates 
had acquired "bearing, purpose, method." "However little has been 
achieved," he commented in a letter on 22 April, "the main thing is that a 
moral force is gathering there and becoming conscious of itself as a result 
of which the Austrianized Prussia of 1819 and 1830 is no longer possible." 
That is, the changed consciousness that preceded major historical trans-
formation had already formed or was now forming. This was his basic ap-
praisal of the diet. He valued it less for its actual achievements (which, 
given its narrowly circumscribed powers and the- king's stubbornness 
were bound to be few) than for the irreversible precedent it set and the fur-
ther progress it promised. Once again, as briefly in 1844, he thought he was 
witnessing the beginning of the "most comprehensive reshapings of do-
mestic and foreign policy for first Prussia and then all of Germany."77 
He developed this estimation of events, along with other major ideas, 
in "The Prussian Constitution," a lengthy review article he wrote for the 
Halle'sche Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung at the solicitation of Max Duncker, 
its political and historical editor,78 In it Droysen repeated themes already 
found in his letters and remarked happily on the political maturity that the 
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delegates had shown so far. He expanded on this idea by claiming that 
Germany and Europe as a whole were impressed by the "amazing spec-
tacle of these proceedings;-amazing not only on account of the quickly 
acquired exercise of parliamentary skill or on account of the wealth of po-
litical sureness and insight that the speeches and votes proclaim; amazing 
above all in the way that the crown and the estates deal with each other, I 
may say [in] the political ethics that have never more happily dealt with a 
more difficult task."79 Droysen made this observation as evidence of the 
readiness of both sides, the king and the delegates, to cooperate in the fur-
therance of necessary historical development.so In other words, he already 
found signs of the reciprocal trust on which statehood had to be founded. 
He therefore thought that he discerned in the sessions a "silent force 
of affairs" (Stille Gewalt der Dinge) that was "more powerful than all inten-
tion, all knowledge, all humanity." That force, he continued, worked 
quietly "in the hearts of men" to produce major changes in history, "and 
where it works, there is God's hand, as in the first bloom of spring, as in 
the first light of dawn-Who will stop it?" In short, Providence was at 
work. Droysen gave a clear indication of the magnitude of the change that 
he thought was in prospect when he criticized his fellow historian Georg 
Gottfried Gervinus for stressing too strongly the need for legal continuity. 
Without abandoning his deep dislike of revolution, Droysen pointed out 
that "no flower has yet bloomed without tearing the bud; there is no be-
coming without abandoning the form that once enchained, and those are 
not the worst moments in the lives of individuals and nations when the 
fullness of their most particular life breaks through the shells that had 
value and purpose only as long as they protected the life that was coming 
into being."Sl Without using the term expressly, Droysen was invoking his 
idea of the "right of history" for, appropriately, one of those rare moments 
when breaks in formal legality were necessary for major historical 
progress. 
He evidently thought that a breakthrough into true statehood was in 
near prospect, for he invoked the characteristic themes of his analysis of 
world history to claim that history, working through the diet, would soon 
make all state citizens into priests arid shrines of the public good and would ad-
vance law and order by making it reborn in every free individual will that fulfils it 
as its own genuine will. The state will no longer be because it is but because every 
instant the wills of free men justify and assure the fact that it exists; the state will 
no longer be the privilege or the property of the crown, still less the accidental bur-
den borne by men and lands thrown together ... Prince and people, crown and 
land, government and governed: all of them together are under the state, are or-
gans and functions of the spirit that lives and works in it, that Hellenic antiquity 
regarded as the divinity of the state.82 
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In view of those conclusions, his excited optimism is entirely understand-
able. He had in mind more than incremental progress toward a still distant 
goal. He thought that Prussia and Germany were on the verge of the true 
statehood that he had long thought to be the necessary outcome of history. 
He tempered his joy, however, with a fear that someone might uncom-
prehendingly compromise the great work at the last moment. 
Specifically, he warned against giving Prussia the wrong kind of 
constitution. As far back as 1843 he had inveighed against the "damned 
error" of using the separation of powers as a "guarantee for the constitu-
tion," because he believed that "the essence of the state" lay in its "cohe-
siveness" (Einheitlichkeit). The object was not to protect the ruled from the 
rulers but to have the entire citizenry join the "hereditary prince" in the 
determination and conduct of state policy.83 He proceeded from these 
premises to a sweeping attack on all written guarantees as contradicting 
the essential quality of statehood: "Not the people, not the citizenry is the 
state, not the sovereign, nor the collectivity of state servants; but all of 
them in their mutual activities and reciprocal effects compose the vital ex-
istence of the idea of the state in the way that body and life, will and 
knowledge jointly are the existence of the idea for which a man lives."84 
In 1843 these were only propositions; in 1847 Droysen used them to com-
ment on current practice. 
Because he thought that history conferred its own right, Droysen was 
not very interested in guarantees merely legal in nature. Furthermore, he 
was afraid that excessive legalism might result in a defectiv~ Prussian con-
stitution, one that contradicted the principle of statehood. He did not, 
however, attack law itself, and he therefore remarked: "Let us understand 
ourselves correctly. Law is much, infinitely much, but not everything (Das 
Recht is viel, unendlich viel, aber nicht aUes)." The wholly unsatisfactory feu-
dal monarchy of the Middle Ages, he pointed out, had also been a "state 
of law" (Rechtsstaat).85 Good laws had a place, an important place, in the 
new state, but they must not divide rulers from ruled. Contemporary Eu-
rope, he claimed, wavered between the "monarchical principle" and "pop-
ular sovereignty," both of which sought to reduce the state to "a mere legal 
relationship." In the former, monarchs tried to guarantee their powers and 
prerogatives, whereas in the latter the people sought legal assurances for 
their rights against, and their control over, the government. Droysen re-
jected both attempts:-Re insisted that "Prussia's development-and, in 
this as in all that noblest and best, let it be Germany's leader-must [lead 
to] a different relationship."86 That relationship had to be one of mutual 
trust rather than legal guarantees: "God willing, juristic law is not the 
final instance for the Prussian state and its future; in bitter days, the king 
and people set up another holy bond between themselves."87 
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These statements show that Droysen's contempt for legal guarantees 
was an integral part of his larger case for Prussian and German exception-
alism. By avoiding the opposed errors of monarchism and popular sover-
eignty, the Prusso-German state would be qualitatively different from any 
other European polity. That is, its ability to abide by a constitution with-
out formal guarantees would show a strength of moral character to be 
found nowhere else. These claims show a remarkable degree of historical 
confidence, but their emphatic reiteration suggests anxiety. What was 
Droysen worried about? He may have been afraid that a constitutionalized 
Prussia would become a state apart from the larger Germany and would 
therefore turn away from the task of unification.88 This was probably part 
of his motivation, because in "The Prussian Constitution" he included a 
strong paragraph warning about the dangers of Prussian selfishness and 
specifically asking Prussia not to pursue unification in a spirit of aggran-
dizement, though he qualified this advice by admitting that in the past 
God had usually worked through self-interested agents.89 This was prob-
ably not his chief motivation, however, because his objections to constitu-
tional guarantees were of long standing and because his surprise in the late 
summer of 1848 at the appearance of Prussian separatism was too great 
simply to be a reappearance of an old worry. 
He was more likely afraid that, at least for the present, Prussia might 
tum out not to be exceptional. Despite his markedly favorable comments 
on the quality of the diet's sessions, he was surely aware that those meet-
ings were often acrimonious and that demands for guarantees against the 
throne were popular. The recurrent inability of delegates and representa-
tives of the king's government to agree might mean that Prussia was just 
like any other European power. In those circumstances it was only sen-
sible for Droysen to remind Prussia of her higher f:alling. A decision to do 
so did not imply a lack of faith in the basic soundness of his predictions. 
He believed that Prussia would seize the opportunity to unify Germany, 
but he could not say when she would seize it. It was reasonable to worry 
that she might now be missing an opportunity. Moreover, it was, by the 
terms of his predictions, the task of historians like himself to make Prus-
sians aware of their historical responsibility, in this case a responsibility 
not to frame a legally cluttered constitution. 
That was certainly his attitude by the autumn. In an unpublished es-
say entitled "Prussia and Germany," he both roundly condemned consti-
tutional guarantees as contrary to the real essence of statehood and tried 
to demonstrate the need to continue and complete the "historical devel-
opment" begun the previous spring. To a degree, this essay is the comple-
ment to his earlier piece, "The Prussian Constitution." There he warned 
against obstructing progress through an overly watchful constitutional-
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ism; here he inveighed against obstruction caused by too-jealous a defense 
of monarchic prerogative.90 In both essays the message was the same: the 
letter of the law must not be allowed to compromise the spirit of statehood. 
He also offered the same inducements for trust and cooperation: just as the 
people would be freer without formal guarantees, so the real power of the 
king and his government would increase to the extent that he shared it 
with the people of Prussia and Germany as a whole. Progressive change, 
he assured his readers, was the normal content of history, and this sharing 
of power was the next necessary instance of that change.91 
Droysen characteristically supported this contention with historical il-
lustration. He pointed to the upswing in German political expectations 
and to the general improvement in the quality of Prussian politics that re-
sulted from Frederick William's ascent to the Prussian throne in 1840. He 
claimed to be especially moved by the king's appeal to his people for sup-
port.92 This was transparently an attempt to associate the entire reign with 
liberalization and to show that convening the diet was a continuation of, 
not a risky departure from, long-term and well-advised policies. Relatedly, 
Droysen argued that the king, far from having come into conflict with his 
people, now more than ever had them on his side. In other words, timely 
concessions to historical necessity strengthened rather than weakened the 
monarchy. These concessions, however,were not cases of surrendering a 
little to save a lot. Droysen insisted that they would actually improve the 
situation of the monarchy. He chose a telling metaphor to underscore this 
claim. A steamship, he urged, hoisted its sails only when the wind behind 
it was blowing faster than the ship could travel under its own power.93 The 
ship, of course, was the monarc~y, and the wind from the stem was pro-
gressive public opinion, which would actually help the monarchy navi-
gate its set course. Droysen added a warning to this promise. If the 
monarchy did not accommodate itself to inevitable change, it would be 
overborne amid needless violence.94 
The present tasks of the Prussian monarchy, therefore, were utterly 
clear to Droysen. It had to use the diet to gain the trust of the rest of Ger-
many as a means to introducing constitutional government in his sense of 
the term to Germany asa whole. In its dealings with the diet, it had to re-
member certain fundamental facts of history, facts that he had often before 
included in his speeches and writings. In negative terms, it had to ac-
knowledge the futility of simply defending outdated privileges, because 
no monarch, not even Louis XIV, had possessed really "unlimited" au-
thority.95 Furthermore, it had to bear in mind the precariousness of Prus-
sia's position within its 1815 frontiers. Only half the population had 
binding "historical memories" of Hohenzollern rule, and the population 
as a whole lacked identical material interests and a common religious con-
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fession.96 This situation could be improved only by bringing true state-
hood to Germany. 
Late in the essay he tried to identify the major advantages that would 
. accrue to the monarchy if it followed Ws course: 
The value of a constitution is to be recognized in the government that its brings into 
existence, because the strongest best fulfils the tasks assigned to it. But this strength 
does not consist in the arbitrary power that it exercises, in the acts of self-will that 
it perpetrates, even less in the monies that it can heap up in the treasury, in the 
masses of men that it trains for war and accustoms to blind obedience, in the om-
nipotence of an officialdom entrusted with everything .... The strength of the gov-
ernment is the greater, the more deeply it recognizes the true task of the state, to 
satisfy which is its function ... the more surely according as the governed see that 
it really values and protects all strengths, energies, and interests,97 
This was Droysen at his best and his worst, his most and least convincing. 
Indeed, the passage nicely shows the tenuousness of his prerevolutionary 
formulations. He promised to the king and his government a vast access 
in power if they surrendered their current position in the interest of even-
tual national unification. That was to ask them to join him in an imposing 
leap of faith. They had to believe that he had correctly interpreted all pre-
vious history and that his consequent predictions were sound. As self-
3interested historical agents, they had trustingly to lay down tangible and 
immediate powers in exchange for a new kind of strength that, they were 
to believe, would be theirs after the historical Prussian state had ceased to 
exist. Droysen must have had some sense of the magnitude of this request. 
Prussia was still ruled by the men who had disappointed him over the 
duchies in 1844 and 1846, and there would have been no point in writing 
either of his 1847 essays if he had assumed that Prussia's governors were 
ready unreservedly to play their parts. He plainly believed, however, that 
they would be ready when they had to be ready, and he seemed unaware 
that he was submitting his most cherished notions about the national fu-
ture to a pragmatic test that they were bound to fail. 
3 ________________ __ 
Parallel Careers: 
Duncker, Haym, Sybel 
While Droysen moved from ancient into modem history and used his his-
torical expertise to supply predictive analysis and advice in the crises over 
Schleswig-Holstein and in observing the abortive convening of the Prus-
sian United Diet, his future allies and collaborators-Duncker, Haym, and 
Sybel-were also beginning their careers as scholars and as partisans. 
Their early works show neither the theoretical grasp nor the historical 
range of Droysen's, both because they were younger than he and, frankly, 
because they could not match Droysen, who possessed one of the greatest 
historical imaginations of all times. Their early ideas demand study, 
nonetheless, because of the light they shed on the mentality of prerevolu-
tionary Protestant liberalism in Germany and because their early ideas 
make intelligible their actions and reactions in 1848 and 1849 and, conse-
quently, the convergences of their careers with Droysen's in the creation 
of the Prussian School. Duncker and Haym at times worked together, but 
they also often worked alone. Sybel still worked by himself. Their careers 
before 1848, therefore, are best studied one by one. 
Max Duncker 
Max Duncker was the first, after Droysen, to effect this merger. He, too, 
had an excited early encounter with what he understood of Hegel's phi-
losophy. Duncker, in fact, was personally acquainted with Hegel because 
of the latter's recurrent social and business visits to his publisher father's 
home, and, at the University of Berlin, he heard his lecture series "Philos-
ophy of History" and "History of Philosophy" before Hegel's death in 
183l.1 The immediate effect was on Duncker's inaugural dissertation on 
Germanic origins, which Haym rightly described as mainly "philosophy, 
Hegelian philosophy."2 Like Droysen, like many in his generation, 
Duncker soon persuaded himself that he had broken with Hegel, and this 
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persuasion was an important part of his mental make-up in this period. As 
with Droysen, however, it is not clear that Duncker saw things quite as 
Hegel did, and anyone reading Duncker's works from the 1830s and 1840s 
would admit that he continued to view matters through more or less 
Hegelian concepts. The lasting effect of his encounter with Hegel's system, 
then, was a vision of historical progress that let Duncker interrelate past 
historical periods so as to make sense of history and to permit confident 
projection of the future. 
Obviously, these tasks came easily to Duncker, whose education dif-
fered from Droysen's in several respects. Duncker also attended and en-
joyed Boeckh's lectures in classical philology, but his real interest, even as 
a student, was in history as historians, not philologists, taught it.3 The first 
person to take a degree in history from a German university, Duncker at-
tended Friedrich Wilken's lectures and historical exercises, heard Ranke's 
lectures, and was a member of Ranke's Historical Seminar for one semes-
ter (the normal length of membership in those years).4 In addition, he 
worked closely with the literary historian (and distant relation) Johann 
Loebell when, during his half year of compulsory military service in an 
ulan regiment, he was stationed near Bonn where Loebell taught.5 Duncker 
continued, however, to view the data of history in terms of preconceived 
ideas. that he borrowed and adapted from Hegel. 
Hegel's influence is, for example, clearly evident in the preface that 
Duncker wrote in 1836 to the three volumes that he edited, under Loebell's 
guidance and for the family publishing house, of the twelve-volume World 
History by Karl Friedrich Becker. His statements there would probably 
have irritated Hegel himself had he read them, because they greatly over-
simplified his arguments and because, naturally enough, Duncker stressed 
only those parts of Hegel's philosophy that served his purposes. He 
wanted to show history to be an orderly spiritual process that moved to-
ward a goal, and he valued historical evidence only insofar as it helped 
him do that. For that reason, he in effect apologized to his readers for in-
cluding so much information in the sections that he edited. An evolving 
"spirit" (Geist) was at work in and behind the details of history, and the de-
velopment of this spirit was the real story the historian had to tell. Duncker 
insisted, however, that a historian had also to give evidence for, and ex-
amples of, its workings, even though he preferred to display "the deeper 
content of the facts and the essence of the reigning ideas" in place of "multi-
fold reasonings, considerations, and evidential relationships."6 The pre-
sentation of evidence, then, was an inconvenient yet necessary means to a 
more important end because it allowed historians to explicate the past in 
context by studying one age in relation to the periods that preceded and 
succeeded iF 
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In practice, this meant that Duncker would supply information, but 
only in order to illustrate the onward evolution of the spirit. Rather than 
inferring his claims from evidence, he used evidence to define and detail 
his claims. To take a case in point, he excused his decision to eke out the 
meager information on medieval constitutional history that Becker himself 
provided because, despite the "difficulty bordering on the impossibility" 
of an inexpert reader thoroughly understanding it, constitutional history 
was especially suited to "permitting the inner life and drive of nations (in-
nere Leben und Treiben der Volker) to emerge."s Those, of course, were what 
really interested him. In a related instance, he promised to deal at length 
with what he defined as "important events," for which he had a more or 
less technical definition. These were those "points in history at which the 
spirit, after it has lain in concealment and worked in silence ... suddenly 
breaks forth and brings new instruments and tendencies to the light of day, 
or, strengthened in one and played out in another, now extinct direction, 
raises one nation (Volk) and lowers another [and] steps into the next stage 
of its development." Events of such magnitude, he claimed, showed so 
much about the course and purpose of history that it was "necessary to dis-
play the entire breadth of the phenomenon in order to bring before the eyes 
of the reader the spiritual content, the leading ideas, and the driving forces 
(geistige Inhalt, leitende Ideen, treibende Kriifte) not in abstract translation into 
thoughts but in the fullness and power of their concrete immediacy."9 He 
wanted to track historical progress. This required including a lot of evi-
dence, but it also made the evidence secondary in importance. The func-
tion of evidence was to illustrate abstractions. That changed in Duncker's 
later writing. 
By 1845, Duncker, still intent on tracking and projecting tendencies in 
history, had become' rather more empiricist in principle, though the 
change was not complete and was more evident to him than to anyone 
reading his statements with care. Perhaps teaching history for two years 
at the University of Halle made him skeptical of generalizations not 
induced from evidence. It is also possible that his recent intellectual 
friendship with the young philosophy student Rudolf Haym was a cause 
of this change, as their association dates from the period immediately 
following Haym's reading of Ludwig Feuerbach's works under the guid-
ance of an older colleague at the Berlin gymnasium where he had taught 
for a year. In that year, Haym finally rejected Hegel's system in favor of 
a more empirical philosophy and may have persuaded Duncker of 
the need to adopt the new philosophical fashion that Feuerbach intro-
duced.10 In any case, Duncker now earnestly and energetically asserted 
the need for historical empiricism. The change was real: in 1836 Duncker 
had written about data as a regrettable necessity. Now, in 1845, he trea-
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sured information, and he described treasuring it as the promising aspect 
of the present age. 
The earliest existing evidence of Duncker's new outlook appears in a 
letter that he wrote to Droysen on 11 February 1845. There he congratulated 
Droysen on the second and final volume of his History of Hellenism and pro-
fessed his own deep respect for the close scrutiny of empirical detail. Only 
in that way, he explained, was it possible to detect and trace the movements 
of the "spirit" through time. Duncker developed his case with appropriate 
examples. Thus, he explained that he traced the evolutions of battles not be-
cause of their intrinsic interest, but because they let him show lithe spirit tri- . 
umphantly penetrating the combatants." Similarly, he studied" great men" 
closely because "they stand at the peak of events, and in their spirits appear 
more or less entire series of the strivings and capacities, indeed the very 
particularities, of nations and periods (Volker und Perioden)."ll Although 
Duncker was no doubt too intent on finding pattern in history to notice it, 
his examples partly undercut his case for the primacy of historical evi-
dence. He was still justifying it as an illustration and elucidation of history' s 
real content. Of course, one should probably not attach too great an im-
portance to generalized compliments of this sort, nor contrast them point-
edly with Duncker's earlier effusions. It is worth noting, nonetheless, that 
Duncker himself thought that he had said something important. 
He explained the nature of that importance in the introduction to his 
roughly contemporaneous Crisis of the Reformation, a slender volume pub-
lished in 1845 that was supposedly a printed version of a lecture given in 
August 1844. (The introduction, however, dates from 1845, and he proba-
bly revised the central text; if he gave it in the printed version, then his au-
dience had sat still for the best part of three hours). In this introduction he 
claimed that historical empiricism was the necessary outcome, in fact the 
culmiriation, of German intellectual history since the eighteenth century, 
and was still Hegelian enough to think of the onward progress of the spirit 
as the real content of history. He divided modern German history into four 
successive and dialectically interrelated phases in the development of the 
spirit. The last of these, which he termed "historical rationalism" and in 
which he located himself, had finally achieved an adequate theory of his-
torical knowledge that would, he was sure, lead it to change Germany very 
much for the better. His exploration into the recent intellectual history of 
Germany deserves careful attention, specifically because it illuminates his 
new attitude toward historical method and, more generally, because it 
shows his sense of the historical significance of his own political and his-
torical strivings. 
The first period was the Enlightenment, about which Duncker, like 
Droysen and many other contemporaries, had major reservations-com-
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bined with real admiration for its historical accomplishments. Duncker 
found it shallow and judged it destructive. He accordingly cited its attacks 
on religion in Germany and bo.th state and religion in France. At the same 
time he noted that the spirit did not make unnecessary movements. In part, 
this was a matter of saying that what happened had to happen and was 
therefore somehow good. In part, too, it was a specific argument about the 
Enlightenment. The Enlightenment was negative, but its negativity had 
positive effects. It was negative in the sense that the "enlightened gaze of 
the understanding (Verstand) ... was unable to comprehend and concep-
tualize (auffassen und begreifen) the products of drives, of fantasy, of feel-
ing."12 This was not a compliment, for, in the language of German Idealism 
that Duncker was applying here, the "understanding" was merely the 
uncreative faculty of rational calculation. He meant to fault the Enlighten-
ment for being too prosaic to appreciate the irrational and, more specifi-
cally, for lacking a sense of history. For dialectical reasons, however, this 
defect was actually a virtue because it provoked a very strong interest in 
the past in what Duncker saw as a second period. 
This second period was Romanticism, which in Duncker's reading 
would not have existed had there been no Enlightenment. He clearly ad-
mired it, though he thought that it, too, was one-sided. He praised it 
for preferring "feeling" (Gemiith) to "understanding," for putting the "full 
heart in place of keen, intellectual insight, immediacy in place of reflec-
tion, poetic darkness in place of prosaic light." These compliments seem 
oddly misplaced in an academic's writings, but Duncker was not really 
an irrationalist; rather, he believed that these attitudes had allowed the 
romantics to perform the valuable service of restoring "their rights to tra-
ditions in church and state." That statement seemed to rank him amorig 
the conservative defenders of historical rights. In fact, though Duncker 
was no more a revolutionary than Droysen, he justifiably thought of him-
self as a partisan of progress, and he accordingly leveled some serious 
charges against the romantics. He accused them of distrusting critical 
thought, with the result that their otherwise admirable attempts at "re-
construction could occur only in a fantastic manner." More serious, in 
their love for the past the romantics failed to take sufficient account of 
historical change. That is, they did not see that the "substance" of history 
was "self-producing" and "both the same as in ages past yet new, purify-
ing itself from stage to stage."13 History was a continuum, but it moved to 
newer and better. If the Enlightenment erred by preferring "pragmatic" 
reasonings to history, Romanticism had the equally serious flaw of trying 
to halt historical change at some point in the past.14 
With that criticism, Duncker was making the same point that Droysen 
had made by invoking the "right of history" against "historical rights." 
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Both men had the same motive, namely, to legitimate continued historical 
change without resort to revolution. Duncker evidently believed that the 
"spirit" took the same view of the matter because, in the third and fourth 
periods that he identified, he portrayed it as preserving the good and elim-
inating the bad features of Enlightenment and Romanticism in order to 
produce.views of history that were decently reverent toward the past yet 
acceptant of change in the future. The spirit used the German "national 
character" (Volkscharakter) to produce these syntheses that, generally 
speaking, corresponded respectively to his earlier, Hegelian, phase and 
to his present, more empirical, one.15 In fact, they were much alike. The 
fourth period was the corrected, really the perfected, form of the third. 
He labeled the third period "Philosophical Rationalism," by which he 
meant German Idealism in general and Hegel's philosophy in particular. 
He described it as an instance of "placing an illegitimate content in a 
legitimate form."l6 Duncker's attack on its "content" was in part a recant-
ing of his earlier disdain for empirical knowledge, but his praise for its 
form was sincere because it corresponded to his own vision of historical 
progress. For that reason, he offered some very admiring statements: 
"Philosophy rejected the one-sidedness of both phases of cultivation (Bil-
dungsstufen), of Romanticism and Enlightenment, of the heart and the 
understanding ... [and] discovered in history the process of the spirit 
(Process des Geistes), of an unconscious drive [moving] through reflection 
to new formations (Gestaltungen)." He found this discovery to be formally 
correct and to be a very positive development because it made it possible 
to see in the state an "objective form" (objektive Gestalt) and to understand 
that "a substance reigned in ethics that lay at the bottom of naive 
morals."l7 These generalizations are tantalizingly abstract, but their gen-
eral purport is clear enough. Philosophy had shown history to be a moral 
process that moved from truth to higher truth. These truths underlay hu-
man morals and, most important, affected action in the state, the highest 
human institution. 
These gains, however, came at some cost, because they did not proceed 
"from practice" but "from the topmost peaks of metaphysical thought."lS 
That is, they were too abstract to take adequate account of empirical evi-
dence and to adequately inform action in the empirical world. The media-
tion between Enlightenment and Romanticism had been only preliminary 
because it was "purely metaphysical." In the fourth and final period, there-
fore, the spirit concretized and completed its work in "historical rational-
ism." This completion, he argued, 
could come about in no other way than that of returning to the world from the· 
heights of the Idea, of using historical rather than logical explication, of abandon-
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ing mystical empiricism and speculation in order more realistically to comprehend 
the real process of history (urn den realen Process der Geschichte rea liter zu begreifen). 
The concept of history as an objective development, as a spiritual process, was dis-
covered by philosophy-it was now a matter of really carrying out this concept, of 
realizing it in all its real moments.19 
This passage shows nicely the real continuity that he saw between "Philo-
sophical" and "Historical Rationalism" and the applicability of both to the 
stages of his career. That is, he had himself moved from "Philosophical" to 
"Historical Rationalism." The latter did what the former only promised. 
By abandoning the former and embracing the latter, he, Duncker, was act-
ing on history's dictates and in history's behalf. This made his work as a 
historian a calling performed in the interest of Germany, the nation that 
had, in his scheme, been chosen to discover and develop historical ratio-
nalism. This celebration of empiricism deserves some discussion. It rests 
on an unfair appraisal of Hegel, who was not anti-empirical, as Duncker 
alleged. Like Droysen, Duncker was judging Hegel more in terms of his 
reputation among young intellectuals than in terms of his actual argu-
ment. This undeserved criticism, however, helped Duncker and others to 
a sense of intellectual and moral independence. It allowed them to borrow 
and use Hegel's concepts while claiming a superiority to him by virtue of 
their chosen study of historical detail. 
The national aspect of his argument deserves strong emphasis. Since 
1843 D1Jncker had argued to his students at Halle that a nation's practices 
and institutions reflected the level of its spiritual development.2o By im-
plication, it spoke well for German brilliance (especially the brilliance of 
German historians) that Germans had discovered these fundamental 
truths, and this discovery promised well for the German future. In the 
introduction to The Crisis of the Reformation, Duncker made this implication 
fairly explicit. This "mediation" between the Enlightenment's ahistorical 
but critical understanding and Romanticism's uncritical but profound love 
of the past would "deepen and form reason (Vernunft) in substance" and 
thereafter lead to "shaping the world according to contemporary percep-
tion (gegenwiirtige Einsicht)"21 In the parlance of German Idealism, after all, 
"reason," as opposed to mere "understanding," was a shaping and cre-
ative faculty. Historical Rationalism, therefore, would see past and present 
as they really were, would discover what needed to be done, and would 
make sure that someone did it. Duncker wanted not only to understand 
history but also, by understanding, to help it along, chiefly by showing 
present and future needs to those who would read and listen and, more 
generally, by providing contemporaries with the moral preparation that 
he, too, saw as a precondition for effective political action. 
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This desire to help history was not simply a personal predisposition. 
At least in principle, it was a logical conclusion from Duncker's interpre-
tation of modem history. The "Historical Rationalism" that informed this 
desire is obviously very similar to Droysen's view of his own role as a his-
torian, and,like Droysen, Duncker used religious improvement as a means 
to political change. The few excerpts included in Haym's adoring biogra-
phy record such suggestive statements by Duncker asa desire "to live vir-
tuously ... striving and in unconscious union with God" and to lead a "life 
of active love, as it is prescribed by Christianity" in order to serve "uni-
versal history" and to bring "freedom and right" to the "Fatherland."22 
Duncker, with the younger Haym in tow, was excitedly involved in the 
work of the theologically progressive Friends of Light (Lichtfreunde), a 
Protestant movement that established "free congregations" in many 
Prussian cities-Halle among them-and sought more liberal governance 
of the established evangelical church in order to make it more responsive 
to the laity, and readily moved through religious to political reform.23 
Duncker unquestionably saw in Christianity the basis for ethical and, so, 
political action; he even thought that Droysen, in the History of Hellenism, 
underestimated the role of "ethical process" in revolt against "demoral-
ized practice" as a cause of Christianity.24 
That polite criticism probably means only that Duncker either did not 
read carefully (or did not read at all) the first volume of Hellenism in which 
Droysen made that point. It certainly shows their agreement that Chris-
tianity, at least as a historical reality, had ethical causes, and underlies their 
agreement that it had ethical consequences. This fact is especially evident 
in Duncker's discussion of the Reformation, which he, too, saw as the be-
ginning of modem history. In his view, the Reformation was not simply a 
turning point in German history. It was the necessary and promising out-
come of at least all previous European history, an outcome that Germany 
was historically privileged to achieve. The four periods he discussed in 
his introduction to the Crisis were themselves the long-term results of 
sixteenth-century religious reform in Germany, and he devoted the body 
of the work to explaining the latter's significance and why its full effects 
could not be enjoyed until his own age. 
Like Droysen, he believed that the Reformation began a course of de-
velopment that would culminate in Germany's unification as a constitu-
tional monarchy. That is evident from a review published in 1844 and a 
piece of surviving correspondence.25 In the Crisis he offered, though in his 
own words, the same arguments that Droysen had. Just as Droysen had 
defined the Reformation as a revolt against a supernatural outlook that de-
tached God from the world Gottentweltlichung), so Duncker described it as 
Germany's affirmation of "sensual health" (sinnliche Gesundheit) against 
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the prevailing "Catholic annihilation of sensuality" (Vernichtung der 
Sinnlichkeit). By "sensuality" he meant less a celebration of the physical 
than the substitution of "natural morality" for medieval "asceticism."26 In 
both pairings of opposites, he wished to contrast a religion that led out of 
this world with a revivified Christianity that inspired and informed action 
in it. Of course, he strongly approved of the latter, and, as Droysen had, 
explained this advance as a synthesis of the virtues of classical antiquity 
and Christianity. The reformers, in his opinion, were deeply pious Chris-
tians, but they were also moved by a wish to "take over into the present 
the virtues of antiquity" in order to achieve "national freedom from Rome, 
national independence and greatness, national unity as opposed to the 
particularism of the Middle Ages."27 
This was, of course, a very present-minded reading of Reformation 
history, and one wonders just which ancient texts, in Duncker's view, 
showed the reformers the need for national unification. Yet this view of 
the Reformation no doubt seemed as convincing to Duncker as it did to 
Droysen. They were doing more than indulging in Protestant fantasies. 
They wanted Germany unified, and as historians they sought to find a 
pedigree for their desire. Two obvious enemies were particularism and at 
least the ultramontane version of Catholicism (Duncker, by the way, had 
considerable respect for German Catholicism, and once explained to 
Droysen that religious reunification might soon be possible).28 By think-
ing of the Reformation as a break with the Middle Ages, it was possible to 
see it as a break with medieval political forms, and it undoubtedly en-
tailed a break with Rome. The association of it with classical antiquity 
was also plausible, although the conclusions that they drew from this as-
sociation were tenuous. Some of the reformers, after all, were classical 
scholars. To Duncker and Droy-sen, the appreciation of classical letters 
implied agreement with the civic ideals found in some classical literature. 
That conclusion seemed unquestionable to mid-nineteenth Germans who 
were unimpressed with constitutional government as practiced in west-
ern Europe and who had experienced political freedom only vicariously 
by reading ancient authors. By casting his argument in these terms, of 
course, Duncker also raised the embarrassing question of why the Refor-
mation had not achieved national unity and freedom. If it had been just a 
foredoomed episode, national unification and constitutional government 
might seem to be as unattainable now as then. Droysen had tried to solve 
this problem by explaining the historical necessity of "powers" preceding 
"states," by showing that the apparent curse of intensified particularism 
combined with royal absolutism was really a blessing. Duncker posed a 
rather different solution, which, however, offered the same explanatory 
advantages that Droysen's had. It allowed the Reformation to set the 
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agenda for the present century while showing that more had been gained 
than lost in the intervening period. 
He held the emperor Charles V responsible for the delay in bringing 
unification and freedom and maintained that if Charles had supported 
the Reformation's efforts at political reconstruction, "England's political 
development would also have been ourS."29 That is, Germany could have 
been a unified state with a national church under a national monarch. By 
refusing to play that part, Charles brought about "territorial particular-
ism in place of unity, a victory of dynastic elements instead of demo-
cratic, the triumph of princes instead of the emperor."30 Duncker did not, 
however, simply blame Charles, because the latter obviously did not con-
sciously intend those results. In any case, Charles was less responsible for 
them than were the circumstances in which he operated. The key point 
for Duncker was that so much could have depended on the will of one 
man. Unification in the sixteenth century was possible only under the ex-
ceptional condition that a great national leader embraced it as a cause. It 
was not enough that every social order except the courtiers and ecclesias-
tics wished for it. They needed to be united, but they were divided in-
stead. The Peasant Revolt and the rising of the knights under Franz von 
Sickingen, for example, were symptoms of a general demand for change, 
but both were too narrowly based to become national in scope. Similarly, 
many in power wanted fundamental reform, but the elective monarchy of 
the Holy Roman Empire was too weak to reform itself and the imperial 
estates too divided to work together in the national interest.31 Germany 
could recognize the need for unity, but it was not yet ready to achieve it. 
As a result, "political reform was completely defeated, the religious not 
half completed."32 
This defeat, however, was only temporary. For the next centuries, it 
meant that German history ran in the channel of particularism and abso-
lutism grounded in "foreign and inaccessible law."33 For the present cen-
tury, the nineteenth, it meant a return to and completion of both the 
Reformation's religious and political tasks. Of this Duncker was certain. 
He seems not to have had-at least he did not publish-a detailed analytic 
scheme of how Germany's misery between the mid-sixteenth and mid-
nineteenth centuries would actually assure the eventual triumph of uni-
fied statehood, but he, like Droysen, believed that this had not been a 
hollow period. After all, in his view the spirit did not work in vain; what-
ever happened was ultimately to the good. His publication of the Crisis 
with an introduction is evidence of this, inasmuch it shows that he be-
lieved that the Reformation and its partial failure, if comprehended by 
"Historical Rationalism," was a needed spur to unification. Moreover, in 
the long term it produced a Germany capable of achieving "Historical Ra-
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tionalism." The German nation was now spiritually ready and morally ca-
pable, as it had n~t been in the sixteenth century. 
Ready for and capable of what? The "national" or "popular state" 
(Volksstaat) was his answer. Like Droysen, Duncker used Volk to denote 
both "people" and "nation," and he saw as the state's proper essence a con-
stitutional system that would overcome both the one-sidedness of royal 
absolutism and the "state of law" (Rechtsstaat) through a "continuing 
process of mediation." In this respect, too, his ideas were very close to 
Droysen's. Both, of course, belonged to the larger grouping of German 
constitutional moderates who wanted to institutionalize political freedom 
without seriously impairing royal prerogative and without violent revo-
lution, but their fundamental similarity was closer than that. Both saw a 
special German constitutional state as a predestined historical imperative, 
and both strongly insisted that its essence was a coming together of rulers 
and ruled. Rather than opposing and checking each other, they were to co-
operate in harmony, a cooperation made possible by the undeniable his-
torical justification that each possessed and, more specifically, by the 
historically necessary spiritual transformation of the German people in 
which both were engaged and which was only now being completed. The 
new state, Duncker explained both in his university lectures and in 1844 in 
an article in the Halle'sche Allgemeine Literatur~Zeitung, whose political and 
historical editor he was, would embody "the spirit of the present" (Geist 
der Gegenwart), just as political institutions always reflected the present 
condition of the "public spirit" (offentlichen Geist).34 
That was why, in 1845 in the Crisis, he was so excited by the advent of 
"Historical Rationalism" with its promise of "shaping the world according 
to contemporary perception."35 Its appearance suggested to him that the 
potential was about to become actual, that the transformed spirit was now 
ready to transform political institutions. The only questions were by what 
means change would come and what would be the nature of that change. 
Duncker was no more ready than Droysen to engage in the utopian pas-
time of mapping the future in great detail, but he had to say more than that 
the future state would be neither absolutist nor rigidly constitutional. De-
spite his avoidance of major publication in this period-and it was not 
then unusual in Germany to defer publication after assuming a professor-
ship-his speeches and writings give a reasonably complete picture of his 
prerevolutionary thinking on these subjects. 
He was, for example, certain that it was not enough for the governed 
to be willing to cooperate freely with the government. In part, no doubt, 
because he feared revolution from below, he expected governments, pri-
marily the Prussian government, to take the initiative that could now suc-
ceed. In order to make people receptive to these approaches when they 
80 Droysen and the Prussian School of History 
came, he made what he termed Prussia's "shining history" a favorite 
theme in the lectures he delivered to lay' audiences in Halle between 1843 
and 1848.36 H the samples that survive are a fair indication of their quality, 
these were highly charged rhetorical exercises. When, for instance, he 
spoke on the occasion of the return of Frederick the Great's dagger by 
France in 1846, he evoked the king's memory and declared: "May his soul 
and his victory dagger ... remain with us forever and lead us onward 
from clarity to clarity and from victory to victory!" These were not simply 
pompous phrases; he wanted his listeners to be mindful of what Prussian 
rulers had done in the past, and he wanted the Prussian government to be 
similarly active in the present. Thus, on another occasion he spoke of the 
importance of the Prussian Reforms in German history and defined his 
own "political standpoint" as working to "carry out the ideas" of those re-
forms "in their progressive aspect" as the sole means by which Germany 
could avoid the equally repellant extremes of continued absolutism or rev-
olution in the French manner.37 Obviously, this meant that Prussia was in-
dispensable and that official Prussia would have to reach out to the nation. 
Accordingly, he looked to Prussian leadership in the present, notably 
during the crises provoked in 1846 by Christian VIII's Open Letter and in 
early 1848 by Frederick VII's January Rescript with respect to Schleswig-
Holstein, and in 1847 during the hopeful excitement that preceded and 
followed the convening of the Prussian United Diet. In the latter case, 
he even insisted that a necessary historical connection existed between 
Prussia's "state development" (staatIiche Entwicklung) and Germany's 
"national development" (nationale Entwicklung).38 Obviously, this was 
identical with Droysen's way of thinking, and, unsurprisingly, Duncker 
was strongly attracted by Droysen's arguments, notably by his thesis that 
Prussia's position as the weakest of the five great powers would compel 
her to unify Germany as a constitutional monarchy. He strongly and ex-
plicitly agreed with that analysis in three letters to Droysen and gladly 
published Droysen's fullest exposition of it, "The Political Position of 
Prussia" (1845) in the Halle'sche Allgemeine Uteratur-Zeitung. He was im-
pressed enough that in 1847 he solicited Droysen to write and publish 
"The Prussian Constitution," obviously with a fair idea of what Droysen 
was likely to say.39 Duncker's acceptance and choice of artiCles is good 
evidence of his own views, because, as he boasted to Droysen, he used 
his editorship to proclaim "the tendency of constitutionalism," that is, his 
own political outlook.40 
His hopes for actions by Prussia, and if possible by other states, in-
cluded, but were not limited to, military action in behalf of the duchies. 
In the aftermaths of both Christiari VIII's Open Letter and Frederick VII's 
January Rescript, he involved himself in the Schleswig-Holstein crises as 
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deeply as his presence in distant Halle permitted. Duncker clearly hoped 
to exert some influence on events and, beyond that, to use the crises to in-
struct his public. As early as June 1844, while the situation in the duchies 
was still fairly calm, he had noted in a letter to Droysen that tensions be-
tween Germans and, Danes provided a welcome opportunity for political 
education in Germarly.41 In 1846 he tried to put that opportunity to use by 
directing the citizens of Halle toward "national affairs."42 
He began by drafting a public letter to Germans in Schleswig-Holstein, 
for which he collected signatures among the residents of Halle. In its cen-
tral portion it read: 
You are fighting for your and our rights, for your and our constitution, for your 
and our nationality, for your and our future: for we must be beside and upon the 
sea, must reunite to ourselves all the lost members of the national body. You will 
be the first to return to the Fatherland. Just as you have often prevailed against the 
sword of the Danes, so you will prevail over their perversions of the law. In this 
you will not stand alone. Impossible that our princes, impossible that our German-
minded monarch should remain non-participants in your struggle!43 
No doubt as much for the benefit of his neighbors as to reassure the Ger-
mans in the duchies, he linked the latter's immediate situation to national 
strivings for constitutional government and a united Germany, providing 
the needed linkage by asserting Germany's need to become a naval power 
and citing the inspiration that the duchies could provide to the rest of 
Germany. He obviously sympathized with the German population of 
Schleswig-Holstein, but he even more obviously hoped that its plight 
would lead to results good for Germany as a whole. This is evident in 
his stated hope that the struggle would move the princes, especially the 
Prussian monarch, to action. Duncker in Halle and Droysen in Kiel were 
in complete agreement on this. 
Some of the language in the letter also suggests another characteristic 
of Duncker's expectations for the future German state. He described the 
duchies as the "first" of the "lost members" to be reunited with the "na-
tional body." This language implies a program of reacquiring lost territo-
ries, a policy that would surely involve the use of force. He listed the 
territories that he had in mind in 1848 in an article that he first published 
in the local Hallische Courier, and then, in slightly shortened form, in the 
Deutsche Zeitung, the organ of southwest German liberalism. He wrote in 
response to Frederick VII's 1848 January Rescript, which stated his claim 
to the succession and revealed plans to incorporate the duchies into an in-
tegrated and constitutional Danish monarchy. "We have," Duncker 
lamented, "lost Alsace and Lorraine, Switzerland, Holland, and Flanders; 
we are losing Lithuania and the Courland; but more than everything that 
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has pounded Germany in her centuries of debasement: Denmark's victory 
over Schleswig-Holstein would be the most shameful."44 In logic, the two 
documents suggest that, after securing the duchies, Germany should regain 
territories currently held by Switzerland, France,. Belgium, the Nether-
lands, and the Russian Empire. This would have required war with much 
of Europe, and Duncker surely did not have that in mind. He wrote the 
pieces at different times and probably just wanted to recall old hurts in 
order to prevent new injuries. It is nonetheless clear that a chief trait of 
the new Germany would be power, at least power to defend, and possibly 
a power to recover, territory. In 1849, after the revolution, Duncker re-
called that the achievement of adequate power through unity had been one 
of its chief attractions for him in earlier years.45 Such attraction must have 
been strong when all he could do about the duchies was to collect funds 
for the legal defense of German agitators there and wait, hopefully, for ac-
tion by Prussia and other German states.46 
His response to the meeting of the first Prussian United Diet in 1847 
was cut according to the same pattern. On the one hand, he hoped and 
asked for decisive actions by Prussian authorities that would keep Ger-
many on track for eventual constitutional unification. On the other hand, 
he tried to use present events for public instruction in order that the pop-
ulation would be receptive to whatever moves the authorities made. These 
tactics were complementary, and he employed both in his responses to the 
summoning and meeting of the diet. Right after Frederick William IV's is-
suance of the February Patent convening the diet, for example, Duncker 
drafted a public letter to the king for which he collected two hundred and 
twenty-five signatures in Halle. The letter was to embolden Frederick 
William to further actions in the interest of constitutionalism and unifica-
tion by congratulating him warmly for acting in a manner" destined to lay 
the firm foundations of a new epoch in our political and national devel-
opment (staatlichen und nationalen Entwicklung)."47 The letter had a further 
and more immediate purpose, however; namely, to make the signatories, 
after they read what they were signing, see events in their real significance 
and rally to the royal government. 
If his hopes were to become realities, after all, both king and people 
had actively to cooperate, and they could do this only if both knew what 
was at stake. Accordingly, on 13 February 1847, he addressed a political 
banquet at Halle to impress on his audience the claim that now, as in the 
time of the Prussian reforms, the drive for national unification and politi-
cal freedom came "from the government, not the people." The govern-
ment's forth~oming attitude was encouraging but insufficient; further 
progress depended on popular support. In order to avoid a relapse like the 
one in 1820, the people of Prussia and, more generally, all of Germany had 
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to invest their energy in the present process of political reconstruction, pri-
marily by accepting that the state was the supreme secular good. Nothing 
that the diet did would have a lasting effect, Duncker explained, until the 
people clearly and visibly realized that "the state stands above family, 
trade, life." In other words, and as a logical consequence of his theory of 
constitutional government, he was not calling on his listeners to force re-
form on recalcitrant authorities but to be ready to submit.freely and hap-
pily to the state life that these authorities were trying to bring into 
existence. He also wanted them to understand the special role that history 
had assigned to Prussia, and therefore argued that further progress could 
occur only when they understood the tendency of Prussian history and de-
sired actively to continue along its "shining" path.48 
Duncker was still very optimistic about the course of affairs in the late 
spring of 1847. He was favorably impressed by the bearing and behavior 
of the delegates, chiefly because these qualities suggested that they were 
ready for responsible enjoyment of political freedom. On 1 June he wrote 
to Droysen: "It finally appears that air and light want to come forth for us 
in Germany." "God be praised," he continued, ''but we will have to drive 
valiantly forward if we want to progress any further."49 By "we" he likely 
meant Droysen and himself (and other like-minded people). Government 
and people needed historical instruction, and when Duncker wrote these 
sentences he wanted Droysen to write "The Prussian Constitution" for the 
Halle'sche Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung. Given his premisses, this was a 
thoroughly reasonable view to take: the future German state would be an 
ongoing collaboration of rulers and ruled, of government and people, and 
the natural task for historical publicism was to predispose both parties to 
this collaboration. Without this predisposition, progress would cease, and 
further letters to Droysen show that he shared the latter's fear that legalis-
tic constitutionalism and royal obduracy might yet put an early end to the 
hopeful current developments.5o 
This persistent desire to unite government and people resulted not just 
from Duncker's belief that such union was the means to national unifica-
tion. He also believed that it was the end to which unification led, for con-
tinuous collaboration was, for him, the essence of state life. As he 
explained to his students in previous years, the future German state would 
be "an enduring process of mediation" (Vermittelungsprocess) between pri-
vate and public interests, between rulers and ruled, really among all groups 
in the state.51 That was why he insisted on avoiding the rigidities both of 
constitutionalism and of absolutism, though he did want constitutional 
government and a strong monarchy. It was also why he applauded Droy-
sen's "Prussian Constitution," with its attacks on the separation of powers, 
though it is important to note that his greatest fear was public apathy. 
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More than Droysen (or Haym and Sybel), Duncker worried that the 
German state might founder on the political indifference of its citizens. His 
ideal of political life, after all, placed very heavy moral demands on the cit-
izens. Consequently, in his banquet speech in 1847, Duncker implored his 
audience to support the monarchy in its reforms and reminded it warn-
ingly of 1820, when, allegedly, Prussian citizens "handed over to officials 
the reins of the state." If citizens would keep their political energies en-
gaged, however, two benefits would follow. The government's real power 
would increase as citizens subordinated everything else to the state's wel-
fare, and the citizens would secure their own legitimate interests through 
what he termed the "principle of self-government" (Selbstregierung).52 This 
emphasis on mutual advantage, of course, is essentially identical with 
Droysen's definition of the state. 
Duncker's conception of German statehood in these terms throws an 
interesting light on his political tactics before 1848. They often seem timid 
and self-protective, not least to his biographer Haym, writing long after 
the event. As remarked, Duncker published very little as yet, and in polit-
ical matters seemed to prefer to have others do the writing, by soliciting 
reviews and articles for the columns of the Halle'sche Allgemeine Literatur-
Zeitung, for example, or by persuading Rudolf Haym to prepare Speeches 
and Speakers of the First Pruss ian United Diet for the Duncker family pub-
lishing house and then trying, unsuccessfully, to persuade Droysen to re-
view it.53 This was, incidentally, also his practice right after the revolution, 
when he forced a harried and thoroughly unhappy Haym to edit the Kon-
stitutionelle Zeitung, showered him with uninvited instructions and criti-
cisms, and submitted little copy of his own to its pages.54 Those cases, of 
course, could be interpreted as laziness or, more favorably, a busy aca-
demic delegating tasks that he lacked time to complete. The situation is a 
little different with his public speaking, for he preferred to address the so-
called Friends of Light at Halle. Haym clearly thought that Duncker was 
active in this group less out of religious interest than out of a desire to pro-
pagandize under the safe cover of religious activity.55 
Timidity would have been understandable on Duncker's part. Though 
Germans could and often did write about political matters in a general 
way, censorship existed, and there was no guaranteed right to free ex-
pression. Professors were state employees with their careers to think 
about, and Duncker had gotten an early taste of state hostility. While per-
forming riillitary service near Bonn in 1832 he had attended a Burschen-
schaft meeting and made the mistake of referring favorably to it in a letter 
to his brother. The authorities distrusted these nationalistic student orga-
nizations and, in view of recent student disturbances in Germany in the 
wake of the French July Revolution, the Prussian authorities who read 
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Duncker's letter took a dim view of this reference; Duncker was sentenced 
to and served six months fortress arrest at Kopenick.56 This conviction for 
a political crime threw his career into doubt, especially when, a decade 
later, he had to approach the Prussian Kultusministerium to receive per-
mission to teach at Halle, and especially as the minister at ;-tJ;1.at time 
was the very conservative K.D.F. Eichhorn, who, along with Friedrich von 
Savigny, was a founder of the Historical School of Law and, given his 
academic background, very attentive to who taught and what was taught 
in Prussian universities. Duncker hoped for some protection from 
Johannes Schulze, with whom he, like Droysen, was on friendly terms, but 
a great deal depended on the contents of his letter.5~ 
The letter reads like an attempt to win official favor, or at least to quiet 
official fears, and that was certainly part of Duncker's intention. He in-
sisted, quite accurately but possibly contrary to appearances, that he was 
not a revolutionary and was not subversive. As a professor, he promised, 
he would "seek historical progress not in destruction but in spiritual re-
newal and moral awakening." After he was granted permission to teach, 
he kept his promise by informing his students that "objective freedom is a 
child of the subjective" and insisting on the need for "beginning with our 
individual ethical, or individual intellectualliberation."58 Neither state-
ment, however, in any way belied Duncker's convictions or theoretical 
postulates. In 1848 he would serve in a revolutionary parliament, but he 
never was, and never would be, a revolutionary. Moreover, the terms of 
his political theory really did mean that private and moral must precede 
public and political reform. It would be a mistake, therefore, to call 
Duncker timid in any ordinary sense of the term. His fear was that the 
people would not be worthy of the authorities, not that the authorities 
would oppress the people or repress him. In consequence, he lived in the 
expectation that official Prussia would carry out its assigned tasks and that 
the German people, thanks to his efforts and the efforts of others, would 
act as they had to act. He consequently devoted his early career to pre-
paring them for these tasks in the certainty that history's provision of "his-
torical rationalism" gave him the needed means for their preparation. If 
the people were not ready when the time came, it would not be his fault. 
He evidently did not consider what would happen if Prussia itself were 
not ready. 
Rudolf Haym 
Rudolf Haym pursued a career in some ways similar to, but in others quite 
different from, either Droysen's or Duncker's. The differences were the re-
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sult of age and training. Born in 1821, he was ten years younger than his 
friend Duncker and twelve years younger than Droysen. His father was a 
Protestant clergyman from Silesia and an admirer of the Enlightenment 
who, Haym reported, sent his son to Halle, where he had himself taken his 
degree, to study theology in the hope that he, too, would become a pastor. 
Haym's own, more secular tastes quickly asserted themselves, and after a 
year's study, he shifted from theology to philosophy. This meant that 
when, under Duncker's influence, he became deeply interested in history, 
he had little knowledge of history, at least of political history, and no ex-
perience in the techniques of historical research or, despite the fact that he 
wrote his inaugural dissertation on Aeschylus, historically oriented philol-
ogy. As he reminisced fifty years later, in the 1840s he "lacked not a sense 
for but a knowledge of history."59 
In 1847 he acknowledged that lack in his attempt to decline Duncker's 
request that he write a book on the Prussian United Diet. 60 The effect of this 
historical interest without historical training on his career was that he 
compromised by writing intellectual histories, especially intellectual bi-
ographies. In political terms, it meant that the historical aspect of his ar-
guments, though strongly present, was always weakly informed and often 
ill defined. This is not to say that his ideas differed fundamentally from 
those of Droysen and Duncker. On the contrary, he took the same view as 
they of the German present and future and liked to think that, in doing so, 
he had the authority of history behind his views. It was just that he could 
not cite much history to prove his points. Similarly, he pursued the same 
tactics as they, namely, preparing future citizens through present instruc-
tion; but, inevitably, his instruction lacked historical depth. Insofar as 
he could, however, he compensated by putting his philosophy to use by 
trying to give a reasoned explanation of the need for moral readiness 
grounded in historical empiricism. That was a promising idea, but Haym 
was still too young to have a lot to say. Moreover, there was a difficulty in 
finding readers and commanding their attention. Droysen and Duncker 
were appointed professors with growing reputations; Haym was still just 
an advanced student who had not yet completed his second dissertation 
(Habilitationschrift). Consequently, he could reach the public only through 
incidental writings, but he did what he could once he was ready to make 
the attempt. 
He was not ready until he first accepted and then in part rejected 
Hegel's ideas. He was, of course, too young to have learned Hegel's phi-
losophy from Hegel himself. He first encountered his ideas through con-
tacts with authors of the Halle'sche Jahrbilcher at a time when, ironically, 
they were already revising Hegel's philosophy in terms of its latent revo-
lutionary implications. Haym, by contrast, was attracted to the system in 
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what he took to be its orthodox and unrevised form. His conversion, for 
such it was, can be dated fairly precisely. In 1842 he reviewed two histo-
ries for the Halle'sche Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung (Duncker was not yet one 
of its editors), a history of English Deism and Ranke's German History in the 
Age of the Reformation. The reviews show that Haym's ideas were still un-
formed and contradictory. He demanded that historians pay attention to 
unchanging, rational values, but he also called on them to show irre-
versible onward change over time.61 Haym later explained this contradic-
tion as a result of a continued adherence to the ahistorical rationalism of 
the Enlightenment and an incomplete assimilation of Hegel's concept of an 
evolving "spirit."62 The latter strain triumphed when, in the same year, he 
wrote Gesenius: A Remembrance for his Friends, a work of which he was sub-· 
sequently understandably ashamed. 
Wilhelm Gesenius (1786-1842) was an expert hebraicist who taught 
Haym Hebrew and who prepared the standard German-language gram-
mar for that language. (After many editions, it is still a standard work). 
Haym, using personal characterizations read in the Young Hegelian 
Halle'sche Jahrbilcher as models, wrote a commemorative essay on the re-
cently deceased professor that, in essence, took him so harshly to task for 
not being a Hegelian that one wonders whether the phrase "for his 
friends" in the title was intended or unintended irony. Haym insisted that 
the historical process consisted in the progressive development of the 
"idea" that subsumed all facts and values, and then complained that Gese-
nius had ignored this truth and merely confined himself to the close study 
of a l~nguage. In Haym's view, that was a sufficient explanation for the 
many personal and intellectual limitations that he catalogued unmerci-
fully in the body of the essay.63 The work is useless for understanding 
Gesenius, but it shows a lot about the young Haym. It displays the char-
acteristic intolerance of a young believer who has just acquired a new faith. 
More specifically, it shows what Haym had assimilated from Hegel: a vi-
sion of progress as a spiritual process and a theory of knowledge that made 
him contemptuous of empiricism. The latter, justified in terms of the for-
mer, was very visible in this work. In the course of denigrating Gesenius's 
study of Hebrew, Haym remarked contemptuously about the "mindless-
ness (Gedankenlosigkeit) of the empiricist" and dismissed as "naive" the 
willingness to study individual phenomena-as if there could be any other 
way to grammatical certainty in a language whose syntactic problems are at-
tested only in scattered passages of Scripture.64 This is another, though un-
usually extreme, example of drawing from the admittedly non-empirical 
system of Hegel's philosophy a lesson with which Hegel would surely not 
have agreed. Part of Hegel's fascination for the young may have been the 
seeming offer of a short-cut to important knowledge. However that may 
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be, this anti-empiricism went well beyond that which Duncker had dis-
played in 1836 and was a good example of the Hegelian defects to which 
Droysen pointed in his letters to Perthes in 1836 and 1837. 
These notions, of course, crept into Haym's other writings as working 
assumptions and go far to explain why, when he sent Droysen a copy of 
his inaugural dissertation on Aeschylus, Droysen could manage to be 
no more than vaguely polite.65 Working from these premises, Haym 
could think in terms of inevitable historical progress, but he could 
not take adequate account of historical data. During the next two and a 
half years, he abandoned these youthful ideas, though they continued to 
have a certain importance for him. More clearly than was the case for 
Droysen and Duncker, his having once entertained these notions only to 
reject them later, meant that his conversion to empiricism, which he 
equated with moral empowerment, seemed a triumphant, because hard-
won, victory. Moreover, the fact that it coincided with a larger shift away 
from philosophical idealism in Germany gave him the sense of experi-
encing in his own intellectual development a vast and inevitable his-
torical change and the heady feeling of embodying historical progress. 
Both Droysen and Duncker had felt the same way at comparable stages in 
their careers. 
Haym could feel that way because he did not revise or reject the other 
lesson that he learned from Hegel, the vision of history as a process of in-
eluctable and essentially spiritual progress. In 1843 in an essay on his goals 
he apostrophized: "I would like to devour whole centuries of the future 
and carry my tent from epoch of humanity to another-not like the eter-
nal Jew but like the eternal man, like the developing, marching history of 
humanity itself."66 If in less inflated language, he could have written that 
at any time before 1848. He thought of history as a progressive march of 
which he wanted to be an integral part, and this wish survived and in-
formed the major intellectual change that he experienced in 1844, namely, 
a conscious and passionate rejection of the epistemology that he had 
adapted from Hegel on the grounds that it was morally disabling to indi-
viduals and to the German nation as a whole. 
This change was as rapid as his initial conversion to Hegelianism, and 
its causes are not altogether clear. When Droysen and Duncker undertook 
similar revisions, they did so more gradually and were surely helped by 
the professional requirement for historians to work continually with em-
pirical data. Droysen also had theological objections to, among other 
things, Hegel's theory of knowledge, which may have at all times pre-
vented him from accepting the system fully. Haym was not yet engaged in 
detailed research, and, despite the fact that he came from a clerical home, 
he was not especially religious. In any case, the record shows that he re-
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jected what he understood of Hegelian epistemology after reading Feuer-
bach under Wilhelm Busse's instruction in 1844, and in January 1845 he 
wrote to his friend Hermann Finke that no one could any longer suppose 
that "the empire of the little Hegelians still stands in full force and 
bloom."67 This raises the question of why he changed his mind, because 
people do not usually reject hitherto cherished beliefs in a few months 
simply because someone has shown them another way of viewing matters. 
The letter to Finke suggests one possible motivation: Hegelianism now 
seemed out of fashion. Haym was following his generation. This does not 
mean that Haym was merely a conformist of the mind. Given his theory of 
progress, a change in fashion would imply a change in validity, would 
imply, that is, that humanity had moved beyond Hegel's philosophy to a 
higher truth. That claim was present in the distinction that Duncker drew 
between "philosophical" and "historical rationalism," a distinction that he 
may have developed through conversations with Haym. It is also possible, 
as a case of a virtue having its defect, that Haym was irritated by the very 
comprehensiveness of Hegel's system and began to feel it to be a sort of 
tyranny. The evidence for this possibility is both speculative and retro-
spective. In 1857 in his genial Hegel and his Times Haym described Hegel's 
as an age when all the disciplines "gathered at the well-spread table of 
Hegelian wisdom," when one was" either a Hegelian or an idiot and a bar-
barian." He concluded by remarking: "One must hark back to that time to 
know what the supremacy of a philosophical system really means."68 This 
is an apt, if overdrawn, description of German academic life a generation 
earlier, but it also reads a little like a former lover trying to explain what 
was wrong in a failed relationship. 
In his long, nearly book-length article "Philosophy," written between 
1846 and 1848 for the General Encyclopedia of the Arts and Sciences (an early 
version of the famous Brockhaus encyclopedia), Haym explained what he 
now thought was wrong with Hegelianism. He, too, summarily accused 
Hegel of endorsing political reaction and accused him of fostering moral 
complacency: 
Hegel is the philosopher of the Restoration, his philosophy a glaring reflection of 
the indolence and self-satisfaction, of the prostration and covering-up under which 
the German nation (teutsche Nation) lay buried after the Enlightenment had 
wearied and withered her, and after the Romantic upsurge had seized her so pow-
erfully. She then covered herself in the memory of these periods that she had sur-
vived and had no more significant work to produce than this philosophy that like 
a dream led past her the substance of her life .... There is no room for character in 
the closed structure of Hegelianism, [for] all the points of subjectivity are broken 
off .... The absolute does not have the German nation in its foundations or elabo-
rations.69 
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Haym used the same highly generalized, stereotypical periodization of re-
cent German history that Duncker had: prosaic, essentially destructive En-
lightenment gave way to unruly romanticism, and both gave way to an 
Idealism that was now itself being rejected in a fourth period concerned 
with moral action. Germany, he insisted, needed a philosophy that left 
room for the "points of subjectivity," by which he meant individual and 
collective moral action in the real, empirical world. 
This was what really interested him. He believed that individual 
ethical action and commitment would find its completion in the state and, 
further, that a real state was unthinkable without morally adequate 
individuals for citizens. Haym believed that these ethical and political ne-
cessities were the cause of the German rejection of Hegel's philosophy, 
though with the important qualification that the philosophy's defect was 
actually a virtue. "The historical situation of the present," Haym ex-
plained, "has undeniably grown out of the tight confines to which absolute 
idealism accustomed her ... the seams with which that idealism contained 
us are tearing." If this odd metaphor meant anything, it was that Ger-
many's liberation from" absolute idealism" would not, could not, have oc-
curred had that idealism not been present in the first place.70 In one way, 
that was a truism, but in another it was a reasonable inference from a his-
torical determinism that always celebrated the necessary as the good: if 
Germany learned to respect empiricism and the need for individual ethi-
cal action by rejecting" absolute idealism," then "absolute idealism" had 
been good for Germany. 
Haym did not cast his argument in those terms, however, in order to 
suggest that Hegel's philosophy was so obviously mistaken that sooner or 
later Germans would reject it. For autobiographical reasons, he under-
stood its immense persuasive power, and elsewhere in "Philosophy" he 
admiringly referred to it as "the mightiest of all modem systems."7l Droy-
sen and Duncker, in their own ways, showed the same ambivalence. Haym 
therefore believed that an imposing power had been required for its over-
turn, and he cited a "historical reaction" caused by the "vital drives of the 
German national spirit (lebendigen Triebe des teutschen Volksgeistes)."72 His 
language shows that he saw this change as decisive for Germany's moral 
and political future, but he believed that Hegel's defeat alone was insuffi-
cient to produce practical results. Because institutions reflected the spirit, 
"a new philosophy" was also needed.73 That philosophy had to encourage 
moral action by taking adequate account of empirical data. Haym did not 
overestimate his own abilities as an expounder of philosophy, but he tried 
to provide at least the elements of this philosophy in three works that, 
despite some obvious differences, contained a set of common and consis-
tent ideas: The Authority that Falls and that which Remains, which he opti-
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mistically subtitled A Popular-Philosophical Essay (1846); Feuerbach and Phi-
losophy: Towards a Critique of Both (1847); and the aforementioned article 
"Philosophy." 
His effort at philosophical reconstruction rested on the observation, 
offered in The Authority, that there was "something" in everybody that was 
"simply incommensurable with the concept (etwas schlechthin for den Be-
griff incommensurables}."74 Here his criticisms of "absolute idealism" as' 
anti-empirical and ethically insufficient came together. In its abstractness, 
this idealism made the individual impossible to comprehend and made in-
dividuals unsuited for ethical decisions in actual circumstances. Haym 
wanted a philosophy that offered valid and binding guidance to real peo-
ple in real situations. His basic task, as he described it in a letter in January 
1845, was to demonstrate "the identity (Identitiit) of the ideal and the 
real."75 This meant explaining in philosophical terms what was in any case 
actually occurring in modern German history, as, in fact, the national re-
jection of "absolute idealism" to which he pointed was a historical case in 
point of a whole population seeking to create such an "identity." 
Haym's discussion of these matters was often murky, and it would be 
a mistake to make him seem more lucid than he really was. Nonetheless, 
the outlines of his argument and its implications are clear enough. The 
"ideal," he believed, existed in the realm of the spirit, the "real" in the 
realm of nature. He wanted to make these identical in the sense that 
the former could validly guide and explain actions in the latter. This "iden-
tity" would not be empirical in the sense that the ideal was merely an ac-
curate description of the real, but it would be empirical inasmuch as the 
ideal could now take account of the concrete and contingent circumstances 
that individuals faced. He wanted not just a valid definition of the true and 
the good, but specific ethical guidance for the actual conduct of affairs. In 
other words, and here too he strongly resembles both Droysen and 
Duncker in their criticism of Hegel, his motivation was fundamentally 
moral. It was also essentially historical because, in supplying the "iden-
tity" that idealism had failed to produce, he believed that he was carrying 
out a historical necessity. 
More precisely, and roughly in the way of the Christians viewing the 
relationship of the New to the Old Testament, he thought that he was 
completing and perfecting what" absolute idealism" had offered in a pre-
liminary but now unsatisfactory way. That is, he admired Hegel and 
Schelling for making the first modern attempts at solving the problem of 
identity, but he faulted Schelling for producing an "identity" so purely 
ideal that it could not apply to particular actions in the day-to-day world 
and blamed Hegel for simply borrowing and adapting Schelling'S useless 
theory,76 He was encouraged in his own attempt by the growing recogni-
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tion of these failings and by the fact that Feuerbach had moved away 
from "absolute idealism" by "pressing toward the concrete" in an evident 
desire "to establish reality and humanity." He did not, however, believe 
that Feuerbach's philosophy was really an improvement, because he had 
so heavily stressed the "ego" at the expense of everything else that he was 
just as one-sidedly trapped in the re~l as Schelling and Hegel had been in ' 
the ideal, but he was pleased that. Feuerbach was a symptom of philo-
sophical change.77 
Haym thought that he had found the needed way to move between 
these two extremes. He tried to present the results in The Authority, where 
he discussed the possibility of individual ethical activity. He reasoned that 
no action could properly be called ethical unless it were freely chosen by 
the actor, that is, unless the ideal informed the real. Because the standard 
was rational and absolute, all ethical people would make the same ethical 
decision in the same circumstances. In that sense, ethics would be author-
itative. This authority, however, had to be freely accepted, rather than 
imposed. That was a problem because, Haym maintained, simple obser-
vation showed that until the present, human history "consisted solely in 
the collision of freedom and authority." A convincing demonstration of 
identity would change all that. With real and ideal reconciled, it would be 
possible to find an "authority ... in response to which I freely renounce 
my freedom once and for all and which I recognize or obey by this very act 
of renunciation."78 This "authority," once discovered and defined, would 
also have major political implications because it gave individuals what, in 
Haym's as well as in Droysen's and Duncker's opinion, was required for 
political life, the ability freely to choose to obey. Haym began his search for 
this authority by pointing out that it had to be a "spiritual power" (geistige 
Macht) because only a faculty of the spirit could decide or obey. He then 
argued that the faculty in question could not be "reason" (Verriunft) be-
cause reason was essentially the same as freedom, and it would be a con-
tradiction in terms to try to reconcile freedom and authority solely from 
the side of freedom. That had been the error of Schelling and Hegel in es-
tablishing a merely "ideal identity."79 Haym therefore turned to what he 
defined as "the need for ethical activity; the authority that abides, that 
which is certain without a concept-it is the conscience (Gewissen)."80 The 
conscience seemed perfectly suited to Haym's purposes, because as it was 
spiritual, it was in the realm of freedom, yet at the same time it was non-
rational and, so, in needed contact with nature and necessity. It alone could 
reconcile the free and the unfree, the ideal and the real. 
This is not a persuasive demonstration. Haym barely defined his key 
abstractions and, more serious, he did not try to prove that the con-
science, as he defined it, actually existed. At best, the subtext of his argu-
ment runs as follows: Ethical activity occurs, but it cannot occur without a 
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requisite human faculty. The conscience is the only conceivable faculty; 
therefore, because ethical activity does occur, there must be such a thing· 
as conscience. The important point, however, is that Haym himself be-
lieved that his demonstration was a success and that he had based ethics 
on the "character" and the "points of subjectivity" that he found missing 
in Hegel's philosophy. Behind, and largely concealed by, the philosophi-
cal jargon of his time and place was Haym's belief that people were good 
in the sense of being conscientious and wanting to submit to rules that 
were both objectively valid and freely chosen. Behind it, too, was a histor-
ical optimism that argued that at last, in the Germany of Haym's time, it 
was possible for people to recognize and act on true moral authority. 
Haym thought history would soon reach its predestined goal, and he 
meant to help it get there. 
Thus he tried demonstrating the authoritative nature of the con-
science, but he did not stop at the basic level of individual ethics. He tried 
to apply his theory. In fact, he believed that it was historically necessary 
that he apply his theory at the collective or public level. To this end, he de-
veloped his theory of "real identities" and the urgent defense of historical 
empiricism that it demanded. Real identities were actual instances of the 
reconciliation of identity between ideal and real. As such, they were his-
torical events, though Haym's relative ignorance of history forced him, in 
most instances, to leave it to his readers to supply cases in point. He did, 
however, supply a typology of these identities, for which he adopted a 
Hegelian terminology. They occurred in three "moments" that, in rank or-
der, proceeded from "speech" through "evolving concrete morality" to 
"art," all of which were subsumed as "abolished [yet 'raised' and there-
fore 'preserved'] moments" (aufgehobene Momente) in "religion," the high-
est form of human endeavor. This listing at first seems apolitical, but that 
appearance is misleading. Religion was the "highest form of action by the 
ego" (Form der Thathandlung des Ichs}.81 This wide definition could and did 
include politics. 
Haym did not fault absolute idealism solely for its ethical insuffi-
ciency. He also condemned it for scanting historical empiricism. The two 
criticisms were part of the same caseinasmuch as it was the inability of the 
ideal to take adequate account of the real-that is, the empirical-that 
caused its ethical failure. The real identities were empirical cases in point 
of the identity that Haym sought and, like Droysen and Duncker, he 
thought of the empirical bent of the German present as a promising sign 
of its ongoing moral and political progress. Thus, comparing the age of ab-
solute idealism with his own, Haym claimed that the preceding generation 
had been "fortunate" in its calling "freely to translate the life of the mind 
into a world of ideas," but he believed that the "present generation" was 
even more fortunate because it was called to exchange the intellectual 
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essence of the old metaphysic "for the gold of real existence." He therefore 
noted hopefully the interconnection between the "ethical tone of the pres-
ent" and the "increased earnestness of empirical research." As a conse-
quence of this "devotion to the concrete," he and his contemporaries had· 
"invincibly rescued ... freedom" and would therefore be able "to steer 
through the conflagration of history into a safe harbor."82 As his choice of 
'a nautical metaphor implies, Haym had in mind collective as well as indi-
vidual redemption and expected practical historical results. 
The immediate means to this progress was historical inquiry. Philoso-
phy, he maintained, had done its part by expounding the idea of freedom 
and analyzing the "vital, developing interpenetration of man and nature 
(Durchdringung von Mensch und Natur)." Now empirical research had to 
provide the "full sense of the historical," without which "real identity" 
could not be achieved.83 He insisted on the specifically historical character 
of this research by pointing out that the otherwise admirable Feuerbach, 
though empiricist in approach, had ignored "the historical moment ... al-
most completely." That was a snare for the "true empiricist" to avoid be-
cause there was no such thing as a "universal human being." There were 
only "nationally, temporally, geographically, and individually deter-
mined human beings."84 With the partial exception of his article "Philoso-
phy," which was a very detailed history of the development of truth from 
the ancient Greece to nineteenth-century Germany, Haym could not him-
self present the results of such inquiries. He could, however, encourage 
others to do so and indicate how history could be put to moral and politi-
cal use, and he did have at least a general interpretation of the past from 
which he, also in general terms, projected the future. 
At first appearance, admittedly, Haym's criticisms of absolute ideal-
ism seem to have little to do with each other. His claim that its identity 
theory was too purely ideal to affect individual actions and his demand 
to take empirical account of history seem related only in the loose sense 
that both required close attention to the concrete and the particular. 
Haym never really integrated these claims adequately into an internally 
consistent philosophy. For all his good intentions, he was Simply not a 
successful synthesizer and not an effective exponent of his own ideas. 
Some of his statements, however, give reasonably clear indications of 
what he wanted to say. His discussion of Kant's ethics and his scattered 
remarks on historical progress since the sixteenth century give a reason-
ably clear sense of what he took truly ethical action to be, of why he 
urged contemporaries to the study of history, and of how he expected the 
future to look. 
His discussion of Kant is quite informative. Haym argued that Kant 
achieved "practical and empirical ... mediation" betWeen philosophy and 
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history. This claim at first seems surprising, but all that Haym reallyrneant 
was that Kant" derived from his doctrine of the categorical imperative-
discussed in Kant's The Metaphysical Foundations of Morals-the obligation 
to intervene as a member in the historical process."85 This is a plausible and 
illuminating way of looking at the categorical imperative, that is, at the 
idea that in ethical activity properly so called, people act in such a way that 
their actions could be framed to the maxim of a universal law. After all, if 
individuals at all times employed the categorical imperative, their actions 
would continuously and freely produce a binding system of laws con-
tained in the empirical data of history, that is, the sum of their actions. The 
result would, of course, also be an instance of that combination of freedom 
and necessity that he so greatly admired and would be what he termed a 
"real identity." 
Hayrn was less convincing, at least as an interpreter of Kant, when he 
asserted as a supposed requirement in Kant's ethics that "philosophy ... 
prove its imperative as such through the observation of the historical 
process." After all, Kant's insistence that motivation rather than result is 
the true test of ethical action meant that ethics were invisible to empirical 
examination. This assertion, however, is good evidence for what Hayrn 
had in mind. Hayrn wanted both the assurance that people could find 
binding ethical standards to guide them in their actions and that an ob-
server could chart these actions in history. He unintentionally distorted 
Kant's meaning in order to gain the latter assurance. Hayrn therefore be-
lieved that it was possible to avoid the danger of seeing in history merely 
"what has happened for the realization of the noumenal moral law" and 
of simply" establishing the imperative as a lifeless fact." That is, it was pos-
sible to go beyond the lifeless history of the spirit that he found in Hegel 
to "seeking ... traces in history where the imperative is present as a'vital 
drive, not as externality but as strength."86 In other words, research could 
find real cases of real individuals performing really ethical actions. In 
Hayrn's terms, "real identities" could be validated both before and after 
the fact. 
The purpose of this search was not simply to supply examples of good 
and bad actions for imitation or avoidance. In 1842 Hayrn had abandoned 
his beliefin timeless truths in favor of a Hegelian vision of progress that 
he kept long after rejecting Hegel's identity theory and embracing empiri-
cism~ He wanted to historicize ethics in order to keep a watch on ethical 
evolution through time. Just as ideas gained and lost validity over time, 
so the ethical content of history changed, and changed purposively. In 
Haym's view, things were getting better. Change was a necessary and 
beneficent part of history, even when it destroyed the old to make way for 
the new. In that attitude, he used the term "right of history" in Droysen's 
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sense.B7 Given his weak grounding in history, he was not able to discuss 
such matters at length or in much detail, but he shared Droysen's and 
Duncker's views of the content and direction of modern history. Again, he 
devoted his major works to providing philosophical legitimation of that 
content. He, too, dated the beginning of modern history from the Refor-
mation and saw the task of the present and immediate future as a re-
sumption and completion of the Reformation's "energetic drive toward a 
restoration of the dissolved unity ... [between] the moral and the intellec-
tual."BB That claim, obviously, made his own philosophizing seem a cen-
trally important contribution to the assigned tasks of the present. He was, 
of course, joining Duncker and Droysen in seeing in the Reformation a 
change in ideas that would ultimately lead to a change in practice, includ-
ing political practice, now that the intellectual requirements for such 
change had been met. 
Germany's present and future politics interested him deeply, because 
in the future German state, he believed, Germany's new ethical discover-
ies would find their complete realization. He did not himself say very 
much about political questions, however, because his ignorance of history 
made him diffident. He preferred to be guided by the senior and more 
knowledgeable Duncker.B9 Unsurprisingly, therefore, his few remarks on 
recent history and on present and future politics are entirely in line with 
the latter's as well, of course, as with Haym's philosophical excursionS. He 
aided Duncker inNs 1846 agitation over Schleswig-Holstein and over the 
meeting of the Prussian United Diet the next year.90 At Duncker's urging, 
he reviewed Georg Gottfried Gervinus's pamphlet "The Prtlssian Consti-
tution" and came to much the same conclusions about it that Droysen did. 
He admired constitutional government, but he did not agree with Gervi-
nus's call for a Prussian constitution both out of a fear that too rigid a con-
stitutionalism would impair cooperation between king and people and in 
the belief that, in any case, a Prussian constitution was too limited an ob-
jective. The object was to unify Germany as a constitutional state.91 
The meeting of the diet excited him because he believed that it was the 
beginning of a major transformation that would, in political terms, com-
plete Germany's ethical progress. He accordingly followed newspaper 
accounts closely and repeatedly turned to Duncker for advice and in-
struction.92 In mid-November he prefaced his Speakers and Speeches of the 
First Pruss ian United Diet, which he prepared at Duncker's instigation, with 
a plausible description of his initial and eventual estimation of the diet's 
significance: 
Just as, after the barren winter, the spring strengthens the earth and enlivens it to 
new birth, so a power of spring ran through us and the entire German nation when 
Prussia's estates were gathered into their first parliament. The remembrance of so 
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much nullity vanished before the hope that mightily seized us: we too would now 
develop laws, we too would become a powerful and respected people (Volk), we 
too would live in the enjoyment of an ordered freedom. The inspired word of our 
representative drove with convulsive effect into the core of our life, and we 
younger ones, who were not blessed to see the war-like rising of the nation (Nation) 
at the beginning~f the century, for the first time experienced the significance of a 
moral movement seizing the entire people (V olk).1n the wide-spread ground of in-
tellectual strivings we saw this movement lead like a fresh stream along whose 
banks the grass again stood green; we drank from it thirstily as from a well of life.93 
The language is florid, but it conveys quite well his sense not just that 
something very important was happening but that something inevitable 
was in process that would revivify Germany in moral and political terms. 
His key hopes were the simultaneous possession of national power and 
"ordered freedom" (geordnete Freiheit). The image of spring following win-
ter, as Haym employed it, was not meant to suggest cyclical recurrence but 
to signal a long-anticipated blossoming. 
He recurred to seasonal images when he discussed his realization, 
months later, that he would have to wait a while longer for unification and 
freedom. He claimed then that he had earlier mistaken" a single, prema-
ture spring day" for the "late appearance of spring" and also compared his 
original analysis to the use of a ''bad star chart" that made it impossible 
correctly to identify the stars and track their courses.94 In their own way, 
these aJ;lalogies were also hopeful because, of course, even a delayed 
spring eventually arrives, and the stars can be tracked with the right star 
chart. This was Haym's assertion of the possibility of certain prediction, in 
fact it was itself a prediction. Just as in "The Prussian Constitution" Ger-
vinus Wrote of a "silent force of affairs" (stille c;ewalt der Dinge) that was at 
work in Prussia and Germany in 1847, so Haym wrote of a "power of 
affairs" (Macht der Dinge) that worked through individuals and toward the 
unification of Germany as a state. This time, he reasoned, it had not pro-
duced the right individuals in the right place and at the right time. The next 
time it would, and he hoped his book would help them learn from the mis-
takes of their predecessors.95 He was confident about the future, and it 
made sense for him to be. By his analysis, the ethical preconditions for 
statehood in Germany already existed and the signs of change seemed 
plain to see. 
Heinrich von Sybel 
Heinrich von Sybel followed his own, rather different, path into what be-
came the Prussian School, and these differences in the course of his devel-
opment help explain the distinctive features of his mature historical and 
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political thought and practice. Even before 1848, for example, he was cau-
tious in offering predictions, though he did possess a theory of progress 
and thought he knew where German history was headed. Further, he was 
an early believer in compromise, in not letting the best be enemy of the 
good, an outlook he associated with the admired English tradition of pol-
itics. Finally, his designation of Prussia as the destined agent of political 
reform in Germany was relatively opportunistic. He thought that, for rea-
sons of tradition and self-interest, Prussia would unify Germany under a 
suitable constitution, but this was a fairly cool-headed calculation un-
mixed with any special affection for the Hohenzollern monarchy. The fact 
that in other, and more important, respects he shared their views sug-
gests, of course, that the real driving force behind the creation of the 
Prussian School was a commpn desire to advocate unification and the ac-
tive collaboration between government and citizens on the basis of histor-
ical certitude. 
His social and geographical origins partly explain these differences. 
He was more socially secure than Droysen, Duncker, or Haym. His ances-
tors belonged to the urban patriciate of the formerly independent West-
phalian city of Soest, and his father earned the fatnily a hereditary patent 
of Prussian nobility for years of diligent work in the Prussian administra-
tion.96 His degree and professorship did not bring him into the elite; they 
merely determined what branch of it he served in, and he seems not to 
have felt, as the others sometimes did, a need to prove himself through the 
possession and display of special knowledge. He· also had less reason to 
feel antagonistic to the old order. Moreover, he was not a Prussian except 
in a legal sense. During his lifetime, to be sure, Soest was a part of the 
Prussian Rhineland, but this was a recent acquisition far to the west of the 
core provinces of the monarchy. As a Protestant in an overwhelmingly 
Catholic area, he felt some affection for the Protestant Hohenzollern dy-
nasty and was profoundly distrustful of the Catholic church, but he was a 
westerner as Droysen, Duncker, and Haym were not. He viewed Prussia 
from an emotional as well as a geographic distance. It also surely made 
some difference that, until 1849, he was not in contact with the other three. 
From 1843 onward, Droysen and Duncker knew each other at least by cor-
respondence and exchanged common political views. Duncker and Haym 
worked closely together from 1845 onward and, through Duncker, Haym 
was at least tenuously in contact with Droysen. Sybel seems not to have 
made their acquaintance until 1849 and to have worked on his own before 
that date. 
His formal education also followed a different pattern. It provided 
him with the intellectual materials necessary for historically based predic-
tions of the national future, but his arguments had distinctive emphases 
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and nuances. For example, he was as devout an empiricist as any of the 
other three, but his empiricism was unproblematic. He invoked it to fault 
careless scholarship, not as a triumph of the German mind toward which 
history had toiled. This was because he never fell under the spell of philo-
sophical idealism and studied under Leopold Ranke at Berlin from 1834 
to 1837. He attended Ranke's lectures in each term of his study, and his 
six-semester membership in Ranke's seminar set a record never again 
matched by a Ranke student.97 Ranke used the seminar not just to have 
students report on their own and comment on each other's research but 
to persuade them of his views on how to study and teach history. Sybel 
was deeply enough impressed that he himself established a historical 
seminar modeled on the original as soon as he became a professor at 
Bonn.98 Sybel meant more than a routine compliment when he wrote 
Ranke in 1874 to describe those seminar meetings as "unforgettable" oc-
casions from which his "academic life took its beginnings."99 Ranke's ef-
fect on Sybel went beyond instilling a habit of meticulous attention to 
document and detail. Sybel also acquired a dogmatic certainty that there 
was one right way, the Rankean way, to research and write history. He 
was, by his lights, merely stating an undeniable truth when in 1844 he 
told Georg Waitz never to let "the positing of grand hypotheses impair 
strictness and method in the treatment of individual sources" and never 
to "make current a preconceived view too early in the consideration of 
the surviving data."lOO This self-assurance is all the more remarkable be-
cause Sybel was then engaged in a serious fight with his friend Waitz 
over the origins of early German political institutions. In any case, these 
were sentiments with which Droysen, Duncker, and Haym would have 
agreed but which they would never have stated so flatly. They defended 
empiricism against the competing approach, which in many ways they 
still admired; for Sybel it was a dogma so certain as to invite statement 
without supporting argument. 
This self-confident empiricism assured that when Sybel turned his 
hand to prediction, his predictions would be grounded in historical data, 
but another of Ranke's legacies threatened to keep his attention safely riv-
eted on the past rather than on the present and future. Ranke, who was a 
conservative opposed to national unification in any case, consistently ar-
gued that history could not instruct the present for the benefit of the fu-
ture. He had excellent grounds for making that case. On the one hand, he 
believed that God worked fundamental changes in history, so that the ex-
perience of one epoch was not relevant to another. On the other hand, and 
more important in this perspective, he did not believe that there was 
progress in history. Without that belief, it was not possible to project ten-
dencies observed in the past into the future. If Sybel had remained entirely 
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true to Ranke's teachings, he would not have ventured to predict, and, in 
the event, his predictions were tentative and cautious. 
Droysen, Duncker, and Haym, of course, variously adapted elements 
. of Hegel's philosophy of history to arrive at a theory of progress. Sybel, for 
several reasons, did not. He appears to have been temperamentally averse 
to philosophy, though he later said that it was "unfortunate" that he had 
not studied it "with the same diligence" as history and at the end of for-
mal study he tried to read Hegel.101 Nothing much came of the exercise, 
though one of the theses for defense appended to his 1838 dissertation on 
the historian Jordanes and the origins of the Getae read: "The historian 
cannot write history without philosophy." Even if he believed that, as op-
posed to offering it for the sake of debate, the proposition is too vague 
to indicate a definite philosophical orientation. Another of the appended 
theses is more suggestive. In a clever reversal of Tacitus's often quoted dic-
tum in the Annals to have written "without anger or passion" (sine iraet 
studio), Sybel asserted that historians do or should write "with" (cum) 
those qualities.102 Again assuming that he did not offer this solely for the 
sake of argument, it reads like an early indication of a strong wish to put 
history in the service of present and future needs, a wish that more or less 
called for a theory of progress. 
Sybel did~ in fact, develop such a theory, or perhaps one should say 
outlook, as he did not systematically articulate or defend it. He borrowed 
the materials from a surprising, though actually reasonable, source, the 
teachings of the great legal historian Karl Friedrich von Savigny. This 
source is surprising because, from the time of his famous debate with the 
legist Thibaut over the wisdom of revising and codifying German law, 
Savigny has been a byword for a sort of legal conservatism. It is not possi-
ble to do justice to Savigny's views in a short space, but it is possible to de-
scribe his basic argument. He believed that laws do, or anyway should, 
reflect the developed condition of the "national spirit" (Volksgeist) and 
should not, therefore, be amended or replaced according to the ahistorical 
dictates of reason. Argued in those terms, the view is hard to refute unless 
one wants to say that laws should not fit time and place. A corollary of this 
view, however, is more problematic, namely, the notion that laws and le-
gal institutions that had existed for some time have a presumed right to 
continue to exist. Droysen's contrast between the "right of history" and 
"historical rights" was an assault on just this corollary. 
It was, however, possible to accept Savigny's basic claim without 
going on to argue against deliberate legal and institutional change. The 
arguments that Droysen, Duncker, and Haym each made against the 
Enlightenment, for example, were quite consonant with Savigny's attack 
on Thibaut's theories without being arguments against progressive re-
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form. Nor was Savigny simply and single-mirtdedly against change. The 
Volksgeist was a historical product that changed and brought changes over 
time, though Savigny had no reason to stress this obvious implication. 
Sybel did. In 1888 he recalled that, as a student at Berlin, he attended one 
of Savigny's lectures "half by accident" and was delightedly surprised by 
the "plenitude of ethical and cultural historical wealth" that a careful 
study of the pandects (the digest of decisions and opinions of Roman ju-
rists) supplied to him. He began to study under Savigny in the belief that 
"a full quantum of juristic education is the indispensable precondition for 
the comprehension and presentation of political history."103 
Sybel evidently liked finding a legal complement to the more narrowly 
political history studied under Ranke, but it also seems to have had the 
wider effect of accustoming Sybel to thinking and judging the suitability 
of institutions and practices in terms of the needs and cultural level of the 
people and country in question. This mental habit could, of course, easily 
become a standard by which to appraise contemporary practice and as-
certain future necessities. Once he was practiced in that habit, once he was 
accustomed to thinking of change, even gradual change, as normal, Sybel 
was able to think of progress as a norm and, so, to judge even sudden and 
major changes as desirable as long they contributed to progress over the 
long term. He argued this case in the first of several scholarly disputes that 
checkered his career. (Though he was always polite to his adversaries, he 
was pugnacious enough really to enjoy a good fight.) 
This first fight grew out of his earliest scholarly publications, his dis-
sertation on Jordanes and the Getae (1838), the History of the First Crusade 
(1841), and The Origins of German Kingship (1844).104 These works all dealt 
with early German history and let him employ both the techniques of po-
litical history learned from Ranke and the techniques of legal history 
learned from Savigny. This combination led him, in the last of these works, 
to the inescapable but at first alarming, and for some time controversial, 
conclusion that the major political institutions of medieval Germany were 
borrowings from the late Roman:t;<:mpire rather than products of slow, 
indigenous development. This conclusion at first disturbed him, and it 
subsequently angered some of his readers, much in the way that any dis-
cussion of possibly beneficial effects of imperialism might outrage a post-
colonial population today. French military successes and legal innovations 
in Germany, earlier in the century, were humiliating, and many Germans 
did not want to read about how much their forebears learned from the 
Roman legions. Moreover,Sybel's thesis contradicted the published views 
of the great Germanist Jakob Grimm and threatened to cost Sybel the 
friendship of his fellow medievalist and Ranke student Georg Waitz who 
was publishing contrary findings in the same area.105 
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Sybel, however, felt forced to his conclusions, because the evidence 
pointed to them and he felt governed by evidence. He read the evidence 
that way because his study of legal evolution made him mindful of the re-
lationship between laws and cultural levels. In this case, he found that Ger-
man political practice in the early Middle Ages, though roughly suited to 
actual needs, was too advanced to have been produced by their primitive 
society. Obviously, then, it had been borrowed and adapted. This meant, 
however, that he had modified Savigny's model of legal evolution in two 
ways, neither of which actually contradicted Savigny. First, and in a man-
ner analogous to Droysen's idea of the "right of history," he implicitly le-
gitimated sudden and profound change by accepting as justifiable German 
borrowings from the Romans. Second, and relatedly, he legitimated such 
innovations by reference to their long-term as well as immediate effects. In 
a revealing passage in a letter to Ranke, he admitted that he was putting 
early Germans on a level with the "West Indian negroes" of the present, 
and then pointed out that it would be valid if the negroes of the West In-
diesi centuries hence, reached the high cultural level to which Germans 
had n0o/ attained. (In fairness, he did not rule out that possibility.)106 The 
letter showed both continued affinity to, and new independence from, 
Ranke. There was nothing in the Rankean approach to contradict instances 
of sudden change and borrowing in history, but, from Ranke's point of 
view, to validate change in terms of benefits over the long run was to in-
troduce an exiguous standard of historical judgment. Sybel needed such a 
standard because he really wanted, as Ranke avowedly did not, to use his-
tory to instruct the present in its tasks. . 
. In principle, this view of history called for the analysis of the present 
and the anticipation of the future in terms of tendencies seen to be unfold-
ing in the past. In practice, Sybel (like Droysen and Duncker and Haym) 
often started from his understanding of the present and his hopes for the 
future in posing questions to the past. This present-mindedness was only 
natural, and it was theoretically defensible as long as its results were 
scrupulously tested with historical evidence. Sybel discussed this matter 
in July 1846 in "On the Tories," one of the lectures that he gave each year 
on the elector's birthday after leaving Bonn in 1845 for Marburg in elec-
toral Hesse: 
HiStory and the present are not only linked by a temporal band. They stand to one 
another like lesson and deed, like knowing and willing. The strivings of the pres-
ent should orient themselves and base themselves spiritually (sich orielltierell Illld 
geistig begriinden) with reference to the completed stages. For his part, the historian 
can win only from a vital rapport with the present the moral warmth (sittlicllC 
Wiirme) needed to make a new artistic existence blossom from the past. ... More 
than any other discipline, therefore, is history forced from her proper tracks when 
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one wants to direct her solely to the learned circles. She is made to prosper in the 
open air and among the drives of the market place. If as a result she is sometimes 
dissipated or falls into error, that is only a sign that she has not yet reached her full 
strength and not at all that she has been seized by a sick deviation.107 
These remarks show both what Sybel had in common with Droysen, 
Duncker, and Haym and what was distinctive in his conception of the 
tasks of the political historian. The obvious and important similarity was 
Sybel's clearly stated belief that history is inherently progressive, that 
progress unfolds in "stages," and that historians should be partisans of ob-
servable progress. In logic, this meant that Sybel, too, had to think of the 
winning side as the right side. This standard, moreover, left no room for 
nonhistorical standards of judgment. 
Sybel also included some ideas that were more strictly his own. His 
claim that only a "vital rapport with the present" allowed the historian to 
write good histories was original, although the others certainly possessed 
that rapport, and the role of present-mindedness in research was an im-
portant question for Droysen years later in his lectures on historical 
method known and published as the Historik. This idea seems to be an ap-
plication of the previously noted thesis appended to Sybel's1838 disserta-
tion that the historian should write "with anger and passion."l08 Sybel also 
wanted to write readable histories to be read by large readerships. Obvi-
ously, the strategy of all four historians required them to reach out to the 
largest possible publics, because, in the nature of things, it would have 
made little sense to have reserved moral and political preparation to a few, 
highly specialized readers. Only Sybel, however, described writing history 
as making "a new artistic existence blossom." He did not want moral 
earnestness to compromise the aesthetic demands of his craft. On the con-
trary, he believed that the one led to the other, and his most politically 
charged prerevolutionary writings are also his most enjoyably readable. 
Droysen, Duncker, and Haym did not yet take the time to worry about 
such matters. 
In other respects, too, Sybel tried to follow the standards that he pro-
claimed. After publishing his controversial Origins of German Kingship in 
1844, he turned away from medieval history and wrote on modem history 
for the literate lay readership. Just as Droysen in 1843 stopped working on 
antiquity and turned to modem history, so Sybel now produced works de-
Signed to tell readers about the prospects for change and to teach them 
how to behave in a changed political system. He complemented these with 
polemics against ideas and practices that he thought inimical to progress. 
It is easy to infer from these works a clear, if general, picture of the Ger-
man future as Sybel envisioned it. He also offered vicarious experience in 
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practical politics, perhaps because, for reasons of social antecedents, he 
could imagine wielding power to a degree that they could not. 
Thus, one of the main points that he made in his previously mentioned 
lecture, "On the Tories of Today," was that even in the England that he 
deeply admired, the land of "slow progress" where "not one of the old 
forms is broken" even while "their content is completely changed," progress 
had often resulted from "countless conflicts" and from the "mixing of 
struggling forces."109 If that had been true of England, it was even more 
true of the Continent. He pursued this idea further in his second, 1847, ad-
dress on the elector's birthday, "On the Relationship of our Universities to 
Public Life." For example, he discussed the often violent expansion and 
consolidation of absolutist monarchies that Droysen had described as the 
rise of the "powers" to make the same point that Droysen did. He con-
fessed that when one studied the victory of absolutism in Germany, it was 
impossible to "defend oneself from a deep regret ... [for] the personal 
freedom, the colorful freshness, and the exciting variety" destroyed in the 
process. He then reminded his audience that history had called the princes 
to "hew from the rubble of German nationality the first stones" for the con-
struction of the future. He pointed to "the new discipline and stark effec-
tiveness of sovereignty" that they had introduced and that would be 
necessary in the ultimately unified Germany and to the "inevitability" of 
their achievement.11o What happened was justified both by its happening 
and by its contribution to the future. 
Sybel was calling for more than resigned acceptance of what could not 
be avoided. He wanted people to welcome the inevitable, and he main-
tained that history provided the winners with the necessary consciousness 
of their historical rightness. For example, he praised the absolutizing 
princes in Germany not merely in terms of their long-range and unin-
tended effects but because their exertions were "borne along by the con-
sciousness of a great and world historical superiority (Bewuj3tsein einer 
groj3en und weltgeschichtlichen Uberlegenheit)" that would not have been pre-
sent had their work not been necessary and that further excused the often 
violent and unlawful means they employed.111 The converse of this atti-
tude was his contempt for, and even anger at, those who took the wrong 
side in history, presumably on the grounds that they might have known 
better than to stand in the way of progress. 
Three clear examples of this disdain appear in Sybel's writings before 
1848. In 1843 thousands of Catholic pilgrims converged on the Trier cathe-
dral to view what they believed was Jesus' robe. Sybel, along with J. Gilde-
meister, another professor at Bonn, responded by publishing a pedantic 
and often sarcastic treatise, The Holy Robe at Trier and the other twenty Holy, 
Unsewn Robes. A historical Investigation. ll2 SybeI:s dislike and distrust of 
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Catholics and Catholicism was consistent and unrelenting, but he was 
angrier at their anachronism than at anything else. He was equally harsh 
in the next year in the pieces that he wrote for the prestigious daily, the 
KOlnische Zeitung, on the Rhenish Autonomen, the privileged corporations 
of former imperial knights and their descendants. Despite his own legal 
status as noble, he had no use for legalized privilege. His irritation at the 
Autonomen, however, was at their misplaced nostalgia for the Holy Roman 
Empire.Il3 In his better-known Political Parties in the Rhineland described in 
their Relationship to the Pruss ian Constitution (published in 1847, but with 
the main text written before the summoning of the Prussian United Diet) 
he was equally severe in attacking the so-called feudal-clerical party for 
trying lito shatter the creations of twelve generations and reverse the world 
of the present."1l4 
To try to reverse progress was not merely wrong but criminal. That, in 
his view, was a mistake that Edmund Burke, his political hero, would 
never have made. To many nineteenth-century Europeans who studied 
England, Burke was not the conservative that a later generation of ideo-
logues made him out to be. His pragmatism (and his eloquence) in deal-
ing with revolution in Ireland and America and his horror (and his 
eloquence) at the revolution in France endeared him to those who wanted 
progress without upheaval. Sybel, who used Burke's career as a model for 
progressive statesmanship, was no exception. In order to correct the polit-
ical inexperience of his readers, Sybel published two long essays on 
Burke-"Edmund Burke and the French Revolution" (1847) and "Edmund 
Burke and Ireland" (1848)-in Adolf Schmidt's politically congenial 
Zeitschrijt fUr Geschichtswissenschaft. The point of these accounts of Burke's 
thoughts and actions during two revolutionary crises was to show how to 
handle major historical change when it finally came. Sybel therefore con-
tinually interrupted his narrative and analysis to address readers in his 
own voice in order to make sure that they had not missed the morals that 
he wanted to draw. 
He heavily underscored Burke's talent for supporting, hence chan-
nelling and controlling, timely change while averting hasty and radical 
measures: In doing so, he singled out for praise Burke's "practical stand-
point" and pronounced "empirical tendency."l15 He also admired Burke's 
"poetic love for the given material" and characteristic habit of "never ask-
ing about system and principle" but only about "creation and effect."1l6 
These compliments reflect a general dislike on the part of German liberals 
for doctrinaire politics. More specifically, they imply a claim that success-
ful statesmen possess the empirical and practical virtues that Sybel rec-
ommended, a case in point of the affinity that Sybel desired between the 
historian and his history. Sybet of course, wanted his readers to acquire 
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these qualities through critical emulation of the models he presented be-
cause he thought that they would soon be called to the unfamiliar exercise 
of self-governance in Germany. He also wanted to give them a compass to 
steer by. That compass was his interpretation of Germany's past and fu-
ture history, but the readers had to know enough history to read its bear-
ing. Here, too, Burke provided a useful model, and Sybel accordingly 
praised him for considering matters in a "world-historical manner" and 
for understanding the great truth that in the broad context of world his-
tory, "the life of a nation (Leben eines Volkes) follows general laws inde-
pendent of the arbitrary will of individuals." Great men like Burke 
accommodated themselves to these laws and thus knew how to behave be-
cause "past and future" were linked "in uninterrupted connectedness" 
inasmuch as "political like linguistiC development possesses an inner ne-
cessity."117 In so arguing, Sybel was employing the vision of historical 
progress that he had adapted from Savigny years earlier. His affinity for 
Burke made him attribute to him his own theory of progress and to por-
tray him, surely incorrectly, as someone who navigated the present with a 
map of the future spread before him. That was what he wanted his read-
ers to do as well, and he was ready to chart the future for them-if only 
somewhat sketchily. As the linguistic analogy suggests, Sybel was more 
modest than, say, Droysen, in predicting the future. At least, it seems a 
more uncertain exercise to determine the future development of a lan-
guage than, thinking of Droysen's favorite metaphor for prediction, to 
guess where a river is headed by noting the direction of its flow. Sybelob-
viously did not think that the task was impossible, whatever its difficulties 
and uncertainties, and he extrapolated from the past at least the general 
shape and content of the future. These anticipations consistently appear as 
points of reference in his writings between 1846 and the outbreak of revo-
lution in Germany in 1848. 
He, too, dated the beginning of modem history from the German Ref-
ormation, which "sunk in the prepared earth ... the seeds of a new world 
history." Like Duncker and Droysen, he insisted that the Reformation was 
as much a political as a religious event. The reformers, he believed, sought 
a comprehensive reform of "faith and morals" and therefore directed their 
appeals to "the mass of the people who thirsted for salvation, rather than 
to the potentates of the Church." The fortunate result was that they had 
"not fallen into one-sided enthusiasm but had united all the achievements 
of scholarship, art, and politics in the rebuilding of the times." He ex-
plained this sweeping quality of their efforts by pointing out that "state 
and society were enclosed in the Church," so that religious renewal re-
quired "a critique of the collective political and social situation."lI8 He also 
pointed to the linkage between classical antiquity and the Reformation, 
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whose political goal, he explained, was the selective creation, obviously 
under greatly altered circumstances, of the "antique state."119 By this he 
meant primarily the return to active political participation of the citizemy. 
More generally, he, too, thought of political life as the necessary comple-
tion of the moral emancipation begun in the sixteenth century. 
Luther, that is, began a "movement" in which "progress" would fol-
low in the" state and profane knowledge," though not all at once and not 
without more or less painful reverses from time to time. These short-term 
costs were the price of long-term benefits, and Sybel readily admitted that 
the immediate effect of the Reformation was the prevalence in Germany of 
particularism and princely absolutism. He made the same case that Droy-
sen and Duncker did, namely, that this unhappy coincidence was the nec-
essary effect of the demonstrable "impotence" of the imperial government 
and the manifest impossibility, given the "general disunity" among the 
territorial princes, of achieving fundamental reforms through consent. 
These factors came powerfully into play during the reign of Charles V. 
Sybel acknowledged the cost to Germany of continued, in fact of increased, 
weakness and division. He also believed that this cost was worth paying 
because the "sole means to escape the misery of general decline" and to 
hasten national unification was the "total rejection of the old, wasted im-
perial unity (Reichseinheit)" and in the temporary increase in particularism. 
In a parallel and closely related fashion, the inciease in the arbitrary pow-
ers of the triumphant princes cleared away the remnants of feudal privi-
lege and, thus, prepared the way for subsequent freedom.120 
Sybel, then, thought of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth cen-
turies as periods of major historical progress in and for Germany. Outward 
expansion and internal integration of some German states meant that 
"large masses were integrated, strong enough to represent worthily the na-
tional spirit (Nationalgeist) at home and the national strength (Nationalkraft) 
abroad and to prepare forcefully for a future unification of the Father-
land."121 This analysis shows several characteristic features of Sybel's 
analysis of recent German history. First, he, too, distinguished between the 
real content of history and the conscious motives of historical actors. The 
princes thought that they were acting in their own interests, but, in fact, 
they were preparing for national unification. As Sybel had remarked in 
praise of Burke, history follows an "inner necessity."122 Second, he looked 
forward both to internal freedom and external strength. Both were ends in 
themselves while being means to each other. Finally, and quite clearly, the 
great goal toward which history was moving was national unification. 
Sybel was, unsurprisingly, especially interested in more recent his-
tory, and his discussions of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth cen-
turies reveal a clear belief that the historical wind had set in for the 
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establishment of a special kind of constitutional order in Germany. Thus, 
he greatly admired Frederick the Great but noted that, for historical rea-
sons, he was the last of the great monarchs.123 Elsewhere, and on a more 
general note, he commented that toward the end of the century, "life 
seemed to go out of" absolute monarchy, which had, in any case, by then 
completed its necessary tasks.124 The occurrence of the French Revolution 
proved that something more timely and vital was needed, though Sybel 
thought that both the theory and practice of the revolution were no better 
than what they tried to replace. The former was flawed because "the com-
plete individualism of natural rights makes impossible a rational and ef-
fective organization ... of rule." This is a curious criticism in view of the 
tremendous military power that the revolution unleashed, and Sybel's 
judgment was obviously more affected by his belief that trust between cit-
izens and government is the source of strength than by the actual evidence 
of the historical record. He also deplored the revolution's practical effects. 
For its first years, he pointed to terror, tyranny, and foreign conquest with-
out explaining how individualism led to these. Over the longer term, it 
was responsible for what he thought of as the chief features of contempo-
rary France. His indictment of it reads like a list of his own social fears: the 
revolution had resulted in "plutocracy" and the prevalence of "competi-
tion, social war, and ever.;.present egotism."125 
Germany had another path to follow and began to advance along it in 
the early nineteenth century. With foreign troops on their soil, Germans 
came to understand that "the time had come to dissolve the absoluteness 
of the individual state (Absolutie des Einzelstaats) on the one hand and 
to strengthen the national consciousness of great Germany (National-
bewuj3tsein groj3en Deutschlands) on the other." Germans, that is, now re-
jected particularist loyalties and became intensely aware of their common 
nationality. They wanted political freedom and political unity. The first 
practical result of this changed consciousness was the "fresh greatness of 
Prussia" shown in Stein's reforms to which, Sybel maintained, the "life of 
the nation" still resonated.126 In other words, Germany in general and 
Prussia in particular were ready, or almost ready, to resume the task of 
unification necessarily put aside long before during the reign of Charles V. 
This movement ceased during the Restoration, but Sybel expected its 
speedy and successful resumption. Like Droysen, Duncker, and, more 
vaguely, Haym, Sybellooked to Prussia to lead in this work, but his de-
signs for Prussia had some distinctive characteristics. . 
He made this case in The Political Parties of the Rhineland (1847), the main 
text of which he completed before Frederick William IV issued the Febru-
ary Patent but the foreword to which he drafted when the Prussian United 
Diet was already in session. He used the work to trace the struggles of 
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a hero, the "constitutional-liberal party" against a villain, the "feudal-
clerical party." The former, as the representative of inevitable progress, 
would ultimately prevail and, when it did, Prussia would get a constitution 
and, after a time, Germany would be unified. In fact, he thought of a Prus-
sian constitution as a precondition for national unification. As a westerner 
who had taught in the Rhineland and in Hesse, he keenly appreciated Ger-
man distrust of Prussia. He therefore judged that a Prussian constitution 
was "in the interest of German unity" because it would eliminate "the dif-
ference between Prussia and the other German states" and thus quiet the 
latter's fears. He also believed that only a constitution would fit Prussia for 
her tasks. By heightening "the political education and dedication" of Pruss-
ian citizens, it would release their energies into the state. It was, he believed, 
"a truth of history" that "the strength of the Prussian state can only be cre-
ated through the free activity of its people."127 
These findings, though in principle based on historical evidence, are 
really derived from Sybel's basically Aristotelian assumption that people 
"are called not merely to family life."128 State power and dynamism would 
increase under a constitution because political activity and engagement 
were basic human needs. This fundamental belief had a major practical an-
nex. Sybel, characteristically if somewhat self-deceivingly, declared him-
self free from the "despotism of theory" and correspondingly aware of the 
"rich variety that the historical development of politics displays." In other 
words, different nations with different pasts needed different constitu-
tions. The Prussian and, later, the German constitutions were not excep-
tions to this rule. In a partial contradiction of his argument from human 
nature, therefore, he called for a Prussian constitution "not as an inherent 
right of men and peoples but on account of its utility in the Prussian and 
German circumstances of today."129 In other words, the political capacities 
of Prussians and Germans had to be exercised in ways and under forms 
that were in the Prussian and German political interest. 
It was, for example, essential that the power of the Prussian monarch 
remain intact because of the presence of "powerful neighbors" and be-
cause the growing conflict of rich and poor required "a strong and steady 
central government" of a sort that no democracy could provide. For 
Sybel, as for Droysen, this did not entail centralism on the French model. 
The diversity among the Prussian provinces and within Germany as a 
whole ruled out that possibility. Moreover, Sybel believed that a decent 
respect for individual needs and local peculiarities would actually in-
crease the strength and cohesion of the state.130 It certainly did not require 
excluding the people from political power. Sybel reasoned that capitalism 
and the consequent conversion of all property into liquid form gave a 
large portion of the population sufficient wealth and leisure for informed 
110 Droysen and the Prussian School of History 
and active participation in state affairs.131 (Almost needless to say, he 
favored a property qualification for the franchise). The object was to 
tap the energy of this loyal and monied citizenry for the good of the 
state, as "utility" was, after all, the standard by which to judge consti-
tutions.132 To that end, he argued that "a free and reciprocal recognition 
of monarch and parliament is the ~ssential, the basic condition of consti-
tutional life."133 He, too, saw political freedom as willing cooperation 
rather than as contest and conflict, though with the important qualifi-
cation that his standard was a "state power that is strong enough for the 
conduct of national affairs without annihilating the sphere of individual 
rights. "134 
In stating that pious hope, Sybel simply did not imagine that there 
could be any rights contrary to state power or that state power, in a uni-
fied Germany, would trample on legitimate rights. This outlook led him to 
distrust formal, legalistic guarantees as much as Droysen and Duncker 
did. He was especially hostile to the idea of the separation of powers, 
which he compared to an attempt to separate "the light from the lamp." In 
his view, such separation was not possible and, even if possible, not de-
sirable, He denied vigorously that it existed even in England, its supposed 
homeland.135 The real cause of his objections was probably less its alleged 
unfeasibility than its threat to weaken the state by setting part against part. 
His fear on this point made sense in light of his belief that freedom and 
strength were reciprocal qualities in the state. On those grounds he argued 
that the constitution would have to rest on a "deep and free trust" among 
all parts of the state, including government and citizenry. He therefore also 
urged "moderation" on all parties and a determination to achieve reforms 
with the least possible break with the past.136 It will come as no surprise 
that he thought it "impossible to found a constitutional monarchy through 
revolution. "137 
It followed, of course, that change would have to come from above, 
and Sybel joined the others in looking to the Prussian monarch to consti-
tutionalize Prussia by voluntarily sharing his sovereignty.138 Interestingly, 
he gave no reasons why the monarch should choose to do this, though by 
implication he had in mind precedents under Frederick the Great and Stein 
and, more generally, the supposed royal self-interest in gaining the access 
of strength that constitutionalism, rightly conceived, was bound to offer. 
He was correspondingly excited and delighted in 1847 by the promise of 
the February Patent. He described it as an "immeasurably important step" 
because simply by issuing the patent, the king had "declared and deter-
mined irrevocably" the necessity for future change that would lead 
through a Prussian constitution to national unification. He believed that 
this harvest could be gathered quickly if the "seed" just planted were prop-
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erly tended and the "natural development of this germ upset by no new 
hindrances." Even if something unforeseen should go wrong, the patent 
and the diet would have indicative significance. Accomplishments to date 
showed an increase in "political sense" that meant that development could 
not be delayed much longer.139 This tranquil optimism did not, could not, 
survive the events of 1848. 
4 ________________ __ 
Expectation and Action: 
March to May 1848 
Droysen, Duncker, Haym, and Sybel misread their situation and prospects 
in spring 1848 for understandable reasons. A brief glance at the political 
world in which they moved will explain why this was the case. On 22 Feb-
ruary the barricades went up in Paris. Two days later, Louis Philippe, 
France's Orleanist monarch since 1830, fled to London while Alphonse 
Lamartine, author of a four-volume history in verse of the French Revolu-
tion of 1789, formed a provisional government for the Second Republic. 
With memories of that revolution very much in mind, the German princes 
hastily introduced reforms and installed popular governments when 
unrest spread into Germany. These new governments sent relatively 
national-minded delegates to the Confederate Assembly (Bundestag) at 
Frankfort, which, in late March, impaneled the Seventeen Trustees (Ver-
trauensmiinner) to draft a constitution for a unified Germany. In the same 
period, though without official sanction, fifty-one persons associated with 
the prerevolutionary opposition met in Heidelberg and called for the con-
vening of a Pre-Parliament (Vorparlament) to meet later in the month at 
Frankfort in order to prepare for an elected assembly that would unify 
Germany. Before either the Seventeen or the Pre-Parliament met, revolu-
tion struck both Vienna and Berlin. On 14 March, Metternich was dis-
missed and fled to England, and on the twenty-first, Frederick William IV, 
sickened by three days of street-fighting in his capital, ordered his troops 
from Berlin and promised his support for constitutional government and 
national unification. 
Things seemed to be changing, quickly and profoundly. The signifi-
cance of these events certainly seemed clear to Droysen, Duncker, Haym, 
and Sybel: in a few weeks, every barrier to Germany's unification as a con-
stitutional state had been leveled. If only the revolution could be kept in 
hand, all that they had wanted and expected seemed certain to be accom-
plished very soon. It seemed that their predictions for the German future 
were about to be realized, and the question now was not how to bring 
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about change but how to keep it moving in the right direction and at the 
right speed. When, in these changed conditions, they sensed danger, it 
came more ·from the left than the right. Their optimism was entirely un-
derstandable, but there was a good deal of self-deception in their appreci-
ation of the situation. They were too ideologically blinkered to see that, in 
fact, less had changed than they imagined. 
Official Germany no longer resisted change and now actually spon-
sored it, but this shift in policy was a result of panic and temporizing rather 
than of a change in heart or, more damaging to liberal and nationalist 
hopes, of a real change of who really had power. The princes hoped to 
avoid the worst and to preserve some of their power by forestalling the 
revolution with timely concessions. Despite their present fears, however, 
the princes were still there, and so were their armies. In March, and for 
some time thereafter, they were either afraid to use those armies or, as hap-
pened in Berlin and Vienna, used them badly by deploying field troops in 
city streets against urban crowds of the soldiers' fellow citizens. Later, 
however, the princes would recover their nerve and their generals would 
make the needed changes in tactical doctrine. Later, too, they would regain 
the confidence, or at least the acquiescence, of a majority of their subjects. 
Many of those who took to the streets in March were not really interested 
in the national questions that preoccupied the deputies in Frankfort, and 
the princes' defense of the sovereign rights of their states was genuinely 
popular even among many liberals. In the spring, however, it would have 
required prescience to see that the conditions existed for a successful coun-
terrevolution. Change seemed unstoppable, and to Droysen and the oth-
ers, change meant the constitutional unification they had long predicted. 
They were, of course, pleased with this conclusion. 
Haym nicely captured the spirit of those first weeks in a letter to his 
parents. He wrote the main text on 16 March, after the revolution in France 
and during the first stirrings in Germany. He registered some anxiety 
when he noted that "the Fatherland is also shaken," but then added confi-
dently that "the long-sought regeneration will proceed out of the peculiar 
spirit and feeling of German nationality." In a postscript written on 18 
March, after he had learned of Metternich's fall from power, he apostro-
phized: "God be praised that we have seen this day; I have great hope that 
He will be of further help!"l He was delighted to witness the outcome that 
he had expected, but witnessing was not enough. The politics of expecta-
tion now had to give way to a politics of action. Before 1848 Haym and the 
others had been condemned, willy-nilly, to approach the history of the pre-
sent mainly as onlookers and commentators. They had done what they 
could, but for the most part, they watched and waited. At last they could 
do something. Politicking was legal, and there were meetings, official and 
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unofficial, to attend and address. Men like Haym were well placed for such 
activities. They were literate, articulate, and energetic. Unlike most Ger-
mans in 1848, they had a program and were used to thinking of politics in 
national terms. Moreover, they were notables of a sort. They were known 
in their localities, at least in a general way, for their political views, and 
their publications gave them something of a national reputation. It was 
also to their advantage that they had moved to the right just by standing 
still. Before the revolution their views were unacceptable to most of offi-
cial Germany. Now there was less to choose from, for those with power 
and privilege to preserve, and their views seemed relatively moderate. 
Their calls for a unified, constitutional Germany were now not very dif-
ferent from what could be heard in the Confederate Assembly. It also 
helped that they wanted to act. 
In Droysen's case this wish was satisfied fairly quickly. In Schleswig-
Holstein a provisional, German nationalist government had constituted it-
self at Rendsburg on 24 March with the avowed purpose of bringing the 
duchies fully into Germany. On the twenty-seventh, it nominated Droy-
sen, prominent for years in local German nationalist politics, to represent 
it at the meetings of the Seventeen in Frankfort, where he arrived on 2 
April. On the sixth he began to attend the meetings of the Seventeen, de-
spite the initial reluctance of the Confederate authorities to challenge Den-
mark by recognizing the credentials of a representative of the Rendsburg 
government.2 The move from provincial Kiel to Frankfort-formerly the 
site of imperial coronations and now the seat both of the Confederate As-
sembly and the unofficial but authoritative Pre-Parliament-was a major 
change of milieu for Droysen. He loved it. Now he met almost daily with 
such political luminaries as Anton von Schmerling and Franz von So-
maruga of Austria and Max von Gagern of Wiesbaden, as well as fellow 
historians such as Gervinus and Dahlmann. He occasionally talked with 
Franz von Colloredo-Wallsee, Metternich's old antagonist and now Aus-
trian delegate to the Confederate Assembly. Droysen's letters and the di-
ary that he now kept sparkle with dropped names. This was very different 
from giving a political edge to his lectures at Kiel, addressing gatherings 
in the duchies, and lobbying by mail with old friends and associates now 
placed in Prussian ministries. If only for reasons of unchangeable tem-
perament, he still found much to deplore, but he was unquestionably 
happy. In one letter he even remarked that he felt as if all his "members 
and faculties were increasing in keenness. "3 His letters in the following 
weeks show that he thought that he was close to the center of power, and 
he took it as a matter of course when the electoral committee for the fifth 
district of Schleswig-Holstein chose him for the National Assembly . .! 
Duncker's entrance into national politics was nearly as rapid as Droy-
sen's. When the revolution reached Berlin on 18 March, he was in Halle 
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and engaged in the initial research for what eventually became his History 
of Antiquity.S He now put his work aside and hurried to the royal court of 
Prussia in order to offer whatever advice he could. There is no reason to 
suppose that he had any important effect on royal policy or action, but cir-
cumstances had changed enough that he at least received a friendly hear-
ing at court. He became closely enough acquainted with Augusta, Prince 
William's liberal and anglophile wife, that he was able in coming months 
to use her as conduit for suggestions on royal policy and as the personal 
contact who years later secured his appointment as tutor to the Prussian 
heir apparent, Frederick. He also met with Rudolf von Auerswald, Prus-
sian minister-president until 29 March, who saw in Duncker two qualities 
especially valuable in the present circumstances: a record of opposition 
of sufficient standing to win the trust of revolutionaries and a commit-
ment to monarchy deep enough to make him a reliable representative 
of Prussia at Frankfort. Auerswald consequently sent him west to the 
Pre-Parliament, though in the absence of direct rail link between Berlin 
and Frankfort, Duncker arrived only twenty-four hours before that body 
adjourned.6 He was actually en route to Frankfort when the Provincial Diet 
of Prussian Saxony elected him representative to the forthcoming National 
Assembly on 2 April, and the final session of the Pre-Parliament that he 
attended threw his mandate into doubt by decreeing that representatives 
to the assembly were to be elected in indirect elections with a nearly uni-
versal male suffrage? 
Duncker's reaction to this sudden tum of events was mixed. He was 
delighted at his election. "Let us thank God that we have seen this day," 
he wrote to his wife, and added that he believed it would be possible 
to "build a good house for the Fatherland." He felt bound by the Pre-
Parliament's election decree, however, and doubted the legality of his 
election. He decided to hold on to his seat, but only until valid elections 
were held. On 10 April the Provincial Diet reversed itself and declared 
its earlier election of deputies null and void. Then, several days later, the 
committee of electors at Halle, in accordance with the resolution of the 
Pre-Parliament, selected Duncker by a heavy majority. In slightly more 
than two weeks, the professor and editor had been endorsed by the Prus-
sian head of government, the Prussian Saxon Diet, and the electors at 
Halle. Duncker was only telling the truth when he described his second, 
definitive, election as "the happiest day of my life."s 
Haym was no less eager to enter national politics, but he found it 
harder to do so because he was younger and less well known. As the rev-
olution spread into Germany, he rushed to complete his article "Philoso-
phy" for the Ersch and Gruber General Encyclopedia for the Arts and Science in 
order to gain the leisure needed for full-time political activity. At the same 
time, on 13 March, he wrote to offer his services to David Hansemann, a 
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celebrated Rhenish liberal who had been pleased by Haym's favorable 
account of him in Speeches and Speakers of the First Prussian United Diet. 
Hansemann replied on the eighteenth by asking Haym to join him at once 
and to come prepared for a long stay. This was an encouraging response, 
and the two met on the twenty-fourth in Cologne and, a few minutes later, 
boarded the train for Berlin, where Hansemann hoped to be asked to form 
a new ministry. Five days later, Hansemann was indeed asked to form a 
new ministry along with Ludolf Camphausen, whereupon Haym received 
the distinctly less gratifying task of clipping and filing newspaper articles 
that might interest Hansemann.9 His credentials qualified him for some-
thing better than that. On 1 April, through Hansemann's influence, he 
became a writer for the Nationalzeitung, a new Berlin daily that favored 
constitutional monarchy and national unification. Haym's appointment 
was good for Hansemann because it gave his government increased access 
to the still volatile public opinion in Berlin. It was also good for Haym be-
cause it gave him increased scope for his energy and talents, though it still 
left him in the position of an onlooker rather than an actor. He was corre-
spondingly pleased when the electoral committee for the Mansfeld Lake 
and Mountain District of Prussian Saxony, following the advice they had 
solicited from Duncker, elected Haym to the National Assembly.1° He 
owed his new position to a friend's influence and to the peculiarities of an 
electoral system in which voters elected electors empowered to choose 
whomever they thought best, but at least, though only twenty-four years 
old and still obscure, he had been elected. 
Sybel was less fortunate. He was well enough known and connected 
to be invited, along with his father, to the Pre-Parliament in which south-
ern and western liberals like himself were in any case overrepresented, but 
he failed to win the seat he craved in the National Assembly. There were 
two reasons for this. First, the economist Bruno Hildebrandt also wanted 
a seat, and Hildebrandt had been on the Marburg faculty longer and was 
better known. Second, Sybel displayed a candor that was morally ad-
mirable but politically ill advised in the present excitement. During the 
campaign, he spoke strongly and repeatedly in behalf of limiting the fran-
chise to those who paid a direct tax. This not only excluded the poor but 
also those who rented property. Some of his potential constituents re-
sponded by gathering around his house on successive nights to break his 
windows, and the voters chose electors known to oppose Sybel's candi-
dacy.ll As a result, Sybel had to be content with a seat in the Hessian 
assembly at Cassell and, in 1850, in the short-lived and futile Erfurt 
Assembly. For the time being, he was stuck in Hesse, though he followed 
events at nearby Frankfort as closely as he could and was an active leader 
in the Marburg Fatherland Union (Vaterlandsverein), an organization of 
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three to four hundred members that was generally friendly to Prussia and 
favored both national unification and constitutional monarchy.12 
All four men experienced much more than just a change in position 
and powers, important though that change was. They had thought about 
politics for years and had a clear sense of what had to happen and what 
had to be done, but of course they lacked practical political experience, and 
despite their frequent and fervent defenses of historical empiricism, they 
thought of politics in generalities rather than in concrete detail. Moreover, 
they had thought of someone else doing history's work, and therefore had 
put most of their effort into preparing people morally and intellectually for 
what was to come. Now they faced a changed situation in which they had 
to carry out the day-to-day tasks of politics. They had good intentions and 
their basic confidence in their predictions remained intact, but they had to 
develop and apply different tactics for a changed situation. This required 
thinking about events on a day-to-day basis and in great detail. There had 
simply been no reason to do this before. There were millenarian strains in 
their thinking, especially in Droysen's, but they were not utopians who at-
tempted an exact and complete portrait of the future. It had been enough 
to sketch its outlines. Now they felt partly responsible for its finished ap-
pearance, and this responsibility tempered their optimism with a measure 
of anxiety. This anxiety was most in evidence either when they had to deal, 
conceptually if not directly, with social groups unlike their own or with 
people who refused against all reason-so it seemed-to see matters as 
they did. 
Before the revolution, for example, they had simply not given much 
thought to those at the bottom of the social scale, though their repeated ex-
pressions of horror at the French Revolution and continual insistence on the 
special dignity of their professional calling certainly bespoke at least a dif-
fuse social fear. Now they wanted to help govern and remake a Germany 
in which popular risings of some magnitude had occurred and were still 
occurring. They were glad that there had been a revolution, but they 
wanted it to stop before it became radical and violent. Furthermore, they 
believed that Germany was shortly destined to become a national commu-
nity. Both halting the revolution in time and constructing a community re-
quired them to deal somehow with lower social classes, about which they 
knew very little. Their received ideas offered a little guidance by ruling out, 
at first, outright repression, but their initial tolerance was limited and frag-
ile and, at varying rates of speed, they moved from incomprehension to ac-
tive antipathy. This is not surprising. As Dunckerrecalled a year later, they 
wanted a national constitution that would be" democratic and honorable," 
not limited to representation of the bourgeoisie in which an overly power-
ful centralized administration "controlled the balance." He meant a fairly 
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broad franchise in a constitutional monarchy run by a strong monarch.13 
Here Duncker expressed a naYve hope shared by all four that with the right 
constitution in place at the right historical moment, social conflict would 
disappear as a matter of course. When the prospect of receiving such a con-
stitution did not immediately quiet unrest, it was logical, though socially 
narrow and uncompassionate, to conclude that whoever was still in the 
streets was somehow unworthy of belonging to the real national commu-
nity by reason of defying plain historical imperatives. 
Droysen reached this conclusion almost at once. His trip to Frankfort 
at the beginning of April led him through the restive Rhineland, and in a 
letter dated 4 April, he remarked: "The people are even worse than I have 
always said, rootless, entirely materialistic, without a trace of piety or any 
but the most trivial interests."14 If Droysen had always thought that, he 
said it only in private and unrecorded conversation. To be sure, he may 
long have had an academic's sniffing contempt for others' "trivial inter-
ests," and at least from the time he wrote the commentaries to his 1832 
translation of Aeschylus he dated the start of world history from Athens' 
ruinous experiment in democracy, but the anger and hatred in his letter 
are new and contrary to his prerevolutionary expectation that in politics 
Germany would succeed where other nations had failed by constructing a 
free and stable national community. Nor was his attitude limited to a re-
mote detestation of people he did not like or understand. In another letter 
written the next day, he pointed to republicanism in the German south and 
to sporadic looting and rioting elsewhere and speculated that everything 
might be wrecked by continued revolution. That was his real fear and the 
cause of his hatred. Germany at last faced the near prospect of freedom and 
unification, and the mob threatened to wreck this opportunity. He began 
to call for official vigilance and timely action. IS Unwisely, he feared the 
people while trusting the princes. 
Haym, and almost certainly Duncker, at first thought in terms of a 
gentler approach. The key document is the statement of political program 
that Haym sent to the electors at Mansfeld that he later claimed was 
"linked as closely as possible to Duncker's."16 Most of the statement is 
given over to the constitutional questions that really interested Haym and 
Duncker, but Haym also included an interesting discussion of the situa-
tion of the poor. He proposed, first, extending to them a modicum of re-
lief through a "more equitable division of tax burdens." Although he did 
not explain what changes in taxation he had in mind, it is at least clear 
that he evidently did not want the state to use its fiscal powers in a way 
that would actually increase poverty. He further proposed applying the 
"principle of association between employer and employee." This pro-
posal is tantalizingly vague. Haym may have been looking backward to 
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guild regulation of production and trade or, relatedly, forward to later 
corporatist attempts to still social unrest. 
In any case, it is clear that Haym did not think of differing economic 
interests as irreconcilable and therefore thought that willing cooperation 
could remove any major sources of conflict. In his view, then, social and 
economic reform had the same moral prerequisites of good will and civic 
dutifulness that political reform did. He went on to moderate even these 
mild suggestions by adding that "in no task must the helping hand draw 
back more quickly than in this, and the one thing that I know for certain is 
that this danger will not bring us down helpless if we hold fast to the prin-
ciple of morality."17If Haym had been practiced in seeking elective office, 
this would read suspiciously like an attempt to reassure through lofty 
vagueness. After all, Haym wanted to be elected and he had no way of 
knowing what the electoral committee in Mansfeld wanted to be told. It is 
more likely that he was guilelessly stating his few thoughts on the matter: 
he was liberal enough not to want the state unnecessarily to intervene in 
society's affairs, and, as his prerevolutionary writings clearly show, he re-
ally believed that sound morality had major practical effects. 
Despite his brevity and consequent imprecision, Haym seemed hon-
estly hopeful. His hope was largely a result of ignorance. Reminiscence is 
weak historical evidence, but a recollection from his memoirs about his at-
titudes in this period rings true. Just after his election to the National As-
sembly, Haym was approached by a man who had opposed his election: 
He was a member of the poorer agrarian classes, a downtrodden, perhaps indebted 
man. What did he care about high politics, a unified Germany, and its future con-
stitution? After the speeches of the enthusiasts, which had beaten upon his ears, he 
expected the abolition of duties and fees that burdened the rural population and 
the levelling of all privileges of the land-holding aristocracy. Would I, then also 
work for that? So little had I thought about these matters, I was all the more moved by the 
modest countenance of the man; I could not promise him exactly that his difficulties 
would be ended in Frankfort, but I could not refuse a few pages on the subject that 
he had put together using a dictionary ... as valuable material for my information 
[myemphasis).18 . 
Haym's memory may have played some tricks on him. For example, his 
claim that the lower classes were uninterested in national affairs was a 
commonplace in Imperial Germany but not in early 1848, and Haym may 
have been less tactful with his interlocutor than he would have his readers 
believe. There is no reason, however, to doubt his claim that he just had 
not thought much about these matters. His recollection of his ignorance is 
probably correct, and his description of his response is suggestive of his 
real attitudes. He was moved by the man's situation and "modest counte-
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nance," yet he had only pity and good-natured contempt at the idea of 
such a person drafting a statement. He could feel sorry for the poor, but he 
could not quite take them seriously. 
His contempt remained, but his good nature soon disappeared. When 
there was a riot at the Berlin Arsenal on 14 June, he wrote to David Hanse-
mann with angry advice. Matters, he claimed, had /I come to a point where 
either a decline into terrorism by the masses begins ... or where once 
again and for the last time there is an opportunity to beat hard upon the 
head of this madness and violation of law and freedom." In other words, 
the alternatives were stark. Either the "madness of the rabble" (Wahnsinn 
des Pabels) would prevail or the "rational development of the state" 
(vernunftige Staatsentwicklung) would continue.19 It is, of course, hardly 
surprising that Haym was appalled at mob violence, especially as in his 
view the revolution had been completed, but several points in the letter are 
significant. First, his language was uncharacteristically violent. Second, he 
did not blame just the rioters but used the word Pabel as a collective noun 
to suggest the existence of a numerous and dangerous underclass of riff-
raff. Third, and most important, he analyzed the situation in terms of a his-
torical cleft stick: either the "rabble" would have its way or political 
development could continue. By implication, constitutional government 
and national unification, despite their historical inevitability, were now in 
doubt. Continued unrest and too yielding a stance by the authorities might 
lead to catastrophe. 
Sybel combined elements both of Haym's initially conciliatory mood 
and the distrust that Droysen expressed in his April correspondence. He 
began with the assumption that at least some reforms were in order, and 
in a declaration of program drafted on 28 April, for a newly formed lib-
eral and nationalist group at Marburg, he called for recognition of the 
principle of "association" in economics as in politics. He did not mean 
only association between employers and employees, as Haym did. In his 
view, anyone should be free to join with anyone in behalf of· common 
ideas and interests. This view held the potential for legitimating the divi-
sion of society into competing interest groups and parties, but that was 
certainly not Sybel's intention. He, too, thought of a unified Germany as a 
basically unitary community, and he had a liberal's confidence that peo-
ple, left to themselves, would learn to agree. Specifically, he invoked the 
principle of "association" in order to invite the lower classes to join the 
Fatherland Union. He was still conciliatory enough to hope that the peo-
ple would soon see things his way.20 He nevertheless hedged this trust 
with nervous skepticism. When he looked down the social slope, he wor-
ried about renewed revolution. Elsewhere in the draft he stated that be-
tween 6 and 11 March, the Hessian people had attacked their government 
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with "irresistible force." He justified this attack on the grounds that the 
government had violated freedom of conscience and had closed all legal 
avenues to improvement. Further revolution was unjustifiable, however, 
because all that had changed, and Sybel now found it "urgently necessary 
... to declare: The revolution, that is the time for forceful change in the state, is 
finished in and for Hesse." The time had arrived to seek "legal betterment 
of our circumstances." Evidently his language was a little too strong for 
others in the union. In the final version, his "urgently necessary" was 
changed to "equally necessary," a revision that left his basic thesis un-
. affected but moderated its force by justifying it on the same grounds as 
the original revolution. 
A further sign of Sybel's social nervousness was his advocacy of the 
limited franchise, for which he paid the price of a lost election and broken 
windows. He associated democracy with misguided efforts by the poor to 
despoil the rich, and in a speech on 28 April, the same day that he drafted 
a program for the Fatherland Union, he claimed that republicans sought 
to appeal to "the poorer inhabitants" by promising them gains "at the ex-
pense of the well-off."21 Unlike Droysen, Duncker, and Haym, he was ex-
plicit in linking his demand to halt or moderate the revolution to the 
defense of property. This linkage, by the way, led him into a historio-
graphical venture of major importance for his postrevolutionary career. 
He concluded that a historically informed populace would be immune to 
republican enticements and decided, probably after losing the election, to 
write a small work for the literate members of the lower classes that would 
"tell the people into what wretchedness the great French Revolution 
brought the lower classes themselves through its communist tendencies." 
Specifically, he planned to show that the French Revolution had gone 
astray because of "insufficient regard for the rights of property. "22 By anal-
ogy, of course, the same danger existed in present-day Germany. Sybel did 
not publish the work in this form. Other claims on his time prevented its 
early completion, and the continual discovery of relevant materials led to 
repeated expansions of its scope. Its first installment appeared in print in 
1853 in his History of the Revolutionary Age 1789-1795, which ran to fivesiz-
able volumes by 1879.23 The multivolumed, finished work retained the 
original thesis of the little pamphlet. 
Fear of social conflict and continued revolution, however, occupied 
only a fraction of these men's attention amid the unfamiliar situation of 
spring 1848. Although they remained basically optimistic through these 
early months, they were aware of other threats to the realization of their 
program and had a heavy sense of the magnitude of the task before them. 
Looking back from the distance of one year, Duncker recalled a political 
consensus in which he had joined: 
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Constitutional monarchy appeared to us as the required demand of the time, as the 
historical necessity of our epoch, as the reconciliation between the north and south 
of Germany, as the compromise between absolutism and freedom. The conquered 
principle was to be offered acceptable conditions, a proper peace was to be con-
cluded between the contending parties. Constitutionalism, as we wanted it, was to 
be democratic and honorable: it was not to be limited to the representation of the 
bourgeoisie in which an overly powerful centralized administration controlled the 
balance; it was to proceed from the self-government of the provinces and to be ful-
filled in the rule of a German parliament. We did not want to preserve monarchy 
as a rule by families but rather as that great and protective institution which, root-
ing itself in the past, could also assure the future, which stood above and beyond 
the parties and their conflicts, guaranteeing the permanence and stability of the 
state, which expressed and represented the majesty of the government. 
This program was simple enough in principle. Monarchy was to retain 
much of its authority, but it was now to act in the national, rather than the 
dynastic, interest and was to share power with representative bodies. Old 
and new would be reconciled, and monarchy would guard the civil peace 
by standing above the parties and representing the state as a whole. The 
question was how to turn this vision into a reality. "Never," Duncker 
averred with pardonable exaggeration, "in the whole course of history was 
there a greater, never a more difficult assignment." It was, he rightly be-
lieved, necessary to overcome divisions of sovereignty, religion, and econ-
omy of centuries' standing in the virtual absence of central institutions 
while fighting against republicanism and reaction.24 Moreover, the general 
agreement that Duncker described left unanswered important questions 
of tactics that the ~ompletion of the draft constitution of the Seventeen on 
26 April posed in acute form. 
This draft constitution was actually the work of a subcommittee of 
the Seventeen composed of Dahlmann, Sylvester Jordan, Friedrich Daniel 
Bassermann, Wilhelm Eduard Albrecht, and Max von Gagern, though the 
Seventeen as a plenum discussed and approved both individual provi-
sions and the document as a whole. In brief, Germany was to be a consti-
tutional monarchy with a hereditary executive and a bicameral 
legislature. The lower house was to be elective and the upper house was 
to consist of reigning princes, representatives from the free cities, and ap-
pointed "men of proven service to the Fatherland." The national monarch 
was to be hereditary and, in addition to holding executive powers, would 
possess the power of legislative initiative and an absolute veto. It was 
also generally assumed, though nowhere actually stated, that the national 
monarch would be a Hohenzollern.25 It was questionable whether this 
constitution, however admirable in design and provisions, could com-
mand both the broad popular support and the assent of the German 
princes needed to reconcile old and new. It was also questionable 
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whether Prussia or, more accurately Frederick William IV, could be 
counted on to do the right thing at the right time. In the immediate after-
math of the Berlin revolution, he had declared in an important phrase 
that, from this moment forward, "Prussia merges into Germany" 
(Preuj3en geht in Deutschland auf). Unfortunately, the promise was impre-
cise, and the changeable king might renege.26 Finally, it was also ques-
tionable whether the rest of Germany really wanted a Hohenzollem ruler, 
especially now that Frederick William had discredited himself first by re-
sisting and then by appeasing the revolution in Berlin. 
Droysen said no to the fi:J:st question and yes to the second, though he 
did so on his own terms. He was a member of the Seventeen, but he was 
harshly critical of its political approach in general and of the draft consti-
tution in particular. This reaction was in part a consequence of outlook and 
temperament. His historical optimism had always been a matter of await-
ing a happy outcome in the long term; when his euphoria weakened after 
the first weeks of revolution, he reverted to finding and censuring human 
failings in the shorter term. He was also unhappily aware of what he took 
to be immediate and mortal dangers to Germany. There was the continued 
danger of republican anarchyP Moreover, Germans were already fighting 
Danes in the northwest and might, he imagined, have at any time to face 
invasion from France or Russia or both.28 The National Assembly was be-
ing elected and would soon convene at Frankfort, but he took no comfort 
in this prospect. He complained that no adequate preparations had been 
made, and he worried about how Austria and Prussia would regard this 
first German parliament.29 He also had a presentiment that the princes and 
the right more generally might be uncooperative, even though cooperation 
was in their real interest and could have been attained if only the other 
members of the Seventeen had been clever enough.30 
He therefore complained of feeling" quarrelsome and irritable" and, 
in a letter to his close friend Wilhelm Arendt, written the day before the 
Seventeen made their draft public, disgustedly and immodestly con-
demned the Seventeen in biblical language for not taking his advice: 
We Seventeen are nothing; despite my best efforts, we took our task as narrowly 
and in as doctrinaire a fashion as possible and have brought into existence a draft 
that, because and insofar as it is good, will be a stumbling block to the Jews and a 
. thing of derision to the heathen. For it is certain that most princes will disavow us 
and the deputies on the right will scorn us. What is to be done! We would have had 
to have had fewer professors and more men of action among us in order to do a 
reasonable job; now we are squeezed-out lemons, more's the pity.31 
Droysen's criticisms seem almost paradoxical at first. He regretted that 
there had been too many "professors" and too few "men of action," yet the 
only good advice came from Professor Droysen. The draft constitution was 
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really good, he thought, but this goodness was a real defect. The great 
chance was seemingly now lost, but in the weeks that followed, Droysen 
acted as if everything could still be put right if others would only follow 
his advice. This reaction was not only a product of irritability and self-
dramatization; Droysen thought that he could see into the future better 
than most others, and it alarmed him when they failed to take his advice. 
His distress was both apparent and real. It was real insofar as, for the 
present at least~ events were not following the course that he expected, but 
his underlying hopefulness was even stronger, because he thought that he 
knew how to get history back on its track. Like Duncker, he wanted to rec-
oncile the old with the new, and he, too, thought that this required a na-
tional constitutional monarchy of the sort proposed by the Seventeen. He 
was entirely sincere when he praised the draft constitution in principle, 
but he believed deeply that the princes, and especially the Prussian 
monarch, had to be similarly persuaded of its excellence because, really, 
nothing could be done without them. He was angry at his fellow members 
of the Seventeen because they had done too little to persuade the old au-
thorities and their potential supporters on the German right. The pream-
ble to the Seventeen's draft made some pleasant-sounding overtures to 
these needed allies, but that was not enough. 
At first, Droysen thought in terms of habituating the princes to na-
tional governance. On 16 April, for example, he had unsuccessfully pro-
posed to the Seventeen that they join with the Confederate Assembly in 
creating a provisional national executive to meet the dangers facing Ger-
many and, equally important, to II anticipate a bit of the future national 
unity (Reichseinheit)." On the seventeenth, he raised this matter again, with 
greater urgency. The period before the National Assembly met would 
bring "endless danger," which would continue even during the "interreg-
num" that would commence with its opening. Germany therefore needed, 
right now, some form of provisional government.32 His colleagues did not 
follow his suggestions, however, and national affairs remained under the 
tenuous control of the Confederate Assembly and the Committee of Fifty 
(FunJziger-Ausschu}3 ), a standing body with loosely defined powers of 
oversight created in a compromise when the Pre-Parliament adjourned in 
early April. 
Under these circumstances, Droysen decided to act on his own, and 
his actions give a clear indication both of his estimation of Germany's his-
torical situation and of his analysis of present German politics. In late April 
he was preparing a general situation report for his government in Rends-
burg when he met Heiririch von Amim, the Prussian Foreign Minister. He 
was encouraged enough by their talk that he arranged for a second meet-
ing on 29 April with Hans von BUlow, an undersecretary in the Foreign 
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Ministry, also in attendance. Droysen rewrote his report for this occasion 
in order to make it a close review of the German political situation that led 
to compelling conclusions about the policies that Prussia must now adopt 
and follow,33 The result was a closely reasoned appeal to Prussian self-
interest that moved ineluctably to its conclusion through the successive 
elimination of all other policy options. This appeal is especially interesting 
because it shows Droysen's calculations clearly and in detail. The funda-
mental fact in current German politics, Droysen maintained, was the" sud-
den and disgraceful (jiihe und schmiihliche) collapse of the system that has 
prevailed in Germany and her individual states ... this system of German 
impotence and self-sacrifice ... [that] was nothing more than the artifi-
cially sculpted keystone in that construct of international law, the Holy 
Alliance." He insisted that it was superficial at best to treat the outbreak of 
revolution in the German states as an accidental byproduct of the upheaval 
in France. The Paris rising was the occasion, but the real cause lay in Ger-
man history. As proof for this contention, he pointed to the speed with 
which the system of 1815 had fallen and added pointedly that any attempt 
to return to the state of affairs that had prevailed before March would 
surely fail.34 In terms of his received theory of history, then, an irreversible 
and irrefutable judgment had been passed according to the "right of his-
tory." Backward movement was impossible, and an indefinite continua-
tion of present dangers and uncertainties was intolerable. That meant that 
further progress was necessary. Germany had to be unified and have a 
constitution, and Prussia really had no choice other than to lead the way 
to both results. 
Droysen admitted that this course entailed major difficulties, even 
though it was the only policy suited to present circumstances. He accord-
ingly termed the Seventeen's draft constitution "impractical," but added 
that "every other possible combination seems to be so to an equal degree." 
He elaborated this thesis by posing a series of disturbing questions: Would 
the smaller German states accept rule by either of the two German great 
powers? Could Austria and Prussia agree to partition Germany between 
them when it had value for either only in its entirety? Could Austria reas-
sume the imperial title without war with Prussia and strenuous objections 
from Bavaria? If, conversely, Prussia tried to rule Germany alone, would 
not Austria withhold the Tyrol and Bavaria? Should'Germany, then, have 
an elected president? Would not that encourage the states to become re-
publican cantons, internally weak and easy prey to foreign invasion? Or 
might it not bring back the difficulties of the Holy Roman Empire as the 
several dynasties turned the elections to their own advantage by extract-
ing concessions in return for support? "In a word," Droysen concluded, 
"there is a danger that Germany, as it reaches out for its long-sought unity, 
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loses it completely, yes, and even its thin remnant, the confederation of the 
princes."35 It was a danger that Droysen thought possible to avert if Prus-
sia would only play its historically necessary role. In order to persuade 
Arnim and Billow to put Prussia on its proper course, Droysen pointed to 
the good features of the draft constitution. It provided for a constitutional 
monarchy that would offer the advantages and avoid the disadvantages of 
democracy and absolutism because, under that system, "hereditariness 
holds the state with anchor-like firmness, and the ministers, the premier, 
their president, come from the representative majority, a continual indirect 
election of the best men."36 Monarchy, that is, would assure continuity 
with the past, and representation would unite state and society and secure 
the most talented citizens for high public office. A Germany so unified 
would be stable and secure. It would also be powerful, and Droysen no 
doubt thought that this prospect would appeal to the two men from the 
Foreign Ministry. 
His basic thesis was that Germany "must be strong, as strong as the 
danger and our hope." Here Droysen sounded the cosmopolitan note that 
often accompanied his most stridently nationalistic utterances. A German 
constitutional monarchy "in the heart of Europe," he insisted, would be 
strong enough to "end the oligarchy of the great powers" that he detested. 
He valued German strength as good in itself, but he also justified it in 
terms of its service to European peace. Germany, once unified under a con-
stitutional monarch, would "create and secure" a "peace of the peoples" 
because it would have no reason to attack any other country and would it-
self be too strong to invite attack. Moreover, it would win the friendship 
and alliance of most of the lesser powers on its periphery.37 Droysen was 
entirely in earnest in so arguing. Power was important to him, and he cer-
tainly had no objection to the deliberate use of force in the pursuit of le-
gitimate national interests, but he also plainly thought that a German 
nation-state would be pacific in inclination and pacifying in effect. Thus, 
in a protocol submitted to the Confederate Assembly on 18 April, he had 
made the same points and further argued that the United States (the 
world's first "state" properly so called) would be Germany's "natural ally" 
and that a unified Germany, like the United States, would have no need 
for the "huge standing armies" characteristic of the old order. If necessity 
arose, an armed citizenry would fight well and gladly in the national de-
fense.38 Droysen omitted those two final points from the memorandum 
that he prepared for Arnim and Bulow, probably because of his current be-
lief that, in the immediate future, Germany needed Prussia's existing mil-
itary establishment and whatever naval strength she could muster for the 
war with Denmark and for use against possible invaders.39 
It was therefore urgently necessary for Germany to become a consti-
tutional monarchy, and Droysen thought that it was just as necessary for 
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the Hohenzollern to become the national dynasty. He thought it self-
evident that only they or the Habsburgs were serious contenders, and he 
did not seriously consider selecting a dynasty from one of the small or 
middle states as a compromise solution. He recognized it as a difficulty 
that either dynasty could be expected to oppose the other's candidacy and 
argued that a compromise between them was impossible because joint do-
minion by both over Germany would amount to a return to the system of 
1815. He had already argued th<;lt this was neither desirable nor feasible. 
Droysen deliberately portrayed the situation as nearly hopeless in order to 
show that hope remained as long as the Hohenzollern were willing to do 
the right thing at the right time. In destroying the system of 1815, he rea-
soned, the revolution had also destroyed the Habsburgs' power. They 
were no longer serious contenders for national leadership because their 
empire was now in dissolution and, in the future, at most a "purely per-
sonal union" would exist among their crownlands and other territories. As 
a result, and here Droysen was being wildly optimistic, Bohemia and the 
German-speaking provinces could be had for Germany, while the Hohen-
zollern could safely make their bid for German supremacy.40 
"To the degree that Austria progressively declines and attempts com-
binations that bear the old signature of dynastic politics," Droysen de-
clared, "Prussia will reveal herself to be a purely German state." In other 
words, simply by being herself, Prussia would stand in shining contrast to 
Austria and attract support throughout Germany. Prussia had to take ad-
vantage of this opportunity by adopting" a constitution based on provin-
cial representation" (provinzial-stiindische Verfassung) in order that she "be 
able to merge into Germany (in Deutschland aufgehen). To the Hohenzollern 
will fall the office left vacant by the Hohenstaufen." Droysen tried to make 
it seem easy and, by invoking a return to lost medieval splendor, he tried 
to make it seem glamorous, but in fact he was asking a lot from Prussia's 
rulers. The enormity of his request explains why he troubled to dismiss all 
other proposed solutions before offering his own. The "constitution based 
on provincial representation" that he demanded in fact meant that there 
would be "no more Prussian monarchy; let her dissolve herself into three 
or four territorial states, each with its own representative institutions, with 
its own administration, in personal union nonetheless with the previous 
ruler." This was the "sole condition" under which it was "now possible" 
to unify Germany and under which Prussia could cease being the least 
among the great powers.41 Stated baldly, Frederick William had to break 
up the state that he ruled. 
Harsh though Droysen's criticism of the work of the Seventeen had 
been, he was himself a prisoner of theory. To be sure, in his memorandum 
he had tried open-mindedly to take close and adequate account of detail 
and contingency, and he had deliberately appealed to Prussian self-interest 
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as well as high-mindedness. His contentions, however, made sense only in 
light of his prerevolutionary reading of the logic and tendency of German 
and world history and, more specifically, of his analysis of Prussia's situa-
tion. These rested as much on still unshaken faith as on evidence. Despite 
the angry complaints that he continually made in April, his historical opti-
mism was still intact; indeed, it was the basis for his complaints, just as his 
seeming responsibility for the national future was his occasion for offering 
them.42 He would fundamentally reassess his ideas only months later, 
when it became undeniably clear that many Prussians valued Prussia and 
that Austria 'was stronger than he had imagined. 
Duncker and Haym also retained their optimism, though they did not 
criticize the work of the Seventeen or call for the voluntary dissolution of 
the Prussian state as Droysen did. Without denying that the course might 
entail serious difficulties, they simply recommended the speedy adoption 
of the Seventeen's draft constitution.43 Of course, they may have been more 
worried than they seemed. Most of the evidence for their ideas in late April 
and early May comes from the campaign statement that Haym drafted and 
modeled on Duncker's, and it would have been only natural for him to dis-
play confidence rather than anxiety, cheer rather than gloom.44 Mter all, 
Droysen wrote his angriest statements in his diary and in his copious pri-
vate correspondence. Still, Haym (and presumably Duncker before him) 
let some expressions of worry slip into his formal statement, though he 
does not seem to have been very worried about the major question of how 
to make the draft acceptable to the princes in general and the king of Prus-
sia in particular. The likeliest explanation is that Duncker and Haym had 
read the draft, agreed with its provisions, and thought that it offered use-
ful guidance for the forthcoming National Assembly. 
In fact, Haym's agreement with the draft constitution was so strong 
that the sections in his statement dealing with constitutional questions 
often borrowed its language, though he tended to defend its provisions in 
terms of the historical theory that he and Dunckerhad articulated before 
the revolution. Thus, he argued that Germany's future constitution could 
not be designed according to the canons of pure reason because it was not 
possible "to assure the happiness of states nor to bind the spirit of nations 
through the rigid order of an artificial system of government." It was, in-
stead, necessary to consult history and, then, adopt the most appropriate 
of "the forms of government discovered and developed over the cen-
turies." In Germany's present circumstances, this meant constitutional 
monarchy at both the state and federal level. Haym's advocacy of consti-
tutional monarchy, which had the advantage of being continuous with 
Germany's political tradition while assuring that the revolution would go 
no further, was enthusiastic and unqualified: "I declare myself to be in fa-
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vor of constitutional monarchy with my entire soul and complete convic-
tion. I hold that to be the wisest way to make popular freedom and princely 
rule compatible on a large scale. I see no risk in introducing this system on 
a broad and popular basis; for it lies in the nature [of this system] that the 
dignity and security of the princes increases ... as the spirit of purified 
freedom penetrates more deeply into the lower level of the population." 
The object was to assure "popular freedom" with as little risk as possible. 
Constitutional monarchy evidently made unnecessary the limitations on 
the franchise that Sybel proposed, because it would actually strengthen the 
princes who would now have a contented citizenry behind them and 
would teach citizens, even those at the "lowest level," that they were part 
of the state and had consequently to work for its welfare. "Harmony" 
would be the result of the combination of "princely rule" and "popular 
freedom. "45 
Haym's statement went beyond these generalities to offer a sketch of 
Germany's future institutions. The monarch, and especially the national 
monarch, was not to be a figurehead. The king of Germany would have 
both legislative and executive powers and would be able to define policy 
and defend national interests. The bicameral legislature would be the "seat 
of ... [the] spirit of harmony." As in the draft constitution, the upper 
house would be composed of reigning princes and "men of the most 
proven patriotic worth." Haym added his own touch tohls description of 
the lower house. It would be elected on a broad, though not universal, 
male franchise and would be the gathering point for "the power of intelli-
gence and moral culture" in Germany. Now as before, Haym associated 
the intellect with morality and saw both as indispensable to Germany's po-
litical reconstruction. He simply assumed that these were the qualities that 
German voters would value in candidates. From both chambers, he further 
argued, "the purified will of the nation (Nation) shall ... emerge and find 
no other obstacle than moderation and ever renewed examination."46 Ger-
many was, evidently, soon to possess the most thoughtful legislature in 
history. In terms of his philosophical vocabulary, the new German state 
would be a "real identity." 
This confidence must have been a little less serene than it appears, and 
Duncker's recollection that the task of creating a constitutional monarchy 
seemed overwhelmingly difficult even in the spring of 1848 is probably an 
accurate description of their actual feelings at the time.47 Aside from fear-
ing further revolution, Haym understood that the princes and the states 
would have to accept constitutional monarchy. He employed a curiously 
reflexive construction to pose this matter: "A national power willconsti-
tute itself over the various states, and their independence will raise itself 
within its proper bounds while they freely move themselves into the pre-
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sented unity." His language makes the process seem automatic, as, given 
his historical theory, it should have been. He also wrote of constitutional 
monarchy being "transposed from the parts to the whole," after which the 
newly achieved national unity would "work upon the members." This 
may explain his optimism, because by 1 Mayall the German principalities 
were more or less constitutional monarchies. That is, the essential precon-
dition already existed. Haym's statement, however, left two further mat-
ters open. He wanted the monarchy to be hereditary-"ifpossible." In 
choosing a monarch, he claimed, "the eyes of all Prussians naturally tum 
to the House of Hohenzollem." That is, his own preference was clear, but 
he implicitly admitted that conditions might require another choice.48 
Sybel took a very different view of affairs. He was still confident that 
Germany would be unified on acceptable terms, but his reading of histor-
ical necessity led him angrily to reject the work of the Seventeen and to re-
ject it in terms quite unlike Droysen's. In his pamphlet "On the National 
Constitution of the XVII Trustees," he claimed to have read the draft "with 
intense regret." "So much talent, so much uprightness and love of Father-
land" had been wasted on a document that at "every point stood in bitter 
contradiction" to actual conditions."49 He based his criticism on his read-
ing of the tendency of German history and voiced two major complaints. 
He objected, first, to the attempt to institute constitutional monarchy at the 
hationallevel and, second, to the separation of powers that he thought he 
detected in the draft. He did not accuse its authors of being ahistorical. He 
conceded that they had tried to take history into account, but he believed 
that they had lamentably misread its real demands: 
The foreword to the proposal is entirely correct when it assumes monarchism 
in most of the German peoples. It is equally certain that in most, even when the 
feeling for German unity momentarily shines forth, the spirit of locality and state 
lies deeper in the blood. We do not wish to praise this or count it good fortune, but 
that is the way it is, and after the history of the last eight centuries it cannot be 
otherwise. In such a context, it is not statesman-like and [not] practical wisdom to 
draft a constitution that is a slap in the face to the most prominent aspects [of that 
situation]. It would be revolutionary if one wished to use all the means at one's 
disposal toward that end; and as it is, it is doctrinaire and nothing more than 
doctrinaire.50 
It is not clear whether this was a new insight on Sybel's part; his prerevo-
lutionary comments on future German unity showed that he expected 
Prussia to playa major role in achieving unification but did not indicate 
clearly the actual shape of the new constitution. In any case, his criticism 
was realistic and perceptive, and he, faulting the draft for being" doctri-
naire," also insisted on constructing the future along lines set by the par-
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ticularities of past and present. He fully accepted the premisses of the Sev-
enteen's draft, but he inferred different conclusions from them because of 
his greater appreciation of the vitality of particularism in German politics. 
Because Germans, in their great majority, were loyal monarchists, they 
would not accept the national dominance of a dynasty other than their own. 
Constitutional monarchy in the form proposed by the Seventeen was un-
likely to be accepted and, even if briefly tolerated, would be subverted by 
the jealousy and discontent that it aroused. That is, it would at best be a 
source of weakness rather than strength. 
Sybellinked this to a second criticism. On the national level, he ar-
gued, the Seventeen's draft" offered only the image and appearance of true 
monarchy without the substantial possession of true power."5t It was 
wrong for Germany to have a national monarchy, and, furthermore, the 
proposed national monarchy was not monarchical enough. In order to 
make this case, Sybel recurred to his earlier theoretical objections to the 
separation of powers and sought to demonstrate that idea's falsity in a way 
that allowed him to describe the sort of constitutional arrangements that 
were well suited to a unified Germany. The Seventeen, he noted, accorded 
executive and limited legislative powers to the monarch, purely legislative 
powers to the parliament, and judicial powers to the national court. He did 
not object to the division between legislative and judicial powers, but he 
was deeply distressed by the proposed relationship between king and par-
liament. Specifically, he disliked the fact that the former could initiate and 
veto legislation while the latter actually made the laws. This seemed to him 
too sharp a division between the executive and legislative powers. "In 
practice," he assured his readers, "such a separation is as unfeasible as if 
one wished to separate the light from the lamp because one can separate 
them in theory."52 
This criticism seems curious at first because the Seventeen had given 
the monarch a share of the legislative as well as full possession of the ex-
ecutive power, and it would have been uncharacteristic for the monarchist 
Sybel to want an elected parliament to possess executive authority. Sybel 
would have replied that the f?,ult lay in draft constitution, not in the terms 
of his argument. Germany needed to be a unitary state in which executive 
and legislative power were in the same hands, and the draft did not pro-
vide for this. He developed this case as a reply to those who cited the Bel-
gian and, especially, the British constitutions to justify the separation of 
powers. He found such citation to be poorly informed and therefore mis-
leading. In England, for example, the separation of powers had been a use-
ful political slogan without practical content. The executive and the 
legislative had in fact always been united there, whether in the king in the 
seventeenth century, in the House of Lords in the eighteenth century, or in 
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the Commons in Sybel's own day.53 This led him to a further observation, 
namely, that England's supposedly constitutional monarchy was as much 
a fiction as her separation of powers. England at present, he argued, had 
parliamentary government, not monarchy, although he acknowledged 
that the queen did play the valuable role of embodying the nation in her 
person. That function was suited to British historical traditions, but could 
not be replicated in Germany where national monarchy, for reasons al-
ready mentioned, would be divisive rather than unifying.54 Sybel's own 
patrician background no doubt helped incline him to this view. 
Germany therefore needed a union of executive and legislative pow-
ers suited to her spirit and traditions. Sybel advised government by an 
aristocratic college, and noted that the cases of Venice, England, and the 
Roman Republic showed that such colleges, rather than monarchs, pro-
vided the greatest degree of strength and steadiness in government. With-
out specifying the actual composition of such a college in Germany, he 
explained that, in keeping with the dominant tendency in modem history, 
it would be necessary to "connect such colleges to a great democratic 
force" in such a way that" at every moment the state power may appear to 
be the product of free popular will ... without sacrificing it to the accidents 
of popular whim." This was the same Sybel who placed his political career 
at risk by calling for a limited franchise in the midst of Germany's first na-
tional elections. He wanted the constitution to be democratic only in a very 
special sense of the term. It was to protect individual freedoms and pro-
vide for an elected lower house, but real power would reside in the aristo-
cratic upper chamber, wh~ch would act as a brake on democracy. He 
wanted to capture the people for the state, not the other way around.55 
Moreover, he expected most governmental business to be carried on in the 
states, which would remain strongly monarchic. He was as resolutely in 
favor of strong, monarchic government in the states as he was opposed to 
it for the nation as a whole.56 The constitutional form that he proposed of-
fered Germany more than what he termed a "blossoming freedom at 
home." Although he did not develop the point in any detail, he believed 
that the collaboration of an aristocratic college with an elected lower house 
would also secure to Germany "the most powerful military strength," and 
that mattered to Sybel as much as it did to Droysen, Duncker, or HaymP 
As historians, they were all acutely, and understandably, aware that dis-
unity had made Germany in recent centuries the battleground of choice for 
Europe. He was, more specifically, uneasy about the course of the fighting 
with Denmark and, like Droysen, feared that France and Russia might at-
tack at any time. His anxiety added force to his comments: Germany had 
to adopt the right constitution and do so quickly in order to ward off for-
eign invasion.58 In this connection, he was especially bothered by Ger-
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many's lack of a navy, and on 17 May he cosigned a strongly worded 
leaflet that called for contributions to construct a powerful fleet to protect 
Germany's coasts and commerce.59 
Sybel's insistent preference for an aristocratic college as the center of 
national government obviously put him, for the time being, at some dis-
tance from Droysen, Duncker, and Haym, but it would be a mistake to over-
rate the difference between his view and theirs. His attack on the draft 
constitution rested on assumptions that he shared with them. Like them, he 
shared the drafters' hopes and wanted the same kind of unified Germany. 
His criticisms had to do only with the means or, more specifically, with the 
shape and composition of the national government. Such disagreements 
about matters of contingency were bound to erupt once Sybel and others 
passed from the generalities appropriate to a politics of expectation to the 
continual judgments and recommendations that a politics of action re-
quired. In this sense, at least, his attack on the draft was similar in kind to 
Droysen's, different though their criticisms were in substance. Equally 
marked differences of opinion would occur in the following months. 
Moreover, Sybel qualified his support for government by an aristo-
cratic college by explicitly identifying an unwelcome but possible situation 
in which government by a national monarch would be not only permis-
sible but also indispensable. Much of his objection to the Seventeen's pro-
posal had been based on the jealousy that he foresaw between dynasty and 
dynasty, and he was evidently most worried at the prospect of a contest 
between the Hohenzollern and the Habsburgs. He therefore speculated 
that, if Austria were to break up or, alternately, to regain its original 
strength and then refuse to enter a unified Germany, a national monarchy 
would become "possible" and at least a "temporary dictatorship" would 
be urgently necessary. In either of these cases, only the House of Hohen-
zollern could provide the leadership that Germany would need and serve 
as the "firm anchor of salvation" in the calamity that would deprive the 
nation of "one quarter of its best peoples." Sybel hoped that neither situa-
tion would arise, though in considering the possibility of an Austrian re-
vival, he· showed a livelier and more astute political imagination than 
Droysen with his confident predictions of Austria's approaching collapse. 
He looked on these possibilities as little short of catastrophic and as cases 
in which there would be "no more talk of natural and healthy circum-
stances" and in which it would no longer "be a question of an enduring 
constitution for our smiling Fatherland." ''It would then," he warned, "be 
a question of saving whatever is to be saved." Germany would be forced 
to substitute a "field commander" for a "constitution."60 This was a telling 
insight because, in the following autumn, Radetzsky's occupation of 
Vienna marked the substantial reconquest of Austrian power and the new 
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Austrian government under Felix zu Schwarzenberg pursued precisely 
the policy of refusal that Sybel had feared. Those events led Sybel fully into 
the camp of Droysen and of Duncker and Haym with whom he now 
worked closely. In effect, Sybel had anticipated the political minimum pro-
gram of the later, postrevolutionary Prussian School. In the spring of 1848, 
however, this anticipation was still faint. He was largely alone in voicing 
this warning, and even in his pamphlet it served as an analysis of the worst 
case included to underscore his chief contention that, under normal cir-
cumstances, national monarchy was not right for Germany. Here, too, 
Sybel resembled Droysen. Both complained angrily about major aspects of 
the Seventeen's draft but did so within an ambient optimism. The National 
Assembly was soon to convene, and in public discourse the question was 
how, not whether, to unify Germany. 
5 ________________ __ 
In the National Assembly: 
May to August 
On 18 May the National Assembly began its sessions in Frankfort's 
St. Paul's Church, a recently built and ungainly red-stone structure never 
actually consecrated for divine services. Germany had no real parliamen-
tary experience, and the confusion and disorganization of the early ses-
sions should have' been depressing, but Droysen, Duncker; and 
Haym-who were attending deputies-were again optimistic during the 
first weeks of the assembly's existence. It gave them a focus for their po-
litical energies, and the fact of its meeting served as a measure of how 
much things had changed since March.! Droysen's correspondence and di-
ary entries nicely illustrate the change in mood that the convening of the 
assembly occasioned. On 16 May he was still complaining about the lack 
of adequate national leadership and compared Germany to a "ship driven 
before the storm."2 On 19 May, however, he noted that he, like everyone 
else he knew in Frankfort, felt the "highest satisfaction" and believed that 
events at last were moving along the "right track."3 This was high praise 
from him, because it showed that he thought Germany was again follow-
ing the dictates of history. In a letter to his close friend Justus Olshausen 
on 20 May, he went further and claimed that the course of affairs in Frank-
, fort now gave him "all the best hope for the future" and, in a letter of Wil-
helm Arendt on 9 June, he went further still by describing "the course of 
our affairs [as] sublime and worthy of admiration." It was, he urged, nec-
essary only to raise one's head in order "to hear the distant thunder of a 
great history."4 He had wholly regained the high spirits that he felt in 
March. 
The opening of the assembly put Duncker and Haym in the same glad 
frame of mind. Haym, the fourth youngest deputy in the assembly, admit-
ted to David Hansemann in a letter that he felt a little out of his element 
among the older and more knowledgeable men around him, but added that 
the meeting of the assembly gave him "the best hopes for the future. "5 Sim-
ilarly, Duncker later recalled his "inspirlltion" when the assembly came 
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into session and his accompanying sense of "uplift at the joyous com-
mencement" of its work.6 It was not the prospect of prolonged parlia-
mentary activity that stirred them. Duncker, for example, modestly ac-
knowledged at the beginning of the assembly's work that he was a worse 
parliamentarian than most of his fellows? He acted on this belief, and only 
twice addressed the assembly as a whole. Similarly, Haym took the floor 
only in January 1849 and afterward never spoke again. Although he later 
described himself as the "most attentive listener" and "most diligent visi-
tor to the sessions," he also recalled that his determination "to follow, to lis-
ten, to observe, to criticize" was a product of the reportorial habits that he 
had acquired when he researched his book on the Prussian United Diet.s 
However attentive he may have been, he admitted in a letter to his parents 
in early July that he found most of the speeches tedious and unimportant.9 
This was also Droysen's finding. He was little inclined to listen carefully to 
others' addresses, and he never addressed the assembly himself. 
This behavior, which at first seems strangely at odds with their pro-
fessed hopes for the assembly, was not the result of shyness or of a disin-
clinationfor public address. For all three men, public speaking had been a 
major tactic before the revolution, and Droysen and Duncker were gifted 
and spirited lecturers. No doubt they disliked having to listen to others. 
Furthermore, they were as outspoken in committee meetings and at the 
political clubs that gathered nightly in Frankfort's inns and public houses 
as they were silent in the assembly. Although Droysen never spoke before 
the assembly, Heinrich Laube in his informative and circumstantial mem-
oir on the National Assembly recalls Droysen in debate as "a victorious 
fighter, a tough opponent with inexhaustible resources" who was "so spir-
ited and so many-sided" that he "gave the impression of superiority" even 
when his opponent mustered the better arguments. In part, Droysen was. 
being playful. He attended "almost daily" the meetings of groups on the 
left with which he had "nothing whatever in common" chiefly to goad 
them into arguments on major questions.10 He was also matching his tac-
tics to the situation as he understood it. As Droysen remarked in a letter 
written on 8 July, he believed that he could ''be more useful in a small 
circle" than in speeches to the plenum.l1 
This assertion fitted his understanding of the assembly's historic func-
tion. He did not think of it as a constituent body invested with full powers 
to draft and implement a new German constitution. To have done so 
would have been to accept the theory of popular sovereignty that he ab-
horred and to have contradicted his own historical theory· according to 
which unification had to come about through a reconciliation between old 
and new and, more specifically, through voluntary Prussian actions. This 
view of affairs obviously diminished for him the importance of debates in 
the assembly, but it certainly did not mean that the assembly itself was 
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uilimportant. Apart from being a legal embodiment of Germany's nascent 
unity and constitutionalism, it was a forum in which the interests of the 
states could be noted and reconciled with the national interest without 
lengthy and parallel negotiations. That was Droysen's view in late April, 
and he still held to it once the assembly was in session.12 It was also the 
view taken by Duncker, Haym, and-though he was not a deputy-Sybel. 
;, This was why they were so interested in the early discussions about the 
competence and legal standing of the National Assembly. 
This view of the assembly's functions of course ruled out the favored 
thesis of the German left, namely, that the assembly should proceed 
"solely and alone" (einzig und allein) in the political reconstruction of Ger-
many, but it also excluded the German right's" contract principle" (Verein-
barungsprinzip), according to which the assembly had the task of drafting 
the constitution but the states as well as the assembly would put it in force 
through multilateral contracts.13 The former was too radical and seemed to 
threaten Germany with republicanism and continued revolution. The lat-
ter, by contrast, was too conservative and seemed equally dangerous. The 
"contract principle" was actually a significant constitutional innovation, 
inasmuch as it gave the nation as a whole, represented by the National As-
sembly, the right to negotiate as a legal equal with the several states, but 
in practical terms it left the states with the power to veto the new consti-
tution in whole or in part. Droysen and the others wanted some means to 
obtain the assent of the states, but this means left the states with too great 
a power to obstruct. Moreover, this principle was fundamentally at vari-
ance with their reading of Germany's current historical situation. 
These considerations became evident in the debate over the Lepel Pro-
tocol. On 4 May, Viktor von Lepel, who represented Hesse-Darmstadt in 
the Confederate Assembly, submitted a formal proposal to create a stand-
ing committee of states' representatives to report on the assembly's actions 
to the states and to communicate the states' wishes to the assembly.14 Al-
though the proposed committee's powers were purely reportorial, it was 
possible to see in the protocol an attempt to undermine the assembly's in-
dependence vis-a.-vis the states, and it consequently called forth a number 
of angry rejoinders. In any case, Lepel's motion demanded a reply because 
the assembly could do little as long as its position and authority remained 
open to question. Droysen accordingly prepared a lengthy memorandum 
for Guido von Usedom, the Prussian delegate the Confederate Assembly. 
He hoped to persuade Prussia to declare for the assembly'S independent 
competence and, in his habitual thoroughness, drafted a detailed explana-
tion of the assembly's historical and legal position.15 
Droysen sent the memorandum on 14 May. It began by posing this cen-
tral question: "Does the Assembly possess the right to frame the German 
constitution, or has it been summoned to contract one with the states?" He 
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argued strongly in favor of the former proposition in a combination of 
precise legal language along, however, with items of historical theory that 
made legal niceties irrelevant to the current situation. In the legal portion 
of his argument Droysen derived the assembly's authority from the col-
lapse of the old system that had been signaled, first, by the appearance of 
new policies and personnel in the states and, second, by the virtual cessa-
tion of the confederation, the "keystone" of the old order. The confedera-" 
tion had "not merely become theoretically unviable" but now was" already 
superseded, in fact and with the full recognition of all parties." More specif-
ically, Droysen meant that the election decrees issued on 30 March and 7 
April by the Confederate Assembly on demand from the Pre-Parliament 
amounted to a tacit surrender by that body, and the states that it repre-
sented, of any legal right to determine Germany's constitutional future. 
The National Assembly, therefore, did not have to contract with the states 
because they had already delegated to it their rights in the matter.16 
Droysert based the historical portion of his case on his concept of the 
"right of history." He suggested as much when he claimed that the con-
federation had "in fact" been superseded, and he made that point explicit 
when he argued that the revolution had occurred because of Germany's 
longing for unification, with the consequence that the National Assembly, 
when convened, would embody that unity. This drive toward unification, 
Droysen believed, was the central tendency in German history and there-
fore legitimated both the revolution that it caused and the assembly that 
was, so far, the revolution's major accomplishment. To give added force to 
this contention, Droysen pointed out that the authority of the assembly was 
the same in kind as that possessed by the princes in and after 1815. That is, 
the post-Napoleonic political map of Germany had been drawn arbitrarily 
and without the consent of the affected populations, but it had been legiti-
mate insofar as it was historically necessary and for as long as the governed 
obeyed their governors. By the same token, the revolution and its achieve-
ments were legitimate because they were now historical facts created by 
historical necessity.17 Though he did not expressly use the terms, Droysen 
based this argument on his essential distinction between the legitimist "his-
torical right" and his more revolutionary "right of history." 
This simultaneous use of arguments that, in logic, contradicted each 
other, was not the result of carelessness. Whether by design or not, this 
combination of arguments was rhetorically persuasive, because it both re-
minded Prussia and the other states of their earlier undertakings and 
pointedly informed them that a revolution had occurred and that they 
were, in consequence, under siege. They had promised unification, and 
they could, if necessary, be forced to keep that promise. The combination 
also reflected Droysen's sense of historical reality. The legal implications 
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of the states' earlier actions mattered because the states still existed, their 
consent was still required, and they were still bound by what they had said 
and done. The revolution was also a reality with its own logic and impli-
cations. It had long been axiomatic for Droysen that legal formulas, how-
ever important they might be, could not invalidate history. The National 
Assembly, therefore, was authoritative whether the states approved of it 
or not. Thus, two separate sets of considerations led to the same result, 
and, in Droysen's analysis, they reinforced each other in yet another way. 
The states, and Prussia in particular, could catch up with history and 
defend their remaining legitimate interests only by keeping to their under-
takings and supporting the National Assembly, which, in turn, could ful-
fil its historic task and grant Germany a stable unity only by working 
with the now transformed states. They needed the assembly's backing, 
and they could gain this only in exchange for good behavior. Droysen 
therefore wanted the states to allow the assembly as much latitude as 
possible. At the same time, he wanted the assembly to be as considerate 
as it could be of the states' interests. Once its authority was unquestioned, 
therefore, he expected the assembly to be prudently mindful of the states' 
sensibilities as it designed the nation's institutions, and he did not object 
to its consulting with the states as long as this consultation was volun-
tary. To that end, and consistent with his long-held views on truly repre-
sentative government, he wanted the assembly to create national 
institutions for Germany that would be responsible only for those areas 
vitally necessary to the nation's internal cohesion and external strength. 
Everything else would be left to the state governments. He reiterated 
these points in the memorandum and other papers and publications in 
the following weeks.18 
This view, of course, had important implications for the standing of 
the assembly. On the one hand, it gave that body dignity and central im-
portance, so that Droysen logically concluded that "the assembly itself is 
the first and decisive fact of the completed unification of Germany in pub-
lic law; it will discuss and decree as to the form and constitution in which 
this political essence shall henceforth operate." By so doing, it would 
demonstrate beyond cavil that in Germany the era of princely property in 
power had ended and real statehood had begun. On the other hand, Droy-
sen's analysis made the states, Prussia in particular, especially important. 
"Now," he insisted, "is the moment in which Prussia can and must assume 
her position." This claim had urgent importance for him: "Only through 
the good will of the current governments in Germany, above all Prussia, 
can the vast danger to which we are so close be removed."19 In Droysen's 
vision of how history moved forward, this complementarity of opposed 
interests was the assurance of coming progress. 
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Droysen was not the only one to draw these conclusions, though it was 
possible to reach them on purely pragmatic, less elegantly theoretical 
grounds. Most deputies in the political center felt as he did, and Duncker 
and Haym record in the their postrevolutionary memoirs having the same 
reactions to the Lepel protoco1.20 In Marburg, Sybel cosigned and proba-
bly authored an appeal to the Hessian government that took the same line. 
It responded to the Lepel Protocol by admitting that the new constitution 
"would come into existence through solid harmonization between· the 
princes and peoples of Germany" and therefore urged the assembly to 
study the political situation carefully and to consult with the state govern-
ments whenever possible. It also stated that if any or all of the states took 
exception to measures in the national interest, then "no other answer is 
possible than that the National Assembly should have the sole right to de-
cide."21 These rationalizations explain the popularity in their camp of the 
somewhat mystifying thesis that the constituent power lay neither with 
the people nor with the princes but arose instead from the "sovereignty of 
the nation" (Souveriinitiit der Nation). 
This important phrase achieved currency in a major speech by the lib-
eral nationalist leader Heinrich von Gagern in which he accepted the act-
ing presidency of the assembly on 19 May 1848. The concept it stated, 
however, had obviously been mooted among sympathetic deputies some-
what earlier, because it appears in Droysen's diary entry for 17 May: "Sov-
ereignty of the nation, not popular sovereignty, not sovereignty of the 
parts."zz Gagern himself justified the concept in terms of its utility, namely, 
the "difficulty ... not to say the impossibility" of unifying Germany except 
under the assumption that the assembly had the last word in constitutional 
questions.23 As a concept, "sovereignty of the nation" assured the assem-
bly a basic minimum of authority without raising the ghost of the French 
Revolution of 1789 by invoking popular sovereignty and without risking 
counterrevolution by conceding to the states. The term's very vagueness 
seems to have attracted Haym, no doubt because it allowed the assembly 
to gain its point without dangerous concessions to the left or the right.24 
This view of the assembly'S authority implied both delight in its exis-
tence and a tendency not to take its proceedings very seriously at most 
times. Supporting it placed Droysen, Duncker, and Haym solidly in its 
right center, and they were early members of what then and since has been 
called the Casinopartei. Because national politics had hardly existed in Ger-
many before 1848, deputies arrived in Frankfort without political affilia-
tions and in considerable ignorance of one another's political views. 
Groupings of political opinion quickly sorted themselves out, however, in 
continual meetings, usually held at night, at various hotels and cafes in the 
city (as a consequence of which Germany's first political parties are named 
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after long defunct bars and cafes in Frankfort}. The right center first gath-
ered at the Mainlust and Weidenbusch but by late June had situated itself 
at the Casino Cafe, from which it took its name, the Casinopartei. This party, 
though the term party is somewhat misleading given the initial lack of dis-
cipline and the tendency of many deputies to float among groupings, was 
the largest in the assembly. It variously recorded 150 and 166 members 
throughout the summer, and though it deferred drafting a program until 
the September Crisis, it distinguished itself from the Cafe Milani on its 
right by rejecting the "contract principle," and the Augsburger Hof party 
on its left by being more conciliatory toward the states even while de-
fending the independent authority of the National Assembly.25 
Parties define themselves in terms of what they do not agree about, and 
the German parties initially defined themselves in response to the combats 
over the powers and position of the National Assembly.26 Given the vari-
ety of reasons that one could have for taking a particular position on the 
assembly's authority and the early tendency of deputies to attend more 
than one party meeting, to say that someone belonged to a particular party 
is to say little about his actual politics, especially in the first weeks of the as-
sembly's existence. Over time, however, party labels came to have greater 
meaning as changing circumstances led to increased clarity about long-
term objectives and this clarity, in tum, led deputies to choose party alle-
giance with care. Thus, in the late summer, the right wing of the Casinopartei 
deserted it to form the Landbergspartei, and in December its particularists 
and pro-Austrians broke away to form the Pariser HofsparteiP Even so, in-
ternal . disorganization in the Casinopartei, of which both Droysen and 
Haym complained, remained a continuing problem that the eventual in-
troduction of party discipline in September only partially remedied.28 
Under these circumstances, a tendency toward differentiation within 
party groupings appeared as a result of which like-minded deputies clus-
tered together and, at times, worked against the larger party of which they 
were nominally members.29 Droysen, Duncker, and Haym, for example, 
belonged to what Droysen termed the "narrower circle" (engere Kreis), 
which variously met at the Weidenbusch, Hirschgraben, and Englische 
Hof.30 Its larger membership included, among others, Heinrich von 
Gagem, Friedrich Daniel Bassermann, Gustav Mevissen, Hermann von 
Beckerath, Karl Jurgens, Adolf Lette, Friedrich Romer, and Karl Mathy.31 
Even this smaller group was not always able to achieve or maintain unity, 
however, and its meetings often became the scenes of long and heated de-
bates. Droysen, Duncker, and Haym also belonged to a small, and pre-
sumably more informal, group that Haym labeled the "professors' circle" 
(Professorenkreis), though he w.as himself not a professor (nor, as his 
postrevolutionary career unfolded, did he ever become one, though he 
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wrote many fine intellectual histories and edited the prestigious journal 
Preuj3ische Jahrbiicher). 
Aside from Droysen, Duncker, and some others whom he did not 
identify, Haym recalled as its members Georg Beseler, Dahlmann, Gervi-
nus, Andreas Michelsen, and Waitz. To a degree, this may have been 
more a social than a political grouping in which academics, now removed 
from their families and universities, continued their prerevolutionary ac-
quaintances, but the grouping surely had a political dimension as well. In 
1848 conflicting political loyalties overbore old social ties. For example, 
Duncker and Haym broke with their old friend Arnold Ruge because of 
his connection with the Frankfort left.32 Furthermore, their political and 
historical ideas were too closely interlinked for them neatly to compart-
mentalize their professional and partisan lives. No doubt it seemed quite 
natural for them to spend time when possible with people who not only 
supported the same political program that they did but also held the 
same tenets of historical theory. It is an indication of this that in Frankfort 
Droysen, Duncker, Haym, and Gervinus (to whom they still felt politi-
cally close) lived within one block of one another on the BleichstraBe, 
whereas no otter deputies had lodgings there.33 
The initial euphoria lasted a while because their view of the National 
Assembly as the duly empowered agent of mediation between old and 
new in Germany met no serious challenge during the first eight weeks of 
its sessions. The assembly's authority still appeared assured, and its ca-
pacity to conduct business in an efficient and orderly fashion visibly in-
creased. The election of Heinrich von Gagern to the acting presidency of 
the assembly symbolized for them the necessity of what had already been 
achieved and suggested that unification and constitutionalization would 
soon be completed.34 Their statements at the time suggest that they were 
both impressed with the likelihood of success and awed by the immensity 
of the task still facing them.35 This contentment distorted their political 
perceptions, however, to the extent that they measured the significance of 
the assembly'S proceedings chiefly in terms of probable effects on Prussia 
and the other states. In addition, their historical philosophy disposed them 
to doubt the significance of merely legal reforms. 
For this reason such eVidently important matters as the framing of 
guarantees as "basic rights" (Grundrechte) bored them. This was true even 
of Droysen, who as a leading member of and recording secretary for the 
assembly'S Constitution Committee (Verfassungsausschuj3) was busily en-
gaged in that very work. They knew that enactments of this kind were im-
portant in their own way, but could not by themselves determine the 
success or failure of unification. In any case, purely formal guarantees did 
not seem as a sufficient condition for true freedom. Accordingly, during 
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the relevant committee sessions Droysen spoke only once, characteristi-
cally to make a case for free schooling for German youth, and took the gen-
eral position that the statement of rights should be drafted with an eye to 
its probable effects on the states.36 When the draft on basic rights came be-
fore the whole assembly, he complained of being bored.37 Only tactical 
considerations made the issue seem at all interesting: they hoped that the 
proclamation of these rights would weaken the appeal of the assembly's 
left throughout Germany.38 
Their interest was correspondingly greater in the debates that fol-
lowed the submission of two motions, each proposed by a deputy on the 
left and each designed to set major precedents through the disposition of 
a specific issue. The first motion was brought forward by Franz Raveaux 
on 19 May and ostensibly dealt with a recent Prussian decree that stipu-
lated that Prussian citizens holding seats both in the German National 
Assembly at Frankfort and the Prussian National Assembly at Berlin 
would have to step down from one or the other. If only for the reason that 
it was impossible to be in Frankfort and Berlin at the same time, the de-
cree obviously made a lot of sense. The difficulty was that a state gov-
ernment had issued a regulation dealing with national representation. 
Raveaux's motion to overturn the decree contained the implication that 
he had made explicit in his speech to the assembly: only the National As-
sembly in Frankfort possessed the right to distribute authority in the na-
tion (Competenz-Competenz).39 
This motion was understandably troubling to Droysen, Duncker, 
Haym, and, more generally, to most of the right center. They agreed with 
Raveaux in principle because he was upholding the standard that they had 
themselves proposed in response to the Lepel Protocol and had affirmed 
in the principle of the "sovereignty of the nation," namely, the assembly's 
final right of decision in constitutional matters. They strongly disagreed, 
however, with Raveaux's present application of it, because they did not 
want to offend Prussia and because too clear and emphatic a statement of 
their own principle would have the undesirable effect of blurring the dis-
tinction between their position and the left's claim that the assembly 
should work "solely and alone." -It was imm,ediately clear that the issue 
that Raveaux had raised would have to be settled and that settlement 
would be difficult.40 
Before any settlement could be achieved, however, the deputy Franz 
Heinrich Zitz of Mainz offered another motion of equal importance. Mainz 
contained a confederate fortress with a mixed garrison of Austrian and 
Prussian troops. On 21 March some citizens made insulting comments 
about the House of Hohenzollern in the hearing of Prussian. soldiers. Dis-
orders broke out and the garrison command imposed martial law on the 
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city, but not before four Prussian soldiers had been killed and numerous 
citizens injured. Zitz had a number of harsh things to say about the Prus-
sian component in the garrison and called on the assembly to discipline the 
offending troopS.41 This motion was problematic for several reasons. First, 
the accuracy of Zitz's charge seemed doubtful, and it was easy to see him 
as a troublemaker. Further, given Mainz's strategic location and the wide-
spread if 'unfounded fear of French invasion, this hardly seemed the time 
to trouble the resident military. Finally, and especially worrisome to Droy-
sen and the others, Zitz's motion, if carried, would not only offend Prus-
sia but also imply that the assembly claimed active governmental as well 
as constituent power.42 
These considerations were weighty enough that the assembly decided 
not to follow Zitz's lead. His motion was referred to a special committee 
that reported back on 26 May with a much diluted version of the original 
text. Even in this form it was not acceptable to Prince Felix Lichnowsky, 
who spoke against it in sarcastic terms, or to Anton von Schmerling, who 
persuaded the deputies to vote a return to the order of the day.43 On 27 
May the deputies turned to the altogether more difficult matter of the 
Raveaux motion. Since its introduction eight days before, numerous 
amendments and alternate proposals had been offered, but their number 
was now reduced to four. None of these dealt explicitly with the original 
question of Prussia's decree on double mandates and all of them were at-
tempts to establish precisely the upper limit of the assembly's competence. 
In the course of the day's proceedings, the majority of the deputies finally 
voted for Johann Peter Werner's version, which stipulated that "all provi-
sions of the individual German [state] constitutions that do not agree with 
the general [national] constitution ... are to be considered valid only in-
sofar as they accord with the latter, notwithstanding their existing efficacy 
until that time."44 
This ingenious compromise nicely demonstrates the determined mod-
eration of the majority in its dealings with the states. The Werner motion 
preserved the assembly's claim to supremacy by proclaiming its right of 
final decision in constitutional questions, but it left the states free to make 
any determinations not directly opposed to those of the assembly and it 
postponed any possible conflict with the states until the national constitu-
tion was actUally completed and in force. Until that time, the states could 
do as they liked. This was just what Droysen, Duncker, and Haym wished. 
They voted with both majorities and applauded the assembly for its wis-
dom, though Haym later expressed a slight regret at the abstractness of 
Werner's language.45 Without seeming to arrogate powers at the states' ex-
pense, the assembly had maintained its claim and had given its work some 
needed protection against the concurrent constitution-making of the con-
stituent assembly in Berlin.46 
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They were almost jubilant in their belief that the disposition of both 
motions marked a great victory in the drive for unification.47 It was as if 
finding the right language in Frankfort could settle the destiny of the 
whole nation. Haym, for example, wrote to Hansemann on 29 May to tell 
him that "in an affair [the Zitz motion] that lay outside our legal sphere we 
rejected any intervention out of hand; there [the Raveaux motion], where 
we moved upon our most particular legal basis, we expressed our 
supreme (iibergreifendes) legislative power in a deliberate statement." 
Haym felt good about this, and concluded: "We have finally moved out of 
our original insignificance, we have finally occupied ourselves with some-
thing besides mere preliminaries and formalities."48 Actually, the assem-
bly's actions were preliminary and formal, but Haym's delight was 
genuine, and this was an excellent chance to point out the assembly's es-
sential moderation to the joint leader of the Prussian government. Droy-
sen reached the same self-congratulatory conclusion. In a letter he noted 
that in voting down the Zitz motion, the deputies showed "what we do not 
want" and in voting for the Werner motion, "what we do want."49 
Circumspect though both votes seem now, these men were respectful 
enough to established authority that the assembly's actions also struck 
them as courageous as well as principled and prudent. Haym subse-
quently described these decisions as the assembly's "vote of confidence" 
in itself.50 Writing at the time, Droysen professed to see in them strong in-
dications that history was still moving along its appointed course: 
"Nowhere in Germany [is] there a doubt of our dignified but earnestly ex-
pressed confidence; the territorial all-mightinesses .... part before us, in 
Berlin the government wishes to support itself upon us. This upsetting of 
power would be unwholesome and incurable if the organs of our unitary 
power were not constructed here at the seedbed of our future. God first 
gave us the wish, the hope for national unification; now the facts force it 
upon US."51 This confidence was still heavily influenced by his providen-
tialism, and the assembly's recent treatment of two difficult motions con-
firmed for him that the achievement as well as the desire for unification 
were historical necessities in accordance with God's plan. There are strong, 
though more muted, hints of the same view in a contemporaneous letter 
of Haym's.52 
The next matter that engaged their passionate interest and, at its con-
clusion, further confirmed their optimism was establishing a provisional 
central government. The need for doing so was obvious and urgent to any-
one who wanted Germany unified. It was clear that it might take months 
to complete a constitution, and Germany had to be governed in the mean-
time. The assembly was too large and unwieldy to perform this task by it-
self and had in any case foresworn such a role when it tabled the Zitz 
motion. These considerations called for a speedy decision, but there was 
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also a reason for caution and some consequent delay. Even though the gov-
ernment would be provisional in form as well as composition, that is, even 
though it would exist only until a new constitution could be put in force, 
it would set an important precedent and probably influence the assembly's 
deliberations on the permanent form of national goveinment. For that rea-
son, discussions of this subject were engrossing and at times heated. 
Proposals for the creation of a provisional executive started coming 
from the floor as early as 23 May. On 6 June the Priority Committee, a 
group entrusted with scheduling the business to be brought for the ple-
nary sessions of the assembly, permitted Ludwig Simon, a deputy from the 
left, to address his colleagues on this issue. The assembly followed his ad-
vice to the extent of creating a special committee, chaired by the historian 
Dahlmann, to study the motions already submitted and then to report back 
with its own recommendation (Prioritiits-AusschufJ tiber die Antriige auf 
Bildung einer provisorischen Centralgewalt).53 The same divisions that would 
plague the assembly as a whole when it handled this difficult question 
also troubled the meetings of the special committee. When it reported on 
19 June, it had no single recommendation to offer; instead, it had a major-
ity report to which Duncker, a committee member, subscribed, and two 
widely varying minority reports. 
There might as well have been no special committee, because in the 
following debates the three original proposals became many. Day by day, 
new and incompatible proposals reached the chair and continual amend-
ments changed beyond recognition proposals already under discussion. 
At the same time, the disunity among the deputies became increasingly 
and distressingly evident.54 These divisions were of considerable force 
in further distinguishing and identifying the still forming political par-
ties.55 They also reflect the marked tendency, directly contrary to the . 
stated beliefs of most, to act as if the revolution's fate hung on finding just 
the right phrase in a piece of legislation. Three questions were really at 
issue in this case. 
The first concerned the shape and composition of the provisional ex-
ecutive. The left, in the interest of popular sovereignty, wanted a commit-
tee of deputies elected by the assembly. Many, however, preferred what 
they called a trias of three members, a Hohenzollern, a Habsburg, and, to 
represent the middle and small states, a Bavarian Wittelsbach. Some of its 
supporters hoped that this would also be the form of the executive in the 
finished constitution, whereas others simply wanted to conciliate the 
states for the present and left open the question of the final form of the na-
tional executive. Then there were those who, anticipating eventual consti-
tutional monarchy, wanted one-man rule, with the executive chosen from 
among the reigning dynasties. Second, and also· troublesome, was the 
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question of the source and legitimation of the executive's authority. Three 
basic options existed that could apply to any of the three proposed forms. 
It could be claimed either that authority derived from the assembly alone, 
or from both the assembly and the states, or just from the states. As one 
would expect, the answers divided largely along the lines of left, center, 
and right, respectively. Finally, there was the question of the exact extent 
of the provisional executive's powers. This question was thorny because it 
touched on cherished notions about the ideal limits of state power, tested 
deputies' adherence to federalism, and would foreseeably affect the states' 
attitudes toward the assembly. 
Droysen, Duncker, and Haym approached these questions with a 
strong sense of their urgency, although they were not always in agreement 
with each other. They were, however, clear about certain matters from the 
outset. They recognized Germany's need to have a provisional govern-
ment as soon' as possible and they wanted to make certain that its form 
would neither exert an unfortunate influence on the assembly's finaldeci-
sions nor exacerbate its ongoing relations with the states, Prussia in par-
ticular. In consequence, they were profoundly opposed to all schemes that 
called for the election of the executive or for the appointment of a com-
mittee of deputies because these implied republicanism.56 'They were just 
as unwilling to countenance the appointment of the executive by the states 
or, as some proposed, using the Confederate Assembly as acting executive. 
They did not want to suggest an unbroken continuity with prerevolution-
ary times and, furthermore, believed that the confederation no longer had 
a useful role to play. They were able to invoke notions from their histori-
cal theory to argue these points. 57 
It is rather more difficult to explain what they did want. The trias 
scheme embodied in the special committee's majority report, in which 
Duncker had joined, had two attractive features. It promised to grant an 
equitable share of influence to the states and, so, to reassure them about 
the assembly's benevolent intentions. Further, the fact that the three rep-
resentatives would, in all likelihood, be close relatives of reigning mon-
archs would be an important concession to the principle of monarchy 
because its acceptance by the deputies would suggest a determination to 
preserve both states and princes.58 In one of his two addresses before the 
whole assembly, Duncker rose to defend this proposal ina fairly theoreti-
cal disquisition. He claimed that the problem before them was the six-
centuries-old ailment of German disunity and insisted that its solution was 
possible only through thoughtful "mediation" (Vermittelung). As in his 
prerevolutionary speeches and writings, he used this term in a more or less 
Hegelian sense to mean a synthetic combination of old with new. He cor-
respondingly urged the deputies that they work "in the sense of a center, 
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in the sense of a vital creative middle, not that middle that anxiously holds 
itself apart from the extremes but that middle that synthesizes the divided 
and opposing forces into a creative and formative motive power" (die au-
seinanderstrebenden Krafte zusammenfasst zu einer schaffenden und gestal-
tenden Triebkraft). The assembly could play that role only by orienting 
itself to the tendency of history.59 
In making that claim, Duncker had a particular and practical objective. 
His great fear, he explained, was that the assembly, in view of its great po-
tential power, would attempt to decide the issue "all by itself." In 
Duncker's view, that approach was both "unpolitical" and "impractical": 
"1 hold it to be unpolitical because it is a mistake to destroy completely a by-
passed system [or] the elements and carriers of a principle (ein iiberwunde-
nen System, die Elemente und Trager eines Principes ganz zu Boden zu werfen). 
It is politically correct in such a situation to carry along in the movement, 
to continue the old elements that were. so long maintained intact in the 
previous circumstances." His understanding of the operation of the his-
torical process, that is, now dictated tactics. Were his advice ignored, he 
believed, the old elements in German political life would actually gain 
strength from the one-sided opposition to which they were subjected and 
thus be able to obstruct unification. Again, this conclusion was required by 
the laws of history.60 His finding was, of course, entirely consonant with 
his assumptions. It shows that he believed that the assembly could succeed 
in its task as long as it made no fatal error. It also reflects his belief that his-
torical progress occurred through mediation between old and new, so that 
if unification was the goal toward which progress had now to move, then 
unification would not occur if the new ignored or crushed the old. His ar-
gument could also be stated in simpler, more pragmatic terms: if the as-
sembly offended the states, then the states might block its efforts. For these 
reasons he urged the deputies to approve the trias plan. 
So persuasive did the case for the trias seem, that Haym, persuaded by 
Duncker's reasoning, mourned its abandonment for some time.61 As the 
discussions in the assembly continued, however, opinion began to run to-
ward the monas, or one-man rule. Droysen presents a case in point of this 
shift. On 6 June, that is, while the special committee was at work but nearly 
two weeks before it reported, he wrote to Arendt: "1 look forward with 
some confidence to the discussions on the creation of a central power ... a 
directory of three as the essence of all the collective powers of the German govern-
ments, chosen by them and appointed by the parliament; that is, installed 
by a vote of confidence from the nation and creating a national ministry 
(Reichsministerium) responsible to us [my emphasis]."62 He was as firm a 
believer in trialism as Duncker or Haym. On 19 June, however, he recorded 
in his diary the previous day's "preliminary discussions in the narrower 
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circle at Jiirgen's, where among others were Lette, Duncker, Kierulf, etc. I 
strove to clarify the purpose of the establishment and to demand speed 
and decisiveness in the decrees; not just executive power but government; 
by no means three but one-the divine order of the world has so prepared 
our affairs that our Washington will not be lacking [my emphasis)."63 Ev-
idently, even God now inclined to executive monism. 
Droysen had changed his mind in the hope that Germany would prov-
identially find a single ruler with heroic qualities, though he almost cer-
tainly also wanted to set a precedent for a subsequent constitutional 
monarch. Even in his 6 June letter praising the trias plan he had warned 
against making too great concessions to particularism now that the states, 
as he believed, were so weakened.64 He had probably taken that warning 
more to heart in the following days. This tum in his opinion, however,. 
forced him to deal with the question of who the single ruler would be. He 
wanted a Hohenzollern, but that was impossible. The March events in 
Berlin and the recent storming of the Berlin Arsenal had brought the 
dynasty into such serious disrepute that when, on 20 June, the deputy 
August Ernst Braun suggested that the assembly vote Frederick William 
IV of Prussia national executive by acclamation,his colleagues actually 
collapsed into laughter and the motion failed even to get the twenty votes 
needed for formal consideration.65 Under those circumstances, one further 
attraction of the trias plan, at least for Duncker, was that it promised to put 
a Hohenzollern at the top, although only as one of three.66 
Droysen therefore tried to tum necessity into opportunity. He looked 
for the happy aspects of the situationand sought ways to improve on it. If 
the choice had to be a Habsburg, not a Hohenzollern, he wanted the situ-
ation exploited in such a way that it would tighten the bonds between 
Frankfort and Berlin. He was partially consoled in any case by the knowl-
edge that the probable choice among the Habsburgs was the now aged 
Archduke Johann. Still a national hero by virtue of his leadership of the 
Tyrolean uprising against Napoleon in 1809, he seemed more a German 
than an Austrian figure. Droysen was also comforted by his continuing 
belief that Austria was on the verge of collapse. Perhaps with Johann as 
executive it would be that much easier to salvage Austria's German 
provinces and Bohemia for the unified Germany. He further reasoned that 
Prussia could gain moral credit throughout Germany by a ready accep-
tance of Johann's investment with office. He hoped that this would bene-
fit the Hohenzollern case when it came time to institute a permanent, not 
provisional, executive. He also wanted to make sure that only an "osten-
sible honor" fell to the Habsburgs and tried to assure that the cabinet offi-
cers who served the executive would be Prussian by origin and German 
in inclination.67 
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Duncker and Haym, again, did not share this outlook, and their at-
tachment to the trias plan in fact grew stronger in the wake of the June 
Days in Paris and the storming of the Berlin Arsenal on 15 June. Further 
revolution seemed to be in the air, and one-man rule smacked of republi-
canism.68 Judging from their votes, they were disappointed and resentful 
when, on 23 June, Heinrich von Gagern momentarily stepped down from 
the president's chair and used his very considerable moral authority to 
persuade the deputies to save time and to avoid useless debate by simply 
naming a national administrator (Reichsverweser) on their own author-
ity.69 This was what contemporaries called Gagern's "bold stroke," and 
his open appeal to expediency-which Haym erroneously interpreted as 
a statement of "principle" and "a huge concession to the left"-should 
have taken much of the sting out of what otherwise might have seemed 
an assault by the assembly on the states' remaining powers. Certainly 
Droysen applauded the action. Even before this he had urged that it was 
wiser "to be practical than to hawk principles." He agreed that the times 
were troubled, that it was necessary to act quickly and decisively, and, 
anyway, he wanted the monas.7° 
Droysen, Duncker, andHaym were, however, in agreement in the 
third major area of concern, namely determining the limits of the execu-
tive's power. That was only natural inasmuch as their differing views on 
its composition was an instance of choosing different means to the same 
end, and the question of executive competence was a question of ultimate 
objectives. First, they believed that he should be responsible to the nation 
as a whole and, hence, accountable to the assembly. Although Haym and 
Duncker had been distressed by the assembly'S seeming arrogation of 
power on 23 June, on the twenty-eighth they voted against Georg von 
Vincke's motion that the election of the national administrator by the as-
sembly be subject to the formal approval of the states.71 It cannot have 
helped that Vincke spoke for the political right, and their principled view 
was that the majority of deputies had voted their conviction and that the 
thing to do now was loyally to maintain unity.72 The matter was less prob-
lematic for Droysen, but he also took the same position.73 They did not, 
however, want the new executive to be the mere agent of the assembly, and 
they accordingly joined in the slender majority that voted down a motion 
requiring the national administrator to "publish and execute the decrees 
of the National Assembly."74 The proposed measure seemed to approxi-
mate too closely the detested centralism of the great French Revolution 
and was, therefore, a threat to the future authority of the states.75 Their rev-
erence for the states, nonetheless, had definite limits. They wanted Ger-
many strong and they wanted effective national government, right away. 
They consequently voted for those measures that gave the national ad-
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ministrator full powers to represent Germany diplomatically, to conclude 
(subject, of course, to the consent of the assembly) treaties with foreign 
powers, and, most important, to exercise supreme command over the na-
tion's military forces. Because these forces were state, really royal, armies 
by tradition and by oath, this was a major challenge to the princes and the 
states. The deputies appear not to have anticipated that in this area the as-
sembly would,· before very long, first clash unsuccessfully with the old 
powers. Given their agenda for Germany, and more specifically the value 
that they attached to tangible national power, they in any case had little 
choice. Unification would have little meaning if the states retained inde-
pendent armies while the national government remained unarmed. 
These developments confirmed and increased their original optimism. 
In keeping with their historical outlook, Duncker and Haym quickly made 
peace with the defeat of trialism. They had been bothered at first by 
Gagern's intervention of 23 June, but Duncker quickly concluded that it 
had all been for the best. Germany would now be able to defend herself 
against foreign dangers and enjoy a foretaste of unification while the as-
sembly continued its labors on the new constitution.76 Haym also felt rec-
onciled. In a letter to his parents on 6 July he announced that "Gagern's 
way was the boldest and the best" and went on to offer some reflections 
on what th~se events showed about the current rate of historical progress. 
He now took the recent defeat of the trias plan as an encouraging sign that 
showed that it is "not men with their wit and clever political calculations 
who make history." History, he urged, ' 
makes itself above the heads of men; the result, such as has appeared here, came 
about through a miracle and as through a higher determination of destiny. No 
principle, no article, no party has triumphed; on the contrary, the instinct for unity, 
the drive toward establishment and preservation of monarchy has conquered. Seen 
from that point of view, the establishment of the position of the National Admin-
istrator and the election of the Archduke Johann has something thoroughly sub-
lime about it; and all of us felt this sublime quality as we, the prince-electors of the 
nineteenth century, elected the "emperor" and as our president led the first cheer 
for the elected. 
This satisfied accommodation with historical reality was, of course, a log-
ical consequence of their historical theory. As men determined to help ef-
fect the historically necessary, there was simply no way to be right against 
history. Haym approached without quite expressing Droysen's overt 
ptovidentialism. If the trias plan had failed, that meant that it was good for 
it to fail and right to be happy about what replaced it. Later, it would be-
come harder to sustain optimism in the face of defeat when more was at 
stake than having a provisional government headed by one person rather 
152 Droysen and the Prussian School of History 
than three. The recent outcome, paradoxically, also confirmed Haym in his 
disdain for parliamentary proceedings, and in the same letter he again 
pOinted to the boring, even trivial, character of most sessions.77 
Droysen took the same satisfied reading of recent events. "Everyday," 
he noted in his diary on 9 July, "the fact presents itself more compellingly 
that the unity and strength of Germany finally wants to become a reality." 
He commented further on the "mysterious" decline of the "republican 
party and specifically the left side of the Assembly."78 He evidently be-
lieved that these events were interrelated strands in the weave of histori-
cal necessity. Like Haym, he thought that history itself, not individuals in 
the assembly, was responsible for what had happened. Thus, in a letter to 
Arendt written the day before, he argued that history had taken "a giant 
stride forwards" in the settlement of the provisional power question and 
now was "finally at the point where it can conduct a little politicS and ... 
we will be happier than ancient Greece which was equally cultivated and 
equally divided." His personification of history was no mere figurative de-
vice, as his reference to ancient Greece shows. He evidently believed that 
at last, after a "little politics," world history would complete in Germany 
its central task of creating stable human freedom. He expected to see this 
occur in a short while. He confessed that he found it hard in the "hurly-
burly of battle" to find an "overview and connection," but he was ab-
solutely certain that the "best part of this vast movement occurs according 
to its own laws." "Matters," he insisted, "are just ripe."79 
This confidence could not last because it was based on an interpreta-
tion of history that some sharply contrary evidence was about to call into 
question. Their optimism sprang from a vision of history as progressive 
and purposive and, more specifically, from two beliefs about the German 
present to which they appealed continually in the spring and early sum-
met, namely, that most Germans really wanted unification in aconstitu-
tional monarchy with a Hohenzollem at its head and that the princes and 
governments of the states would accept the loss of sovereignty and cur-
tailment of their powers in exchange for guarantees of remaining auton-
omy and in the national interest. Disillusionment was approaching on 
both scores, especially the second. The states did not take recent events, es-
pecially the creation of the provisional executive and the first attempts that 
his government made to exercise its nominal authOrity, nearly as well as 
they had expected. Prussia's reactions were especially alarming because of 
the confidence that they reposed in her and because of the centrally im-
portant role that they expected her to play. 
Despite the political naIvete they often displayed, they fully under-
stood that they were asking Prussia to make sacrifices that she would find 
difficult to make. That was why they had tried to concede to her interests 
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and sensibilities whenever possible, even while insisting when neces-
sary-as in asserting the assembly's ultimate competence or in giving 
diplomatic and military supremacy to the provisional executive-on the 
irreducible primacy of the nation's claims. They thought that Prussia 
would fall in with their plans, first, because those plans were historically 
predestined and, second, because historical evidence seemed to be on 
their side. In a heavily autobiographical passage from his recollective his-
tory The German National Assembly (1849-50), Haym wrote of deputies like 
himself during this period: "They correctly believed that it would be good 
if Prussia's royal house and people endured for a time yet and patiently 
submitted themselves to an idea that could only manifest itself as rough 
and painful in its first fury. Was not such an approach itself grounded in the en-
tire course of Pruss ian history? [my emphasis]"80 This idea had a prehistory 
in the prerevolutionary speeches and writings of Duncker and Droysen, 
and it later became a common theme in the mature histories of the Prus-
sian School. In the early summer of 1848 it possessed obvious relevance: 
Prussia was so great a state that it would do what had to be done, just as 
it had done so many times before. Then, to make the assurance even surer, 
there was the matter of the states', especially Prussia's, self-interest. In a 
newspaper article written in early June, Droysen had argued that the states 
would make the needed "sacrifice" because there was "no longer any sep-
aration between the governments and the nation." Therefore, "only the dy-
nastic interests" could be offended. He did not take these very seriously 
because the "Viennese court was broken for the second or third time ... 
Or does one fear the Prussian cabinet? It is so far gone that it seeks its sup-
port in Frankfort."B1 In fact, Prussia was neither as selfless nor as helpless 
as they supposed, and was increasingly willing and able to assert its in-
terests against the assembly. 
Warning signs began to appear right away. Haym learned from 
Hansemann of Prussia's reservations about a national government in 
which she would not be directly represented, and more public indications 
quickly appeared.B2 On 29 June the Confederate Assembly granted merely 
de facto recognition to the provisional government, obviously an indi-
cation of the attitude of the states. On 4 July, Rudolf von Auerswald, 
Prussian minister-president since 25 June, sent an official note to the Na-
tional Assembly in which Prussia recognized the new government but 
qualified this recognition by stipulating "that no consequence for the fu-
ture be drawn from the National Assembly's procedure in this extraordi-
nary matter." Despite the conventionally polite official language, this 
declaration threw doubts on the assembly's powers. On 8 July, Hannover 
submitted a declaration that recognized the government but expressly 
complained that its creation injured Hannover's sovereignty. On 12 July, a 
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number of the states went beyond expressions of doubt of the assembly's 
competence and, in effect, began to undercut the autho~ity of the new gov-
ernment itself. The new government had asked the states to send military 
contingents to Frankfort to swear allegiance to Johann and his govern-
ment. Austria, Prussia, Bavaria, and Hannover refused outright, and only 
a few of the small states actually complied.83 
From their point of view, the situation continued to deteriorate, 
though neither then nor later did they appreciate the real popularity of 
the particularist reaction, especially in Prussia.84 For example, Droysen 
hoped to compensate Prussia for the assembly's unilateralism in setting 
up a provisional executive and then appointing a Habsburg by creating a 
government staffed by Prussians and sympathetic to Prussia. Berlin was 
initially receptive to such plans, but for reasons unacceptable to Droysen 
and most of the National Assembly. Prussia wanted to use the appointees 
as a counterweight to Austrian influence and to centralism, whereas 
Droysen wanted a means to bind Prussia to the German nation. The ten-
sion between Berlin and Frankfort with respect to this matter became 
strong enough that the favored candidate for national minister-president, 
the Rhenish liberal Ludolf Camphausen, felt obliged to decline because 
he could not do what both Berlin and Frankfort wanted. Droysen was 
greatly upset because a Prussian of equal stature at home and equal pre-
sentability in Frankfort simply did not exist.85 
Meanwhile, the Foreign Ministry in the provisional government went 
to the Austrian Anton von Schmerling and the Ministry of the Interior to 
J.G. Hecksscher of Hamburg. The only Prussian in the new ministry was 
General Eduard von Peucker as minister of war, and his early actions only 
further alienated Berlin. The refusal of the larger states to permit their 
armies to swear allegiance to the national government offended his sense of 
discipline, and his response was an order on 16 July for the armies to parade 
before the national colors and to pay homage to the national government.86 
The state governments took principled exception to the centralism that this 
implied. More to the point, the loyalties of their armed forces were at issue. 
Droysen was thoroughly alarmed at their reactions, and Duncker, using his 
contact with Princess Augusta, prepared a memorandum that defended the 
assembly and its action in moderate terms while trying to appease Prussian 
anger. He especially sought to convince her that Prussian self-interest itself 
dictated warm cooperation with the assembly at Frankfort.87 Apart from the 
immediate ill will that the Peucker affair caused on both sides, it meant that 
no candidate acceptable to Berlin would also be acceptable in Frankfort. The 
nearest approximation to such a compromise was the appointment of Her-
mann von Beckerath to the Finance Ministry, and he aroused no enthusi-
asm in Berlin. The naming as minister-president of Prince Karl von 
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Leiningen, author of a recent article in the Frankfurter Oberpostamts-Zeitung 
in favor of future centralism, was positively offensive to Prussia.88 
That these events were beginning pn')foundly to undermine their ini-
tial optimism shows in some of Droysen's observations. He was in despair 
and termed 9 August, the day of Leiningen's installation, "the worst day I 
have ever lived through."89 By that date, other, equally disturbing signs of 
polarization between Berlin and Frankfort had contributed to this mood, 
though it was hard for them to acknowledge these signs of hostility. Their 
whole understanding of German history told them that it should not exist, 
while what they observed showed them that it did. The period from mid-
July to early August was a time of mounting and finally successful assaults 
on the high optimism that they achieved at the end of June. The shocks that 
they received occurred through personal intervention: in politics as well as 
through distressed observation of official events. 
On 12 July, for example, Droysen tried to improve matters by writing 
to Hans von BUlow, an under-secretary in the Prussian Foreign Ministry 
whose acquaintance he had made in late April in a meeting with then 
Prussian Foreign Minister Heinrich von Amim. He evidently wanted to 
'Use this personal contact to tell the assembly's side of the story to official 
Berlin, and he began the letter by admitting that the steady drive toward 
unification might be less visible in the Prussian capital than at Frankfort. 
He assUred BUlow, however, that this drive was "irresistible" and that the 
election of the national administrator was therefore better explained by 
the "general conditions" in Germany than by any special "virtue of the 
National Assembly." In other words, the assembly had only done what 
history required of it and was not bent on demeaning Prussia. He then 
discussed the need for self-denial in the present moment. His tone be-
came wheedling. He found Prussian irritation understandable because, as 
"a Prussian born," he had himself required "self-conquest" to vote for 
Archduke Johann. He now expected similar resolution on the part of offi-
cial Prussia. He wrote that Prussians were rightly proud, but their pride 
would be especially justifiable if they now continued their long tradition 
of sacrificing themselves for the_greater national good.90 With these pre-
liminaries completed, Droysen made his major point: "It is completely 
clear that if Germany is to become a real federation (Bundesstaat), along 
with military affairs, above all foreign relations must be purely German 
and treated as such." He consequently urged Prussia to take "a bold but 
at the same time worthy step" and "remove the foreign politics of Ger-
many from Prussia completely and place them in the hands of the central 
power." This action would bring two major benefits to the Prussian gov-
ernment, he believed. First, it would allow it to outflank the increasingly 
uncooperative Prussian National Assembly in Berlin because the Prus-
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sian throne would be openly allied with national unification. Second, the 
Hohenzollern dynasty would regain in a moment the confidence of 
Germany lost in the preceding months, and its future in the unified Ger-
many would be assured.91 In his optimism, Droysen was once again ask-
ing of Prussia more than she would give, though on this occasion he 
did not ask her to dissolve herself into smaller territorial units. Even so, 
he was asking Prussia, whose troops were taking the brunt of the war 
against Denmark, voluntarily to surrender control of its foreign policy. 
That Droysen asked for these things at all, however, shows his continued 
confidence in his prerevolutionary theorizing about Prussia and her his-
torical mission. 
He cannot have been altogether surprised by the reply, however, both 
because of the skepticism that Prussia had already expressed about the as-
sembly's recent creation of a national government and because of current 
rumors-they turned out to be correct-that Prussia contemplated a sep-
arate peace with Denmark.92 Certainly the reply was harsh. BUlow did not 
reply in person and instead commissioned Heinrich Abeken, a university 
acquaintance of Droysen's, to respond. Abeken's lengthy note bristled 
with a Prussian particularism offensive to Droysen and showed consistent 
hostility to the policies being pursued in Frankfort. As he accurately in-
formed Droysen, the monarchy's reservations toward the provisional gov-
ernment did not come only from a few well-placed reactionaries but 
instead reflected the deeply held views of the government, the Berlin As-
sembly, and a majority of Prussians in all the provinces. Prussians, he in-
sisted, had "the most decided German inclination," but "there has in 
addition to that been expressed with equal decisiveness the consciousness 
that Prussia must not cease to be Prussia when it does or wants something 
for Germany."93 
Abeken offered these general observations to rationalize a specific 
proposal. Because the world knew Prussia but not Germany, why not let 
Prussia take over the control of foreign affairs for the nation as a whole?94 
This suggestion, though a mirror image of Droysen's suggestion, would 
not by itself have horrified him. Droysen had himself mooted it several 
days earlier in the Constitutional Committee as a less desirable, nonethe-· 
less possible, way of concerting a common national foreign policy.95 It was 
the reasons that Abeken supplied that were unacceptable to Droysen. They 
entailed perpetuating Prussia's separateness. In his diary Droysen noted 
bitterly that Abeken's note had given him a "penetrating view" of the 
"misconceptions and pettiness of affairs" current in Berlin.96 
Then followed the politely phrased officialPrussian protests during 
the Peucker controversy ominously followed by publication of the pam-
phlet, "The German Central Power and the Prussian Army." The work was 
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anonymous but had in fact been written by Karl Gustav von Griesheim, a 
Prussian general on active duty. This fact was known to Droysen and al-
most certainly to Duncker and Haym. The work, then, might be a less po-
lite way of making official Prussian views known. It was worrisome 
enough just as an indication of Prussian military views. Griesheim advised 
against yielding Prussian forces to national control and suggested instead 
that theybe used at an opportune moment to seize territories north of the 
Main River for Prussia. He also made the same point urged in Abeken's 
letter, namely, that Prussia not cease to be Prussia even in a unified Ger-
many.97 Droysen, Duncker, and Haym were understandably troubled by 
this display of unabashed Prussian particularism.98 
Under these pressures, their moods changed, though not all at once. 
In July, Droysen began to record in his diary his discouragement at reports 
arriving from Berlin. At first these entries were short and noncommittal, 
but then he began to record his feelings in longer, more emotional pas-
sages.99 Similarly, Haym used his correspondence with Hansemann to de-
fend the authority of the assembly and to declare its readiness to cooperate 
with the Prussian government, but with time his points became at once 
more insistent and less assured. By the end of July, in marked contrast to 
his statements only a few weeks before, his nervousness and lack of cer-
tainty were unmistakable. lOll Their basic conficience was beginning to 
break, though it would be some time yet before they arrived at a funda-
mental reappraisal of the situation. 
As late as 1 August, Droysen composed an essay in which he re-
marked approvingly on the evident growth of sentiment in favor of unifi-: 
cation and professed special pleasure in the assembly'S recent decision to 
retain Posen (Poznan) for Germany, a move which to him seemed a mile-
stone in the evolution of a national foreign policy. Germany had at last 
learned "the proper egotism" in the conduct of its affairs.101 In its pages 
he did not shy away from the increasingly strained and worrisome rela-
tions between Frankfort and Berlin, but he still tried to find grounds for 
continued hope. That is, he acknowledged that further progress de-
pended on Prussia's unreservedly embracing federal unification and ad-
mitted that Prussia's historical pride and fear being submerged might for 
a time prevent Berlin from adopting and following the correct policies, 
but he assured his readers that these difficulties would soon disappear. 
The Hohenzollern monarchy was already completely German and would 
soon acknowledge the fact and act accordingly. Simply by feeling a need 
to explain and excuse the delay he had moved some distance from his 
earlier optimism, and his closing words show that his confidence was 
shallow: "Once again," he stated, Prussia held "the fate of Germany in its 
hands-perhaps for the last time."102 
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That was wishful thinking, and Droysen's growing fears were more 
evident in another draft of the essay, where he said that it was obvious to 
observers that Prussia had to be dissolved into smaller units in the inter-
est of unification, and then asked: "But will this be attainable? Will the dy-
nasties, the states, the tribes (Stiimme) agree? We stand on the brink of the 
only reaction that Germany has to fear. Not an Austrian ... It is essentially 
a Prussian question that is at stake. Prussia has a history; therefore, Prus-
sian particularism, the most justified kind, is beginning to assert itself. 
Prussia's retreat from full, complete, unreserved freedom would be a legal 
title for every other dynasty to demand the same. A new miscarriage 
would only leave Germany the more impotent."103 Not only was Droysen 
more fearful in private than in public, he also feared different things. He 
was worried not merely about delay but about failure, a failure caused by 
Prussian particularism. For the time being he had stopped worrying about 
the republican left and had sensed the danger of "reaction" in Prussia it-
self. However understandable Prussia's current attitudes were, they 
threatened a revival of particularism in all the states that would not only 
halt progress towards unification but would actually leave Germany 
worse off than it had been before March. If that were true, it meant that 
Droysen had been wrong about many things and that it was time to rethink 
his ideas. 
He was only partly able to do so. In a diary entry made on 7 August, 
he freely expressed his anger and disappointment without quite admitting 
that, perhaps, he had been wrong and that, perhaps, he had expected the 
impossible. In keeping with a vision of historical necessity in which his-
tory was never wrong though individuals might err, he disgustedly tried 
to find out what might yet be salvaged: 
On this day I felt the entire impotence of our situation. It is hopeless that the activ-
ity, yes, the existence of our assembly and bur work can always appear to be called 
into question anew. If there is so little conquering truth in our activity, then history is just 
in permitting German unity to be purely diplomatic ... The Prussians have a justified 
attitude but it is overstretched and exaggerated ... The whole object of controversy 
is accorded a position that ... puts us at a distance from what we should be doing. 
Precisely the non-dynastic, precisely the March movements,however else they may 
be judged, were the basis for unification for all. This is being increasingly surren-
dered. Perhaps very necessary and wholesome. For if I judge this assembly correctly, it 
will never create a constitution out of its plenary powers. Events will intervene first 
and necessarily ripen and then a constitution will be decreed [for] the poor Father-
land, in the best and most salutary case a Prussian [myemphasis]!l04 
It is important to note both what he did and did not admit. He admitted 
that history was not turning out as he had expected, though he did not ac-
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tually say that he had misread it or that it had been unreadable. This was 
entirely consistent with his view of history as a passer of judgments that 
. were beyond appeal. He did not conceal his own unhappiness, but he 
could not blame history and therefore could not blame Prussia, which, af-
ter all, was merely acting as history's agent. He was consequently pre-
pared to accept whatever happened, although he still thought some form 
of unification was inevitable and hoped that at least this would occur 
through a constitution dictated by Prussia and, presumably, including a 
degree of Prussian hegemony in Germany. 
This crisis in Droysen's thinking is important both as an indication of 
the quandary in which these historians' theory placed them when they 
faced unwelcome events and as a foreshadowing of their future political 
program. No one was more passionately attached than Droysen to the idea 
of Germany's unification as a constitutional monarchy created through 
Prussian sacrifice. Yet faced with evidence of the unfeasibility of this pro-
gram, he had to beat down his anger with deliberate stoicism because there 
was no defying history. It was an attitude of accommodation, but it was a 
principled accommodation. Now, as in later years, this took the form of 
seeking unification on any terms and, in the best case, as a virtual Prus-
sian takeover of Germany that would have horrified him not long before. 
This was not simply a scaling down of demands in the face of adverse cir-
cumstance; rather, it was a taking of the best that history had to offer as the 
best because history offered it. 
Droysen's August despair quickly passed, but it left him shaken 
and sobered, and later disappointments at Frankfort brought its return 
with more enduring effects. On 7 August he toyed briefly with the notion 
that perhaps the republican left had been correct in arguing that the 
assembly should act on its own, but he quickly dropped that radical line 
of speculation, and his depression deepened by the ninth. By the tenth, 
however, he hoped that history might, after all, cunningly provide a 
means to the sort of unification that he once confidently expected.105 He 
wrote to Arendt, as he often did in moments of excitement. He laid much 
of the blame for the current situation on Prussia, though he also criticized 
the assembly for treating Prussia like a petty state like Nassau. He con-
tinued this partial exoneration by observing that Prussia "must either 
destroy or be destroyed" and then, without mentioning who the adver-
sary would be, expressed his hope that through war Prussia would find 
an "occasion" to make herself "indispensable to Germany ... [for] with-
out war everything will become confused." Before this war broke out, 
the National Assembly had to rush to complete its constitutional draft so 
that there would be "organic institutions of unity" that Prussia could 
put into force at the moment of her choosing.106 Then this idea, too, 
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dropped from sight for a while, and he returned to counselling appease-
ment of Prussia by the assembly. He cannot yet have abandoned all 
his earlier hopes because even in the autumn he had not wholly given 
up the belief that Prussia might break voluntarily into smaller states 
in the service of unification.1°7 Where else could he tum except toward 
Prussia? 
There is no evidence about Duncker's views specifically in August, 
although his 31 July memorandum to Princess Augusta shows the same 
fears that led Droysen to his crisis.108 In any case, the degree to which he 
was scandalized when the deputy Lorenz Brentano suggested that the 
republican rebel Friedrich Hecker was no worse than Prince William 
(he was angrier than either Droysen or Haym) suggests an anxiety about 
Prussian sensibilities, as well as loyalty to Augusta's husband.109 Haym 
went through an evolution like Droysen's, but without its suddenness or 
intensity. The first sign of a change on Haym's part appeared in a report 
that he sent on 12 August to his constituents at Mansfeldin which he 
explained that the particularist reaction in Prussia required that "the 
politics of trust make way for the politics of negotiations and trans-
actions." Like Droysen, he blamed Frankfort as well as Berlin for the im-
passe that had occurred, and he wanted restraint and conciliation on 
both sides. He really wanted Prussia to play the part for which he 
thought her cast. Successful unification was possible only if the "people 
and government of Prussia" willed it and therefore resolutely supported 
the National assembly. At the same time, the assembly had to accom-
modate Prussian feelings: "If we are prepared to relent in the harsh asser-
tion of the idea of German unity, then those on the other side will relent 
in the exaggerated and poorly understood assertion of particularism."llo 
If only because he was writing to those who had elected him, he ex-
pressed himself with guarded optimism, but the change in his outlook 
since late June was obvious enough. Unification now seemed contin-
gent rather than ineluctable and had probably to be achieved in a com-
promise form. 
The change in Haym's outlook was more evident in a letter that he sent 
to his father on August 28 in which he admitted that everyday he had to 
learn "to modify the ideal according to the conditions of reality." This was 
the same note of stoicism that Droysen had sounded: Haym was willing to 
let history dictate to him, though two particular matters left him feeling 
uncertain. First, he was troubled that the eventual rule of the Hohenzollern 
over a unified Germany was not" already more securely in the -sack" than 
was in fact the case. Second, he complained that "world events are now so 
confused that no one can know what even the immediate future will bring 
us."m He was puzzled because history had not behaved as he had sup-
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posed it would. He nonetheless still took it as axiomatic that he would fol-
low the "conditions of reality" and seems to have trusted that whatever 
happened would somehow be good. His complaint about the present con-
fusion of events also shows that he continued to think of predictability as 
the normal condition of history. He was mentally prepared for the accom-
modation that he, too, would have to make. 
6------
Crisis and Reconstruction 
By late summer, unexpected events had severely stressed the optimism 
that Droysen, Duncker, and Haym felt after the question of the provisional. 
executive had been resolved in late June. In several important respects, 
Droysen had briefly changed his political program, though not yet his vi-
sion of history, and Haym now thought that unification could be achieved 
only with greater difficulty and after greater compromise than he had ear-
. lier supposed. These changes in outlook, however, were only partial and, 
to some extent, temporary. It took more than Prussian obduracy in the face 
of the provisional government's decrees to force them to revise ideas long 
and fervently held. Their historical theory at first blinded them to un-
welcome facts, and it also enabled them to find some hidden good in seem-
ing bad when disappointing evidence became too obvious to disregard. 
From September onward, however, successive dashings of their hopes 
forced on them important and lasting changes. These disappointments 
were too severe for them to absorb without some fundamental rethinking 
and reconceptualization. They altered their political program and, more 
important, revised both their historical theory and their interpretation of 
history's course. 
This revision was sparked by a change in Prussia's policy toward the 
ongoing war with Denmark over Schleswig-Holstein. Retaining these ter-
ritories for Germany and exploiting the struggle for their retention as a 
means of binding Prussia to the national cause had been a major interest 
of theirs since at least 1844. They had, consequently, been greatly encour-
aged when Prussia, partly in an attempt to recoup some of the prestige just 
lost in capitulating to the revolution in Berlin, made a major declaration of 
policy on 24 March 1848 that committed her forces to maintaining the ter-
ritorial integrity of the duchies, to preventing their incorporation in whole 
or in part into Demnark, and to maintaining them as a unit in a newly uni-
fied Germany.! That declaration, however, and the subsequent dispatch 
under General Wrangel of by far the largest contingent in the mixed Ger-
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man force in the duchies were the actions of a sovereign state acting on its 
own initiative in what it then saw to be its own interest. Even before the 
frictions caused by the creation of a provisional executive, the assembly 
tried to nationalize the war in the north and, thus, by implication to con-
trol the disposition and use of the Prussian contingent. Specifically, the as-
sembly insisted in a motion passed on 9 June that it alone had the right to 
conclude any binding treaty with Denmark. Droysen, representing a dis-
trict in Holstein, voted for this measure. Duncker and Haym, representing 
Prussian districts and surely understanding that the bill was, in the nature 
of things, aimed to tie Prussia's hands, voted against it.2This measure com-
pleted an anomalous and politically dangerous situation: Prussia, poten-
tially as strong as ever, bore the brunt of the fighting and assumed the risks 
of War in the Baltic, whereas the National Assembly at Frankfort claimed 
the credit and denied Prussia the right to supplement military action with 
diplomatic measures that might seem to be in her interest. (Of course, the 
assembly could hardly have claimed to embody national sovereignty 
while conceding to a single state what amounted to a deciding voice in na-
tional foreign policy). 
Prussia's apparent willingness to accept this situation was encourag-
ing while it lasted, though Prussian discontent surely was one reason for 
her summer protests over the provisional government's claims to inde-
pendence in foreign policy and her refusal to allow her army to swear 
allegiance to the national government. Droysen, Duncker, and Haym evi~ 
dently missed these clues, or else refused to recognize them as a result of 
wishful thinking. From Prussia's continuing military participation they 
drew the incorrect conclusion that this was a sign of her real willingness 
to accept heavy burdens on behalf of Germany and a promising indication 
that, when the time came, she might still do whatever was necessary for 
unification. Droysen claimed this in his 1 August essay and, again, in an 
article written after the preliminary truce between Prussia and Denmark, 
on 29 August.3 Duncker suggested the same thing in more general terms 
in a speech before the assembly, and both he and Haym recalled this as a 
basic belief during the late summer.4 Given their strong initial support for 
Prussia's action in the duchies and their lingering hopes that Prussia 
would finally cooperate in unification, their continued faith was under-
standable though quite mistaken. As a matter of principle, they disbe-
lieved rumors about a Prussian separate peace with Denmark.5 
They were surprised and embarrassed, therefore, when Prussian and 
Danish representatives at Malmo in Sweden agreed on 26 August to a pre-
liminary truce. They, and the rest of the deputies in Frankfort, now faced 
a dilemma. If the National Assembly ratified the truce, as Prussia wished, 
it would involve itself in the odium of an agreement that many in Germany 
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thought shameful and would appear to be subservient to Prussia. If it re-
jected the truce, however, it would prolong a conflict that was hopeless 
now that Prussia had withdrawn and would worsen relations with Berlin 
beyond repair.6 Either way, the assembly would lose. This situation was 
especially painful for Droysen, Duncker, and Haym because it demon-
strated the wrongness of their, earlier estimation of Prussia. Thus, on 11 
July, when Duncker addressed the assembly on the rumors of Prussian 
plans for a separate peace, he had remarked that "if [the] reports were true, 
then the foreign politics of the old Germany would be stronger than those 
of the new, then the politics of the unified Germany would be weaker ... 
than those of the divided Germany."7 In July he had pointed to those im-
plications because he thought that their very gravity showed the implau-
sibility of the rumors. Now that Prussia had made peace, he was forced to 
accept these evident but very unwelcome conclusions. 
While they considered the implications of Prussia's action, they had to 
decide how to vote when the truce came before the assembly for ratifica-
tion. That is, they had either to involve themselves in approving a treaty 
they thought disgraceful or in continuing a now unwinnable war while an-
gering Prussia. They would have much preferred to be allowed to stand 
aside, and at first they actually hoped that the national government would 
spare the assembly embarrassment by signing the truce on its own au-
thority and then presenting the deputies with a welcome fait accompli.s 
That course of action was probably illegal, however, and the Provisional 
Government declined to try it. Their only comfort was that they would not 
actually have to vote for or against the truce itself but only for or against 
its temporary "arrest" (Sistierung), and this was a distinction without a dif-
ference because a "no" vote meant that the truce would go into effect.9 
D~cker and Haym were sure that Prussia had made a disastrous error, 
but they did not want the split between Berlin and Frankfort to become ir-
reparable and they voted against the continuation of the arrest.lO 
Droysen faced more of a predicament. He thought that Prussian good 
will was indispensable for national unification, but he had been involved 
for four years in the politics of the duchies and he sat in Frankfort for the 
fifth district of Holstein. Possibly in the belief that the majority would vote 
to end the arrest in any case, he voted for its continuance in the first vote 
and then was stricken to discover that his side had won and that the as-
sembly had, in effect, repudiated the truce. He knew that his decision had 
been untenable. Before the vote he had opined that rejection of the truce 
would mean that "Prussia or at least half of Prussia will be against US."ll 
Ten days later he wrote to the wife of a friend in Kiel that "the question it-
self has for a long time not concerned our lovely land [Schleswig-Holstein] 
but Prussia."12 In his remorse, he now switched sides. Along with Karl 
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Philipp Francke, Richard Jens Ernst von Meergard-Brunn, and Andreas 
Ludwig Jacob Michelsen, he drafted the compromise resolution that 
would let the truce come into force and was part of the slender twenty-one-
vote majority that passed it on 16 September.t3 
All three were no doubt relieved at this outcome, but they could take 
no satisfaction in it. In their correspondence, both Droysen and Haym 
noted that the assembly had lost much of its moral authority in the process, 
and they were also depressed by the revulsion with which many deputies 
now regarded Prussia.14 In fact, resentment over what, as the deputies saw 
it, Prussia had done to the assembly by making peace had grown so intense 
that Duncker, despite his own pronounced misgivings about Berlin's de-
cision, made it a point of principle to say nothing critical about Prussia.t5 
Because Prussia still seemed the key to unification, it was necessary to fol-
low her even when she acted against vital national interests.t6 As Haym 
put it in a letter to Hansemann on 17 September, the "honor of Prussia" 
had been at stake in the preceding day's vote.17 That was why he had voted 
as he had and why, despite considerable disenchantment, he continued to 
defend Prussia. 
Droysen was of the same mind, though he added a note of moral 
pride about the self-mastery that it took him to support Prussia.tB In fact, 
he felt as if he and his fellow deputies now faced a devil's alternative. In a 
letter to Wilhelm Behn on 15 September, for example, he explained histri-
onically that 
if we reject the armistice, then Prussia will break with us, then we will be excluded 
from international relations, then we must revolutionize and anarchize in order to 
fight against I don't know whom, then we must expect the hungry French in Baden 
and even give up the duchies ... If we approve the truce, then the central power 
and the parliament will be morally broken, the agitators will cry treason, the red 
republic will appear first in Baden and Wiirttemberg and Rheinhessen and the 
French will march quickly to its aid.19 
Despite these feelings, he helped prepare the compromise resolution that 
approved the truce the next day, as he evidently thought that it would also 
bring renewed revolution and French invasion. Perhaps he now thought, 
as he had in August, that a war would help speed unification. Like Haym 
and Duncker, however, his continued loyalty to Prussia was tinged with 
criticism. After all, the sort of unification that he wanted was not possible 
in the face of Prussian opposition, even though, in a letter to Justus 
Olshausen, he attributed the present crisis to "the insanity of Prussian 
diplomacy." In the same letter he explicitly blamed Prussia for dooming 
Germany to upheaval and invasion.20 He no longer referred to Prussia's 
tradition of self-sacrifice. 
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It soon seemed that Droysen's worst fears were being realized. The 
truce was not popular, and the vote of 16 September made the deputies at-
tractive targets in the streets of Frankfort. On 16 and 17 September, they 
were jeered, pelted, and threatened. Worse, on the eighteenth two conser-
vative deputies, Prince Felix Lichnowsky and General Hans von Auer-
swald were attacked and killed by a mob. Even in quiet times, Droysen, 
Duncker, and Haym were alarmed at the idea of revolution. Now they 
thought they were in the middle of one, and Haym at one point found him-
self barricaded with sixty other deputies while the 'crowd outside smashed 
the windows and tried to break down the door.21 It was only natural that 
in his next report to the voters in Mansfeld he asked for their unwavering 
support for the sternest measures to repress any new violence.22 He had 
his physical security to think about, and he returned to the arguments that 
he had made in mid-June after the attack on the Berlin Arsenal. This time, 
they signaled a lasting movement rightward, and Duncker accordingly ap-
pealed to the conservative Georg von Vincke not to resign his seat in the 
wake of the September disorders. Duncker still disagreed with Vincke's 
belief that the constitution should be a contract between the states and the 
assembly, but he pleaded with him to stay because that collaboration be-
tween the center and the right were now more necessary.23 
This was a sign of the difficult and essentially contradictory situa-
tion in which these men now found themselves. The acceptance of the 
armistice, although underscoring their dependence on Prussia, had left 
them disillusioned and skeptical about Prussian reliability. The September 
riots had then thrown them back on the old powers, Prussia in particular, 
as the only possible guarantors of law and order. Their political isolation 
was painfully evident. Both Droysen and Haym noted the anomaly of their 
position.24 Their present circumstances were very different from those that 
had existed between May and mid-July, and would become worse as the 
success of counterrevolution in Austria and Prussia further circumscribed 
the small room for maneuver left to them. Of course, they were not alone 
in suffering under these constraints. A number of members of the 
Casinopartei seceded on the grounds that the party was too accommoda-
tionist toward Prussia and founded a rival right-center grouping at the 
Augsburger Hof. The remaining members at last found it necessary to 
draft a program, but could arrive at nothing clearer than a compromise for-
mula that stated a continued desire for unification and argued against 
either further revolution or particularist reaction. It had nothing positive 
to offer in their places.25 
Droysen, Duncker, and Haym were at a theoretical as well as a politi-
cal impasse. Along with devising a new political strategy suited to their 
present helplessness, they also had to interpret history in order to under-
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stand what had gone wrong. Given their reliance on history for practical 
guidance, they'could not attempt the former until they had completed the 
latter. This was what Duncker had in mind when, a year later, he described 
September 1848 as the "turning point" and when Droysen described it as 
a time of rigorous political education.26 They did not arrive at definitive 
answers for some time, however, though Haym began to formulate one in 
his first letter to Hansemann since July. He could not report on affairs in 
Frankfort while ignoring the fact that matters had fundamentally changed 
in the intervening period. Haym now thought it necessary to reconsider 
his notion of historical progress. "A future historian," he urged, "will have 
to date from September of this year a new epoch in the entire movement: 
everything is so confused anew, new occurrences have so decisively inter-
vened in what seemed to be so tractable a development of affairs (En-
twicklung der Dinge)." He consequently believed that a "turning point in 
history" (Wendepunkt der Geschichte) had been passed and that new ap-
proaches to existing problems had to be discoveredP This was more than 
rhetorical complaint: because they approached politics from the perspec-
tive of foretelling history, day-to-day disappointments forced revision of 
their historical theory. Consequently, Haym's remarks now went well be-
yond the uncertainty that he expressed to his father on 28 August.28 He 
was clear that something irreversible had occurred, even though he was 
not yet sure just what had happened or what to do, and he still evidently 
believed that historical analysis would yield reliable, if less reassuring, po-
litical guidance. . 
Droysen was of the same opinion, and advanced it with more brutal 
frankness. In a letter to Karl Josias von Bunsen in early October he argued 
that the settlement of the armistice question and its consequences had 
ended "all idyllic delusions and self-deceptions." Discouraged, he now 
confessed: "We believed the idea of unity to be stronger than it is;it is ev-
ident that interests, customs, disinclinations are far too discordant to be 
reconciled with the sovereignty of unity."29 He now blamed himself (along 
with others, of course): he had misread the evidence, reached faulty con-
clusions, and, so, seen his warmest hopes disappointed. The experience of 
further disappointments that autumn forced them, at varying rates of 
speed, to consider the implications of these initial reactions. This consid-
eration led first Droysen,. and then Duncker and Haym, to revise their 
ideas in important ways in and after December. 
In the nature of things, many of these unwelcome events were beyond 
their control, but in one instance, the so-called question to Austria (Frage 
an Osterreich), Droysen himself precipitated the bad news. In framing this 
question, Droysen acted from a new sense of realism and his desire to learn 
the real state of affairs, however discouraging it might be. On 19 Septem-
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ber-three days after the assembly's acceptance of the Malmo Truce and 
one day after the deaths of Lichnowsky and Auerswald-the Constitution 
Committee on which Droysen sat created a special subcommittee to draft 
the articles on the nation (das Reich) and the central power (Reichsgewalt). 
Droysen was a member of this subcommittee, along with Georg Beseler, 
Alexander von Soiron, Dahlmann, and K.J.A. Mittermaier. In the course of 
its first session, he took what turned out to a major step toward the final 
definition of the Prussian School. 
He argued that it was time to determine Germany's actual territorial 
limits and, more specifically, to discover Austria's real intentions on in-
clusion in a unified Germany. It was obviously necessary to know how 
large the state would be and what dynastic interests might have to be ac-
commodated, but Droysen was further convinced that if the assembly con-
tinued to work in ignorance of Austrian designs, the Habsburg monarchy 
would be in a position to sabotage its work. The result was the draft of 
articles 1, 2, and 3, which he and Dahlmann wrote together. The sub-
committee discussed the proposed articles for several days and on 26 Sep-
tember sent them unamended to the Constitution Committee as a whole.3D 
The committee studied them until 11 October and then sent them virtually 
unaltered to the plenary assembly, where, after heated debates lasting 
from 19 to 27 October, they were finally approved.31 
Droysen and Dahlmann wrote the articles designed to elicit a clear 
Austrian response by posing national as well as historical requirements for 
admission. The first stipulated that member states would be those of the 
German Confederation. This was a historical standard. The second stated 
that no unit of the unified Germany might be connected with non-German 
lands. The third slightly qualified the second by allowing that, in cases 
where such a connection had existed previously, it might be maintained, 
but only in the form of personal union. These articles employed national 
criteria. They had potential bearing on several German territories, but 
Droysen was correct when on 19 September he termed them collectively 
the "Question to Austria." Tiny Limburg, for example, would be unaf-
fected because it was, in any case, held by the Dutch crown only in per-
sonal union. From the German point of view, the same was true of 
Schleswig-Holstein; Germans had fought there to insist that the duchies 
were not parts of the Danish monarchy. Prussian Posen had never been 
in the German Confederation, and the majority of its inhabitants spoke 
Polish, but the assembly had long before declared it German, so it would· 
not be lost. The Austrian Empire, however, would have to be partitioned 
in order for its German provinces to enter a unified Germany. Upper and 
Lower Austria, Styria, the Tyrol, and Bohemia could enter, but the rest of 
the empire could not. Droysen wished to force the Austrian government, 
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still exiled from Vienna at Olmiitz (Olomouc) in Moravia, to choose be-
tween entering the new Germany at the cost of territorial integrity and the 
preserving of that integrity at the cost of exclusion from German affairs.32 
Droysen's motives are open to scrutiny. He was right that the assem-
bly had to know what Austria intended, and purely diplomatic soundings 
might not have yielded the needed intelligence even had they been seri-
ously attempted. These articles, however, were bound to force a crisis both 
between Austria and the assembly and between pro-Austrian and pro-
Prussian deputies in the assembly. Droysen did not discuss these risks in 
public, although he may privately have reasoned that agreement based on 
a common desire to seek the unattainable was not worth preserving. It is 
also. quite possible that he expected a negative answer from Austria as an 
offset to the disrepute into which the other great German power, Prussia, 
had fallen after the Malmo Truce. On two previous occasions he had noted 
that Austria's position in revolutionary northemItaly was parallel to that 
of Prussia in the war with Denmark, and it must have galled him that Aus-
tria had managed to maintain her prestige intact in Germany and Prussia 
had not.33 Moreover, as he reported to Bunsen in early October, Berlin and 
Frankfort were at loggerheads, with neither able to bend the other to its 
will, and he feared an attempt to unify Germany without Prussia. Given 
those worries, a move that might force Austria to exclude herself from Ger-
many would have the virtue of making Prussia seem indispensable.34 It 
seems unlikely that he expected a positive response.35 Of course, no one, 
not even Droysen, could have been entirely sure what the effect of these 
articles would be, and certainly the deputies who approved them were 
not, in their majority, bent on provoking Austria.36 
Droysen was at least fairly certain that Austria's reply would be neg-
ative, that she would appear to be an enemy of national uirification, and 
that this enmity would justify "Prussia and little Germany (Kleindeutsch-
land) unifying the more integrally."37 "Little Germany" still meant the 
smaller German states, as. opposed to Austria and Prussia, although it was 
about to acquire its subsequent and more familiar meaning, namely, a Ger-
many unified with Prussia but without Austria.38 Despite his perennial 
distaste for Austria, however, this maneuver was not, strictly speaking, 
anti-Austrian. Droysen, like virtually all the deputies, wanted Austria's 
German provinces in the united Germany. In June that had been one of 
Droysen's reasons for accepting the election of Archduke Johann as Na-
tional Administrator (a consideration that also helped bring Duncker and 
Haym to their senses after the trias plan was rejected).39 They had based 
those hopes, however, on the belief that Austria was about to collapse and 
that the desired provinces could be had without unacceptable conditions. 
By late September it was clear that Austria had survived the shocks to 
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which it had earlier been subjected.40 In these changed circumstances, 
Droysen believed, Austria would resist entry into a tightly federated 
nation-state, and he did not want to loosen the terms of unification in Aus-
tria's interest. If, therefore, Austria in effect withdrew from Germany, this 
withdrawal would merely confirm a loss of territories already sustained. 
Germany would need Austria's military resources, but these could also be 
had through an alliance between two separate states.41 
Droysen was prepared to surrender more than Austria's German 
provinces. He told Bunsen that if Austria did not enter the unified Ger-
many, then Bunsen's proposal to divide Germany into national circles 
(Kreiseinteilung) would become unworkable.42 The full details of Bunsen's 
scheme are besides the point here, but it required the dissolution of Prus-
sia into smaller, component parts. That requirement had, of course, also 
been dear to Droysen, who had repeatedly insisted that it was a prerequi-
site to successful unification. By clear implication, Droysen was now will-
ing to leave Prussia intact in a unified Germany. That was a major shift in 
his views because, given the disparity in size and resources between Prus-
sia and the other states, this would amount to virtual Prussian hegemony. 
Presumably, he found unifiCation even under that unsatisfactory condi-
tion preferable to any other foreseeable outcome. 
Eventually, if not at first, Duncker and Haym reached substantially the 
same conclusions. Whatever their initial reactions to the" question to Aus-
tria," and they later voted for it in the plenary assembly, they were partly 
relieved when Prince Windischgratz's army took Vienna on 31 October 
and ushered in a reaction virtually certain to answer the "question to Aus-
tria" in the negative. The triumph of counterrevolution saddened them, 
but they were happy that it occurred in Austria and not elsewhere.43 This 
shows a clear readiness to think of Austria, though not Prussia, as dis-
pensable for a unified Germany. They made their views even clearer when 
reports of the Kremsier Program, which was Austria's answer to articles 1, 
2, and 3, reached Frankfort on 2 December. This program was drafted un-
der the guidance of the new Austrian minister-president, Prince Felix zu 
Schwarzenberg, and published on 27 November. Its central thesis was that 
Austria's" continued existence as a political unity is a German as it is a Eu-
ropean necessity." Under the terms of articles 2 and 3, this meant that Aus-
tria would not enter a unified Germany. To do so would have meant 
partitioning the German and non-German Habsburg territories. The p~o­
gram went on to explain that Austria would therefore hold herself apart 
until some later date, at which time both states, Germany and the Austrian 
Empire, would be rejuvenated and reformed and would determine the ex-
act nature of their relationship to one another.44 Droysen noted in his 
diary with grim satisfaction: "Now one knows what Austria wants."45 
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Similarly, Duncker and Haym believed that the Kremsier Program 
greatly simplified the question of who was to rule in Germany. They, too, 
now thought of unification in terms of the dominance of a great German 
power, and they were pleased that it would now be easier to secure Prus-
sian leadership.46 Consequently, they were delighted at the fall of the 
Schmerling government in Frankfort on 13 December, even though 
Schmerling had been a respected member of the Casinopartei, and strenu-
ously resisted the efforts of those who, like the fallen minister, tried to re-
store the ties between Austria and Germany.47 
Their support for the exclusion of Austria and their altered sense of 
Prussia's role in unification were not solely the effects of the September cri-
sis. In the autumn the political situation in Prussia also underwent a pro-
found change, and the events in Berlin strongly affected their sense of what 
could be expected from the Hohenzollern monarchy. A brief review of 
these events is necessary in order to understand the evolution of their 
views. The crisis in Prussia was the long-term result of the mutual distrust 
between the Prussian National Assembly on the one hand and Frederick 
William IV and successive Prussian governments on the other. This dis-
trust arose from irreconcilable notions of the source and nature of legiti-
mate authority and increased markedly in the late summer and early 
autumn. First, the Berlin assembly passed a resolution calling for a purge 
of reactionary officers. This was an irritant for two reasons. By tradition, 
the Prussian army was a royal army, and, so, the deputies seemed to be 
trespassing on the king's preserves. By passing the resolution, they im-
plicitly claimed governmental as well as purely constitutive authority. The 
moderate ministry under Ernst von Pfuel, appointed in late September, 
was unable to silence the increasingly restive assembly through conces-
sions. Open conflict became unavoidable in October, when the deputies 
voted to omit reference to the supposedly divine origins of the king's 
power from the new constitution. By so doing they directly challenged 
Frederick William's cherished sense of the nature of his office.48 
King Frederick William responded by ordering a sizable increase in 
the number of troops stationed around Berlin and placed them under the 
unified command of General von Wrangel. When the king had capitulated 
to the revolution in the preceding March, he had ordered the army out of 
Berlin; he had not yet brought it back, but clearly he meant to do so if 
events required it. At the end of October, he let the Pfuel ministry resign 
and, on 1 November, announced a new government under Friedrich 
Wilhelm von Brandenburg, his nephew and a man of notoriously conser-
vative views. The Berlin Assembly protested angrily, but without effect, 
while the new ministry prepared for action. On 9 Noveqtber, citing disor-
ders that had broken out in Berlin after two deputies had been too uncrit-
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ical of the siege of Vienna, Brandenburg read a royal decree that adjourned 
the Prussian Assembly until the twenty-seventh and ordered it to recon-
vene at the provincial town of Brandenburg, where, allegedly, the assem-
bly would find the calm needed for orderly proceedings. The deputies 
were outraged. On 15 November a majority of them contrived to meet pri-
vately (and illegally) to vote the withholding of taxes until such time as 
the Brandenburg ministry was dismissed from office and the recent de-
cree rescinded.49 
Inevitably, these events alarmed Droysen, Duncker, and Haym and, 
along with the problem of relations with Austria, dominated their politi-
cal calculations throughout November. As it happened, Droysen was in 
Berlin to witness them. He had wanted to do all that he could to explain 
the "question to Austria" to the Berlin authorities and, if possible, to per-
suade them to share his views. On his own initiative he traveled to Berlin 
on 29 October, just after the National Assembly in Frankfort accepted 
articles I, 2, and 3. When he learned that Windischgratz had taken Vienna, 
he decided to prolong his stay and, so, was there when the crisis oc-
curred.50 Even so, he could not always be sure just what was happening 
and what it all meant because detailed and accurate information was 
nearly as hard to obtain in Berlin as in Frankfort.51 Certain matters, how-
ever, seemed clear despite the prevailing confusion. 
Given the pivotal position of Prussia in their political schemes, all 
major events there had national implications. They could not regard the 
crisis as just an internal Prussian affair. Furthermore, they were strongly 
mclined to side with the king and the Brandenburg ministry against the 
Prussian Assembly. There were several reasons for this predisposition. 
First, the assemblies in Frankfort and Berlin were jealous of each other and 
often mutually antagonistic. Further, there were more democrats among 
the deputies in Berlin than in Frankfort. In consequence, the Berlin As-
sembly seemed to be a fomenter of democratic revolution in Prussia. After 
visiting one of its sessions on 2 November, Droysen described it as "child-
like" and in a reference to the most radical phase of the French Revolution, 
"eager to play the Convention." When a crowd threatened one of his rela-
tives, he was ready to conclude the worst: "The 'people' are extremely 
eager for murder, hanging, the sight of blood. "52 
Haym, too, accused the Berlin Assembly of a dangerous mixture of 
revolutionary zeal and infantile irresponsibility. He attributed the deputies' 
actions to ignorance and remarked characteristically that it was" as if they 
had never learned history or at least as if they had never learned anything 
from history." He feared that the tragedy of the French Revolution of 1789 
was about to be replayed in Prussia and, presumably, in Germany as a 
whole.53 Later, he was even less charitable. He claimed that the deputies 
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had attacked their king and government "like children, others like mis-
chievous youths" and described their motives as "ineptitude and confu-
sion" on the one hand and "ambition and frivolity" on the other.54 Duncker 
expressed these views even more forcefully. On 11 November he wrote to 
his electors at Halle that in Berlin "the rabble and their leaders" were plot-
ting the seizure of power. If allowed to succeed in their design, he main-
tained, "Frederick William IV will climb the scaffold in about six months, 
and you will be lost along with the crown if you do not join in this step." 
After trying to frighten his constituents in this way, he urged them to 
action by comparing events in Berlin to a "rolling wagon" that had to be 
halted early in its career or not at all.55 
This reaction was consistent with their repeated alarms at any seem-
ing prospect of renewed revolution, and no doubt their recent brush with 
the September riots in Frankfort had heightened their sensitivities. They 
were, however, nearly as alarmed at the Prussian Assembly's seeming in-
difference to national questions in general and to the Frankfort Assembly's 
authority in particular. As recently as 23 October, the Berlin Assembly had 
angered them by voting a resolution that called into question the National 
Assembly's handling of Posen's status. They had thought that the final 
competence of their assembly had been settled once and for all by the pass-
ing of the Werner motion in June. As a result, they saw in the Prussian As-
sembly an alliance of the two forces that they feared and hated most, 
democracy and particularism.56 This alliance seemed to compound previ-
ous disappointments by putting unification further at risk and evidently 
called for prompt action. 
It was obviously necessary to defend the Prussian monarchy against 
its presumed attackers from within. For that reason, Duncker had written 
to his constituents at Halle to undercut any sympathy they might have felt 
for the deputies in Berlin. Haym was of the same mind.57 On 12 November 
he wrote to his parents and explained that struggle in Prussia was not be-
tween despotism and constitutionalism but between "the crown and an-
nihilation of the crown."5B In one of his reports to the electors at Mansfeld 
he advised that support of the Prus~ian Assembly against the monarchy 
would open the way to "the onset of the repUblic and anarchy."59 Defense 
of the monarchy was not by itself sufficient, however, because they also . 
distrusted the monarch's motives, especially after Prussia's uncooperative 
behavior in the late summer and the conclusion of the Malmo Truce. For 
example, on 17 September, Haym had written to Hansemann of his fear 
that an attempt by the king and his ministers to reassert royal authority 
would provoke a violent and radical revolution.6o He must have recalled 
this advice in November and in part blamed the monarchy'S troubles on 
its own narrow-mindedness. Droysen was nearly as frightened of suc-
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cessful counterrevolution as of renewed revolution because he understood 
that the voice of Prussian particularism was as loud in "the detestable, hys-
terical nest at Potsdam" as in the Berlin assembly.61 
Their fear of both revolution and of particularism bore on their reac-
tion to rumors that the Brandenburg ministry might try to circumvent the 
Prussian National Assembly altogether by simply imposing a constitution 
by royal fiat. Droysen first heard speculation to that effect on 1 November, 
during his stay in Berlin.62 They found this possibility alarming because 
they thought that the current Prussian government was composed of ex-
treme reactionaries so that the issuance of a constitution could misfire in 
either of two ways. It might provoke the revolution that they feared or, al-
ternately, it might succeed and lead to a particularist consolidation that 
would separate Prussia from the rest of Germany.63 Their dependence on 
Prussia to carry out unification, however, was too great for them to be 
even-handed in their condemnation of the warring parties there, and even-
tually circumstances reconciled them to a royally decreed constitution. 
At first, they joined hopefully in efforts to exploit the crisis in such a 
way as to bind Berlin to Frankfort. In that spirit, they voted against all mea-
sures proposed in the National Assembly at Frankfort that would have 
censured the king and his ministers and, instead, voted in favor of the res-
olution passed on 20 November that clearly acknowledged the justice of 
the Prussian government's position but urged upon it the need for mod-
eration in the moment of its victory. That is, the resolution asked that the 
state of siege in Berlin be lifted and that the Prussian National Assembly 
be allowed to return from Brandenburg as soon as it was safe for it to do 
so. They followed this line because they hoped to curry favor with official 
Prussia while at the same time moderating its reactionary, and so proba-
bly particularist, tendencies. For that reason, they worried that the mea-
sure passed on 20 November might not be supportive enough to win 
Prussia's gratitude.64 . 
Their belief in the imminent danger of revolution in Berlin suggested 
an extension of this tactic. Because they thought the threat to the Prussian 
throne was real, they hoped that Frankfort might be able to defend the king 
and his government in exchange for a relaxation of Prussia's hitherto un-
compromising attitude towards the National Assembly and the provi-
sional government. For that reason they warmly supported the dispatch to 
Berlin of a negotiating team led by Daniel Friedrich Bassermann, special 
National Commissars (Reichskommissaren) Eduard Simson and August 
Hergenhahn, and-unofficially but in fact on behalf of the whole assem-
bly-Heinrich von Gagern.65 At least in the beginning, Droysen seemed 
optimistic about the prospects for this approach. In a letter to Beseler on 2 
November he remarked: "It is entirely certain to me that soon Frankfort 
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will be ... the only salvation for Prussia."66 A day later he reported hap-
pily on the Prince of Prussia's supposed eagerness to win support in 
Frankfort.67 It is at least possible that he hoped the crisis would continue 
long enough to extract maximum concessions from Prussia.68 
This hopefulness actually masked an underlying desperation. On his 
return from Berlin on 8 November, Droysen urged that a delegation be 
sent as soon as possible, but when it actually departed on the twenty-third, 
he termed it the "last card" held by the National Assembly. His diary en-
tries for the following days betray his hope for good news and his fear of 
further disappointments: he thought the situation might still be saved, but 
his painful memories of recent months told him that it was hardly a fore-
gone conclusion that Prussia would take the opportunity that history of-
fered her.69 While he awaited reports from Berlin, he put all his energies 
into rapid completion of the constitution so that appropriate institutions 
would already exist if Frederick William, saved from revolution, at last 
agreed to be hereditary monarch of a unified Germany.70 
These considerations help to explain the relief they felt when they 
learned about the Kremsier Program on 2 December. Austria's voluntary 
withdrawal from Germany seemed a favorable development inasmuch as 
it created a situation in which hereditary constitutional monarchy seemed 
the only practicable form of government and, equally good, one in which 
Prussia could assume national leadership without a contest with Austria 
and, given Germany's need for strength,largely on her own terms.71 Prob-
ably for the same reason, Droysen was not bothered when he learned on 7 
December that the Prussian king had decreed a new, and fairly liberal, con-
stitution two days before.72 The danger of Prussia consolidating itself apart 
from Germany seemed less now that Prussia could remain Prussia in a uni-
fied Germany ruled by a Hohenzollern monarch. Of course, in terms of 
their expectations in the spring and early summer, that would have been 
a very inferior sort of unification, but their historical outlook again coun-
selled resigned acceptance of the inevitable. With Austria out of Germany, 
the possibility of merging Prussia completely into Germany was too slight 
to be an issue. At least the new constitution, despite their previous fears, 
was liberal enough to forestall revolution and showed that Prussia had not 
simply slid into reaction.73 In an essay drafted on Christmas Day 1848, 
Droysen noted happily that the constitution had the added benefit of 
showing that Prussia was forward-looking, whereas recent events in 
Olmiitz showed that Austria still wanted a return to the past,74 
This is not to say that the events in Vienna and Berlin at the end of 
November and the beginning of December led them to return to their 
earlier optimism. They were merely relieved that not everything was lost 
and that a chance apparently still existed for national unification of some 
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kind. Even to maintain that qualified hope they had to accept the loss of 
Austrian territories and the admission of Prussia on terms that would have 
appalled them a few months earlier. A less noticeable but equally impor-
tant change in their outlook was their loss of confident certainty. They be-
came increasingly interested in power as such and increasingly impressed 
with the role of moral will, of daringly pursuing one's goals when oppor-
tunity beckoned. Both developments fed on a growing belief in historical 
contingency. Once they had firm expectations; now they had only hopes. 
Because outcomes now seemed less certain, they wanted either to compel 
the changes they desired or at least to suppose that the degree of their de-
sire made their success more likely. All three historians underwent these 
changes, and, with them as a basis, Droysen also began to revise his inter-
pretation of Prussian and German history. 
Droysen underwent this transformation somewhat earlier than 
Duncker and Haym, although he was slow to abandon his strongly prov-
idential view of history and, consequently, usually thought in terms of a 
narrowing of choices and of the difficulty of discovering what historical 
opportunities actually existed. The first evidence of change appears in a 
letter written to Wilhelm Arendt on 27 November 1848. His familiar views 
at first seem to be precariously intact, but subsequent statements show that 
he had already begun to alter them. When he was writing, the situation in 
Prussia was still unclear, and he was torn between fear of renewed revo-
lution there and hope that the assembly in Frankfurt might yet be able to 
make a mutually advantageous deal with the Prussian monarchy. After 
describing the unruly mobs he had seen in Berlin a few weeks earlier, he 
exclaimed: "What times we live through! It is actually miraculous, if only 
one had no heart. In any case, history is at work Uedenfalls die Geschichte ar-
beitet)." He acknowledged his anxiety in the present crisis, but expressed 
a continued belief, despite continual appearances to the contrary, that 
history was purposive and presumably beneficent. Thereafter his remarks 
betrayed a deeper uncertainty. He expressed continued trust in the 
Hohenzollern, but qualified this trust by saying "at least they are not ill-
willed." Similarly, it was hardly a ringing statement of historical optimism 
to declare: "Prussia must advance if the least is to come out of this German 
mess (deutsche Schweinerei)." He claimed never to have been of "better 
courage," but concluded his remarks in the subjunctive: "Let it only hap-
pen (Geschiihe es nur)."75 He had conceded that the long-expected unifica-
tion was by no means inevitable and now depended on the energy and 
willingness of the Hohenzollern. 
This conclusion probably followed from his judgment that the assem-
bly, after the events of the preceding ten weeks, lacked independent 
power. On 7 December he commented in his diary that the assembly was 
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now "weak" because it had resisted anarchy at "Malmo, Vienna, and 
Berlin"; three days later he declared that it had only one option left, to de-
clare for hereditary Hohenzollern rule over Germany and hope that Prus-
sia would do what was asked.76 The same argument appeared in a more 
elaborate and developed form in an essay drafted in incomplete form on 
Christmas Day 1848. The piece dealt with the main question then facing 
the deputies, namely, how to organize the permanent national executive, 
though it was really an opportunity for Droysen to organize his thoughts 
in a time of uncertainty. He censured the National Assembly of which 
he was a member for self-deception: it had failed to see that it was all-
powerful "only to the extent" that it worked for "the possible, the neces-
sary, the wholesome." In history as in physics, that is, "the law is not that 
which moves but rather the understanding of the movement."77 
These comments, of course, were consistent with his long-held view 
that it was necessary to work with, not against, historical development, 
and in offering them he may have had a specific objective in mind. He 
faulted the deputies, himself among them, for having focused too nar-
rowlyon "the distinction between monarchy and republic," when, in fact, 
"particularism" was really the "common enemy."78 This was a good ploy 
for attracting needed support from the left, and the same argument at-
tracted nearly half the votes of the moderate leftist Westendhall Party into 
pro-Prussian ranks in the vote of 13 January.79 He had more than tactical 
considerations in mind, however, and he meant to point out a fundamen-
tal error in his earlier thinking. The real mistake that he and others had 
made earlier in the year was to suppose that the "idea of national unity" 
was "so great, so convincing, so simple" that its victory was assured.so He 
now saw the future as far more uncertain and valued actual power far 
more highly. 
In the essay, therefore, he argued to the conclusion that he had indi-
cated earlier in his diary. The assembly had to concentrate on the only task 
that it might complete, namely, persuading the Hohenzollern to rule Ger-
many: "Whatever the parliament has done of good and evil, it is certain 
that it has only One Decision left to make. And it will effect something 
great if it makes it with wisdom; if not, then it is quite irrelevant what it 
decides in this or any other question. History would desert the place where 
it was misunderstood."81 In its weakness, the assembly no longer had a 
real choice, and, Droysen's seeming assurance that "wisdom" would bring 
success notwithstanding, even taking the right action offered no guaran-
tee of a favorable result. History, that is, did not bring about outcomes; it 
. only offered opportunities that fools and cowards might fail to seize. This 
is clear from his explanation of the way in which German history now had 
to be understood. 
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Much of his account parallels closely his argument in Lectures on the 
Wars of Freedom and other prerevolutionary writings, but some familiar 
themes and arguments are absent and some new ones have taken their 
place. Possibly as a means to save space, but more probably because of a 
change in focus, the world-historical character of his earlier discussions is 
lacking. He was now interested only in Germany and Prussia's mission 
there. In a clear reference to recent events, he contended that "particular-
ism" had set the "basic tone" of German history until German unity be-
came a mere "empty shell." This deplorable situation endured until the 
eighteenth century, when "spiritual developments" (geistige Entwicklun-
gen) called forth a "German spirit" (deutsche Geist) for which the battle of 
Rossbach provided "the first day of its satisfaction." This preliminary suc-
cess in the tug of war between particularism and the desire for unification 
was nearly undone in the "terrible times" of the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries, times that ended only in the "rising of Prussia and 
North Germany" which, in turn, left Germany caught in a "deep contra-
diction" because Prussia had engaged herself in the national interest but 
was also trapped in a set of obligations to Austria. This contradiction, he 
alleged, lasted until after 1830 with the result that all Germany suffered.82 
At first glance, this interpretation looks like the one Droysen offered be-
fore the revolution, but there is an important difference. He emphasized 
the war against Napoleon, but not the Prussian reforms and the refreshing 
foretaste of real freedom and he no longer portrayed the struggle as one 
between "powers;' and "states." 
There were other changes as well. Before March 1848, Droysen did not 
concern himself very much with Prussia's establishment, in the German 
north, of a Customs Union (Zollverein), but now this point seemed centrally 
important to him. It was a symptom of Prussia's dedication to German 
unity, just as Prussia's inability to extend it beyond North Germany 
showed that "unification even in material interests was not possible on the 
basis of the sovereignty principle of 1815, [and] people began to feel all the 
more painfully the necessity of new forms (Nothwendigkeit neuer Formen)." 
Two points need to be made here. First, Droysen was more interested than 
previously in outward manifestations of power, whether in the form of a 
successful war against the French Army or, in more pacific terms, the cre-
ation and thwarted extension of a customs union. Second, he now de-
scribed in changed terms history as a process of "spirit" (Geist). It was no 
longer a matter of people's ideas logically moving toward the solution of 
a problem posed many centuries before but of their seeing more clearly the 
inadequacies and inequities in their actual circumstances.83 No doubt his 
own recent disappointments helped lead him to this second insight. Just 
as his own painful experience of powerlessness showed him the impor-
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tance of power, so it now helped him see how the inconveniences faced by 
others (say, in the conduct of commerce across a nation divided in tariffs, 
currencies, and weights and measures) might lead them to see the advan-
tages of unification. This discovery must have been something of a conso-
lation to him inasmuch as it was just one more instance of finding some 
hidden good in seeming bad. 
These considerations led him to a further conclusion, odd though it 
seems in view of some of the harsh comments that he made about Prus-
sian policies in the 1840s and in view of the degree to which Prussian ac-
tions had brought the assembly in Frankfort to its present impasse. He 
now discerned an increasingly national "direction" in Prussian policy af-
ter Frederick William IV's ascent in 1840 and claimed that the real possi-
bility of "inner reconstruction" that it offered had been frustrated only by 
the stubborn particularism of the South German states, most notably 
Bavaria. It was, he now believed, their blocking of internal reform that 
had made the March revolution necessary.84 Of course, he had never been 
fond of small states and had always distrusted the Catholic South, but 
this was new. He was well on the way to making Prussia not only the ul-
timate, but also the long-term and consistent champion of a unification 
that she would appear to be in his subsequent histories. In a way, these 
arguments were self-serving in the present conditions. They gave him a 
villain to blame for what had gone wrong, let him exonerate (and flatter) 
a Prussia whose services were still needed, and left intact at least his basic 
thesis that unification was necessary and that Prussia acted in its behalf. 
But they were more than convenient rationalizations. In Droysen'sap-
proach, one's understanding of the present informed one's study of the 
past just as knowledge of the past instructed actions in the present. The 
change in present circumstances, therefore, called for a reinterpretation of 
the past. 
They also required some change in how he went about interpreting it. 
The first unmistakable evidence of this change appeared on 2 December in 
a letter to his close friend Justus Olshausen. "I have always sensed," Droy-
sen reported, "how infinitely great the difference is between the merely 
well-meaning and the statesman-like." It was during the September crisis, 
he claimed, that he had learned "with horror" that 
it is clearly easier and more comfortable to represent a principle and its conse-
quences than to realize it; that in politics, the science of the possible, the best is ruinous 
and only the good, indeed the miserable has its value. It is certain, however, that 
we are going through a school here than which one more educational cannot be 
conceived; except that learning requires a strength, a self-denial, and an honesty 
that not everyone possesses. The most difficult task of all is to maintain a vision of 
the whole (Blick Jilr das Ganze). The self-conquest that the armistice question cost 
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me was orily my first exercise in school! Happy are they who think that fortiter velie 
leads to the goal in political affairs [my emphasis].85 
The letter managed to be both self-pitying and self-congratulatory at the 
same time. Droysen was more aware than he had been of the fallibility of 
human judgment in discerning historical tendencies and devising political 
strategies. That is, he was markedly more pessimistic about the possibility 
of drawing the correct conclusions from history. He did not doubt that his-
tory had a purpose; otherwise, he would not have complained that it was 
"difficult ... to maintain a vision of the whole." He did acknowledge, 
however, that only those sternly disciplined enough not to misconstrue ev-
idence as a result of fervent hope could practice politics as the "science of 
. the possible." 
He recurred to this argument in an essay, when he reflected that it had 
been German consciousness of the need for unification that had allowed 
the February revolution in France to spark the March risings in Germany 
that, in turn,led to convening the National Assembly to "give firm forms" 
to the "magical word of German unity." That consciousness, however, 
could not accomplish the "most difficult task of the political man," which 
Droysen defined as "recognizing the quietly forward-flowing movement 
that can alone endure in the midst of so great an upheaval whose nature it 
is to stir up all the passions and to release all possible demands, to confuse 
all ideas into a wild mixture of possibilities and impossibilities."86 Droy-
sen still insisted that there was a right course to follow, but it was just when 
one most needed to discover that course (in the middle of a revolution, for. 
example) that it was most difficult to find and follow it. The obvious cor-
rective was a patient study of the situation that would allow one to dis-
tinguish between what was possible and what was not. That entailed 
a careful consideration of contingency and a readiness, not shown by 
Droysen earlier in his career, to accommodate oneself to unpleasant con-
sequences before they occurred. 
If viewed from that perspective, his renewed and more energetic in-
sistence on the centrality of particularism in German history was a hypo-
thetical explanation of defeats yet to be suffered as well as those already 
encountered. Similarly, his insistence that Prussian politics had served the 
national interest throughout the 1840s was a means to showing that Prus-
sia might yet do as she ought. Droysen searched carefully for any indica-
tion that the Hohenzollern monarchy would or could play the role he once 
was certain history had assigned to it. In conducting that search, he was 
chastened enough to attach the greatest importance to sheer power and to 
consider seriously that Prussia might not, after all, take the opportunity of-
feredher. 
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Even so, he inclined to a cautious optimism. In a letter to August 
Kopisch on 3 January, he presented his central thesis, already implicitly 
present in his essay on the national executive: "A history like Prussia's can-
not have been a mistake. Through the Great Elector, through the great 
Frederick, through the sly king of the Wars of Liberation [Frederick 
William III] Prussia has grown to the point of saving the interests of 
Germany from Austria which abused Germany for the sake of her foreign 
crown." The grand tendency of Prussian history, that is, had been to em-
ploy Prussian strength for the nation as a whole. This would be the orga-
nizing thesis of his sixteen-volume History of Prussian Politics (1855-86), 
the formative work of the Prussian School. For the present, however, Droy-
sen wanted some assurance that victory was still possible, and he em-
ployed his thesis to show that it was in accord with earlier Prussian history 
that Frederick William IV had given all his lands to Germany, wishing to 
cease to be a European power (Macht) in order to become a German one." 
The terminology is interesting, because in earlier writings that shift was to . 
create a "state" (Staat) in place of a mere "power." He also thought it a log-
ical continuation of earlier Prussian history for Prussia to curb any further 
Austrian interference and to undertake command of a unified Germany.B7 
. At the same time, he now found it entirely conceivable that Prussia 
would fail to fulfil her "German mission" (deutscher Beruj) and decide in-
stead to "proceed in cooperation with Austria." If that happened, she 
would not merely revert to the "unhappy condition ... in which she was 
the least of the great powers." On the contrary, she would "sink infinitely 
below~' her prerevolutionary status because she would have "surrendered 
her mission" and become just a German state among German states like 
Saxony. Droysen therefore hoped, if only for reasons of her own self-
interest, that Prussia would shun the latter course and energetically 
pursue the former by acting deliberately as "the German power." In so 
arguing, Droysen's improved sense of contingency led him to a height-
ened awareness of voluntarism in history, and he now wrote in terms of 
Prussia's need to "decide," "recognize," "acknowledge," "step forward," 
and "will."88 This word choice made sense because Prussia's mission was 
now indicated, not required, by history. 
In consequence, the main task remaining to the National Assembly 
was to persuade Prussia to continue to act in Germany's behalf. This per-
suasion was to take the form not of appeals to her better nature but to her 
needs and interests as a power. On 16 December, for example, in a letter to 
Arendt he reviewed the situation created by the Kremsier Program and the 
new Prussian constitution and claimed that a unified Germany and an in-
dependent Austria were historical complements. Austria would keep 
France out of northern Italy and prevent racial war in southeastern Europe 
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while the Prusso-German state provided the needed barrier against 
Russia in the east and France in the west. He saw the need, therefore, to 
place "Prussia in such a position that she devotes herself wholly and 
gladly to this task." He once insisted on the need for Prussia's dissolution 
into a unified Germany; now he offered control over Germany as an in-
ducement to cooperation: "I work, .. for the hereditary hegemony of 
Prussia (erbliche Hegemonie PreuJ3ens)." Prussia had to know that Germany 
w~s hers for the taking so that she would link her "proud defensive sys-
tem" to that of Germany as a whole.89 This was not a stray thought, and he 
reiterated the case in a strongly worded letter to Olshausen on 7 January.90 
As Droysen's analysis suggests, the possession or attainment of 
power, military power, now seemed the true measure of political success. 
He had always rated it highly, and the same experience of the assembly's 
inability to control events that informed his increased awareness of his-
torical contingency also made him see more clearly the advantages of be-
ing able to dictate outcomes. His statements, however, show that he now 
treated power as an end in itself as well as means to higher ends. As early 
as 3 December he wrote to Kopisch that his primary" goal" was to increase 
the "power of Germany" and further declared: "Power is salvation (Die 
Macht ist Rettung)."91 He was equally explicit in his Christmas essay on the 
formation of the national executive: "The practical English understand 
better than we the old Greek saying: 'Gold is the man.' And by the same 
token: 'Power is the state' seems to be more regretted than comprehended 
by us. All our constitutional forms and basic rights are nothing if we do 
not know how to raise our nation (Reich) to a power (Macht). Indeed, it is 
so much a matter of power and only of power that even freedom is worth-
less in its absence. "92 Here, again, he now used "power" as a term of praise 
rather than opprobrium. His basic argument was that Germans were too 
good to understand that they had to be strong, though Droysen surely 
hoped that they would soon learn this important lesson. Of course, he did 
not actually say that power was more important than freedom, merely that 
freedom was "worthless" without it. Certainly he did not mean that Ger-
many had to be strong rather than free, and in his 2 December letter to 
Olshausen he took pains not be misunderstood on that point by explain-
ing that he wanted "to strengthen and maintain the external framework 
of Germany on the way to constitution and reform [my emphasis]." He as-
sured Olshausen that "freedom will not elude us as soon as we attain a 
tolerable position on the route to unification."93 Nevertheless, his state-
ment shows a major shift in priority. He had formerly thought that free-
dom was the precondition for power; now he thought exactly the opposite 
to be the case. 
During December, Duncker's thinking underwent parallel changes 
that appear in the "Report of the Commission of the Casino Society on the 
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Central Executive." This report, issued just before Christmas 1848, was 
supposedly the work of a four-man committee, but it was really Duncker's 
doing. He called for the committee, dominated its sessions, and did the ac-
tual writing.94 The document's purpose was to give the Casinopartei much 
neede<i guidance in deciding on the shape of the nation's executive. This 
topic seemed especially urgent once it was clear that Austria had with-
drawn and, in any case, the relevant articles of the draft constitution would 
soon be discussed by the assembly.95 In presenting his views on this ques-
tion, Duncker also revealed the changed contours of his historical and po-
litical thinking, and for this reason his reflections deserve close study. 
He made the command of effective force the supreme criterion for 
judging executive arrangements by assessing each possibility in terms of 
the strength that it would offer or deny to Germany. Thus, he rejected 
either the "renewal or reformation" of the old German Confederation not 
on the grounds that history had bypassed it or that it was illegitimate but 
because, if its delegates had first to confer with their governments, "any 
quick and strong (rasch und kriiftig) administration would be impossible." 
By the same token, he opposed any scheme in which the old delegations 
would be replaced by it senate elected by the states. The result, he alleged, 
would be a sort of "republic" that would contradict the cbnstitutional 
arrangements in the states and, so, disorganize and weaken the nation 
as a whole. German strength depended on a "strictly introduced confor-
mity ... between the parts and the whole." He also objected to the Turnus 
idea in which the executive position would rotate among monarchs. Habs-
burg and Hohenzollern rulers would work to thwart each other, he 
warned, and dynasts from the lesser states would command insufficient 
respect. In all cases, national strength would suffer. Unsurprisingly, given 
his record in June during discussions of the provisional executive, he was 
faintly more sympathetic to the idea of a Trias and conceded that joint ex-
ecutive tenure by a Habsburg, Hohenzollern, and Wittelsbach would have 
something to offer by way of "permanence and stability," and he was 
pleased that it did not threaten the monarchic principle, but he nonethe-
less noted that the proposal had two irremediable flaws.96 
First, Duncker plausibly claimed that three men would have diffi-
culty reaching prompt decisions. Further, and more serious, a Trias 
would not command sufficient respect in Germany. In a statement that 
shows the bitterness that he felt about the events of the preceding several 
months, he commented: 
The provisional condition in which we now find ourselves has sufficiently shown 
how weak a central government is, especially in its dealings with the larger states, 
especially when it does not have decisive power (entscheidende Macht) directly at its 
disposal which, even through its moral weight, through the fear that a word can 
provoke, prevents any thought of resistance from arising. If, however, the central 
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power was impotent at a time when the upsurge of the whole nation, when the vi-
tally and strongly driving idea of unification stood by helpfully and supportively, 
how· will it be when, in the necessary course of history (notwendiger Gang der 
Geschichte) decline, retreat, and the backlash of particularism follow rising, 
progress, and the drive to unity? Both moments, the drive towards unification and 
the familiarity with separate existence, the sense for the whole and the traditions 
of the history of the tribe (Stamm) interpenetrate and oppose one another in the past 
and present of Germany and in the breast of every individua1.97 
The measure of suitability, then, was strength, especially the strength to 
compel respect and obedience within Germany. Duncker thought this 
strength to be necessary because he now was far more aware of the con-
tinued hold of particularism and now thought that historical necessity was 
on the side of division as well as of unification. In other words, his insis-
tence on the need for power was a result of his altered historical diagnosis 
of Germany's situation. 
Predictably, Duncker also opposed the scheme for an elective consti-
tutional monarchy. His opposition resulted from two considerations. 
First, he plausibly argued that German history showed it to have one ma-
jor disadvantage: "Elective monarchy tore apart our unity and our people 
(unsere Einheit, unser Volk ausgerissen)." It had, in fact, been the "basic 
source of everything wrong with the nation," and he believed that there 
was no reason to expect happier results from a second attempt. Now, as 
under the Holy Roman Empire, candidates for the office would be forced 
to make damaging concessions in order to be elected so that national 
strength would erode with each succession. Second, he believed that elec-
tive monarchy would tempt rulers to exploit their position for selfish 
interests because, in an elective monarchy, "the dignity is only temporar-
ily conveyed to a prince." He might, therefore, regard his office as an 
"affair of honor," but it was unlikely to "claim his interest and strength 
to the full extent." Here, too, "previous German history provides suffi-
cient warning examples." Rather than endanger his hereditary holdings 
at the cost of his posterity, the ruler would tend to exploit the rest of 
the nation in his dynastic interest. Quite simply, an elective monarch 
would not have enough of a stake in the long-term welfare of Germany as 
a whole.98 
The conclusion was obvious. Only a hereditary monarch could assure 
"the necessary firmness and steadiness in the constitution and the gov-
ernment," could preside over "the organic growth of the new formation 
of affairs in Germany," and could provide the "indispensable external 
power and position of Germany." These were what Duncker really 
wanted for Germany, but to attain them it was not enough that the office 
be hereditary. Its incumbent had also to possess an independent power 
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based on his state of origin. For that reason, the monarch would have to be 
either a Habsburg or a Hohenzollern. Duncker preferred the latter in any 
case, and in explaining this he sought to show, in case anyone had misun-
derstood the significance of the Kremsier Program, that Austrian and 
German interests diverged and that the Habsburgs were basically un-
suited to rule Germany. Multinationality, he contended, was the essential 
historical principle of Austria. That meant that investing a Habsburg with 
German monarchy would be bad for Germany because its king would 
have at heart interests irrelevant and at times opposed to those of Ger-
many proper. It might also be bad for Austria and Europe; if the German 
parliament forced the king to act strictly in the German interest, Eastern 
Europe might be thrown into chaos. He was therefore strongly opposed 
to a simple merger between the German states and the whole Austrian 
Empire, and he was scarcely more sympathetic to the idea of admitting 
only the German provinces of Austria into a German federation (Bun-
desstaat) while Germany and Austria combined as the two units of a con-
federation (Staatenbund). 
It was, he maintained, historically necessary for Austria to exist inde-
pendent of, though closely aligned with, a unified Germany: "Austrian 
politics have consistently worked toward that conclusion since 1815, not 
to go back any farther: she has retreated from Germany step by step in or-
der to round out and consolidate the Austrian monarchy as a whole." In 
recent years, he argued, Austria had ignored German politics except when 
she intervened to repress "political innovations" and had, in effect, "aban-
doned the rest of Germany to Prussian hegemony under the name of the 
Zollverein." Viewed in that light, the Kremsier Program was the "key-
stone" of a long-standing and powerful historical development that had to 
be accepted and respected.99 ' 
Under those circumstances, Duncker reasoned, Germany really had 
no choice: she had to choose a Hohenzollern as hereditary constitutional 
monarch. He acknowledged the danger of Prussian hegemony, but he be-
lieved, or professed to believe, that this danger could be averted by timely 
action. "If we for our part grasp this situation quickly and in a statesman-
like manner," he argued, "it will be possible to abolish every contradiction 
between dynastic power and the power of the nation in the executive to be 
created for this federal state." As long as the deputies were swift and de-
cisive in offering the crown to the Hohenzollern, the result would be not 
"the feared hegemony of Prussia, but, on the contrary, Germany's con-
quest of Prussia" and her "immediate and unconditional control of the 
great powers of this state." In order to support this claim, Duncker pointed 
out that the Hohenzollern, if given power over Germany as a whole, 
would be unable to distinguish Prussian from German interests. The dy-
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nasty would therefore think and act in national terms, though he admitted 
that the South German Catholic states would have to be protected with 
specific guarantees and reminded that Austria would be able to intervene 
diplomatically on their behalf.1°o 
Duncker was not being altogether candid. He clearly wanted a Ger-
man constitutional monarchy with the Hohenzollern as hereditary rulers, 
and he undoubtedly wanted Prussia's power for the unified state, but 
some of his other recommendations did not reflect his real thinking. He in-
sisted on the need for speed, but in a letter to his wife written on or about 
20 December, only a few days before publication of his report, he criticized 
Heinrich von Gagern for seeking a "rapid decision." It was first necessary, 
he argued, that "the people get used to the idea of excluding Austria which 
is too new and huge for them." He no doubt hoped that his report with its 
temperate explanation of why Germany and Austria had to move in dif-
ferent directions would help to accustom them to this novel prospect. Fur-
thermore, his private statements about Austria show that his personal 
estimation of her was less generous than that which appeared in the report. 
For example, he also told his wife that Germany faced a stark alternative: 
"With Austria, no unity; without Austria, the remainder will form a strong 
state."101 He was even harsher in another letter, written on New Year's 
Day, 1849.102 National unity and strength were what really interested him, 
and he probably dismissed in the report the danger of Prussian hegemony 
more as a means to reassure worried readers than out of genuine convic-
tion, for he was prepared to accept unification on any available terms. At 
least, in a nearly contemporaneous letter to his wife he was unabashed in 
describing a unified Germany as a "Prussian empire."103 
Such an attitude was consistent with his general appraisal of the situ-
ation. On the one hand, he believed that the program that he recom-
mended in his report was the correct one.104 On the other, he no longer 
took its fulfillment as inevitable. Unification had become for him a moral, 
rather than a historical, necessity, something hopefully to attempt rather 
than something confidently to await. He thought that his cause had fi-
. nally reached its time of crisis, and wrote to his wife: "The ship is really 
cracking at all her joints and the billows are rising high." He therefore 
counselled her, also in inflated language, to "raise high the banner of 
hope" and claimed that his side would conquer because it "had to con-
quer."105 That is, it should conquer because it was right and because good 
people wanted it to succeed. The future now seemed more contingent 
than it had, and his remarks seem desperate and determined rather than 
confident and optimistic. 
Haym's analysis of the situation, despite some distinctive emphases, 
was close to Duncker's. He agreed fully with Duncker's report, and began 
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to express his own views openly and forcefully in January 1849.106 He 
heavily emphasized the primacy of power. On 4 January, for example, he 
addressed the assembly for the first and last time to speak against a mo-
tion to censure the Prussian government for both its actions against the 
Prussian National Assembly in November and its proclamation of a con-
stitution in December. In November he had conceded the formal illegality 
of Prussian actions but had defended them as justifiable measures of self-
defense in the face of imminent revolution. He now broadened this argu-
ment into an apology for power. He contended that questions of legality 
were irrelevant in the present instance because Prussia had acted out of po-
litical necessity. The assembly had to do the same.107 He urged his listen-
ers to view matters "in a practical sense" and to employ "a viewpoint 
turned not backwards but forwards." This led him to stress two points. First, 
elections were due in Prussia, and Haym advised the assembly to act in 
such a way that Prussian voters would trust their government and thus 
lend it the strength needed for its role in national unification. Second, he 
pointed out that the matter under discussion was "less a question of free-
dom than a question of power."108 
He, too, now gave power primacy over freedom~ Haym saw the 
matter as a "question of power" in several senses. On the simplest level, 
the assembly's power was "only moral" so that the assembly would 
be defeated in a contest with Berlin. He also thought that the assembly 
could increase its meager strength by winning the "applause of one of the 
greatest peoples of the Fatherland (eines der groflten Stiimme des Vaterlan-
des)."l09 That is, it should try to win Prussia to its side by placating the 
Prussian government. He thought that power was at issue in yet a third 
sense: "It is not merely a matter of the power of this assembly, for the 
service of power (Dienst der Macht) is mutual." By this he meant that 
the assembly should use this chance "to strengthen the power of the 
Prussian state (Macht des preuflischen Staates)" in the expectation that Prus-
sia would make a decent return on the favor. uo It was in Germany's inter-
es~ to increase the power it would soon need when the national 
constitution was ready to implement. In that attitude, he had argued two 
days earlier in a letter to Hansemann that Germany needed a "Prussian 
imperial crown" and would point out in a report to the electors at 
Mansfeld on 22 January, the German "people" (Volk) deserved to belong 
to "a state that was unitary in itself, externally strong, and, to say it all, 
a state among the states of Europe." He therefore advised the deputies 
to cease debating the motion of censure and to return to the business of 
the day.111 
His pronounced admiration for physical power and his admonition 
that the assembly's power was "only moral," however, did not mean that 
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he had entirely abandoned his prerevolutionary belief in the necessity and 
efficacy of moral power. Haym now expressed this belief with the term 
"revolutionary idealism," a concept that he first invoked in a letter to 
Hansemann on 2 January and then elaborated in subsequent letters. He 
wrote to defend himself and like-minded deputies against Hansemann's 
irritating charge that they were impractical and more interested in ideas 
than in reality. Haym conceded that there was some justice in Hanse-
mann's reproaches: Some of his colleagues were indeed "ideological" and, 
so, might create a "fiasco" while trying to pursue their "bold politics." He 
also wanted Hansemann to understand that the other party in Germany 
was not composed of "practical men" like himself but of men who coun-
tered the "perhaps very ideologically conceiv~ program" of the right cen-
ter in Frankfort with ideas "still more chimerical, still more insane." Haym 
had in mind both those who wanted a return to prerevolutionary condi- . 
tions and those who desired a German republic. In his view, the majority 
of deputies who wished the exclusion of Austria and unification under the 
Hohenzollem were realistic by contrast because their "revolutionary ide-
alism" was essentially "historical."112 
This defense of his own program and approach seems almost to damn 
both through faint praise, because Haym did not claim to be practical, only 
to be less impractical than those he opposed. In his next letter to Hanse-
mann, he was rather more forceful, but he lacked confidence and the tone 
remained apologetic. He wrote to report on the effects of the Austrian note 
of 4 February, which, despite the latitude for national unification seem-
ingly granted in the Kremsier Program, strongly protested the mooted cre-
ation of a unified Germany under the Hohenzollem. Haym claimed that 
the note had awakened and enlivened the assembly rather than demoral-
izing it as, he believed, the Austrians had intended. He attributed this to 
the assembly'S "idealism," and he defined this "idealism" as "the higher 
ascending politics of the National Assembly, the revolution, in other 
words, the ideal opinion (ideelle Meinung) deposited in the Church of St. 
Paul's [where the assembly met] after the flood waters of riot had run their 
course."1l3 The ideas that he put to use in this argument drew on those in 
his statements before the revolution and during its earlier course. He drew 
on his prerevolutionary theory of "real identities," according to which will 
preceded act and ideas preceded will, and on his springtime view that al-
though "riot" and revolution had to be suppressed, the fact of the March 
revolution established its historical legitimacy and thus legitimated the 
National Assembly and its efforts. 
He changed the terms of the argument, however, when he gave 
Hansemann a closer look at the nature and importance of the assembly's 
"idealism" : 
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This idealism-which, by the way, is not an abstract but a historical idealism-
may in many ways appear abandoned and impractical to a practical man, and 
we received his teachings with scrupulous attentiveness. Because the power of 
our faith and courage are about to be tested and, we do not doubt, to carry the 
day, I feel forced to ... explain again to you that this idealism, present the whole 
time in our dispositions, is a 'reality' just as powerful and just as deserving of 
attention ... as the particularist strivings of the dynasties and the threatening 
aspect of foreign lands. Our ideal politics is to your practical political artfulness 
as Alexander was to Diogenes. We would choose to be Diogenes-if we were 
not Alexander!114 
Haym's allusion to Plutarch's account of Alexander the Great's encounter 
with Diogenes of Sinope is a little precious and may have been lost on 
Hansemann, but it is helpful in understanding what Haym meant. Unlike 
other philosophers, Diogenes did not seek out Alexander, so Alexander 
went to him. He found him lying in the sun and asked if he wanted any-
thing. Diogenes told him to stand so as to shade him from the sun, and, on 
leaving, Alexander remarked that, if he were fi(ll)t Alexander, he would like 
to be Diogenes. Haym used the story to illustrate his chief contention. With 
it, he compared "practical" men such as Hansemann to philosophers such 
as Diogenes and idealists such as himself to Alexander. 
In Plutarch's account, after all, both protagonists are admirable, Diog-
enes for his detachment and Alexander for his prowess. Haym was ready 
to compliment Hansemann for his clear-sighted appreciation of political 
reality but enjoyed the irony of pointing out that he and others like him had 
real power because they and their ideals were facts, just as Alexander's vic-
tories over the Greeks had been. They were, however, only facts among 
facts. Like Duncker, Haym was now aware of historical contingency. His 
idealism was a "reality" to take account of-just as he knew Hansemann 
took account of "the particularist strivings of the dynasties." In other 
words, he was again defending his position by showing that it was at least 
as good as that occupied by his opponents, though he now defined its good-
ness in terms of moral force. Moreover, and again like Duncker, he was pre-
dicting victory less in terms of historical inevitability, although he did note 
the" historical" rather than "abstract" character of his "idealism," than of 
"faith and courage."115 He rated power as supreme, but ranked moral will 
as a special kind of power. Possibly for rhetorical reasons, the letter of 11 
February exuded a declared confidence that his side would win against all 
odds, but his letters to Hansemann over the next three weeks contained ad-
missions that things might go wrong, that, for example, the Hohenzollem 
might refuse the crown when it was offered to them.116 
Haym carried these ideas to their logical conclusion in another letter 
to Hansemann on 6 March. Hansemann had suggested that the Trias plan 
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be revived, and Haym heatedly replied that the "form" of the unified 
German state was "no longer in question." The real question was 
"whether something new was to be created at all." Haym readily ac-
knowledged that Germany might simply return to its unhappy prerevo-
lutionary condition, but he insisted that, if unification did occur, it would 
take the form of a "hereditary imperium" (Erbkaiserthum) of the Hohen-
zollem. He thought that historical tendencies inclined in that direction, 
but understood that the result was by no means a foregone conclusion. 
Success really depended on the moral strength of the dynasty in question 
and its people. Victory was still possible if "even a spark of the spirit of 
the conqueror of Silesia [Frederick the Great] remained among his succes-
sors." Failing that, he suggested that "the mind of the great Frederick, if 
not present on the throne, must surely be alive in his people." "If," he ar-
gued, "the government does not push forward along the track upon 
which the destiny of the Prussian state should fulfil itself in accordance 
with its historical determination, then the chambers should drive the gov-
ernment onwards." He still thought that history had a logic, but it was 
logic easily defied or ignored. Given the recent record of the Prussian 
government, chambers, and people, he cannot have been too hopeful. His 
persistence in the face of continual, discouraging reports is to be ex-
plained by an important admission that he made to Hansemann: "One 
does not surrender at a low price an idea followed for months, even if the 
conviction of its correctness and inner necessity did not permeate all of 
US."117 His shift from historical determinism to a moral voluntarism 
aligned with history was complete. 
These revisions and modifications brought their ideas into line with 
those that Sybel had published the preceding spring in his pamphlet "On 
the National Constitution of the Seventeen Trustees." There he had ar-
gued against hereditary constitutional monarchy for Germany on the 
grounds that most Germans were too deeply particularist to follow a 
dynasty other than their own. Events since midsummer seemed to have 
confirmed his analysis. In his pamphlet, Sybel had also argued for an 
"aristocratic college" as national executive unless, as had now happened, 
Austria withdrew from Germany and consolidated itself as a separate 
state. In that case, Germany would have to "place at its head the man 
who will show the greatest power .and will in the German cause," 
namely, the king of Prussia. That prospect had depressed Sybel, not out 
of a disregard for Prussia or the Hohenzollem, but because then it would 
be a matter of saving "whatever can be saved," of substituting a "field 
commander" for a "constitution." Sybel also admitted, however, that 
such a development would have some compensating features, if only be-
cause the national monarch and the unity he provided would be greeted 
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as a "firm anchor of salvation ... in the midst of such misfortune."lls 
Now, in late 1848 and early 1849, events had met his conditions for 
favoring hereditary Hohenzollem over Germany. What he had urged as a 
hypothesis then, was observable reality now, and Droysen, Duncker, and 
Haym were recommending the Hohenzollem for reasons about which he 
had speculated in the spring. The record of Sybel's actions and ideas in 
the summer and autumn of 1848 isloo incomplete to reconstruct how his 
views evolved during this period. He was at a distance from the center 
of action as a deputy to the provincial assembly at Cassell, and the 
surviving fragments of his correspondence are few and uninformative. 
By January he strongly supported unification with the Hohenzollem as 
hereditary constitutional monarchs, possibly as the best solution possible 
in the circumstances or, possibly, as a result of changed perspective, as 
something good in itself. If Eduard Zeller, a friend who boarded at the 
Sybel house in Marburg for most of 1849 is to be believed, Sybel was now 
an enthusiastic and consistent advocate of Hohenzollem rrue, even at the 
price of Austria's exclusion.ll9 1t is at least clear that he was well enough 
apprised of who did what at Frankfort to know to write, on 10 January, to 
Droysen, as member of and record-keeper for the assembly's Consti-
tution Committee (Verfassungsausschuj3) to request documents that he 
thought might be useful in drafting a constitution for Hesse. He seems 
never to have been in contact with Droysen before, but he evidently knew 
that they agreed on basic matters: while soliciting further information on 
Droysen's views, he congratulated him on being "thoroughly Prussian 
and imperial in the present crisis." Sybel emphasized his own strong sup-
port for hereditary rule by the Hohenzollem in Germany.120 It was the be-
ginning of their political association. Droysen at once sent back a warmly 
appreciative reply and soon wrote Sybel again to urge him to agitate in 
Cassell for the Hohenzollem candidacy.l2l They continued their associa-
tion into later years. In a number of respects, it was a natural alliance, and 
not only because circumstances now forced Sybel, even if he was not oth-
erwise inclined, to support the Hohenzollem candidacy. Circumstances 
had also forced Droysen-and Duncker and Haym-to take a view of his-
tory and its implications for present politics that came more easily to 
Sybel. Before the revolution and during its first months, after all, they had 
held fast to a belief that history was ineluctably progressive and inter-
pretable in a way that allowed fairly certain prediction. The idea that it 
might nearly defy interpretation and had therefore to be thought of as 
filled with dangerous contingencies, such that one had to try to strike the 
best bargain possible, was at first alien to them. It took successive defeats 
and disappo.intments to make it an integral part of their outlook. Sybel, 
by contrast, had taken a more open-ended view of progress. He was a 
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Ranke student, largely uninstructed in the mysteries of Hegel's phi-
losophy of history. He believed that there was such a thing as progress 
and he believed that the outlines of the future could be discerned 
vaguely, but he had always inclined to take affairs on a day-to-day basis, 
to hope for the best, and to define the best as the best possible under the 
circumstances. 
That was very different from supposing that if something happened, 
it happened for the best. The latter belief was easy enough to sustain as 
long as one lacked even seeming power, and it could be maintained for a 
while when Germany's reconstruction seemed to be proceeding, despite 
occasional frustrations. Unexpected disappointments might, after all, be 
explained away as unforeseen paths to the ultimate good. But Droysen, 
Duncker, and Haym took empiricism seriously. The accumulation of evi-
dence eventually told against their initial optimism and made self-
conscious realists of them. Where once they had looked forward to the 
moral regeneration of humanity, or at least of Europe, through Germany's 
achievement of freedom, they now hoped at least that Germany might be 
unified. Where once they had seen the urge for freedom as the cause for 
unification, they now looked on freedom as, at best, a byproduct of na-
tional unity and strength. Nor were the changes limited to alterations in 
political program. History had seemed, in Droysen's metaphor, a "stream" 
whose destination could be discerned. Now it appeared to be a torrent that 
was navigable only with difficulty and considerable risk. They knew 
where they wanted to go, but now felt that they were navigating without 
a reliable map. 
What had happened to them was, in one way, not very remarkable. 
They were just men with ideas who tried their ideas against realities and 
found out that their ideas were defective. They might have simply given 
up on politics. Instead, following the logic of their faith in history, they at-
tempted an accommodation. As tamed ideologues, they would throw 
away what they had to and keep what they could. At least they could spare 
themselves excessive self-reproach. It was not as if they had been really in 
charge of events. They had never been in a position to remake Germany. 
This meant that they could blame others, as well as themselves for what 
went wrong and try to instruct the nation in how avoid the mistakes just 
made. Certainly, the change did not unmake them as historians. The ex-
perience led Droysen to untenable conclusions in his History of Prllssiml 
Politics, but it vividly informed his lectures on the philosophy and meth-
ods of history, the Historik for which (along with Alexander the Great and 
The History of Hellenism) he is still celebrated. Duncker's and Haym's 
major works still lay ahead, and so did Sybel's. His were tendentious, but 
the tendencies in part antedated the failure of the revolution. Actually, the 
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fact that they continued as active historians is what makes their experience 
important: they taught their students to regard historical results as legiti-
mate and as not subject to any external standard but success. With the map 
gone, that assumption was bound to result in a mixture of cynicism and 
voluntarism. It took them a few years, however, to sort out and think 
through the lessons just learned. 
7 _____ _ 
Toward the Prussian School 
The disappointing spring of 1849 forced Droysen and his colleagues to 
modify further their historical and political thinking. The result was the 
historical outlook called the Prussian School, an outlook still optimistic 
about thePrusso-German future but now more self-consciously realist and 
more focused on military force and moral will. It is worth noting that this 
change occurred while they were still fairly young. They had long careers 
ahead of them in which to follow the implications of the ideas they 
devised. Droysen, the eldest, was forty-one in 1849. Duncker was thirty-
eight, Sybel thirty-two, and Haym a youthful twenty-eight. This continued 
shift in their thinking did not occur all at once, of course, because at first 
they could not be fully clear about what had happened. 
On 3 April, Frederick William of Prussia had refused to accept the 
German crown from the National Assembly. It was clear what he would 
not do, but it was not yet dear what he would do. This also made it clear 
to Droysen and the others what could not happen, namely, national unifi-
cation by a Prussia that would cease to be Prussian in the process. 
Nonetheless, it was not evident to them what would happen instead-
complete defeat or compromised victory. The result was a strategic un-
certainty that led to a tactical unsureness. They were forced to think, to 
modify and to reorder their ideas. Until the conclusion of the Punctation 
of Olmiitz (Olomouc) between Prussia and Austria in November 1850 (an 
event that deeply shocked and angered them), it seemed at least possible 
that Prussia would unify northern Germany in the Erfurt Union, which 
briefly had its own parliament. In the short term, the four had to estimate 
this union's value and decide whether to work for its realization. The an-
swers to these tactical questions depended on their strategic estimates of 
actual Prussian policy and, more important, their new sense of what his-
torians could and could not achieve in politics. Once Prussian capitula-
tion to Austria was manifest in 1850, they faced the essentially different 
strategic problems of deciding what could yet be attained by the strategy 
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of motivating Prussia to move in the possibly distant future. Their solu-
tions dictated a tactical decision about the kind of history to write under 
the changed circumstances. 
In order to establish the context for their decisions both before and af-
ter Olmiitz, it is advisable to survey briefly Prussian policies in and after 
March 1849. The architect of those policies was the remarkable Catholic 
conservative Joseph Maria von Radowitz, a descendant of Magyar nobles 
who had moved to northern Germany, a soldier in Napoleon's army, 
French educated, Prussian only since 1823, and a trusted friend and ad-
viser of King Frederick William. Radowitz was one of those conservatives 
in the generation after Metternich who rejected the latter's pessimistic im-
mobilism in favor of cautiou.s reform that would conserve what was 
essential in the old order. 1 As a member of the assembly at Frankfort, there-
fore, he had favored the limited, kleindeutsch variety of unification sought 
by Droysen and the others. Like Droysen's ideal Prussian statesman, he 
thought this to be in Prussia's real interest, as well as in the interest of so-
cial stability. Frederick William's refusal of the proferred crown in April 
1849 did not change Radowitz's mind, and he persuaded the Prussian king 
to try to unify Germany on his own. At first, circumstances helped Rado-
witz make his case, in Prussia and in some of the other German states. Aus-
tria was tied down in fighting revolt in Hungary and could not do much 
to oppose Prussia. Moreover, social revolution, furthered by economic 
woes and regional differences, had rekindled in the German Southwest af-
ter the Prussian refusal of March 1849. It required the Prussian army to 
quell these, and the suppression was complete only with the fall of Rastatt 
in July. Obviously, this made the princes dependent on Prussia, and even 
Wiirttemberg and Bavaria fell in with Prussian proposals for union as long 
as the rebels were threateningly active within their frontiers. When they 
did feel bold enough to tum Prussia down in late May, they still did not 
dare actively oppose the Three Kings' Federation (Dreikonigsbund) of Prus-
sia, Hannover, and Saxony. The states issued a constitution (Unionsverfas-
sung) on 28 May 1849 that excluded Austria, made the Prussian king the 
chief executive, and provided for a parliament elected on indirect suffrage 
with voting by classes instead of the more democratic franchise of the 
Frankfort constitution. All the German states other than Austria were in-
vited to join this union.2 In consequence, 150 liberals-Duncker among 
them-from the former assembly in Frankfort gathered at Gotha to give 
their blessings to the union.3 (Some of these same liberals, including 
Duncker and Sybel, also sat in the union's Parliament at Erfurt.4 
It is easy to see the attraction of Radowitz's experiment for some 
liberals, although others, like Droysen, never held much hope for it. It is 
certainly fascinating to speculate about what might have become of this 
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earlier, gentler version of what Bismarck later brought about by force, 
namely, partial unification of Germany in the form of extended Prussian 
domination over the other German states. In the event, the prospects of the 
union dimmed perceptibly after August 1849, when Austria, with Russian 
help, defeated the revolt in Hungary. Austria's Prince Schwarzenberg nat-
urally opposed a scheme that would exclude Austria from leadership in 
German affairs and instead preferred a German federation led by Austria. 
The defeat of the Magyar revolt, combined with Russian diplomatic sup-
port, gave Schwarzenberg a free hand. For a time he waited. Then, in the 
summer of 1850, the Prussian-Ied Erfurt Union threatened intervention in 
the member state Electoral Hesse, where the prince-elector was about to 
abrogate his own constitution. Austria, backed by Russia, sided with the 
Prince-Elector, and German civil war seemed to be in the offing. After 
some light skirmishing, the Prussian king was prevailed on to give way by 
the many Prussian conservatives who looked on Austria and Russia as 
friends, distrusted the liberals who supported the Union, and had opposed 
Radowitz's scheme all along. So, in October 1850 at Olmiitz (Olomouc) in 
Moravia, Prussia agreed to let the union lapse. As Schwarzenberg's federal 
scheme was also unworkable, Germany reverted, in national constitu-
tional terms, to the old German Confederation that had supposedly ended 
in March of 1848.s 
The school resulted from their twofold response to this disappoint-
ment. First, they made important changes in historical analysis. Droysen 
and the others, in order to take account of what had and had not happened, 
revised their views on the course of German history and their evaluation 
of the forces that made history happen, in Germany and elsewhere. Sec-
ond, they changed their strategy by continually abandoning direct politi-
cal action in favor of political instruction. In doing so, they did not simply 
return to prerevolutionary practice. Too much had changed for that to 
happen: the lessons that they now taught were different, and so was the 
nature and objective of their instruction. They exchanged confident pre-
diction for urgent reminders of what Prussia had been (and could be again) 
and hoped that those who would be in power would read their works and 
return to the fray inspired and informed, ready and able to advance Prus-
sia's deeply German interests. The first mature work of this sort, a book 
whose publication is the starting point of the Prussian School of history, 
was Droysen's Life of Field Marshall Count York von Wartenberg (2 vols., 
1851-54). In its pages, Droysen meticulously recorded, but also celebrated 
and recommended, the decisions and doings of the Prussian general who 
in 1812, seeing Prussia's main chance in Napoleon's disaster at Moscow, 
single-handedly and cleverly detached Prussia from the French alliance 
and led her into an alliance with the other powers in the liberating strug-
gle against Napoleon. Droysen was recommending-and Duncker, Haym, 
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and Sybel applauded him for this-clear-sighted recognition of specific 
Prussian interests in German unity, energy in pursuing these interests, and 
unblinkered appreciation of military force and political calculation. 
This was a book Droysen could not have written earlier in his life. It 
simply would not have made sense to do so as long his chief objective was 
to prepare Germans for citizenship, rather than to goad Prussian officials 
to action. Nor would it have made sense to do so as long as Droysen and 
his colleagues were hopeful about the future. York, and the many other, 
later works of the Prussian School, were emplotted so as also to show what 
had gone so badly wrong in 1848 and 1849. That is, the virtues and genius 
of a Field Marshal York (or of any successful Prussian leader) always ap-
pear to be those that the hapless deputies at Frankfort lacked: realism, dy-
namism, state egoism, and the possession of, and readiness· to employ, 
adequate military force. In contrast to such prerevolutionary works as 
Droysen's Lectures on the Wars of Freedom (2 vols., 1846-48), these newer 
works seem refreshingly commonsensical in not equating the future Ger-
many with God's kingdom on earth. They are much less pleasant to read, 
however, because of the recurrent note in them of self-abasement. Not 
squeamish about military force before the revolution, these historians now 
saw force as the real source of legitimacy and were deeply embarrassed 
ever to have thought that mere parliamentary decrees would effect what 
only an army could accomplish. 
None of this is to say that they simply turned their backs on their pre-
vious careers. Most of their postrevolutionary ideas had prerevolutionary 
precedents. They thought, with considerable justice, that they had cor-
rected theory and practice in the light of the lessons learned during the 
successive disappointments encountered between late summer 1848 and 
spring 1849. This new realism, however, was bound to have something 
brutal and opportunistic about it because of their pronounced tendency to 
accept the results of history as by definition good. Recent history seemed 
to show the triumph of force and interest over ideals, and they revised 
their ideas accordingly. This recompounding of their ideas, however, is 
not fully intelligible without at least a brief look at their work after 3 April 
1849, because the two parts of their i"esponse were really answers to two 
very large questions they had not had to pose uptil after Frederick 
William's refusal: What was there left to hope for now? And what should 
they do in the present circumstances? These questions were urgent be-
cause, first, Prussia had not acted as they had ~~pected and, second, they 
now had no obvious political role to play even though tq,eir commitment 
to unification under Prussia remained unbroken. 
After the disappointment at Frankfort in April1849, they agreed about 
what should happen next: Prussia should energetically lead Germany to 
unification, by military means if necessary, while defending and extend-
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ing moderate constitutionalism. For a time, however, they did not agree 
about the tactics that they should employ to encourage this outcome. This 
disagreement, though basically friendly, was most pronounced between 
Droysen and Duncker. Sybel's initial ideas on this subject are not in evi-
dence, although his practice followed the lines laid down by Duncker, and 
Haym, now as earlier, was guided in all political matters by Duncker. The 
disagreement was over the utility of parliamentary politics in the present 
circumstances. It first arose with respect to the status and tasks of the Na-
tional Assembly after Frederick William's refusal. Droysen concluded, 
with harsh realism, that the assembly's work was finished and that the 
deputies should surrender their mandates and go home. After a brief 
intelligence-gathering mission to Berlin in May, he did just that and went 
back to Kiel, which, in acknowledgment of the political retreat that this im-
plied, he referred to as his "Patmos."6 At least for the moment, he was re-
ally quite sure that the old party of the right center had no national role as 
an organization. Affairs were in the hands of the princes and their gov-
ernments, especially Frederick William's. In letters to Duncker, he there-
fore criticized the meeting at Gotha in late June 1849 to reconstitute the 
right center as a party and, despite Duncker's insistent urgings, refused to 
attend the gathering.7 
Duncker saw matters differently. He believed that a reorganization of 
"our firm, our party" would provide much needed "moral support" for 
those in Berlin still set on a national course.S Even before this, he hung on 
at Frankfort for weeks after Droysen thought it useless, because he be-
lieved that the right center could at least bear moral witness against the ex-
tremes of revolution and reaction.9 Moreover, he did not know what else 
to do with his time. It was, as Haym discovered, hard simply to leave pol-
itics and return to the study.!o Droysen, after all, was still associated with 
the provisional government in Schleswig-Holstein; in returning to Kiel, he 
was returning to what seemed to be a major theater of the national strug-
gle. Droysen could not actually do much there, but at least he had an out-
let for his political energy. That seemed enviable at the time. His friends, 
Duncker prominent among them, repeatedly wrote to him in the next two 
years for reports on activities there, and Duncker even briefly considered 
following Heinrich von Gagem's lead and enlisting in the Germafl "olun-
teer army in Schleswig-Holstein for a final, heroic stand against the Danes 
and, perhaps, the Russians.!1 
This disagreement, however, was over tactics, not strategy. In his later 
biography of Duncker, Haym emphasized the remarkably close friendship 
that Droysen and Duncker forged in the final days of the assembly, and es-
pecially noted the frequency and respect with which they corresponded 
about politics in order to discover the best means to common ends.12 The 
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surviving correspondence between the two, and Duncker's own memoir 
on Droysen, bear this OUt.13 They were obviously very close friends-
at least until February 1851, when Duncker, rightly or wrongly, accused 
Droysen of reneging on an agreement to publish his biography of York 
with his father's firm-and they agreed more often than they disagreed.14 
Furthermore, their respective preferences for different tactics were relative 
rather than absolute. Each paid some respect to the other's preference. 
If Droysen considered it foolish to linger at Frankfort and thought that 
the Gotha meeting was useless and ill-advised, he did not suppose that 
it did actual harm or object to Duncker's continuing references to "our 
party" (by which he meant those of the right center who had favored 
hereditary constitutional monarchy under the Hohenzollern). In addition, 
he consistently gave the party, through Duncker and, more sparingly, 
Haym, as much constructive advice as he could. In other words, he evi-
dently wished that Duncker were right, but ill-humoredly doubted that he 
was. Thus, Droysen was delighted that Duncker was elected to the Prus-
sian Parliament in June 1849, obviously thought of him as representing a 
sort of national party, and advised him on tactics. He suggested, for ex-
ample, that, in deference to Prussian opinion, he make as little of his Frank-
fort connections as possible and that he lead his colleagues in a responsible 
opposition with its own program and with a demonstrable readiness to 
guide the conduct of Prussian policy when necessary.15 Similarly, he 
agreed with Duncker that the Berlin-based Konstitutionelle-Zeitung, origi-
nally Hansemann's paper, which Duncker, after great efforts, arranged for 
Haym to edit, was a necessity for Prussia and Germany because their cause 
needed a daily paper.16 Thereafter, he frequently advised Haym on its tone 
and contents and was a frequent contributor,17 These instances show that, 
disillusioned with parliamentary practice as he was, Droysen had not yet 
lost all hope that something might come out of Duncker's strivings. 
He did not believe, however, that such actions could have much effect 
on events, whereas Duncker and his" friends" (including Haym, whom he 
more or less forced to edit the Konstitutionelle Zeitung) still thought that a 
dignified, public exposition of their ideas might move the Prussian au-
thorities in the right direction.18 This was really a difference of opinion 
over how much influence a certain kind of pressure could exert, for they 
all agreed on the direction in which Prussia needed to move and that only 
moral pressure, sooner or later, could occasion that movement. For his 
part, Duncker returned to parliamentary politics with some reluctance, 
and even before Olmiitz seriously considered the sort of retirement that 
Droysen had recommended.19 That was logical, because Duncker also 
agreed with Droysen that Prussian military power now held the key to na-
tional developments and that, in the last analysis, the Prussian king and 
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his ministers had to decide whether and when to turn that key. This was 
not a conclusion drawn from cynicism or militarism. Rather, it was a find-
ing based on their hopes and experiences. They wanted unification with-
out revolution, and Prussia had refused the compromise that the assembly 
had offered. Obviously, the princes would have to be forced to go where 
they would not be led, and Prussia was the obvious candidate for forcing 
them because history had selected her for national leadership by making 
her the only major German state with an interest in and ability for such 
leadership. 
With that as his outlook, Duncker visited Berlin in late May, conferred 
with Princess Augusta and Prince William, and recorded his words to 
them in an unpublished essay. He spoke and wrote of the need for Prussia 
to conquer Germany, not only morally by proclaiming national and liberal 
goals, but also militarily by overawing Germany with its army and forcing 
the other states either to follow its lead or, in Austria's case, to stand aside 
while Prussia unified the rest of the nation: "One must see batallions and 
hear trumpets everywhere."2o Droysen was of much the same opinion, and 
his word choice shows clearly his heightened appreciation of force in the 
making of history. On 6 June 1849, he complained to his old friend Wil-
helm Arendt that Prussia had erred in not accepting power from the as-
sembly and now had no sensible recourse but to obtain it by force: "Now 
purely Prussian Uetzt nur stockpreuj3isch)! There will be another national 
power (Reichsmacht) if this Prussia obstinately seeks its position by its own 
will and according to Germany's demonstrated necessity. Power is the 
best legitimacy (Macht ist die beste Legitimitiit)."21 Not only is this the lan-
guage of force. It is also the language of moral voluntarism, which also be-
came a major element in his postrevolutionary historiography. Prussia had 
to act "obstinately" and "by its own will." Stubborn wanting had replaced 
the freely dawning consciousness of Droysen's prerevolutionary analysis 
of history. The real question between Droysen and Duncker, then, was 
how to get Prussia to decide to use the power she possessed. 
Duncker's answer, and it seemed tenable to him until the Prussian 
government discredited itself at Olmiitz, was moral persuasion. He wanted 
there to be an active and identifiable center party throughout Germany to 
tell Germans in general and the Prussian government in particular what 
ought to be done and to offer a clear alternative to the timid and reac-
tionary policies that he found too much in evidence at Berlin. For that rea-
son, Duncker defended to the skeptical Droysen the Gotha meeting of 
liberals bent on supporting Prussia's Union Constitution, and he worked 
hard to find a suitable editor (Haym finally agreed after several other can-
didates, including Droysen, refused) for the daily Konstitutionelle Zeitung,22 
His lobbying with Prussian officials and with Augusta and William in May 
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1849 was another form of persuasion. He also believed in the continued 
need for parliamentary wprk, uncongenial though he found it. He there-
fore allowed his followers at Halle to nominate him for a seat in the 
Prussian lower house to which, despite the introduction of the notorious 
three-class electoral system and a growing distrust of the left with which, 
unfairly, many now associated him, he was elected by a solid majority in 
July 1849.23 In January 1850, he also agreed to run for a seat in the Erfurt 
Parliament.24 
In one respect, continued parliamentary activity was an extension of 
his efforts to persuade. Duncker was not fond of speaking, but a seat pro-
vided a forum from which to spread his views. He also wanted some op-
portunity to influence policy. In Berlin, he worked to prevent reactionary 
revisions of the Prussian constitution (he became a member of the Consti-
tutional Committee) and to keep Prussian foreign policy firm in the de-
fense of Schleswig-Holstein and in the pursuit of national unification.25 
Similarly, at Erfurt-where Sybel also sat as a deputy-Duncker worked 
energetically and effectively to secure the presidency for the liberal 
Eduard Simson.26 Even Droysen, who came to Erfurt as a spectator, saw 
this as a major accomplishment, though he did not single out Duncker 
for praiseP 
It is hard to say how much Duncker expected to come of these efforts, 
but his stated hopes were modest enough. In a remark specifically in-
tended to persuade Droysen to attend the June 1849 gathering at Gotha but 
that has wider relevance for his view of his activities, he said simply: "We 
two cannot do much, but we can do something."28 Of course, he would not 
have put himself to the trouble of attending if he had thought that any ef-
fort would fail. One suspects that his hopes were higher than his statement 
suggests, if only because he became so angry when Prussia did not follow 
the advice that he and his colleagues offered. 
At one point in July 1849, he felt almost ready "to prefer the democratic 
hoggishness (Schweinerel) to the princely" -a remarkable confession for 
Duncker.29 Haym later recalled Duncker's view of the Erfurt Parliament as 
a battle to be won if, but only if, the party of unification could display mas-
sive powers of endurance.3o It is also worth noting that Duncker was furi-
ous after what he considered the faked battle between Prussia and Austria 
at Bronzell in October 1850 and the consequent abandonment of Prussian 
plans for national unification at Olmiitz. He was enraged because he 
felt deceived. After some hesitation, he decided to serve out his term in 
the Prussian Parliament, though he now felt that its work was useless. 
Duncker now shifted, quite naturally, to what he did best: advancing po-
litical arguments through historical writing. This strategy was not entirely 
new to him, of course. Before 1848 he had used historical lectures to pre-
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pare educated Germans for moral citizenship, and since the revolution 
he had written two historical works with strong political implications, 
namely, his History of the German National Assembly at Frankfort (1849) and 
his Heinrich von Gagern (1850).31 Those were reflective works that told Ger-
man liberals what they had done right and what wrong. He now put his 
main effort into researching the slender volumes of contemporary history, 
Four Weeks of Foreign Policy and, later, Four Months of Foreign Policy. Both 
were carefully researched exposes of what he portrayed as treacherous 
and cowardly Prussian subservience to Austria and, behind her, Russia. 
These were polemical histories about what official Prussia had done 
wrong. This criticism was no doubt a consequence of pent up disappoint-
ment at many Prussian failures, but it also reveals the same kind of moral 
voluntarism noted in Droysen's statements in 1849. Prussia had acted 
badly because she had not willed to act rightly. This was very different 
from Duncker's earlier confident belief in historical process. The immedi-
ate result, it must be added, was an unsuccessful official prosecution of 
Duncker and his publisher Veit. Interestingly and suspiciously, he pub-
lished both works with Veit in Berlin, and his earlier book on Gagem with 
Costenlohe and Remmelmann in Leipzig. All his other works to date, in-
cluding his politically more matter-of-fact History of the German National 
Assembly, were published by his family firm Duncker and Humblot. Per-
haps he expected to be prosecuted.32 
Droysen, by contrast, returned to historical instruction immediately 
after he left Frankfort in 1849 because he was more pessimistic about the 
chances for progress in the near future. He therefore chose to await its 
eventual resumption while writing histories of Prussian politics that iden-
tified sound and unsound tendencies in Prussian history in order to 
remind Prussian statesmen both to pursue the former and to shun the lat-
ter. To that extent, his intention was didactic. He proposed more than sim-
ple moralizing, however, inasmuch as he identified sound policies with 
Prussian interests and Prussian interests with German unification and the 
concomitant benefits of national strength and the reconciliation of freedom 
with authority. He was still in the business of prediction, though his pre-
dictions now dealt with the future play of state interests more than with 
the triumph of moral ideals. Again, this was a response to political failure, 
and in this response Droysen changed not only his strategy but also the 
analysis on which that strategy rested. Droysen had taught those lessons 
before, but now he wanted to remind rulers of their duties rather than to 
prepare Germans for citizenship. Prussia's disappointing performance to 
date had heightened his appreciation of moral will as a factor in history. 
In addition, though the distinction may at first seem tenuous, Droysen 
had earlier treated Prussian self-interest as a means to the end of state-
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hood. He now treated it as an end as well as a means. In addition, his 
earlier predictions were cosmopolitan because he considered national 
unification a solution to a universal problem of freedom. It would primar-
ily benefit Germany, but it would also bless the whole world by resolving 
the world historical problem of freedom discussed in early chapters. Now 
Droysen wrote only about the good unification would do for Prussia and 
Germany. In the process, he stopped referring to God in his writings. This 
does not mean that Droysen lost his faith. Indeed, his resignation no doubt 
followed at least in part from a certainty that God would at last provide a 
way that he, Droysen, could not discover. But Droysen now directed his 
analysis so closely to objective self-interest that it no doubt seemed beside 
the point to invoke Providence. He continued to think of history as pur-
posive and self-justifying, but power-and the will to use it-now seemed 
the mechanism that made history move. The assembly had possessed the 
will but lacked the power, Prussia the power but not the will. Droysen 
wanted to be sure that the next time, and he believed that there would be 
a next time, the two, will and power, would come together. In any case, a 
confident Augustinian sense of where history is going is inherently unsta-
ble, because by definition human beings cannot truly understand what 
God has in mind. Droysen stopped talking about God because bad times 
showed that the ways of Providence were less intelligible than they once 
had seemed. ' 
This outlook had the further advantage of assuring Droysen that what 
had gone wrong was not his fault. He told Duncker in a letter of 13 June 
1849 to remember: "Now we are only private people."33 There was, at least, 
some satisfaction in being right when so many others were wrong. He felt 
betrayed by the princes and, worse, by the German people, but at least his 
own conscience was clear.34 If history was somehow providential, there 
was no possibility of simply condemning its outcome. Moreover, Droysen 
was actually optimistic, if only in terms of a peculiar logic distantly de-
rived from Hegel. He reasoned that things had become so bad thilt they 
had to become better. Because he believed that it was in Prussia's interest 
to unify Germany, and because he saw Prussia now following the oppo-
site course with predictably unhappy effects, he concluded that circum-
stances alone would soon force Prussia onto the right path.35 
Droysen's new historical writings, accordingly, had the added advan-
tage of reassuring him about the future. Granted, he could not always 
maintain such equanimity. Right after Olmiitz, for example, he wrote to 
his old friend Gruner in some anxiety, but at nearly the same time he as-
sured Duncker that everything would have come right within ten years.36 
In general terms, and for similar reasons, he reasoned as, a little later, 
Marxists waiting for revolution would reason: the worse, the better. Of 
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course, they also were working with the implications of Hegeli~ dialec-
tic: What went wrong now, because it irritated and energized, made later 
success all the more certain. More specifically, Droysen took comfort in 
precedents in Prussian history: periods of defeat and seeming decline, the 
Seven Years' War or the Napoleonic conquest, had always given way to re-
form and new advances, the League of Princes (Fiirstenbund) or the re-
forms under SteinP Of course, this was not an entirely new component in 
his thinking, because long before the revolution he had envisioned Ger-
many's modem history as an instance of the last becoming the first. Now, 
however, a somewhat revised interpretation of the logic of Prussian his-
tory sustained him in these comforting thoughts. 
The best known of Droysen's contributions to the literature of the 
Prussian School is his massive yet incomplete History of Prussian Politics. 
The first volume appeared in 1855, and he published sixteen volumes ofit 
before his death in 1886. Despite his own longevity, Droysen's life ran out 
faster than Prussia's diplomatic and military history; when he died, his 
narration had not come within a century of the present. This immense 
book was the logical product of this postrevolutionary musings. In a lead 
article for the Konstitutionelle Zeitung, written in part to help the always im-
portunate Haym, who had otherwise to fill the front page as well as proof- . 
read copy and see it to the .printer, he wrote on 10 October 1850: "Some-
one must finally decide to write an histoire de la diplomatie prussienne; that 
will be very instructive."38 He also wrote to his brother Karl in May 1851 
about the need for such a work.39 This work, however, was still a distant 
prospect; it would require, obviously, extended research, and the relevant 
archives were not yet open to Droysen. For the present, his seminal con-
tribution was the work mentioned above, his Life of Field Marshall Count 
York von Wartenburg.40 This portrait of the great Field Marshal is important 
because, through meticulous scholarship, it admiringly shows him exem-
plifying the traits that Droysen, in his History of Prussian Politics, would as-
sociate with the sweep of the Prussian past. 
To be sure, the work was also meant to instill a sentimental Prussian 
patriotism. In a defensive but basically honest answer to Theodor von 
Schon, to whom he frequently wrote for material on York and who de-
manded that he emphasize the "specific Prussianness" (spezifischen PrellfJ-
enthums) of York, Droysen sentimentally recalled seeing" old Blucher" on 
his horse in front of his father's house in 1813 and claimed always, even in 
1848, to have worked in Prussia's interest because those were Germany's 
and, as in 1813, Prussia could again raise herself to greatness by identify-
ing her history with Germany's.41 He wanted his biography to have just 
that effect. Nor did he suppose that only he could or should write to such 
an effect. For example, in a letter dated 15 January 1851, written to Field 
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Marshall Karl Count von Muffling (who had been quartermaster-general 
of Prussia's Silesian army in the 1813 campaign) to solicit further informa-
tion about General York, Droysen suggested that Muffling himself write a 
memoir to inspire the present generation with past Prussian greatness, 
even-or especially-if he brought the story II only to 1815."42 
His larger purpose remained instruction of responsible Prussial) offi-
cials in such historical verities as would suit them for the kind of princi-
pled opportunism he admired in the field marshal. In this respect, York 
was a summing up as well as an anticipation. Its characteristic assump-
tions had already appeared in Droysen's important essay, dated 7 August 
1849 and printed by Duncker and Humblot, entitled "Prussia and the Sys-
tem of the Great Powers: Opinions of a Schleswig-Holsteiner."43 That work 
deserves careful consideration. Apart from having the claim of chrono-
logical priority, it has three other noteworthy features. First, Droysen him-
self thought highly of it. He often referred to it in his correspondence, and, 
in a lead article written anonymously for the Konstitutionelle Zeitung in 
1850, he coyly recommended it as a genial and persuasive work.44 Far from 
being a merely incidental piece, it was an authoritative statement of his 
postrevolutionary views and a preliminary statement of ideas that he 
would soon treat at much greater length. Second, it is wonderfully com-
prehensive in its treatment of Prussia's past, especially its recent past, and 
its future prospects. Its brevity, and the purely illustrative use of evidence 
permitted this since it enforced trenchant generalization. Detail and schol-
arly caution make York a more tentative statement of the same themes. 
Third, and important as evidence of Droysen's conscious effort to revise 
his prerevolutionary views in light of revolutionary and postrevolution-
ary experience, he put an old insight to new uses. 
The old insight was his thesis that the 1815 settlement condemned 
Prussia for geographical and demographic reasons to be the least of the 
five II great powers" (England, France, Russia, and Austria were the others) 
on terms that ultimately would force Prussia to unify Germany, if only as 
a means to augment its own power.45 This thesis had first appeared in full 
form in his article liThe Political Position of Prussia," written in 1845, with 
Duncker's agreement, for the Halle'sche Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung, and 
thereafter was a commonplace in Droysen's political reckonings. This ba-
sic thesis, however, now received several new elaborations and emphases 
that became characteristic of the Prussian School. The first of these was his 
claim that Prussian history consisted in a series of II great crises" in which 
the monarchy found itself called on to decide its future and, consequently, 
the future of Germany. In other words, crises like the present one were 
common, and they could be mastered if only the requisite moral will was 
present in Prussia's rulers. Prussia had not always made the right deci-
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sions in the past (for example, it had not in 1815), but it often had. He 
hoped that it would do so now, and he was sure that, eventually, it 
would.46 Of course, this was a case in point of the new importance that he 
attached to will and decisive action as factors in history. Those who ruled 
Prussia had to learn, presumably in part through studying works like this, 
to act resolutely in the Prussian and German interest. Relatedly, he also 
placed much greater emphasis than previously on the importance of self-
interest. He had always supposed that Providence worked through self-
interested historical agents, but he had not previously held up the ruthless 
pursuit of self-interest as a sufficient as well as necessary cause of change. 
For example, after demonstrating the anti-German tendency of Austria's 
pursuit of her own interests, he asked rhetorically whether Prussia did not 
also follow "only its own interest," only to reply: "God grant, that it fully, 
ruthlessly, quite boldly follow its interest; because it embraces not only a 
third of the nation but-thanks to the artificial politics of 1815-its disjecta 
membra are spread from the extreme northeast to the southwest of the Fa-
therland." Any state so placed, he believed, would find it "convenient" 
that its contours fit those of the larger nation and that it could profit from 
their incorporation.47 His argument, one that he repeated in his corre-
spondence, was that Prussia had only to pursue remorselessly its own self-
ish interests and Germany would be unified.48 
This celebration of will and selfishness as the agents of history'S mak-
ing derived, in tum, from an avowedly realistic acknowledgment of the 
centrality of force. When he turned to the events of 1848, he tried to dis-
tinguish reality from appearance. "The March Revolution," he explained, 
"appearecr at last to have put the nation's destiny into its own hands. 
'German Unity' was the magic word that promised to free us from all 
evil." Of course, that had not been the case. He had always been skeptical 
about legal formalities, but now he was openly contemptuous: "It is an 
empty verbal debate, whether the parliament could decree through the 
power of national sovereignty, or whether it had only the mandate to 
contract. It had [the] right insofar as it had power (Es hatte Recht, so weit es 
Macht hatte); and that ended at just the point where it had to be most ef-
fective." The historical moral seemed clear: "Realities began to triumph 
over ideals, interests over abstractions."49 This attitude, which in 1853 
Ludwig August von Rochau enduringly christened Realpolitik, was less 
cynical than at first it seems. Droysen did not mean that "ideals" and "ab-
stractions" counted for nothing; he did mean that they should be counted 
on to the extent, and only to the extent, that they were backed by ade-
quate force. In a sense, that is both a truism and an exaggeration, but it 
mattered to Droysen less as a moral proposition than as an assurance that 
unity and freedom were eventually inevitable because Prussia had an in.,. 
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terest in them and had the power to achieve them-if only she possessed 
the requisite will. 
To achieve that will, she had only to compare her interests to those of 
her great historical rival, Austria. Here was another, though more spe-
cific, change in his thinking, this one dating back to his posing of the 
"question to Austria" the previous autumn. He now no longer expected 
to gain Austria's German provinces for Germany and therefore had less 
reason to conceal his opinions about Austrian statecraft. Moreover, he 
rightly saw in Schwarzenberg's government in Vienna a resourceful op-
ponent of national unification. Even so, given his new appreciation, he re-
luctantly admired Austria for its historical successes: "Who fails to note 
the glorious past of this proud Habsburg monarchy? While we other Ger-
mans declined and our name became shameful, Austria had its victories 
over the Turks, its dominion over Hungary and Italy, its European poli-
tics. But it lived from the decline of Germany; its greatness was condi-
tioned by our impotence. The policy of Austria was and is not to let 
Germany act for itself."so 
Droysen had become "little German" (kleindeutsch), in the updated 
meaning of the term and with a passion. Germany should be "small" in the 
sense that Austria would not be part of it. Austria's exclusion from a uni-
fied Germany was no longer the regrettable but necessary result of the 
impossibility of having two masters in'the same house. She had to be ex.,. 
cluded because her interests were, in historical tendency, inimical to those 
of the larger Germany. 
Prussian interests, by happy contrast, corresponded exactly with those 
of Germany as a whole. Droysen was at pains to rebut the common charge 
that Prussia had been the ruin of the Holy Roman Empire. He insisted in-
stead that "out of the dividedne~s, out of the rottenness of the empire" 
Prussia had arisen as the only power capable of "national development."sl 
This, of course, was the governing thesis of the sixteen volumes of the His-
tory of Prussian Politics. In the present work, Droysen chose for reasons of 
space to limit his examples to the policies of Frederick the Great, Stein, and 
the founding of the customs union (Zollverein), which he singled out for 
special praise. These were instances of his larger claim that Prussian rulers 
always, when they really pursued their own interests, simultaneously ad-
vanced those of Germany. . 
That finding, of course, had powerful and immediate bearing on pre-
sent politics: "Now more than ever Prussia must seek its calling and its 
strength in German development." This meant, first, recognizing that the 
(l;erman Confederation was not only not in Prussia's interest but had ac-
tually been founded contrary to that interest.S2 Never a respecter of legal 
niceties, especially in international law, Droysen now implicitly invoked 
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his older conception of the "right of history" to justify a radical Prussian 
revision of the German political system: 
The affair of the nation is now in Prussia's hands (Die Sache der Nation ist jetzt bei 
Preuften). And Prussia can save it and itself in no other way than by making a 
deeper historical right (tiefere historische Recht) of a great national development cur-
rent against the dead rules, used only as a pretext, whose inability to confine it [na-
tional development] any further is factually proyen. Prussia must henceforth take 
upon itself alone the position in Germany that it was supposed to share with Aus-
tria .... Prussia must be ready to break the apex of the system of 1815, this 
deathbed of the middle of Europe, because notto be able to do so means its doom.53 
This was a pretty brutal view of affairs. When, in earlier years, Droysen 
invoked the "right of history," he had done so defensively in order to re-
fute the immobilism of the doctrine of "historical rights" to which he, as 
a moderate, felt nonetheless drawn. Now he was so mastered by his love 
for the idea of a unified nation that he was calling for Prussia to defy the 
existing treaty system, surely by force, for the sake of unification and 
national power. 
He was quite explicit about this. Droysen employed phrases that an-
ticipate Bismarck's famous "blood and iron" speech of 1862. (That is not 
surprising; according to Droysen's student Alfred Dove, Bismarck read 
and greatly admired Droysen's essay.) For example, Droysen concluded 
the work by arguing: "Not from freedom, not from national declarations 
was the unity of Germany to be achieved. It required a power against the 
other powers, to break their resistance, to defend us against their selfish-
ness."54 This was, of course, more than just a promise, or threat, of war. It 
was also a complete break with the latent cosmopolitanism of his prerev-
olutionary theories. He more or less assumed the hostility, because of ad-
versarial interests, of all the other powers, though in later writings he 
speculated about the possibility of an alliance with England.55 
This view of national prospects explains Droysen's disinclination to 
attend further party meetings or to conduct further parliamentary busi-
ness. That is, by arguing in these terms he left matters to the Prussian king, 
his government, and his army. His actions were consistent with his con-
victions, and inJater years he made it a practice to intervene in day-to-day 
politics only on issues affecting higher education.56 But it was really not in 
his nature to stand aside. The Prussian School, again, was a response to 
failure in two ways. It was a response inasmuch as it was a revision of a 
prior analysis of history, and the contents of "Prussia and the System of the 
Great Powers" show clearly the effects of that revision. It was also a re-
sponse in strategy, and Droysen's withdrawal from practical politics was 
merely the negative side of that response. Publishing works like this was 
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its positive aspect. Droysen thought that telling the truth would help his-
tory follow its proper course. 
Droysen plainly thought that this literature was an area in which he 
himself could make a signal contribution through his publications. Indeed, 
in these years his career became bifurcated. At least after he left Kiel, where 
because of his political past he was no longer welcome as a state servant 
on the faculty, he no longer made political instruction the central focus of 
his teaching. He did teach recent history at Jena, but his lectures also dealt 
with historical methodology and in his seminar he led students to a vari-
ety of topics, many of them far afield from modem, and modem German, 
history.57 Actually, that made a good deal of sense, given his new defini-
tion of purpose: He no longer needed to direct his political lessons at the 
general, even the general academic, public, though he did need to produce 
books for Prussia's present and future rulers. Over the longer term, his 
sense of this need led him to project and then, to the extent that time per-
mitted, to complete his History of Pruss ian Politics. 
He certainly tried to achieve it. His introduction to the work accurately 
stated the moral that the thousand succeeding pages ~~re to document. 
His first paragraph, obviously composed with a view to the present, read: 
"Never has a state raised itself more quickly and proudly than Prussia af-
ter the days of Jena." Droysen conceded that events elsewhere contributed 
to national liberation, but he insisted that "the essential point" was that 
Prussia "picked itself up," that men "crowded to create new goals and 
form for the old strength and loyalty of Prussianness."His stated purpose 
was to write a "remembrance" (GediichtnijJ) for one of the men "from that 
circ1e."58 A GediichtnijJ, of course, is a memorial piece, invariably a work of 
praise, usually uncritical praise. Droysen wanted to praise York because 
by withdrawing the Prussian contingent from the French grande armee and 
allying it with the now advancing Russians, he had liberated Prussia and 
helped overthrow Napoleon. In his present exultation of force and will, 
however, Droysen admired York's ruthlessness to the point of antagoniz-
ing Schon, who cut off relations with him after the book appeared.59 Droy-
sen's purpose, transparently and avowedly, was to present a figure for 
imitation and admiration, and in this he succeeded. The work was long for 
a biography, though not unduly so, and it was generally quite readable. 
Nevertheless, Sybel's criticism that Droysen was too "laconic" in his analy-
ses is well founded.60 
At least, the York biography was more influential than his History of 
Prussian Politics, for obvious reasons. First, it was more accessible. Even a 
long biography, with a "laconic" interpretive voice, is easier to handle than 
a history that begms in the fourteenth century and promises to proceed, 
volume after long volume, through the years until death of author or the 
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conclusion of Prussian history stops it. Droysen promised a lot in his in-
troduction to the History, but any discerning reader knew that it would 
take him many years to keep that promise. Second, the biography ap-
peared at the right time. Its first volume was published in 1851, when those 
who wanted to believe in Prussia's mission most needed encouragement, 
and when Georg Heinrich Pertz's four-volume biography of Stein was still 
literary news. Pertz's work aroused interest in the lives of the Prussian re-
formers without satisfying it and seemed long, diffuse, and too unsympa-
thetic to its subject. Droysen's work shone in contrast. Moreover, it had the 
advantage that biography has over history in the matter of didacticism: it 
showed virtues in action, exercised by a single agent for his own reasons 
but also for the general good. In his foreword to the History, Droysen 
promised the same benefits by claiming that he was interested in the pre-
sent and its needs and that his book would meet those needs by "under-
standing through research (forschend zu verstehen)."61 York, by contrast, 
offered this benefit through the inspection of a single, active life and was 
correspondingly influential. 
The reactions of his historical and political colleagues to York must 
have gratified Droysen. Certainly these reactions show the essential affini-
ties among their views. Sybel, for example, was delighted with its contents 
and its thesis. Droysen and he had been in friendly correspondence at least 
since January 1849, though they briefly lost contact the following year and 
in October 1850 Droysen asked Sybel's brother-in-law about him.62 In June 
1851 Sybel wrote to Droysen in reply to the latter's solicitation of an arti-
cle for a scholarly monthly that Droysen planned to publish, though noth-
ing came of the plans. Sybel liked the book for reasons that Droysen 
appreciated. Sybel had been writing critical letters to the Braunschweige Re-
ichszeitung in order to refute their thesis that Prussian "regeneration" was 
"hopeless" and that only "Prussia's defeat" could bring "our political sal-
vation." Sybel, of course, disagreed and was distressed at how these views 
were dividing the "party" to which he and Droysen adhered. He said that 
he welcomed York because it made it easier to refute these views by show-
ing, as Droysen intended, the latent strength that Prussia possessed even 
in moments of weakness and defeat.63 He noted and appreciated Droy-
sen's intended parallelism between York's age and his own. For the pre-
sent, however, Sybel did not imitate Droysen's example. He had too much 
else to do. At the time he wrote to Droysen, he was investigating earlier ex-
amples of the Roman influence on early German kingship that he first 
wrote about, controversially, in 1844. In addition, he was about to begin 
research for his magisterial History of the Revolutionary Age, which he first 
projected in the spring of 1848 with the contemporary Hessian revolution 
in mind. This work reflected far deeper interest in social forces than Droy-
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sen showed.64 By late summer he was already consulting the archives in 
Paris, and the first volume appeared in 1853. Sybel turned to sustained re-
search in Prussian history only later, at first in minor works, such as his 
published lecture "On the Development of Absolute Monarchy in Prus-
sia," given at Bonn in August 1863 and then, more massively, in 1886, 
when he began to publish his six-volume Founding of the German Empire by 
William 1. This, of course, was after unification and after the relevant source 
materials were present.65 In a sense, however, he was resuming a task he 
began in a small way in 185l. 
Certainly Droysen saw in Sybel a historiographic as well as political 
ally. He was delighted at Sybel's praise of York, despite Sybel's accompa-
nying, and warranted, criticism of his prose style. That was more than an 
instance of gratified vanity; Droysen was pleased because Sybel approved 
the book's political utility.66 This pleasure seems to have informed the next 
stage in his correspondence with Sybel. On 9 September 1851, he wrote to 
inform Sybel that, for political reasons, he was leaving Kiel for a chair at 
Jena and invited him to fill the vacancy. He did so with the approval of the 
university authorities, but his insistent and repeated efforts at persuasion 
show that he really wanted Sybel to exchange Marburg for Kiel, presum-
ably so that Sybel could continue Droysen's political orientation there.67 In 
the event, after the reimposition of Danish authority, it was hard to win of-
ficial approval. The delay annoyed Sybel, and he withdrew his applica-
tion.68 Droysen would not have involved himself so deeply in recruiting 
Sybel unless he thought that he represented the same political and histor-
ical approach. He was really not that tolerant a person. For that reason, 
Droysen repaid Sybel's earlier compliments when the first volume of The 
History of the Revolutionary Age appeared. He thought it much the best book 
on the subject and found it politically instructive. It taught contemporaries 
what not to do. His only criticism, and here too he was repaying Sybel, was 
stylistic. He thought that Sybel was too much influenced by Ranke and 
thus too prone to include detail. This made it hard to find the forest be-
cause of the trees. Droysen simply assumed, correctly, that Sybel agreed 
with him that "our science is one of those that, above everything, should 
make a person better; its best strength is of an ethical nature (den Menschen 
auch besser machen sollen; ihre beste Kraft ist ethischer Art}."69 
Haym was also deeply impressed by Droysen's York. Haym was 
bound to approve the political and moral tenor of York because it was the 
same as his own. During his tenure as editor of the Konstitutionelle Zeitung, 
Haym gladly published lead articles submitted in 1850 by Droysen, most 
of which in one way or another drew on his interpretation of Prussian his-
tory, not just because he was harried and overworked but because he 
agreed with them.70 Droysen's York, however, was important for Haym in 
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a more special sense. It helped give him a sense of vocation, professional 
and political, when he most needed it. In order to see how this was so, it is 
necessary briefly to review some pertinent facts in Haym's professional 
biography. When Haym entered politics in 1848, he had completed his 
inaugural dissertation but not his Habilitationsschrift, the second, more 
demanding dissertation. He was in the unenviable, though not unusual, 
situation of possessing the title" doctor" while lacking an academic career. 
He could not teach in a university, and that was what he wanted to do. 
When he left Frankfort in 1849, therefore, his first intention was to remedy 
this situation through prompt habilitation before the Prussian authorities 
took unfavorable note of his recent political activities. To this end, he sub-
mitted his prerevolutionary article "Philosophy" and successfully de-
fended it while maintaining secrecy about his simultaneous editorship of 
the Konstitutionelle Zeitung.71 
This gave him the standing he desired, but little else. After his ejection 
from Berlin in the wake of an article that he wrote and published about the 
Punctation of Olmiitz, he periodically gave the unpaid lectures that he was 
now entitled to give at the University of Halle, but he could not find a pay-
ing position. Inevitably, he ran out of money and decided to support him-
self while he looked for an appointment by writing works that would 
convey major intellectual truths to a literate lay readership.72 That decision 
posed a major problem beyond the obvious one of how to support himself 
with publications of that sort. The problem followed from his simultane-
ous determination to write works that were politically instructive. Now as 
before, heeamestly wanted national unification under Prussia, but he was 
still haunted by the difficulty that he experienced before 1848: he wanted 
to argue from history but he still had no real historical training. Droysen's 
York made this difficulty more acute. Between 1849 and 1851 Georg Hein-
rich Pertz's four volumes on the life of Stein appeared. Then, in 1851, York 
was published and Haym read and liked it. Droysen's book, and the pre~ 
vious examples of Dahlmann's prerevolutionary histories of the English 
and French revolutions, at first suggested to Haym the possibility of miri-
ing Pertz's book for materials for a short and readable life of Stein. He 
abandoned this idea, however, because of his unfamiliarity with adminis-
trative techniques and because it was obviously dubious simply to rewrite 
someone else's work and publish the results under one's own name.73 
Haym could not, however, abandon the idea of writing some kind of 
history. He was too impressed with the effect of Droysen's work, even 
though he also thought that it was too demanding for a large public to 
read,74 He thought that biography, because of the possibility of establish-
ing an elective affinity between the reader and the character read about, 
was an excellent means for political and moral instruction. He probably 
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felt that sort of attraction to individual lives himself. This much, at least, 
is clear: in both his autobiography and his life of Duncker, he recalls the 
excitement aroused by Droysen's book and also recalls that it was much 
discussed in meetings at Gotha, sponsored by Duke Ernst of Coburg, the 
brother of Victoria's Prince Albert, held to consider literary alternatives to 
practical politics during the current period of reaction. He also mentions 
that in these meetings the instructional use of biography was a favorite 
topic.75 In the same period, 1851-52, he finally abandoned his alternate 
plan of writing a synthetic intellectual history of Germany from Kant 
to the present in favor of writing intellectual biographies of leading Ger-
man thinkers. He had already, as a stopgap to earn some money, written 
on Friedrich Gentz; he now began to write such works as a matter of 
course, beginning with his biography of Wilhelm von Humboldt.76 Droy-
sen's work, though by no means the sole cause, had contributed heavily 
to Haym's discovery of a way in which he could write politically instruc-
tive history. 
In the same period, Duncker also turned to political historiography as 
the best means for remedying Germany's present political ills. He had, 
again, employed it as a secondary strategy before Olmiitz with his history 
of the National Assembly and his brief biography of Heinrich von Gagern. 
He used it for moral and political indictment just after Olmiitz, when he 
published, first, "Four Weeks of Foreign Policy" and, then, "Four Months 
of Foreign Policy" in order to show what he took to be the cowardice and 
deceit of Prussia's government in the face of Austrian and Russian oppo-
sition. These were detailed and convincing works that showed a remark-
able ability to infer the details and nuances of Prussian foreign policy. As 
Haym rightly remarked, they were unsurpassed in detail and accuracy un-
til Sybel, with the archives opened to him by now friendly Prussian au-
thorities, published his Foundation of the German Empire.77 These works 
showed his talent and inclination for the political use of history, but he also 
wrote each for specific purposes. The history of the assembly began as a 
report to his electors that he decided to share with the larger public to ex-
plain what had gone wrong, and his work on Gagern was written at the re-
quest of a publisher planning a larger anthology of short biographies.78 As 
previously explained, his two works on Prussian foreign policy were re-
sults of his anger, the effect of his belief that he had to do something. 
In the wake of Olmiitz, however, Duncker decided that a more con-
sistent and ambitious historiographic strategy was necessary, although in 
the event he did little himself to carry it into effect, because he had long 
ago committed himself to write his History of Antiquity and was just then 
writing the first volume.79 His own writings on Prussian history came 
only later, maWy after 1867, when he was appointed director of the 
214 Droysen and the Prussian School of History 
Prussian State Archives, and took the form of detailed monographs on 
particular subjects. That is not surprising because, by then, Droysen al-
ready was producing the synthetic account that Duncker thought the pre-
sent circumstances required. Duncker's actual output is less important 
here than the convergence of his views with those of Droysen on the need 
for historical works that would show the prior tendency of Prussian his-
tory and teach Prussia's leaders how to behave in the future. He certainly 
had a lot planned, before the demands of his existing obligations over-
whelmed his new projects. He was very excited by the meetings at Gotha 
in 1853 held to coordinate literary and historical efforts in behalf of unifi-
cation, the same meetings that Haym attended in which Droysen's York 
was held up as an example of what could be accomplished.80 Despite 
their tiff about Droysen's choice of publishers for York, Duncker awaited 
its appearance impatiently.81 
In the aftermath of the Gotha meeting in 1853, that book,and the larger 
genre of instructive biographies, was very much on Duncker's mind. He 
wrote to Droysen on 11 December 1853 in the friendliest terms. Those at 
the session had instructed him to ask Droysen for advice about whether it 
would be fair to the publisher Riemer for him to write a short biography 
of Stein based entirely on Pertz's recent work and to find out if, as Georg 
Wilhelm Nitsch claimed, Droysen was himself working on a book on the 
reaction in Prussia. He asked only for "suggestions and advice," though 
Droysen thought that he wanted to write a popular condensation of his 
own York-permission for which he readily gave. Droysen may have read 
carelessly, or perhaps he read very carefully between the lines, because a 
popularization of Droysen was a major item of discussion at the meetings. 
Certainly, he understood the kind of work that Duncker had in mind. As 
Duncker stated in the letter, he was already rewriting Pertz's Stein and was 
seriously considering writing biographies of the Prussian military re-
former Scharnhorst and of Wilhelm von Humboldt (as Haym, also at the 
meetings, eventually did for the latter).82 A nearly contemporary letter 
from Droysen to Gustav Freytag, who was also at Gotha and wrote inde-
pendently to Droysen, shows that Droysen thought that the great need 
was for work in the unexplored areas of Prussian social and agrarian his-
tory, but he also welcomed Duncker's plans to do what he had done with 
York's life with his and other lives and in a popular form.83 
In fact, Duncker's letter shows his final adherence to the strategy that 
Droysen had advised since the end of the National Assembly, namely, the 
use of histOriography to prepare for a renewed effort at national unifica-
tion under Prussia. It also shows a partial renewal of Duncker's opti-
mism. He responded to recent complaints by Droysen about 
"materialism" by claiming also to see·"germs of something better": "I see 
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these above all ill the direction that our literature on history, on recent 
history and Prussian history, is taking and in the public's participation in 
these matters. We have to support this tendency against the materialism 
of natural science and to put the real idealism of history (realen Idealismus 
der Historie) in the place of the fantastical idealism of philosophy (phan-
tastischen Idealismus der Philosophie) that filled and blew around in the 
heads of youth before 1848."84 
Before 1848, in his Crisis of the Reformation, Duncker had drawn a con-
trast between "philosophical" and "historical" idealism in order to distin-
guish between two ways of viewing and acting in the world. Now he used 
analogous terms to distinguish between two genres of moral instruction. 
This was, of course, an acknowledgment that Droysen had been right, both 
in his strategy and in his earlier optimism. It was. also a compliment paid 
to Droysen's recent work, completed and in process, which was plainly 
central in the literature to which Duncker pointed. Duncker now saw 
Droysen's postrevolutionary histories as the logical outcome of the saving 
movement toward empiricism to which he had pointed even before the 
revolution. Droysen understood this to be a letter of agreement, and 
wished that it were possible for the two to meet. In his letter of reply he 
scored two major points. First, for the present any political efforts that 
went beyond literary politics were "in part in vain, in part dubious," and, 
second, such·efforts could and should affect Prussian policy: "Without the 
German orientation Prussia ... is not to be saved."85 Those two points are 
a good, compact statement of what had become, and thereafter remained, 
the attitude of the Prussian School. 
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Suggested Readings 
The following is a selective list of secondary literature for further exploration of 
major topics in the preceding discussion. It is not intended to be a complete bibli-
ography. I have tried to suggest titles that are gateways to further study of partic-
ular topics. Most of these works provide bibliography for study in depth. Many of 
these titles do not appear in my citations, because I used those to acknowledge spe-
cific debts. Conversely, I have not listed here all secondary literature cited above. 
Primary texts appear below only-when they also serve as secondary texts. 
Historians of the Prussian School 
Interesting, insightful, and synthetic, but limited to 1848 and its preparation, is 
Wolfgang Hock, Liberales Denken im Zeitalter der Paulskirche (Miinster, 1957). 
Those who are interested in Droysen's mature historical theory, the eventual 
product of the development traced above, should go directly to his Historik. Vor-
lesungen ilber Enzyklopiidie und Methodologie der Geschichte, ed. R. Hubner, 5th ed. 
(Darmstadt, 1967). These are the lectures he gave at Berlin until the 1880s and con-
tinuously revised; hence, they show where he came out, not where he entered, as 
a theorist. The Grundrif3 portion has been published in English as Outlines of the 
Principles of History (Boston, 1893). His son, Gustav Droysen-himself a historian 
of some note-wrote the first half of a good biography of his father, Johann Gustav 
Droysen. Bis zu Beginn der Frankfurter Tiitigkeit (Leipzig and Berlin, 1910). Droy-
sen's career as a whole is described, in necessary brevity, in his student Otto 
Hintze's biographic essay "Johann Gustav Dr()ysen" in Soziologie und Geschichte. 
Gesammelte Abhandlungen zur Soziologie, Politik und Theorie der Geschichte, ed. Ger-
hard Oestreich (G6ttingen, 1964). Reading the entirety of the massive Droysen 
Briefwechsel (2 vols., ed. Rudolf Hubner [Berlin, 1929]) provides the equivalent of 
biography. 
The best work on Droysen's political theory, though I think it suffers from its 
ahistorical organization, is Giinther Birtsch, Die Nation als sittliche Begriff. Der Na-
tionalstaatsbegriff in Geschichtsschreibung und politischer Gedankenwelt Johann Gustav 
Droysens (Cologne and Graz, 1964). Still commanding, fifty years later, as an ex-
planation of Droysen's Prussian politics is Felix Gilbert's Johann Gustav Droysen und 
die preujJsisch-deutsche Frage (Berlin, 1933). Part of it has been translated and 
reprinted in Gilbert, History: Choice and Commitment (Cambridge, Mass., 1977), 
17-38. Gilbert is famous in this country for his work in Renaissance and diplomatic 
history. Before he emigrated from Nazi Germany, he worked on Droysen-friend 
and tutor of his ancestor Felix Mendelssohn. 
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The politics of Schleswig-Holstein are terribly complicated. Anni Meetz tried 
to explain what Droysen was doing there in Johann Gustav Droysens politische 
Tiitigkeit in der Schleswig-Holsteinischen Frage (Erlangen, 1931). It would be well to 
supplement Meetz with W. Carr, Schleswig-Holstein 1815-1848. A Study in National 
Conflict (Manchester, 1963). Carr, who became interested in the duchies while in 
military service there at the end of the war, continually mentions Droysen. Because 
Carr writes as one who at first understood nothing, he is wonderfully clear in his 
explanations. See also R. S. Elkar, Junges Deutschland in polemischen Zeitalter: Das 
schleswig-holsteinische Bildungsburgertum in der ersten hiilfte des 19. Jahrhunderts (Diis-
seldorf, 1979). 
Droysen's historical theory is ably discussed in terms of its continued rele-
vance in J6rn Riisen, Begriffene Geschichte. Genesis und Begrundung der Geschichts-
theorie J. G. Droysens (Paderborn, 1969). Riisen also discusses Droysen's political 
thought in "Politisches Denken und Geschichtswissenschaft bei J. G. Droysen" in 
Politische Ideologie und nationalstaatliche Ordnung. Studien zur Geschichte des 19. 
Jahrhunderts. Festschrift for Theodor Schieder, ed. K. Kluxen and W. Mommsen (Mu-
nich and Berlin, 1968). I discuss Droysen's theological views in "Theology in 
Droysen's Political Historiography: Free Will, Necessity, and the Historian" in 
History and Theory 3 (1979): 378-96. On Droysen's puzzling silence about Judaism 
as a source for Christianity, see Arnaldo Momigliano, "J.G. Droysen between 
Greeks and Jews," in Essays in Ancient and Modern Historiography (Middletown, 
Conn., 1977), 307-25. Momigliano explains that Droysen's wife (like Max 
Duncker's) was a sincere convert to Christianity who remained interested in Ju-
daism. Droysen's background in philology is discussed in detail in Benedetto 
Bravo, Philosophie, histoire, philosophie de l'histoire. Etude sur J. G. Droysen historien 
de l'antiquiU (Wroclaw, 1968). These works, of course, will refer the reader to yet 
more literature on Droysen. 
His colleagues, unfortunately, are less written about. For Duncker there is 
Haym's engaging but, of course, uncritical Das Leben Max Duncker (Berlin, 1891). 
There is also an article in Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie, 1817-44 (Frankfurt, 
1959). These should be supplemented with the letters and notes in Duncker, Poli-
tischer Briefwechsel aus seinem Nachlaj3, ed. Johannes Schulze (Leipzig, 1923). It is at 
least amusing to see a devoted, fictional portrait of Duncker as a kid in the family 
novel by Dora Duncker, Das Haus Duncker. Ein Buchhiindlerroman aus der Bieder-
meierzeit (Berlin, 1918). Haym told his own story, and told it well, in Aus meinem 
Leben. Erinnerungen aus der Nachlaj3 herausgegeben (Berlin, 1902). As in his account 
of Duncker's life, however, Haym treats the events of his life through the crisis of 
1848 and 1849 as the conquest of naivete by hard-won wisdom. There is also Hans 
Rosenberg's excellent Habilitationschrift, which he wrote in tandem with editing 
Haym's letters for publication and just before his departure from Nazi Germany, 
Rudolf Haym und die Anfiinge des klassischen Liberalismus (Munich, 1933). Both 
Haym's and Duncker's work for the Preuj3ische Jahrbucher are discussed in the old 
but still important group portrait by Otto Westphal, Welt und Staatsauffassung des 
deutschen Liberalismus. Eine Untersuchung uber die Preuj3ischen Jahrbucher und den 
konstitutionellen Liberalismus in Deutschland von 1858 bis 1863 (Munich, 1919). 
Sybel's political philosophy is impressively and cogently analyzed by Hellmut 
Seier, Die Staatsidee Heinrich von Sybels in den Wandlungen der Reichsgrilndungszeit 
(Liibeck, 1961), an early and admirable example of German's postwar examina-
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tions of political presuppositions. For a hostile Marxist view, see Hans Schleier, 
Sybel und Treitschke. Antidemo kratismus und Militarismus im historischen-politischen 
Denken groflbourgeoiser Geschichtsideologen (Berlin, 1965). Schleier's title succinctly 
restates his argument. Heinrich von Treitschke, whose historical career began af-
ter the period covered above, is analyzed from a very different perspective in 
Walter Bussmann, Treitschke: Sein Welt und Geschichtsbild (G6ttingen, 1962). See, 
too, Andreas Dorpalen's biography Heinrich von Treitschke (New Haven, 1957). 
The one account of the largely like-minded but independent Ludwig Hiusser is 
Annaliese Kaltenbach, Orientation et definition du patriotisme allemand chez un his to-
rien de l'Allemagne du Sud: Le Palatin-Badois Ludwig Haeusser, 1818-1867 (Paris, 
1965). 
Historians in Nineteenth-century Germany 
The more fully to place in context the historians of the Prussian School, it is neces-
sary to read about major historians and historical thinkers (not always one and the 
same) who worked just before and during their careers. The best history of Ger-
man historical writing in any language is Georg Iggers, The German Conception of 
History (Middletown, Conn., 1968). Iggers provides a cogent analytic narration of 
German historical ideas and provides his own very useful annotated bibliography. 
Also in English, well written, but inevitably dated, is G.P. Gooch's History and His-
torians in the nineteenth Century (London, 1914). Critical, Marxist analyses of Ger-
man historians are available from the East German Joachim Streisand, ed., Studien 
uber die deutschen Geschichtswissenschaft, 2 vols. (Berlin, 1963-65). Also useful is 
Heinrich Ritter von Srbik's misleadingly titled Geist und Geschichte des deutschen 
Humanismus bis zur Gegenwart, 2 vols. (Munich, 1950-51). Srbik sympathizes with 
the older, idealistic histOriographic assumptions, though as an Austrian pan-
German he did not approve of the politics of the Prussian School. His tone is curi-
ously noncommittal, perhaps prudently, because he wrote while suspended from 
teaching on account of his earlier enthusiastic support of Hitler. Not in the least 
noncommittal is Georg von Below, Die deutsche Geschichtsschreibung von den Be-
freiungskriegen bis zu unseren Tagen (Berlin, 1916). An intellectual heir of the Prus-
sian School, writing in the superheated patriotism of the First World War, he 
described these historians as they might have wished to be described. Somewhat 
similar in outlook is Eduard Fueter's very brief Geschichte der neueren Historiogra-
phie, 3d ed. (Munich, 1936). 
The Prussian School's optimistic belief in historical purpose prevented its ad-
herents from being historicists, but they shared many historicist assumptions. In-
dispensable for serious study, therefore, is Friedrich Meinecke's adoring but 
magisterial Entstehung des Historismus, available in a nicely readable English 
translation as Historicism: The Rise of a New Historical Outlook (London, 1972). Mei-
necke's Weltburgerthum and Nationalstaat, also avaliable in English as Cosmopoli-
tanism and the National State (Princeton, 1970), is also very useful for 
understanding the presuppositions of these historians. Also good on the subject 
of historicism is Carlo Antoni, Lo Storicismo (Rome, 1957), available in French as 
L'historisme (Geneva, 1963). Historicism is a slippery term. Helpful for definition is 
Dwight Lee and Robert Beck, "The Meaning of Historicism," in American Histori-
cal Review 59 (1953-54): 568-77. In searching for presuppositions, it is also reveal-
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ing to study historians compositely in terms of their views on other nations. 
Heinz-Otto Sieburg, Deutschland und Frankreich in der Geschichtsschreibung des 19. 
Jahrhundert, 2 vols. (Wiesbaden, 1954-58) ably tells how Germans pictured the 
French and vice versa. Very useful, especially with respect to German misinter-
pretation of English constitutional history, is Charles McClelland, The German His-
torians and England: A Study in Nineteenth-Century Views (Cambridge, 1971). The 
much older work by Antoine Guilland, L'Allemagne nouvelle et ses historiens. 
Niebuhr-Ranke-Mommsen-Sybel (Paris, 1899), translated as Modern Germany 
and her Historians (London, 1915), gives a sense of how this looked from across the 
border. Michael Niemillier's Liberalismus und Revolution. Das Problem der Revolu-
tion in der deutschen liberalen Geschichtsschreibung des 19. Jahrhunderts (DUsseldorf, 
1972) establishes convincingly the dominant Protestantism in these historians' 
outlook, and the instability of their idea of revolution. See also Andrew Lees, Rev-
olution and Reflection. Intellectual Change in Germany during the 1850's (The Hague, 
1974). Lees categorizes change and included many historians in his sample: 
The historians of the Prussian School need to be contrasted with other practi-
tioners with whom they did not agree. They differed from Ranke, with whom 
Duncker and Sybel studied, chiefly because he did not believe in progress; rather; 
every age was "immediate to God./I See especially Carl Hinrichs, Ranke und die 
Geschichtstheologie der Goethezeit (Gottingen, 1954); Theodor~ von Laue, Leopold von 
Ranke. The Formative Years (Princeton, 1950); and Wilhelm Mommse'n, Stein, Ranke, 
Bismarck (Munich, 1954). Mommsen is especially interesting because of his effort 
to recover a lost political-historical vocabulary. Hegel also belongs on this list, as a 
historical thinker, though not as a historian. Excellent for seeing what in Hegel at-
tracted them is the Israeli scholar Shlomo Avineri's Hegel's Theory of the Modern 
State (Cambridge, 1972). Also useful is the older study by Hermann Heller, Hegel 
und die nationale Staatsgedanke (Leipzig and Berlin, 1921). Of course, what Hegel 
actually meant is less important than what his followers thought he meant. See 
Karl Lowith, From Hegel to Nietzsche: The Revolution in Nineteenth Century Thought 
(New York, 1964) and Herbert Marcuse, Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of 
Social Theory (New York, 1963). More recently, John Edward Toews does a first-
rate job of tracing the history of hegelianism in Hegelianism: The Path toward Dialec-
tical Humanism 1805-1841 (Cambridge, 1980). Also see William J, Brazill, The 
Young Hegelians (New Haven, 1970). It is easy to study Droysen's teacher August 
Boeckh in On Interpretation and Criticism, ed. and trans. John Paul Pritchard 
(Norman, Okla., 1968). Their contemporary Theodor Mommsen, sometimes an 
ally and sometimes a critic, is ~bly discussed in Albert Wucher's suggestive 
Theodor Mommsen. Geschichtsschreibung und Politik (Gottingen, 1956). Wucher 
asks very important questions, and his notion of historical research as vicarious 
politics applies to these men at many points in their careers. Mommsen's life 
is exhaustively retold in Lothar Wickert's monumental Theodor Mommsen. Eine Bi-
ographie, 4 vols. (Frankfort, 1959-80). Both Droysen and Sybel personally were 
close to the older, more Whiggish Friedrich Christoph Dahlmann, discussed in 
Friedrich Heimpel, Zwei Historiker. Friedrich Christoph Dahlmann. Jacob Burckhardt 
(Gottingen, 1962). For a complete biography, see Anton Springer, F. C. Dahlmann, 
2 vols. (Leipzig, 1870-71). See also Dahlmann's Die Politik auf den Grund und 
das Mass der gegeben Zustiinde zuruckgefiihrt, ed. and intro. by Otto Westphal 
(Berlin, 1924). 
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History and Providence 
For the purposes of this study, the following specimens of a very extensive litera-
ture are especially germane. Robert Nisbet,in the course of a sociological polemic, 
provides a vital distinction between development and progress in Social Chimge and 
History: Aspects of the Western Theory of Development (Oxford, 1969). A compact, rea-
soned overview of the history of providential history is Karl L6with, Meaning in 
History (Chicago, 1949). J.G.A. Pocock provides a compelling history of the Au-
gustinian basis of much prudential political thinking in his erudite Machiavellian 
Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton, 
1975). For some insights on philosophical historians' tastes, see Frank E. Manuel's 
"Leaps into Free Consciousness: Resonances from the German Academy," in 
Shapes 'of Philosophical History (Stanford, 1965). For an overwhelmingly sympathetic 
account of the consolations of Augustinian providentialism, read Charles Norris 
Cochrane, Christianity and Classical Culture (Oxford, 1940). For a more recent study, 
see R.A. Markus, Saeculum: History and Society in the Theology of St. Augustine (Cam-
bridge, 1970). 
German Academic Life 
The historians of the Prussian School worked in a social as well as an intellectual 
context. Without pointing to the large and growing literature on the social history 
of nineteenth-century Germany, I want to recommend some important works in 
German academic history. Works that, in very different ways, deal critically with 
German universities in the Imperial Germany are Helmut Schelsky, Einsamkeit und 
Freiheit: Idee und Gestalt der deutschen Universitat und ihrer Reform (Reinbek, 1963); 
Fritz Ringer, The Decline of the German Mandarins. The German Academic Community, 
1890-1933 (Cambridge, 1969); and Konrad H. Jarausch, Students, Society and Poli-
tics in Imperial Germany. The Rise of Academic Illiberalism (Princeton, 1982). For an ex-
planation of the structure of German universities, the older work by Friedrich 
Paulsen, Die deutschen Universitiiten und das Universitiitsstudium, 2d.ed. (Hildesheim, 
1966) is very valuable. These historians were part of the "university reform" of the 
nineteenth century, nicely discussed by R. Steven Turner in "University Reform-
ers and Professorial Research in Germany, 1760 to 1806" in The University in Soci-
ety, ed. Lawrence Stone, (Princeton, 1974), 2:495-531. Suggestive in ways that 
include but go far beyond the academy is Hajo Holborn, "German Idealism in the 
Light of Social History," reprinted in Holborn, Germany and Europe: Historical Es-
says (New York, 1971), and, relatedly, Leonore O'Boyl~, "Klassische Bildung und 
soziale Struktur in Deutschland zwischen 1800 und 1848," in Historische Zeitschrift 
207 (1968): 584ff. Useful for watching the political effects of scholarly exchanges is 
R. Hinton Thomas, Liberalism, Nationalism, and the German Intellectual, 1822-1847: 
An Analysis of the Academic and Scientific Conferences of the Period (Cambridge, 1951). 
German Liberalism 
As I have tried to indicate in the text, the term liberalism-a nineteenth-century ne-
ologism always hard to define precisely-is problematic but necessary to describe 
Droysen and his colleagues. Their theology made them more radical and their 
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Prussianism and monarchism more conservative than their French and English 
counterparts. Nor did they speak for all German liberals, despite their eventual 
prestige and influence. In the aftermath of Hitler, the standard approach to Ger-
man liberalism, understandably, was to seek the reasons for its failure. This litera-
ture is part ofthe Sonderweg argument (see below). The title of Friedrich Sell's book, 
Die Tragodie des deutschen Liberalismus (Stuttgart, 1953) is a case in point. Sell is right 
about tragedy, but I question the degree to which 1848 spoiled German liberalism. 
Its prerevolutionary character was also illiberal. The most impressive example of 
that thesis, and one whose viewpoint I share, is Leonard Krieger's German Idea of 
Freedom (Boston, 1957), which argues that Germans imagined individual mental 
freedom and collective freedom, but not freedom as pluralism. This argument is a 
. distant descendant of Ernst Troeltsch's essay, written in the early Weimar Repub-
lic, "The Ideas of Natural Law and Humanity in World Politics," in Natural Law and 
the Theory of Society 1500 to 1800, ed. Otto Gierke (Boston, 1957), 201-22. Troeltsch 
claimed that Germany lost its natural law tradition after the eighteenth century. 
The more economic emphasis of the Rhenish liberals, such as Haym's patron David 
Hansemann, is well covered in Jacques Droz, Le Liberalisme rhenan 1815-1848 
(Paris, 1940). Liberal interest in economic practicalities thoroughly and cogently 
discussed in Theodore Hamerow, The Social Foundations of German Unification 
1858-71,2 vols. (Princeton, 1969-72). James J. Sheehan, German Liberalism in the 
Nineteenth Century (Chicago, 1978) is comprehensive, clearly written, and up-to-
date. See also the provocative essays in Konrad H. Jarausch and Larry Eugene 
Jones, eds., In Search of a Liberal Germany: Studies in the History of German Liberlism 
from 1789 to the Present (New York, 1990). The history of German ideas on repre-
sentative government is exhaustively but lucidly treated in Heinrich Heffter, Die 
deutsche Selbstverwaltung im 19 Jahrhundert: Geschichte der Ideen und Institutionen 
(Stuttgart, 1950). 
Vormarz and 1848 
Contemporary accounts of very great interest are: Karl Biedermann, Erinnerungen 
aus der Paulskirche (Leipzig, 1849); Johann Gustav Droysen, Die Verhandlungen des 
Verfassungsausschusses der deutschen Nationalversammlung. Erster Theil (Leipzig, 
1849); Max Duncker, Zur Geschichte der deutschen Reichsversammlung in Frankfurt 
(Berlin, 1849); Rudolf Haym, Die deutsche Nationversammlung. Ein Bericht aus der 
Partei des rechten Centrum, 3 vols. (Frankfort, 1848-50); and Heinrich Laube, Das er-
ste deutsche Parlament (Leipzig, 1849). 
The standard German account is the liberal Veit Valentin's Geschichte der 
deutschen Revolution von 1848-49, 2 vols. (Berlin, 1931). Even better is Jacque Droz, 
Les Revolutions allemandes de 1848 (Paris, 1957). Specifically on the situation in Frank-
fort is the fine narration by Frank Eyck, The Frankfort Parliament, 1848-1849 (New 
York, 1968). An exciting critical perspective, also useful for the history of liberalism, 
is Wilhelm Mommsen, Grosse und Versagen des deutschen Burgerthums (Stuttgart, 
1949). Two further works to consult to put the revolution in social perspective are 
Rudolf Stadelmann, Soziale und politische Geschichte der Revolution von 1848 (Munich, 
1956), which is brief yet comprehensive, and Theodore Hamerow, Restoration, Rev-
olution, and Reaction. Economics and Politics in Germany, 1815-1871 (Princeton, 1958). 
Hamerow's chapters on the revolution go far to explain why it failed. 
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The Question of a German Sonderweg 
That German political and historical thought was nationally distinctive is really 
beyond cavil, as some of the texts mentioned above under "Liberalism" nicely il-
lustrate. That claim is conceptually distinct from the question of whether, socially 
and politically, Germany took a distinctive path into modernity. (The two ques-
tions become one, however, either if one presumes the social determination of all 
ideas or one assumes that true social· history should ignore individual thinkers.) 
Two German exceptionalist accounts I have found useful for thinking about the 
Prussian School are Hellmut Plessner, Die verspiitete Nation (Stuttgart, 1959) and 
Ralf Dahrendorf, Society and Democracy in Germany (New York, 1967). Plessner ar-
gues that Germany modernized very fast, very late. Dahrendorf provocatively 
and cogently explains the German problem in terms of social causes for a "consti-
tution of authority" rather than a "constitution of freedom." Anyone interested in 
this sort of argument must read Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship 
and Democracy (London, 1967). Though Marxists such as Eckhart Kehr in Schlacht-
flottenbau und Parteipolitik 1894-1901 (Berlin, 1930) also argued about a special 
path, this notion has been usefully challenged from a Marxist perspective in 
David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley, The Peculiarities of German History. Bourgeois So-
ciety and Politics in Nineteenth Century Germany (Oxford, 1984). For a good, critical 
overview of the problem, see Richard J. Evans, "The Myth of Germany's Missing 
Revolution," in his Rethinking German History. Nineteenth-Century Germany and the 
Origins of the Third Reich (London, 1987), 93-122. 
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